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Kim Davies The Transcendental Foundation of Ethics. 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents a transcendental argument to establish the 
existence of objectively necessary and categorical moral principles. 
The strategy followed might be called Analytic-Hegelian. I t traces the 
necessary conditions of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concepts at the heart of 
our philosophical endeavours, thereby reversing the l i n e of development 
of the primary formation of concepts; and culminates i n a self-recognition 
of the subject as a being for whom certain moral principles objectively 
and categorically hold. 
Chapter One shows that refutations of radical empiricism which take the 
concept of experience for granted, f a i l . Chapter Two examines the concept 
of experience required for empiricism to be possible. Chapter Three, 
investigating the necessary conditions of the p o s s i b i l i t y of this concept 
(rather than of experience i t s e l f ) , shows that empiricist scepticism i s 
possible only i f there exists an objective r e a l i t y populated by items 
independent of experience. Empiricist scepticism i s incoherent. 
Chapter Four deals with beginning philosophy. Some possible s t a r t i n g -
points are considered, before discussing the concept of thought required 
for c r i t i c a l philosophy to be possible. The necessary conditions of the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of t h i s concept include the existence of the external world, 
and (Chapter Five) of thinking, speaking subjects. The relationship 
between thought and language i s elucidated. Chapter Six shows that the 
grasp of the thinking subject requires the subject to be engaged i n 
communication, and to be a subject for whom communication i s a value. 
Chapter Seven shows that the principle of maintaining communication i s 
necessarily presupposed as an objectively necessary and categorical moral 
pri n c i p l e by anyone who questions i t . I t i s thus unchallengeable. I t 
serves, furthermore, as the foundation for a substantive n o n - r e l a t i v i s t i c 
ethics, with universal application. The transcendental foundation of 
ethics has been established. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
ATTEMPTED REFUTATIONS OF RADICAL EMPIRICISM 
Introduction 
This chapter serves as a prologue to the main argument. 
I t considers arguments which claim to show that empiricism 
i s incoherent. Empiricism i s understood here primarily i n 
i t s c r i t i c a l function, interrogating claims to knowledge on 
the basis of a recognition that how things are experienced 
as being need not happily coincide with how they r e a l l y are. 
The sceptical challenges that empiricism lays down are wel l -
known; when taken to t h e i r l i m i t , they seem to leave the 
radical empiricist with the claim that perhaps a l l there i s , 
i s experience (even experience of the present moment), and 
nothing else. I t i s the composite of this claim and i t s 
attendant scepticism that I refer to by the term 'radical 
empiricism'. Each of the arguments discussed aims to show 
that t h i s claim i s i n some sense incoherent, and the sceptical 
cutting edge of empiricism thereby limited i n i t s application. 
I take up these arguments for two reasons. F i r s t ; I 
hope to show that the arguments, which to some extent represent 
three major anti-empiricist trends i n modern English-language 
philosophy, with sources i n Kant's Transcendental Deduction, 
Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument, and the theory of 
meaning expounded by Davidson and others, nevertheless f a i l to 
address themselves to the heart of radical empiricism. Second 
i n discussing and c r i t i c i s i n g the three kinds of argument, 
I hope to distance them from my own argument i n Part One, 
which i s also to the effect that radical empiricism i s 
incoherent. I would not think t h i s argument worth the 
trouble, i f i t did not lead on to further, more sig n i f i c a n t , 
conclusions. 
Empiricism and the Bounds of Sense 
I n t h i s book Professor Strawson seeks to renew the 
Kantian enterprise, stripping o f f the speculative aberrations 
of Transcendental Idealism to reveal that hard core of argument 
which constitutes i t s analytic essence. Part of what remains 
i s held to amount to a r e f u t a t i o n of that radical empiricism 
which holds that i t i s possible that a l l there i s , i s experience, 
and that the existence of an independent world populated by 
material objects i s open to doubt. Though f i f t e e n years old 
and widely discussed, The Bounds of Sense remains a locus classicus 
f o r the modern Kantian movement against empiricist scepticism. 
I t i s important therefore to i d e n t i f y and examine any central 
presuppositions which have so far escaped sustained attention, 
and i n considering Strawson's account of Kant's Transcendental 
Deduction, I wish to show that he does not oppose, but rather 
presupposes the basis of radical empiricism, and hence i s incapable 
of escaping i t s l i m i t s or i t s attendant scepticism. 
For Strawson, the Transcendental Deduction results i n us 
favourably entertaining the conclusion that, as a necessary 
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condition of the p o s s i b i l i t y of experience, experience 
i t s e l f "must have such i n t e r n a l , concept-carried connectedness 
as to constitute i t (at least i n part) a course of experience 
of an objective world", (p.117) This i s "the thesis of 
o b j e c t i v i t y " . (p24) Let us f i r s t notice an ambiguity i n 
the phrase "experience of an objective world", since Strawson 
never e x p l i c i t l y concerns himself with i t . The "of 1 1 here 
could be merely i n t e n t i o n a l , i n the Scholastic and Husserlian 
sense, indicating that i t must, at least, seem i n experience 
that there are independent objects i n an objective world, 
whether or not such objects, or such a world, exist. Thus 
even i f we suspend judgment as to t h e i r actual existence, 
experience i s s t i l l of objects i n an objective world i n th i s 
i n t e n t i o n a l sense. Alt e r n a t i v e l y , the "of" could indicate 
a full-blown, successful cognitive r e l a t i o n between the 
experiencing subject and the actually existing objective world 
i t experiences, as i s presupposed by our ordinary t a l k of seeing 
and otherwise perceiving things. 
On f i r s t reading i t seems as though Strawson i s addressing 
the o b j e c t i v i t y thesis under the f i r s t interpretation, as concerned 
merely with the internal structure of experience. For consider 
t h i s elucidation of the conclusion: 
The minimum implied (by the dual character of 
experience as requiring both particular ' i n t u i t i o n s ' 
and general concepts for t h e i r 'recognition') i s 
that some at least of the concepts under which 
particular items are recognised as f a l l i n g should 
be such that the experiences themselves contain the 
basis for certain a l l i e d d i s t i n c t i o n s : i n d i v i d u a l l y , 
the d i s t i n c t i o n of a subjective component within a 
judgement of experience ... c o l l e c t i v e l y , the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the subjective order and 
arrangement of a series of such experiences on the 
one hand and the objective order and arrangement of 
the items of which they are experiences on the other. 
(p.101) 
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The argument here seems to be aimed at establishing 
that experience must have a certain internal character: 
the subjective/objective d i s t i n c t i o n must be made within 
experience, by using concepts, i n which the d i s t i n c t i o n i s 
i m p l i c i t , to recognise the particular items of experience 
(the i n t e r n a l 'accusatives' p.98) as being of such and such 
a kind. I n Husserl's terms, experience must be (at least i n 
part) i n t e n t i o n a l l y of an objective world. This reading i s 
reinforced by the way Strawson takes as his main opponent the 
sense-datum th e o r i s t , descendant of the classical empiricists, 
who supposes that there could be experience articulated e n t i r e l y 
i n terms of concepts of items such that 'there was no d i s t i n c t i o n 
to be drawn between the order and arrangement of the objects (and 
of t h e i r particular features and characteristics) and the order 
and arrangement of the subject's experiences of awareness of them'. 
(p»99) I t i s t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y which the Transcendental Deduction 
i s to rule out. 
I f t h i s interpretation i s correct, then a b r i e f comparison 
with the self-styled radical empiricist Husserl w i l l show that, 
while damaging to classical empiricism, Strawson's account 
leaves the radical empiricist essentially u n s c a t h e d . H u s s e r l , 
drawing on the Cartesian foundation of r e f l e c t i o n on the cogitatio, 
the pure experience, as that alone which i s apodictically given, 
distinguishes between experiences which are, i n t e n t i o n a l l y , of 
objects l i k e cats which exist independently of the experience 
i t s e l f , and experiences which are, i n t e n t i o n a l l y , of objects 
l i k e after-images or t i c k l i n g sensations which do not exist 
independently of the experience i t s e l f . J' For Husserl, t h i s 
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d i s t i n c t i o n can be made wit h i n experience, under suspension 
of judgement as to whether an objective world actually exists. 
What Strawson, following Kant, has shown i s that this d i s t i n c t i o n 
must be made within experience, i f there i s to be any experience 
at a l l , and that t h i s i s effected through the employment, within 
experience, of concepts of the objective. This seems to leave 
open the question of the actual existence of anything independent 
of experience, and, of course, Kant himself in s i s t s that a l l he 
can r i g h t l y claim i s that experience must have a certain internal 
conceptual structure, and that nothing can be said of whatever 
i s beyond the realm of experience. But Strawson seems not to 
accept t h i s : 
The analytical argument to conclusions 
about the necessary structure of 
experience must be evaluated on i t s own 
merits. I f we accept the conclusion 
that experience necessarily involves 
awareness of objects conceived of as 
existing i n time independently of any 
particular states of awareness of them, 
then we must accept i t without reservation. 
We have no extraneous standard or scheme 
i n terms of which we can give an esoteric 
sense to the question whether such objects 
r e a l l y e x i s t , as we must empirically 
conceive of them as existing, independently 
of our perceptions, 
(p.26l-2) 
Here Strawson sterns to rejec t the radical empiricist notion 
that i t i s possible that only experience actually exists. For 
we can give sense to the question of whether purportedly independent 
objects actually exist, only within our conceptual scheme, and the 
answer i t receives is a commonplace affirmative. I t now appears 
that the phrase "experience of the objective world" i s to be 
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understood as i n d i c a t i n g the actual existence of such a 
world, w i t h which some c o g n i t i v e consummation i s e f f e c t e d . 
But consider t h i s f u r t h e r . The context of Strawson's 
i n j u n c t i o n i s a discussion of Transcendental Idealism i n 
which he dismisses both Kant's transcendental con t r a s t 
between t h i n g s as they appear and things as they are i n 
themselves, and the accompanying metaphysics of the a f f e c t i o n 
o f our f a c u l t i e s by things-in-themselves which generates our 
rep r e s e n t a t i o n s . As e a r l i e r c r i t i c s remarked, t h i s theory 
i n v o l v e s an extension of the a p p l i c a t i o n of the categories 
beyond the realm of experience, an extension r u l e d out as 
incoherent by Kant's own ' p r i n c i p l e of s i g n i f i c a n c e ' ( c f . p . l 6 ) . 
We do n o t , and cannot, have any scheme i n which we could speak 
of how things r e a l l y are i n the sense of Kant's Transcendental 
I d e a l i s m . I t i s from t h i s c r i t i q u e t h a t Strawson's claim t h a t 
we can r e l y only on the conceptual scheme we do, and must, employ 
i n experience, gains i t s s t r e n g t h . However, things are not so 
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . Strawson refuses to go beyond the conceptual 
scheme which s t r u c t u r e s experience; questions of existence only 
make sense, and can only be s e t t l e d , w i t h i n t h a t scheme. But 
t h i s r e f u s a l , and i t s supporting theory, themselves presuppose 
the v a l i d i t y of another sense of existence: t h a t i n which experience 
i t s e l f i s held t o e x i s t . 
For the v a l i d i t y of t h i s p r i o r sense of existence, i n which 
experience i s said t o e x i s t , must be presupposed before the 
Transcendental Deduction t o the v a l i d i t y of the employment 
w i t h i n experience of concepts of the obj e c t i v e can even begin. 
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The sense of the claim t h a t there i s experience cannot, 
then, i t s e l f presuppose the v a l i d i t y of t h a t conceptual scheme. 
Indeed, w i t h i n t h a t scheme, i t i s a mere 'commonplace' t h a t 
there i s experience, on the p a r t of b o d i l y people engaged w i t h 
the world and each other, but c l e a r l y n e i t h e r Kant nor Strawson 
wishes t o begin h i s deductions from such a p o i n t . The question 
as t o what t h i s p r i o r sense of existence amounts t o , indeed the 
whole issue of the presupposition of the v a l i d i t y of such a sense, 
i s nowhere e x p l i c i t l y considered by Strawson; from the opening 
page he t a l k s of experience i n a way which assumes i t s existence 
to be e n t i r e l y unproblematical. Seeking f u r t h e r e l u c i d a t i o n we 
must t u r n t o Kant himself, whose problems, and hence the 
presuppositions of whose problems, Strawson takes up. And i n 
Kant, and even more i n Husserl, i t i s clear t h a t the sense i n 
which experience e x i s t s i s a d e r i v e d from Descartes. Experience 
i s t h a t which i s immediately present, here and now, given w i t h 
absolute c e r t a i n t y . So w h i l s t r e j e c t i n g Kant's double-aspect 
theory of objects - as they appear, and as they are i n themselves 
we can recognise the existence of a standard according to which 
we can ask whether the o b j e c t i v e world r e a l l y exists: t h a t of 
immediate presence, which i s accorded to experience i t s e l f . 
Nor i s t h i s standard merely "extraneous"; i t i s c e n t r a l t o the 
K a n t i a n , and so the Strawsonian, p r o j e c t . This emerges i n 
Strawson's r e f o r m u l a t i o n of the argument f o r the o b j e c t i v i t y -
t h e s i s , which considers the "necessary s e l f - r e f l e x i v e n e s s " of 
experience as the " e s s e n t i a l core of personal consciousness". 
(p.107): 
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For the necessity of saving the r e c o g n i t i o n a l 
component i n an experience from absorption 
i n t o i t s sensible accusative (and thereby 
saving the status of the experience as 
experience £sc. as having the dual character 
mentioned e a r l i e r ] ) i s simply i d e n t i c a l w i t h 
the necessity of p r o v i d i n g room, i n experience, 
f o r the thought of experience i t s e l f ; and i t 
i s j u s t t h i s necessity which c a l l s d i r e c t l y f o r 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between how things are and how 
they are experienced as being and hence f o r the 
employment, i n judgements of experience (though 
not i n every such judgement) of concepts of the 
o b j e c t i v e . 
(p.110-1) 
I n t h i s important r e - c a s t i n g of the c e n t r a l argument 
Strawson allows himself t o speak both of the concept (or 
"thought") of experience, and of experience i t s e l f , while 
w i t h regard t o the o b j e c t i v e world we are t o be s a t i s f i e d 
w i t h concepts only. This asymmetry, which r e s t s on the 
unacknowledged and unquestioned sense of existence i n which 
experience i s assumed t o e x i s t , i s surely the mark of the problem 
which the sceptic seizes on as the question of the ac t u a l existence 
of the o b j e c t i v e world. For the sceptic demands the same high 
standard of immediate presence, and the accompanying ap o d i c t i c 
c e r t a i n t y , accorded t o experience. This i s the fundamental sense 
of existence here, underlying both the o b j e c t i v i t y - t h e s i s and the 
p r i n c i p l e of s i g n i f i c a n c e , and the r e s t r i c t i o n to the conceptual 
scheme ne c e s s a r i l y employed w i t h i n experience, grants only a 
second-rate Ersatz t o the o b j e c t i v e world. I n Kant himself, 
while r e j e c t i n g the mechanics of h i s Transcendental Idealism, 
we can see an attempt a t dealing w i t h a problem which Strawson 
f a i l s t o recognise. 
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I t i s possible t h a t Strawson might baulk a t being t o l d 
t h a t he presupposes the existence of experience i n the Cartesian 
sense, and r e j e c t the n o t i o n of experience as immediately given, 
though t h i s would make less c l e a r the i n t e r e s t which the concept 
of experience, indeed the whole Kantian epistemological p r o j e c t , 
has f o r him. Nor, given h i s f a i l u r e t o consider adequately 
Kant's Cartesian presuppositions, would t h i s be a p a r t i c u l a r l y 
g r a c e f u l gesture. The c e n t r a l p o i n t , however, remains. 
There i s a primary sense, however elu c i d a t e d , of existence i n 
which experience i s taken t o e x i s t , and n e i t h e r Kant nor Strawson 
have shown t h a t the o b j e c t i v e world e x i s t s i n the same sense. 
Accounts w i t h the sceptic remain to be s e t t l e d . 
We can conclude from t h i s t h a t the v i c t i m of Strawson 1s 
account of the Transcendental Deduction i s c l a s s i c a l empiricism 
and i t s descendants, e s p e c i a l l y sense-datum t h e o r i e s . This may 
indeed leave us w i t h p a r t of "the framework of a t r u l y e m p i r i c i s t 
philosophy" (p.19), but we must recognise i t s l i m i t a t i o n s , i n 
p a r t i c u l a r i t s f a i l u r e t o deal w i t h r a d i c a l empiricism. For 
both r a d i c a l empiricism and Strawson's Kantian r e f u t a t i o n 
presuppose a sense of existence, i n which experience i s assumed 
t o e x i s t . The overcoming of e m p i r i c i s t scepticism requires more 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n than i s manifest i n The Bounds of 
Sense. I n p a r t i c u l a r i t requires us t o address such unacknowledged 
presuppositions. To unearth another of these, l e t us t u r n t o a 
second argument against the r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s t . 
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Empiricism and the P r i v a t e Language Argument 
One claim made f o r Wittgenstein's argument against the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of a p r i v a t e language i s t h a t i t shows the incoherence 
of the k i n d of r a d i c a l empiricism which emerges from the Cartesian 
emphasis on the c o g i t a t i o as t h a t which i s i n d u b i t a b l y given. ^' 
I n considering Anthony Kenny's a r t i c l e "Cartesian P r i v a c y " 
I want t o show t h a t such an empiricism - which holds t h a t there 
i s , perhaps, only the experience of the present moment - i s not 
r e f u t e d by the PLA. '^ This i s not because the PLA i s i t s e l f 
i n v a l i d , but because such an empiricism need not be committed 
to the use of a language which i s p r i v a t e i n the relevant sense. 
For present purposes, then, we can put aside the question of the 
v a l i d i t y of the PLA, and the h i s t o r i c a l p o i n t t h a t Descartes 
h i m s e l f was committed to the p o s s i b i l i t y of a p r i v a t e language. 
We s h a l l concentrate on the more ambitious claim mentioned above. 
Kenny c l e a r l y f e e l s t h a t a Cartesian enquirer i s committed 
to the use of a p r i v a t e language, arguing t h a t "the r e f e r e n t s 
of the words of Wittgenstein's p r i v a t e language correspond t o 
Descartes' cog i t a t i o n e s " ( p . 3 6 l ) . Why should he t h i n k t h i s ? 
I f the language contains words f o r sensations, 
then the connection between the words and the 
sensations must be set up without the i n t e r -
mediary of the n a t u r a l expression of sensation 
i n b o d i l y behaviour; f o r the words of the 
language are supposed to have meaning at a 
stage a t which i t i s d o u b t f u l whether there 
are any bodies at a l l , 
(p.362) 
This deals e x p l i c i t l y only w i t h words f o r sensations, which 
I s h a l l consider l a t e r . F i r s t , l e t us look at words f o r ordinary 
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p u b l i c o b j e c t s , l i k e c a t s . How does the Cartesian doubt 
a f f e c t them? Take a thought l i k e 'There i s a c a t ' . We 
must suspend judgement on such a claim, according to the 
Method of Doubt, since we cannot be sure t h a t any m a t e r i a l 
objects e x i s t , l e t alone t h i s p a r t i c u l a r purported ca t . 
We must r e s t r i c t ourselves t o a claim l i k e ' I t seems t h a t 
there i s a c a t ' : t h i s i s i n d u b i t a b l e . Now what has happened 
t o the meaning of 'cat' here? Has i t changed, so t h a t the 
word no longer r e f e r s to an o r d i n a r y p u b l i c o b j e c t , but to a 
p r i v a t e one - a c e r t a i n complex of sense data, or a Lockean 
idea, say? This may have been the c l a s s i c a l e m p i r i c i s t s ' 
view, and indeed t h a t of Descartes himself, but i s i t the only 
view open to an e m p i r i c i s t ? Again, f o r the s e l f - s t y l e d r a d i c a l 
e m p i r i c i s t , Edmund Husserl, the answer i s no."*" 
This answer i s based on the contention t h a t the p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y 
r a d i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n of the object of the c o g i t a t i o i s t h a t which 
describes i t e x a c t l y as i t i s experienced; or, as Husserl would 
also say, as i t i s "intended" i n the experience. Such d e s c r i p t i o n 
of the " i n t e n t i o n a l o b j e c t s " of experience can be undertaken under 
suspension of judgement as t o the actual existence of the object 
i n question, and plays a c e n t r a l r o l e i n Husserlian phenomenology. 
Consider, f o r example, my l o o k i n g a t a c a t . Let us suspend 
judgement as t o whether the cat a c t u a l l y e x i s t s or not. Nevertheless, 
the o b j e c t of the experience i s given, at l e a s t i m p l i c i t l y , as 
something which i s a l i v e and f u r r y , which eats, drinks and so on: 
i n s h o r t , i t i s given as a cat - my experience i s , i n t e n t i o n a l l y , 
of a c a t . Now i f someone convinces me t h a t i t i s , i n f a c t , a 
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cardboard r e p l i c a of a c a t , then, according to Husserl, my 
experience may undergo a g e s t a l t switch. Even though nothing 
i n the f i e l d of v i s i o n a l t e r s , my experience i s now i n t e n t i o n a l l y , 
not of a c a t , but of a cardboard cut-out; i t i s given, at l e a s t 
i m p l i c i t l y , as inanimate and n o n - f u r r y , r e q u i r i n g n e i t h e r food 
nor d r i n k , and so on. I f I r e a l i s e t h a t I am enjoying the e f f e c t s 
of an h a l l u c i n a t o r y drug, and I am t o l d t h a t nothing but a blank 
w a l l stands before me, then again, though my v i s u a l f i e l d remains 
the same, the c o g i t a t i o may change; i t s i n t e n t i o n a l object i s 
no longer given as a p u b l i c o b j e c t a t a l l , but as a p r i v a t e 
h a l l u c i n a t o r y image. F i n a l l y , i f I attend purely t o the sense 
q u a l i t i e s of the v i s u a l f i e l d , the experience i s now, i n t e n t i o n a l l y , 
of something s t r i p p e d of a l l other meaning ( e i t h e r as p u b l i c or 
p r i v a t e o b j e c t ) ; t h a t i s , of a s p a t i a l arrangement of patches of 
colour of d i f f e r e n t shade, i n t e n s i t y and so on. 
Here the c l a s s i c a l e m p i r i c i s t may claim t h a t only t h i s l a s t 
d e s c r i p t i o n i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y r a d i c a l , because i t describes the 
basic e x p e r i e n t i a l data, devoid of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Since a l l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are e s s e n t i a l l y contestable constructions, only 
w i t h t h i s l a s t attempt do we get the hard s t u f f of experience, 
the data which are given. Husserl denies t h i s : f o r him the 
phenomenological mode of d e s c r i p t i o n i s primary; and we can get 
t o the supposedly n e u t r a l d e s c r i p t i o n , f r e e of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , 
only by a process of a b s t r a c t i o n , s t r i p p i n g o f f the meanings 
given i n experience and a r t i c u l a t e d i n the phenomenological 
d e s c r i p t i o n . 
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C e r t a i n considerations seem to support Husserl here -
f o r example, the way A.J. Ayer introduces h i s "percepts" by 
means, u l t i m a t e l y , of a l o c u t i o n l i k e " i t seems t h a t there 
i s a cat". 5*' However, a l l we need a t present i s the weaker 
cl a i m t h a t the phenomenological d e s c r i p t i o n does not presuppose 
the "sense data" d e s c r i p t i o n as a c o n d i t i o n of i t s meaningfulness. 
I f t h i s i s the case (and I s h a l l consider i t again l a t e r ) we can 
view the Cartesian doubt as suspending judgement about the actual 
existence of the i n t e n t i o n a l objects of our c o g i t a t i o n e s ( a t 
l e a s t of those which are given as e x i s t i n g independently of the 
experience) while the c o g i t a t i o r e t a i n s i t s phenomenological 
meaning. Nothing, as: f a r as experiences goes, changes. 
As f o r the language i n which the d e s c r i p t i o n of the c o g i t a t i o 
i s undertaken, the phenomenological standpoint gives us an important 
a l t e r n a t i v e . Instead of the Cartesian doubt f o r c i n g a change i n 
our view of the meaning of words, such t h a t they are taken to r e f e r 
t o immediate sensations, sense data and so f o r t h , we can keep the 
meaning of the words unchanged, so t h a t i f they successfully r e f e r , 
they r e f e r t o p u b l i c objects l i k e c a t s . The e f f e c t of the Doubt 
i s t o suspend judgement on the actual existence of these purported 
r e f e r e n t s . Rather than change the meaning and secure successful 
reference, one leaves the meaning as i t i s , and suspends judgement 
on r e f e r e n t i a l success. Now t h i s s u rely removes one reason f o r 
t h i n k i n g t h a t a p r i v a t e language must be used here, f o r i t s words 
r e f e r not t o immediate p r i v a t e sensations, known only t o the 
speaker, but ( p u r p o r t e d l y a t l e a s t ) to p u b l i c objects which can 
be met w i t h by others. " But the Doubt i s t o suspend judgement 
on the a c t u a l existence not only of the .purported r e f e r e n t s of the 
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words of the language, but also of the whole pu b l i c context 
w i t h i n which the p u b l i c i t y of meaning i s a t t a i n e d . Does 
t h i s not force us back onto a p r i v a t e language? No. The 
meaning of the words i s s t i l l not p r i v a t e ; i t r e s t s not on 
bare ostensive association w i t h p r i v a t e sensations or ideas, 
but on a context of communication about a public world. I f 
judgement as t o the existence of t h i s context i s suspended, so 
as t o t r e a t i t as the i n t e n t i o n a l c o r r e l a t e of pure experience 
w i t h i n which the p u b l i c / p r i v a t e d i s t i n c t i o n i s drawn, the 
language remains p u b l i c ; i t i s i n p r i n c i p l e comprehensible to 
oth e r s , and i t s use i s i n p r i n c i p l e open to t h e i r checking, 
whether or not such others a c t u a l l y e x i s t . Thus f o r the r a d i c a l 
e m p i r i c i s t i t i s possible t h a t there a c t u a l l y e x i s t s only a series 
of experiences, among which are experiences i n t e n t i o n & l l y of 
people communicating about m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s , responding p o s i t i v e l y 
or n e g a t i v e l y t o utterances, teaching the meanings of words and so 
on; p r o v i d i n g , i n s h o r t , the necessary context f o r the emergence 
of a p u b l i c language. The p u b l i c i t y of meaning i s thus adequately 
founded on the i n t e n t i o n a l character of such experiences, i r r e s p e c t i v e 
of the a c t u a l existence of such people and objects. 
As long as we d i s t i n g u i s h sense from reference, as any adequate 
theory of language must (although perhaps the theory of the c l a s s i c a l 
e m p i r i c i s t s does n o t ) , we can i n t e r p r e t the Doubt as above. Indeed, 
once the phenomenological a l t e r n a t i v e t o c l a s s i c a l empiricism i s 
considered, t h i s seems t o me by f a r the most n a t u r a l way of construing 
the e f f e c t s of the Doubt, and i f so, i t secures f o r the reconstructed 
Cartesian an immunity t o the PLA, which would apply only to less 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d forms of r a d i c a l empiricism.' 0 . Before discussing f u r t h e r 
the v i a b i l i t y of t h i s o p t i o n , l e t us ask why i t i s not considered by 
Kenny (and, f o r t h a t matter, W i t t g e n s t e i n ) . 
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One reason, h i n t e d a t above, i s t h a t Descartes and the 
c l a s s i c a l e m p i r i c i s t s seem t o have held t h a t a word must 
r e f e r t o something i f i t i s t o be meaningful, so t h a t i f 
we suspend judgement as t o the existence of ordinary m a t e r i a l 
objects we must t u r n elsewhere, t o sense data and p r i v a t e 
sensations, t o account for the meaningfulness of language. But 
i t would be wrong to saddle r a d i c a l empiricism i n general w i t h 
such an inadequate theory of language: Husserl, f o r one, having 
st u d i e d Frege, would r e j e c t i t . 
There i s another reason, which i s t h a t the focus on the 
example of pain stops Kenny from seeing the a l t e r n a t i v e to 
c l a s s i c a l empiricism. He quotes from Descartes' S i x t h 
M e d i t a t i o n : 
( I found e r r o r ) not only i n (judgements) founded 
on the external senses, but even i n those founded 
on the i n t e r n a l as w e l l : f o r i s there anything 
more i n t i m a t e or i n t e r n a l than pain? And y e t I 
have learned from some persons whose arms or legs 
have been cut o f f , t h a t they sometimes seemed t o 
f e e l pain i n the p a r t which had been amputated, 
which made me t h i n k t h a t I could not be q u i t e 
c e r t a i n t h a t i t was a c e r t a i n member which pained 
me, even though I f e l t pain i n i t . 
Kenny continues: " I n p a i n , as i n s i g h t , we must d i s t i n g u i s h 
what i s s t r i c t l y c o g i t a t i o . The i n d u b i t a b l e c o g i t a t i o w i l l be 
the "immediate p r i v a t e sensation"" (p.362). Consider t h i s 
f u r t h e r . Kenny c l e a r l y takes the a p p l i c a t i o n of Cartesian doubt 
to a claim l i k e "There i s a pain i n the f o o t " to work l i k e t h i s ; 
since we cannot be sure of the existence of the f o o t , a l l we are 
e n t i t l e d t o claim i s "There i s a pain", where " p a i n " now r e f e r s 
t o a p r i v a t e sensation, independent of any actual f o o t , or body, 
a t a l l - and so, of course, of any behavioural m a n i f e s t a t i o n of 
sensation. "Pain" must on t h i s view be par t of a p r i v a t e language, 
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i t s meaning based on a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the p r i v a t e sensation, 
and so t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Cartesian doubt - which seems 
adm i t t e d l y t o be Descartes* own - f a l l s prey t o the PLA. 
Our reconstructed Cartesian, however, has an a l t e r n a t i v e . 
I n s t e a d of "There i s a pain", the a p p l i c a t i o n of the Doubt 
could as w e l l give us " I t seems t h a t there i s a pain i n the 
f o o t " , i n l i n e w i t h i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o claims l i k e "There i s 
a c a t " . Here, " p a i n " remains p a r t of a pu b l i c language: a 
pain i s the s o r t of f e e l i n g you get when someone, say, stamps 
on your f o o t , and which i s manifest i n screams, w r i t h i n g s , 
withdrawal of the f o o t and so on. So the pain i s experienced 
as being i n the f o o t , even though we suspend judgement as to the 
act u a l existence of t h a t f o o t . The Doubt says t h a t maybe there 
i s no pain i n the f o o t , i t j u s t seems t h a t there i s . 
The temptation here i s t o say t h a t there i s more to i t . Not 
only does i t seem t h a t there i s a pain i n the f o o t , there j j j a 
sensation, whether i n an actu a l f o o t or not. So t h i s might seem t o 
be a more exact d e s c r i p t i o n of the case: "There i s a pain, which 
seems t o be i n the f o o t " . C e r t a i n l y i t seems t o f i t the amputated 
limb example. But must 'pain* here be p a r t of a p r i v a t e language? 
Only i f i t supposedly gets i t s meaning through association w i t h the 
bare sensation, independent of connections with the body and w i t h 
behaviour. But t h i s need not be the case. The e m p i r i c i s t has the 
o p t i o n of saying t h a t 'pain' i s p a r t of a pu b l i c language, i n t h a t 
i t has p u b l i c meaning v i a the normal connections w i t h body and 
behaviour. W i t h i n t h i s s e t t i n g , we can allow t a l k of pains which 
do n ot i n f a c t have the l o c a t i o n they seem t o have; but such t a l k 
must be understood as p a r a s i t i c on the normal s i t u a t i o n . On t h i s 
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view, Cartesian doubt i s taken not to change the meaning of 
words, so t h a t " p a i n " gets only a p r i v a t e sense, t i e d only 
t o the bare, disconnected sensation, but to suspend judgement 
on the existence of the p u b l i c objects i n connection w i t h 
which the word f o r pain gets i t s p u b l i c meaning. 
Again, t h i s seems t o me the most n a t u r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of the workings of the Doubt, and t o rescue the r a d i c a l 
e m p i r i c i s t from the claws of the PLA. Nevertheless, two 
ob j e c t i o n s must be discussed, which put i n question the 
coherence of t h i s v a r i a n t of empiricism. The f i r s t concerns 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of the u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a t i o n of the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between how things are experienced as being and how things are, 
and so between successful and unsuccessful attempts at r e f e r r i n g . 
I t i s said t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n works w i t h i n the context of a 
genera l l y " r e a l i s t " framework - " r e a l i s t " i n t h a t i t assumes 
the existence of a r e a l i t y independent of experience - but makes 
no sense when applied t o t h a t context i t s e l f , so as t o suspend 
judgement on the existence of the m a t e r i a l world i n t o t o . For, 
the argument goes, there i s no empir i c a l cash-value at stake here, 
nothing i n experience could count f o r or against e i t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e , 
and so there i s no meaningful d i s t i n c t i o n t o be made. This can 
also be expressed by saying t h a t , while we le a r n the d i s t i n c t i o n 
i n s i t u a t i o n s where we recognise t h a t what was experienced as being 
the case was not i n f a c t the case, we cannot, i n p r i n c i p l e , get 
ourselves i n t o such a s i t u a t i o n w i t h respect to the whole m a t e r i a l 
w o r l d , and so the d i s t i n c t i o n i s no longer meaningful. 
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Two p o i n t s can be made i n r e p l y . F i r s t , t h i s argument, 
which r e s t s on a s t r o n g l y v e r i f i c a t i o n i s t c r i t e r i o n of 
meaningfulness, i s separate from the PLA, and very c o n t r o v e r s i a l . 
I t i s , f o r example, a matter of contention whether the c r i t e r i o n 
escapes i t s own s t r i c t u r e s , or r u l e s i t s e l f out as meaningless. 
Secondly: i f such an argument were to succceed, t o ensure the 
PLA's h o l d on r a d i c a l empiricism, i t would render the PLA 
superfluous, since the argument would r u l e out r a d i c a l empiricism 
on i t s own account. 
The second o b j e c t i o n focusses on another c r u c i a l presupposition 
of r a d i c a l empiricism. The claim t h a t a p u b l i c language i n which 
to describe experience can be r e t a i n e d , w h i l s t commitment to the 
existence of a p u b l i c world i s suspended, neccessarily presupposes 
the meaningfulness of t a l k about pure experience; and, c o r r e l a t i v e l y , 
the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the concept of pure experience. This 
pr e s u p p o s i t i o n l i e s unacknowledged i n the discourse of r a d i c a l 
empiricism and the opponents so f a r discussed. What are the 
necessary conditions of the meaningfulness of such t a l k , and of 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of the very concept of experience? The c r u c i a l 
arguments concern not the language i n which the world as experienced 
i s described - as Kenny and W i t t g e n s t e i n hold t o be the case - but 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of experience i t s e l f . 
I n discussing t h i s v e r s i o n of the PLA, and the Kantian argument 
presented by Strawson, the use of Husserl as a touchstone has shown 
how r a d i c a l empiricism can survive t h e i r challenge. I n each case 
we are t o l d something about the kinds of concept t h a t are necessarily 
employed i n the a r t i c u l a t i o n of experience, without addressing 
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d i r e c t l y the concept of experience i t s e l f . We could form a 
composite of the two, which would assert t h a t experience must 
be a r t i c u l a t e d i n concepts of the o b j e c t i v e , the l i n g u i s t i c expression 
of which must have a pu b l i c sense. But, as we have seen, t h i s 
leaves us w i t h the existence of experience i n a sense unquestioned 
by e i t h e r , and already e x p l i c i t l y presupposed by Strawson, which 
makes room f o r the s o p h i s t i c a t e d e m p i r i c i s t s s c e p t i c a l challenge. 
The charge of incoherence made i n these arguments f a i l s to s t i c k ; 
i t s v i c t i m s w i l l be the r e l a t i v e l y unsophisticated 'sense-datum' 
th e o r i e s commonly a t t r i b u t e d t o , amongst others, the c l a s s i c a l 
B r i t i s h e m p i r i c i s t s . We w i l l need t o take i n t o account developments 
since the time of Descartes, Locke and Hume. 
From t h i s i t w i l l be c l e a r t h a t my sympathies l i e i n p r i n c i p l e 
w i t h those p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the debate on transcendental arguments 
who claim t h a t , whatever can be shown concerning the necessary 
employment of c e r t a i n concepts, or conceptual schemes, t h i s cannot 
s e t t l e the question of whether those concepts are ever successfully 
a p p l i e d ; t h a t i s , whether the items of which they are the concepts, 
a c t u a l l y e x i s t . Thus Stroud argues t h a t transcendental arguments 
of the s o r t we have been discussing can prove at most " t h a t , f o r 
example, we must believe t h a t there are m a t e r i a l objects"; ' they 
cannot show such b e l i e f s to"be t r u e , t h a t m a t e r i a l objects a c t u a l l y 
e x i s t . Stroud accepts t h a t such arguments, i f v a l i d , r e f u t e a 
r a d i c a l conventionalism which holds t h a t our employment of a p a r t i c u l a r 
conceptual scheme i s , i n the l a s t instance, a matter o f d e c i s i o n ; but 
denies t h a t they defeat the s c e p t i c . For, even i f a c e r t a i n k i n d of 
scepticism i s i n t e l l i g i b l e only i f the conventional conceptual scheme 
i s already employed, t h i s shows t h a t t h a t scheme i s o b j e c t i v e l y 
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s u c c e s s f u l l y applied only i f we import some form of v e r i f i c a t i o n 
p r i n c i p l e ( f o r example, to the e f f e c t t h a t , f o r at l e a s t some 
basic concepts, i f we have the concepts we can sometimes know 
t h a t they are suc c e s s f u l l y a p p l i e d ) . Such v e r i f i c a t i o n i s m , 
and the a l l i e d Paradigm Case Argument, founder on the f a c t t h a t , 
as Rorty puts i t , "appearance i s as good as r e a l i t y f o r g i v i n g 
meaning t o terms (or content t o concepts)". 1 3' Something l i k e 
t h i s argument i s accepted by several philosophers i n t h i s area;1*"-
and i s f u r t h e r supported by the argument given e a r l i e r i n t h i s 
chapter t o the e f f e c t t h a t there i s , pace Strawson, a sense of 
existence i n which we can ask whether the objects, of which our 
concepts are the concepts, a c t u a l l y e x i s t . Given t h i s , i t i s 
w i t h some reluctance t h a t I t u r n t o a development of the argument 
about conceptual schemes. 
"A Transcendental Argument t o end a l l Transcendental Arguments" 
Rorty, strengthening Stroud's i n t u i t i o n , claims t h a t "no 
transcendental argument w i l l be able t o prove necessary existence 
(e.g. of m a t e r i a l objects)'". 1 5' This leaves i n t a c t a k i n d of 
•parasitism' argument, t o the e f f e c t t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r proposed 
a l t e r n a t i v e t o our ord i n a r y conceptual scheme i s p a r a s i t i c on 
the o r d i n a r y one, i n t h a t i t "would not be i n t e l l i g i b l e t o 
someone who was not f a m i l i a r w i t h the o l d way".1^ This, Rorty 
argues, must be the p o i n t of transcendental arguments defined as 
those which prove t h a t c e r t a i n concepts are necessary f o r experience. 
"For what would be the p o i n t of knowing, f o r example, t h a t you have 
to t h i n k about m a t e r i a l objects i f you are going t o t h i n k about 
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anything a t a l l , except t o defeat the person who suggests 
a d i f f e r e n t 'conceptual framework'?" 1 7' Eorty suggests 
t h a t t h i s must take the form of an ad nominem response 
l i m i t e d t o such a l t e r n a t i v e s as the sceptic may propose. 
Thus the Kant-Strawson argument succeeds only i n showing 
t h a t the sense-datum conceptual scheme i s p a r a s i t i c on the 
or d i n a r y m a t e r i a l object one. There can be no general 
ad hominem argument, to show t h a t a l l a l t e r n a t i v e conceptual 
schemes are p a r a s i t i c on our ord i n a r y one, since we cannot 
l i m i t i n advance the sceptic's imagination. 
Now there i s a response t o t h i s l i m i t a t i o n on the scope 
o f transcendental arguments. For, according to Rorty, Davidson 
has an argument which i n v a l i d a t e s a c e n t r a l presupposition of 
s c e p t i c a l and a n t i - s c e p t i c a l transcendental argumentation. 
Both scepticism and the Kantian arguments against i t , presuppose 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between conceptual scheme and content. This 
d i s t i n c t i o n , says Davidson, the t h i r d and l a s t dogma of empiricism, 
i s u l t i m a t e l y untenable. Both the sceptic and the a n t i - s c e p t i c 
thus have the imaginary ground removed from beneath t h e i r f e e t . 
This, says Rorty, i s "a transcendental argument to end a l l 
transcendental arguments". w-
This i s an i n t e r e s t i n g argument, not l e a s t because i t i s a 
v a r i a n t of one advanced by Hegel against Kant nearly two hundred 
years ago. Hegel c r i t i c i s e s the presupposition of the separation 
between subject and o b j e c t , which he sees i n Kant's work, and the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between conceptual scheme and content can be taken as 
one of i t s guises: the conceptual scheme i s c o n t r i b u t e d by the 
su b j e c t , the content by the o b j e c t . There w i l l be reason t o come 
back t o t h i s p o i n t i n a l a t e r chapter. 
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Furthermore, the argument aims to silence scepticism 
by showing that i t i s , i n the l a s t instance, u n i n t e l l i g i b l e : 
that a necessary condition of i t s meaningfulness does not 
obtain. I n seeing whether the argument succeeds, I want 
to look not so much at Davidson's argument i n d e t a i l , but 
rather Rorty's transcendental use of i t . But there i s at 
least one point about Davidson's own argument that I want to 
raise. Davidson suggests that people have di f f e r e n t conceptual 
schemes i f they speak languages which f a i l of i n t e r t r a n s l a t a b i l i t y . ^ * 
But, Davidson argues, we cannot make sense of the notion of a 
conceptual framework which i s "largely true, but not translatable". 2 2-
We can never be i n a position to judge that others possess a 
d i f f e r e n t conceptual scheme. Further " i f we cannot i n t e l l i g i b l y 
say that schemes are d i f f e r e n t , neither can we i n t e l l i g i b l y say 
that they are one".23- The very idea of a conceptual scheme i s 
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . Now th i s seems to force too far the l i n k between 
possessing a conceptual scheme and possessing a language. Surely, 
we want to say, the Newtonian physicist had a d i f f e r e n t conceptual 
scheme from that employed by twentieth-century physicists. They 
did not possess the concepts that are now employed, or, of course, 
a grasp of t h e i r interconnections. They worked with a dif f e r e n t 
scheme which i s now outmoded. Now of course we can understand 
Newtonian physicists - often they already speak the same language, 
and do not need to be translated - and i f a modern physicist were 
able to t a l k with a Newtonian one, she might well be able to give 
the Newtonian a grasp of the new concepts. Nevertheless, prior 
to such consultation, they have d i f f e r e n t schemes. The difference 
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between A r i s t o t e l i a n physics and both the Newtonian and 
r e l a t i v i s t i c physics i s even greater. I t seems that we 
have a v a l i d sense i n which to speak of alternative schemes 
for conceptualising our experience or, ignoring the sceptic, 
the world. What might be argued, of course, i s that the 
i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of one scheme presupposes the employment 
of that to which i t i s an alternative: perhaps r e l a t i v i s t i c 
physics i s parasitic on the Newtonian concepts i n th i s way. 
Or, furt h e r , that the p o s s i b i l i t y of such alternatives pre-
supposes a central shared core (f o r example, the concept of 
a material object), so that these alternative schemes cannot 
be r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t , but must f a l l within certain l i m i t a t i o n s . 
Understood l i k e t h i s , as arguing that we can make no sense of 
the notion of r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t conceptual schemes, and that 
variations must a l l share certain l i m i t i n g features, Davidson's 
argument may f i n d a comfortably sympathetic audience.^ The 
apocalyptic tones of h i s , and Rorty's, utterances w i l l , 
however, have been muted. 
Let us see how successfully the argument can combat the 
sceptic. I t seems clear, i n li n e with what has been said so 
fa r , that the sceptic can accept either that there can be no 
conceptual scheme r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from the ordinary one, or 
that the very notion of a conceptual scheme is u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . 
For the p o s s i b i l i t y of empiricist scepticism does not rely on 
the p o s s i b i l i t y , or even the concept, of radically alternative 
conceptual frameworks; but merely on the recognition that 
whatever conceptual scheme i s employed, how things are experienced 
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as being need not coincide with how they are. There i s the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of experiential error. Given th i s p o s s i b i l i t y , 
we may ask whether any feature of our ordinary viewpoint, 
including the b e l i e f i n a material world, i s actually true. 
The sceptic may produce alternative schemes, so as to suggest 
that the b e l i e f s formed withi n our conceptual scheme are open 
to question, but they are not required. The sceptic need set 
up no competition, only ask how we know that a certain be l i e f 
i s true, or that how things are experienced as being i s how 
they r e a l l y a r e . 2 6 A l l the sceptic requires, i n fac t , i s 
precisely that ordinary, simple notion of t r u t h as objective -
and i t s inseparable comrade, error - which Davidson himself 
takes as basic. Thus while i t i s fashionable to see the 
Kantian-style transcendental enterprise i n terms of j u s t i f y i n g 
the employment of a particular conceptual scheme i n the face of 
alternatives, and although Kant's work certainly lends i t s e l f to 
such an int e r p r e t a t i o n ; i f the transcendental strategy i s aimed 
rather at the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of knowledge-claims i n face only of 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of error, or of the non-veridicality of experience, 
then Davidson's argument marks at most a dead-end for the fashionable 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
Even so, i n a l a t e r discussion, Davidson pursues another 
aspect of his approach to meaning, and the question of how 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the speech of another i s possible, aiming to 
show that scepticism i s u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . Though d i s t i n c t from 
the argument against the idea of a conceptual scheme, th i s argument 
appears i n tandem with i t , as well as elsewhere. Let us take i t 
on i t s own merits. 
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Following Quine, Davidson supposes that we can t e l l 
when a speaker holds a sentence to be true without knowing 
what she means about the sentence, or what beliefs she holds 
about i t s unknown subject matter.^ 7- But given such evidence, 
an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the utterances must go hand i n hand with 
an a t t r i b u t i o n of beliefs to the speaker, since the holding 
true of a sentence i s the outcome of two factors: what the 
person believes, and (what she takes to be) the meaning of the 
sentence. But i n constructing a theory of belief and meaning 
from sentences held true, i f we cannot assume that the speakers 
language i s our own, the only p o s s i b i l i t y i s to s t a r t by 
assuming general agreement on b e l i e f s . ' This principle 
of charity i s not merely a methodological option, but a 
necessary condition of having a viable theory at a l l . 2 <^ 
" I f " , Davidson adds, "we cannot f i n d a way to interpret the 
utterances and other behaviour of a creature as revealing a 
set of beliefs largely consistent and true by our own standards, 
we have no reason to count that creature as r a t i o n a l , as having 
b e l i e f s , or as saying anything". 3 0 Now t h i s i s not to say 
that we must interpret another's utterances so as to obtain 
t o t a l agreement i n be l i e f s ; some false beliefs can be 
accommodated. I t does mean, however, that we can only i d e n t i f y 
a (perhaps false) b e l i e f on the assumption of the tr u t h of a 
wide range of b e l i e f s , w i t h i n which the belief i n question i s 
located. 3 1 , As Davidson puts i t : "the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of 
such i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s must depend on a background of largely 
unmentioned and unquestioned b e l i e f s " . 3 3" Thus, for Davidson, 
we can rule out a p r i o r i the p o s s i b i l i t y of massive error i n our 
b e l i e f s . We may not know s p e c i f i c a l l y which are true and which 
fal s e , but most of them must be true. 
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Davidson then turns t h i s point about the necessary 
constraints of radical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , against the sceptic. 
I n a l a t e r paper he c l a r i f i e s the point of the ear l i e r 
discussions. Not only must an interpreter assume agreement 
of b e l i e f s , but further "objective error can occur only i n a 
setting of largely true b e l i e f . Agreement does not make for 
t r u t h , but much of what is agreed must be true i f some of what 
i s agreed i s false". 3 3 - Davidson then introduces the idea 
of an omniscient interpreter, who solves the problem posed by 
the interdependence of b e l i e f and meaning as we do. Therefore, 
she must f i n d as much agreement as i s needed to make sense of 
at t r i b u t i o n s of belief and interpretations of utterances; and, 
being omniseient, what i s agreed i s by hypothesis true. 
Davidson concludes: 
But now i t i s plain why massive error about 
the world i s simply u n i n t e l l i g i b l e , for to 
suppose i t i n t e l l i g i b l e i s to suppose there 
could be an interpreter (the omniscient one) 
who correctly interpreted someone else as 
being massively mistaken, and this we have 
shown to be impossible. -34-. 
Does this argument work? 
The principle of charity, that we should optimise agreement 
on b e l i e f s i n interpreting the utterances of another, i s clearly 
important. But consider t h i s point: " i t would be more charitable 
to make allowances f o r the likelihood that (the speaker's) circumstances 
.... may have led him understandably into e r r o r " . 3 5 - Lewis continues, 
"We should even ascribe to him those errors which we think we would 
have made, or should have made, i f our evidence and training had 
been l i k e h i s " . 3 6 . Now t h i s improved version of the principle 
of charity, with which Davidson apparently agrees, i s crucial i n 
the discussion of the e f f e c t of Davidson's argument against 
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scepticism. To see t h i s , l e t us grant Davidson's omniscient 
interpreter a few practical a b i l i t i e s , so that she bears a 
certain resemblance to Descartes' malignant demon. Suppose 
thi s interpreter has arranged things so that i t seems to 
someone that she lives on earth, and interacts with people 
and objects i n the ordinary way, whereas i n fact there exists 
only t h i s one person, who i s wired up to a piece of gadgetry 
i n a l i t t l e box somewhere i n space. The interpreter has things 
arranged so that she knows how things seem to the motionless 
person i n the box (by means of visual display u n i t s , and so on), 
but also of course, so that she knows how things r e a l l y are, which 
i s very d i f f e r e n t . Further, i t i s arranged that the deluded 
vic t i m actually utters the sentences that she thinks she does. 
How i s the omniscient one to i n t e r p r e t these? Given her 
omniscience, so that she knows what the victim has for evidence, 
she can make certain assumptions about the victim's b e l i e f s . 
I t w i l l be reasonable to assume that the victim has largely the 
b e l i e f s which the interpreter would have i n the same position. 
Thus the interpreter w i l l a t t r i b u t e to the victim a whole network 
of b e l i e f s , i n the l i g h t of the evidence available to the victim, 
i n the context of which particular beliefs can be i d e n t i f i e d and 
c r i t i c i s e d , and so on. But of course, things are such that 
these beli e f s w i l l be largely false. The interpreter w i l l 
therefore i n t e r p r e t the victim's utterances i n such a way as 
to mesh i n with an a t t r i b u t i o n of b e l i e f s , most of which are 
f a l s e , but which are eminently reasonable i n the l i g h t of the 
evidence available to the speaker. She has "correctly interpreted 
someone else as being massively mistaken". I f t h i s tedious 
scenario i s , as i t seems to be, consistent, then we must further 
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admit the p o s s i b i l i t y that when we interpret the utterances 
of others (or at least when i t seems that t h i s occurs), we 
assume a corpus of shared bel i e f s which may nevertheless be 
massively i n error. Davidson's argument, while i t shows 
that, i n ordinary circumstances, interpreters w i l l assume 
agreement i n beliefs with those whose utterances they int e r p r e t , 
cannot f u l f i l the grander purposes set for i t . I t cannot 
assure us of the t r u t h of most of our b e l i e f s : i t cannot 
refute the empiricist sceptic. 
Concluding Remarks 
None of the arguments discussed above reaches the heart of 
that sophisticated radical empiricism which has developed since 
the doctrines of the classical B r i t i s h Empiricists. I n the l i g h t 
of t h i s , some philosophers have concluded that no transcendental 
argument can f i n a l l y s e t t l e accounts with scepticism. 3 ?- However, 
none of the above arguments address the central presupposition of 
radical empiricism, namely of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of 
experience. I n the following chapters I shall claim that there 
i s a kind of transcendental argument which genuinely defeats 
scepticism precisely by investigating the necessary conditions 
of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of experience, and hence of 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of radical empiricism i t s e l f . 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Concept of Experience 
I n the l a s t chapter, the general picture that I hoped 
would emerge i s this: i f arguments against radical empiricism 
and i t s inherent sceptical p o s s i b i l i t i e s leave the a v a i l a b i l i t y 
of the concept of experience unquestioned, then they cannot 
leg i t i m a t e l y get beyond the radical empiricist position that 
i t i s possible that experience i s a l l there i s . We should 
therefore not take t h i s concept for granted, but look for the 
necessary conditions of i t s p o s s i b i l i t y . I f the statement of 
these conditions c o n f l i c t s with the radical empiricist thesis, 
then that thesis must be false. More w i l l be said of t h i s 
strategy i n the next chapter, but a b r i e f formulation of i t i n 
Kantian styl e would be t h i s : instead of asking for the necessary 
conditions of the p o s s i b i l i t y of experience, we ask for those of 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of experience, and hence of radical 
empiricism i t s e l f . Clearly, though, i f we are to examine the 
necessary conditions of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of 
experience - the central concept of radical empiricism - then 
we need to know more precisely \Vhat the concept of experience i s . 
This i s a confusing and contentious issue, and has been throughout 
the past few centuries of philosophy. I feel that i t needs to be 
discussed above a l l i n r e l a t i o n to the philosophical purposes which 
the concept i s expected to serve. With this i n mind, and to provide 
some of the context with i n which further discussion can take place, 
I want to look at a pa r t i c u l a r feature of recent B r i t i s h philosophy. 
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The Kantian and the Sense-datum Theorist 
Over the l a s t twenty or t h i r t y years sophisticated 
sense-datum theorists l i k e A.J. Ayer, and Kantian challengers 
such as P.P. Strawson, appear often to ta l k r i g h t past each 
other. The intransigence of each protagonist strikes his 
opponent as an almost w i l f u l refusal to see points which are 
there to be seen. I n discussing a recent exchange between 
t h e m , I want to see why this i s so, and to relate i t to 
the question of the d i f f e r e n t philosophical purposes connected with 
the d i f f e r e n t concepts of experience which they take as primary. 
I begin with an outline of a particular sense-datum theory, 
as a target f o r Kantian attack. (There have been many di f f e r e n t 
theories which could legitimately be termed 'sense-datum theories'. 
This one i s intended to be as close as reasonably possible to the 
l e t t e r , and more importantly to the purpose, of Professor Ayer's.) 
Our perceptual judgements embody or r e f l e c t a general view of the 
world, as containing objects, variously propertied, located i n a 
common space and continuing i n t h e i r existence independently of 
our interrupted and r e l a t i v e l y f l e e t i n g perceptions of them. 2.-
However, alive to the p o s s i b i l i t y of error i n such judgements, 
and i n the l i g h t of possible r i v a l views of how tilings are - for 
example that a malign demon makes i t seem, merely, as i f there 
were such a world - responsible philosphers must work back from 
these views to a common ground which the r i v a l views can agree 
on. Thus both the ordinary r e a l i s t view of the world, and the 
views which oppose i t , can agree that i t at least seems that the 
material world exists; experience, i n Husserlian terms, i s at 
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least i n t e n t i o n a l l y of such a world. Sentences which report 
how things seem can then, i f desired, be transformed into 
sentences about seeming-objects, or sense-data, as long as we 
say nothing about sense-data that cannot be translated back 
into the terminology of seeming. Given the agreement on 
how things seem, or are experienced as being, there i s no need 
to r e s t r i c t ourselves to the t r a d i t i o n a l sense-datum concepts 
l i k e coloured patches and t i c k l i n g sensations: sense-data can 
cover, f o r example, 'visual leaf-patterns', where such terms 
are understood as 'applying to any members of the range of 
patterns which would t y p i c a l l y lead the observer to think 
that he was seeing the corresponding visual object.' ^  This 
agreement also helps us to avoid other problems t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
associated with the empiricist's use of the concept of experience. 
For the agreement on data i s not gained by a supposed immediate 
r e f l e c t i o n (on ' t h i s , here, now'), but by working back to a 
position which i s acceptable to r i v a l theories. (Thus while 
Priestley spoke of mercury losing phlogiston, and Lavoisier of 
the formation of mercuric oxide, they could agree that mercury 
turned red when heated.) The data do not have to be absolutely, 
i n c o r r i g i b l y and i n f a l l i b l y given as the result of a process of 
immediate r e f l e c t i o n , but only given r e l a t i v e to the competing 
theories; so the problems of such foundational immediacy are 
avoided. (We should note that without the existence of such 
r e l a t i v e data, the theories could not be understood as competing.) 
The description of experience can then be taken as providing data, 
r e l a t i v e to the possible views of how things r e a l l y are; and since 
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that description does not e n t a i l that the material world 
(or the malign demon) actually exists, the claim that i t 
does exist must be seen as a theory, re l a t i v e to those data. 
I n t h i s l o g i c a l sense we can speak of the ordinary r e a l i s t 
view of the world as an interpretation of these data, or as a 
theory based on the evidence presented by experience. I n t h i s 
s i t u a t i o n , the philosophically responsible thing to do might 
seem to be to claim that perhaps a l l there i s , i s experience, 
and to keep a sceptical distance from claims about the actual 
existence of the material world and i t s objects. How does 
Strawson reply to a l l this? 
One reply we could expect concerns the generality of this 
r e t r e a t to a ( r e l a t i v e l y ) neutral sense-datum description. 
Consider, fo r example, a particular experience describable as 
"seeming to see a pink elephant". Let us propose two theories 
to account fo r this experience. One claims that there exists 
a pink elephant which i s indeed being seen; the other that there 
are no such elephants, only the experience of seeming to see them 
(induced, we could suggest, by abnormal electro-chemical a c t i v i t y 
i n the b r a i n ) . Now, Strawson could argue, while the retreat to 
a sense-datum description, as neutral re l a t i v e to the r i v a l 
theories (providing data each can accept), i s available with 
regard to a single experience, i t cannot be coherently undertaken 
across the board. That i s , he would argue that such backtracking 
to the sense-datum description i s possible only within the framework 
of a general b e l i e f i n an objective, independent world. The view 
that perhaps experience i s a l l that exists - associated with a 
general retreat to sense-datum descriptions - i s not coherent. 
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This i s e f f e c t i v e l y the argument c r i t i c i s e d i n the previous 
chapter. I t i s i n any case not that which Strawson presents 
here (though i t i s not clear to what extent he distinguishes 
the two f o r himself). I n the present exchange, Strawson 
produces an argument which brings to l i g h t a difference i n 
opinion concerning the concept of experience and i t s function. 
Strawson argues that i n giving a s t r i c t l y v e r i d i c a l account 
of our experience we must use concepts of r e a l i s t i c a l l y conceived 
objects; ^ ' indeed, as Ayer agrees, the description w i l l be 
arrived at through an attenuation of our perceptual judgements.^' 
But these concepts are indispensable, Strawson continues, only 
because, p r i o r to philosophical r e f l e c t i o n and awareness of 
scepticism, we take the general view of the world articulated 
through concepts of the objective as true. This i n turn has 
the consequence that i t i s inappropriate to represent the r e a l i s t 
view of the world as a theory based on experiential evidence, as 
an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the data, since the s t r i c t description of 
the data must be i n terms which "presuppose the acceptance of 
the theory on the part of those f o r whom the data are data". 
Sensible experience ( i n general) presents i t s e l f as an immediate 
consciousness of the existence of things outside us: the r e a l i s t 
view of the world i s not a theoretical commitment, but something 
"given with the given", ^-
What should be the response here? I t must be based on a 
closer understanding of the purposes pursued by the sense-datum 
t h e o r i s t and the Kantian. Ayer, engaged i n the project of the 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n of knowledge-claims, i s aiming at laying out the 
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l o g i c a l relations between possible views of how things are, 
and the v e r i d i c a l description of experience i n which judgement 
as to the actual existence of 'things outside us 1 i s suspended. 
The notions of data, evidence, inference, interpretation and 
theory must be understood i n this context, that of an analysis 
of the extent to which the judgements embodied i n our sense-experience 
go beyond what i s l o g i c a l l y entailed by a s t r i c t description of 
that experience; and not as elements of some actually occurring 
processes. As Ayer frequently insis t s , 1 0 - th i s excuses us from 
the implication that any conscious process of inference, carrying 
us from the received data of experience to the construction of a 
theory, actually occurs. The temptation i s rather to say that 
the process i s i m p l i c i t , but there i s danger here. Such a process 
presupposes at least an i m p l i c i t awareness of the data. I t i s a 
mistake, however, to think that c a l l i n g an awareness i m p l i c i t 
thereby precludes i t from questions as to i t s conceptual structure: 
i t merely transfers the question from the e x p l i c i t to the i m p l i c i t 
l evel of awareness. We can clearly distinguish between the awareness 
of, say, a five-year-old who handles and talks of chairs and tables, 
and that of a new born baby. The five-year-old, though not cognisant 
of the term "material object", may be held., i n virtue of her or his 
behaviour, to have an i m p l i c i t awareness of chairs etc. as things 
which persist i n space and time, which can be touched, seen and so 
on - i n short an awareness of them as material objects - which the 
baby lacks. Even two-year-olds, without the use of the term 'chair 1, 
may manifest an i m p l i c i t awareness of an object as a chair (and, 
a f o r t i o r i , as a material object), by using i t to s i t on, dragging 
i t to the table atitea-time, and so on. Again, there i s here an 
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i m p l i c i t awareness with a d i f f e r e n t structure from that of 
the baby. Now i t seems to me reasonable to carry over the 
l i n k between the notions of awareness of something ais X, and 
of the use of the concept of X, from the e x p l i c i t to the i m p l i c i t 
l e v e l . We could then t a l k of the i m p l i c i t use of concepts i n 
cases of i m p l i c i t awareness of something &s such-and-such. I t 
may be argued that the l i n k between the notions of the use of 
a concept and of l i n g u i s t i c competence have a stronger t i e , 
though some p a r a l l e l account of the structural differences between 
i m p l i c i t awarenesses would be required, and t h i s issue w i l l be 
taken up i n Chapter 5« I n any event, the point of Strawson's 
objection remains: i f there i s to be an i m p l i c i t awareness of, 
fo r example, visual leaf patterns, jis visual leaf patterns, such 
an awareness (the i m p l i c i t use of such concepts) presupposes 
acceptance of the ordinary r e a l i s t view of the world, so that 
such an awareness cannot provide us with data upon which that 
view i s a theoretical construction. Further, Strawson argues, 
i f t h i s awareness i s of, f o r example, coloured visual patches 
as coloured visual patches, even the i m p l i c i t use of such 
t r a d i t i o n a l sense-datum concepts presupposes at least the i m p l i c i t 
use of concepts of the objective, and hence the acceptance of the 
r e a l i s t view of the world; again such an awareness cannot provide 
us with data upon which that view i s a theoretical construction. 
I t seems, then, following Strawson's argument, that the i m p l i c i t 
awareness with which the i m p l i c i t i n f e r e n t i a l process i s to begin 
must not employ concepts at a l l ; i t must be an awareness of 
something without being an awareness of i t j« such and such. 
That i s , the sense-datum theorist seems to be l e f t with the notion 
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of an awareness of pure sensory material, prior to the reception 
of any conceptual form, as the f i r s t step i n the process which 
leads to the i m p l i c i t adoption of the ordinary r e a l i s t view of 
the world. Now t h i s suggestion of an absolute separation of 
sense material and conceptual form, with awarness of the former 
preceding conferral of the l a t t e r , is hardly acceptable; for 
one thing, i t presents us with a mysterious form of awareness 
to which we can never return, since even the a r t i s t ' s awareness 
of items i n the visual f i e l d i s of them as a round red patch 
(and so on), and so which hardly squares with the epistemological 
purposes fo r which sense-data were f i r s t introduced. To then 
attempt to describe t h i s bare material only compounds confusion, 
since any description would necessarily presuppose that the 
material had been brought under concepts. There i s no way we 
can reach these bare data, we can deal with the experiential 
material only as already conceptualised. I n the l i g h t of these 
considerations i t would seem sensible to scrap the whole notion 
of an i m p l i c i t i n f e r e n t i a l process from sense-data to the r e a l i s t 
view of the world. Instead, we can f i n d an analytical place for 
t a l k about sense-data. For the sense-datum theorist can claim 
that f o r the use i n perceptual experience of concepts of ordinary 
physical objects to be possible, there must at least be some s e n s i t i v i t y 
t o , f o r example, differences i n colour, shape, rel a t i v e spatial position 
and so on. This i s not to imply that there actuallyoccurs an 
awareness of such items, as coloured patches, or as visual leaf 
patterns, p r i o r to the adoption of the r e a l i s t view of the world 
ar t i c u l a t e d through concepts of the objective. Nor does i t imply 
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a bare awareness of the sensory content, employing no concepts, 
p r i o r to that adoption. I t merely makes and develops the 
analytical point with which Kant begins the Critique of Pure 
Reason, that there could be no experience without both i n t u i t i o n s 
and concepts. The analytical separation presupposes the unity 
of experience as that within which the components are separated; 
there i s no implication that the components could be torn free 
of that context so that one could precede the other i n a temporal 
process. 
I t should be clear now that the contention,that our claims 
about the existence of a real material world and things within 
i t go beyond what i s entailed by a s t r i c t l y v e r i d i c a l description 
of experience, i s separable from the notion that some kind of 
i n f e r e n t i a l process actually, i f mysteriously, occurs. The 
sense-datum theorist can then accommodate Strawson's following 
summary: 
Whereas Ayer says we take a step beyond 
our sensible experience i n making our 
perceptual judgements, I say rather that 
we take a step back ( i n general) from 
our perceptual judgements i n framing 
accounts of our sensible experience. 
For i t can be agreed that a description of the experience arrived 
at through attenuating our ordinary perceptual judgements presupposes 
the non-inferential use of concepts of the objective, and the 
pretheoretical acceptance of the r e a l i s t view of the world as true. 
This i s the step back. But, the sense-datum theorist maintains, 
i n the l i g h t of the p o s s i b i l i t y of error, and of alternative claims 
as to how things r e a l l y are, we can see that a logical step forward 
i s required to get from the s t r i c t description of experience to the 
r e a l i s t view. This view has the logical status of a theory re l a t i v e 
to experience. 
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We can now see t h a t Strawson's concern to show t h a t 
concepts of the o b j e c t i v e must necessarily be employed i n 
experience, p r o v i d i n g a framework w i t h i n which alone concepts 
of sense-data can be used, does not i n i t s e l f c o n f l i c t w i t h Ayer's 
concern w i t h the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of knowledge-claims normally 
a r t i c u l a t e d i n terms of concepts of the o b j e c t i v e . For the 
question of the conceptual ( o r i n t e n t i o n a l ) s t r u c t u r e of 
experience, even of i t s necessary conceptual s t r u c t u r e , i s a 
side issue f o r Ayer here. I n saying t h a t experience i s u l t i m a t e l y 
of sense-data, he i s making a claim about e v i d e n t i a l primacy 
( i n the sense explained above), r a t h e r than about the concepts 
i n which experience i s , or must be, a r t i c u l a t e d : the ' o f i s 
not i n t e n t i o n a l . The s o p h i s t i c a t e d sense-datum t h e o r i s t can 
accept the Kantian view t h a t experience must be a r t i c u l a t e d 
through concepts of the o b j e c t i v e , and t h a t only w i t h i n such 
a framework can sense-data concepts (the t r a d i t i o n a l or the 
' v i s u a l leaf-r pat t e r n ' k i n d ) be employed, since the primacy 
here accorded to concepts of the object i s pre s u p p o s i t i o n a l : 
the use i n experience of sense-data concepts necessarily 
presupposes the use i n experience of concepts of the o b j e c t i v e . 
None of these a f f e c t s the p o i n t t h a t the claims i m p l i c i t i n such 
experience go beyond the a v a i l a b l e evidence. 
Strawson and Ayer are t o t h i s extent a t cross-purposes. 
There are, however, features t h a t confuse the issue, the most 
important being Ayer's persistence i n t a l k i n g of the c o n s t r u c t i o n 
of our ordinary r e a l i s t view of the world on the basis of sense-data 
( o r 'percepts', as he p r e f e r s t o c a l l them). The s t o r y he t e l l s here, 
reminiscent of Hume, i s f u l l of t a l k of an observer of 
sense-data, remembering and comparing them and so coming 
t o t h i n k c e r t a i n t h i n g s ; developing c e r t a i n concepts; 
making c o r r e l a t i o n s and adopting c e r t a i n measures. Ayer 
then takes a l l t h i s back: i t i s merely a f i c t i o n to show 
the general features of our experience t h a t make i t possible 
tu-tor us t o su c c e s s f u l l y employ the r e a l i s t ' t h e o r y 1 . This 
of course i s what he must say, i f he i s t o avoid Strawson's 
o b j e c t i o n , but i t makes the use of the s t o r y misleading at 
the very l e a s t . I n f a c t , there seems t o be a tension i n Ayer's 
thought between the a n a l y t i c a l account of features necessary to 
our having the^ experience we have, and which embodies our 
or d i n a r y r e a l i s t view of the world, and the need f e l t f o r some 
k i n d of quasi-psychological account of how, on our l i m i t e d data, 
we a r r i v e a t such a r i c h and complex view. This tension c l o s e l y 
p a r a l l e l s t h a t between Kant's a n a l y t i c a l use of the concept of 
syn t h e s i s , and h i s use of the term t o name an actual mysterious 
o p e r a t i o n on the p a r t of the transcendental ego. As Strawson 
argues w i t h respect t o Kant, i t i s the l a t t e r use which must be 
j e t t i s o n e d i n order t o make way f o r 'a t r u l y e m p i r i c i s t p h i l o s o p h y ' . ^ 
Once t h i s i s done, i t may seem t h a t the main reason f o r c a l l i n g Ayer 
a sense-datum t h e o r i s t , the r o l e i n which he receives most challenges, 
evaporates. Nevertheless, what remains i s the primary r a d i c a l 
e m p i r i c i s t concern w i t h the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of knowledge-claims, 
and the attendant p o s s i b i l i t y of scepticism. 
This introduces a second confusing f e a t u r e , already mentioned, 
which i s the f a c t t h a t i t i s unclear t o what extent Strawson runs 
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together h i s argument about the necessary conceptual s t r u c t u r i n g 
of experience, which i s a t work i n t h i s exchange w i t h Ayer, and 
h i s argument about the incoherence of r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s t scepticism. 
I hope t o have separated these out, and t o have shown t h a t we can 
accept the former w h i l s t r e j e c t i n g the l a t t e r . 
I n the l i g h t of t h i s discussion, we can see t h a t the di f f e r e n c e s 
between Strawson and Ayer a r i s e i n p a r t from confusion as t o the 
concept of experience being used by t h e i r respective opponent, and 
as t o the f u n c t i o n assigned by t h e i r respective opponent t o t h a t 
concept* But how can we get anywhere w i t h examining the necessary 
c o n d i t i o n s of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of experience, without 
being c l e a r about the concept i t s e l f ? And how can we do t h i s , 
when the adoption of a p a r t i c u l a r concept of experience i s i t s e l f 
a matter of argument? To f i n d our way here, and to see the 
importance of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l purposes which u n d e r l i e the adoption 
of a p a r t i c u l a r concept of experience, l e t us look closer a t Strawson's 
concept of experience and the purposes he has f o r i t . 
The concept of experience, and i t s p h i l o s o p h i c a l purpose 
Strawson sets out the f o l l o w i n g t h e s i s assumed as a premise i n 
( h i s r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f ) the Transcendental Deduction: 
t h a t there must be such u n i t y among the 
members of some temporally extended series 
of experiences as i s re q u i r e d f o r the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of self-consciousness, or 
s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n of experiences, on the 
p a r t of a subject of such experiences (the ^ 
t h e s i s of the necessary u n i t y of consciousness). 
This t h e s i s i s l i n k e d w i t h the dual character of experience 
( v i z . " t h a t p a r t i c u l a r contents of experience should be recognised 
as having some general character") and, as so l i n k e d , i s taken as a 
st a n d a r d - s e t t i n g d e f i n i t i o n of what i s t o count as 'experience' .'1 
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He also takes care not to presuppose anything about the 
nature of the p a r t i c u l a r items recognised as having a general 
character. His favoured term i s "accusatives", i n d i c a t i n g 
t h a t they are i n t e r n a l t o experience, and not n e c e s s a r i l y ( a t 
t h i s stage) conceived of as independent of experience. Strawson 
then t r i e s t o show t h a t , beginning w i t h t h i s concept, the 
•contents* or 'accusatives* of experience must be brought, a t 
l e a s t i n p a r t , under concepts of the o b j e c t i v e . But why should 
we begin w i t h t h i s concept, w i t h t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of "experience"? 
Strawson notes t h a t other forms of sentience, short of t h i s standard, 
may e x i s t , but goes on t o argue not only t h a t no other philosopher 
"even the most economical of e m p i r i c i s t s ' has t r i e d to work w i t h 
4 a 
a more l i m i t e d conception, ' but t h a t only t h i s concept of 
experience 'can be of i n t e r e s t t o us".* ? 1 I t i s not c l e a r to 
me t h a t w r i t e r s such as Hume, Russell and Ayer do i n f a c t b u i l d 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of self-consciousness i n t o t h e i r concept of 
experience; but I wish t o discuss the question of the i n t e r e s t 
which binds together the community i n d i c a t e d by Strawson's f i r s t -
person p l u r a l . 
Some s i m p l i f i e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l h i s t o r y may be u s e f u l here. 
Strawson wants to presuppose nothing about the character of the 
items of which experience i s experience, so as t o argue f o r the 
primary and necessary a p p l i c a t i o n i n experience of a c e r t a i n 
conceptual framework. But why t h i s i n t e r e s t i n conceptual 
frameworks? I n s o f a r as i t r e f l e c t s Kant's own concerns, i t i s 
a response t o Hume's c l a s s i c a l empiricism, and the accompanying 
"scandal t o philosophy and t o human reason i n general t h a t the 
existence of things outside us must be accepted merely on f a i t h " . ' 
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But Hume e f f e c t i v e l y runs together the question of the 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n of our ord i n a r y b e l i e f i n an independent world 
w i t h the question of the conceptual s t r u c t u r e of experience. 
I n s t e a d of s t i c k i n g t o the p o i n t we have seen made by Ayer, 
t h a t such a b e l i e f a f f i r m s more than can l o g i c a l l y be e n t a i l e d 
by any s t r i c t account of experience,-2-1- he continues t h i s w i t h 
a theory of how, w i t h the a i d of the p r i n c i p l e s of the imagination, 
we progress from awareness of simple sensory q u a l i t i e s to the 
r e a l i s t p i c t u r e we a l l end up w i t h . I t may then seem t h a t , i f 
i t can be shown t h a t sense-data concepts presuppose the a p p l i c a t i o n 
i n experience of concepts of the o b j e c t i v e , the recurr e n t ghost of 
scepticism can be l a i d . This we have seen, i n Chapter One, not 
to be the case, but i t helps us understand one component of Strawson's 
concept of experience. For a f u l l e r understanding of the phil o s o p h i c a l 
motives u n d e r l y i n g the choice of t h a t concept we must examine some of 
the presuppositions shared a l i k e by the Kantian and the sense-datum 
t h e o r i s t , by Strawson and Ayer. 
They, w i t h others i n the mainstream of post-Cartesian philosophy, 
share a concern w i t h the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of claims to knowledge and the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of scepticism regarding such claims; and here l i e s the 
importance f o r philosophy of the concept of experience. I t s 
fundamental s i g n i f i c a n c e l i e s i n i t s opening a gap, between how 
th i n g s are experienced as being and how they are, which i s the 
ground of the p o s s i b i l i t y of any c r i t i c a l philosophy. I n the l i g h t 
of the possible d i s p a r i t y between how things are and how they are 
experienced as being, the question of the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of claims 
t o knowledge emerges. Without the r e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s possible 
d i s p a r i t y , t h i s epistemological gap, the i n t e r r o g r a t i o n of knowledge-
claims which i s c e n t r a l t o a l l philosophy (other than the 'angels 
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on p i n s ' type) would not be possible. I t underlies the 
Cartesian Doubt and those t r a d i t i o n s i n Western Philosophy 
which f o l l o w e d i n i t s wake. I t also helps us understand 
other features of Strawson's concept, since f o r someone t o 
possess the concept of experience required here, and t o 
recognise the epistemological gap, the s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n of 
experience i s r e q u i r e d ; as when we comment on an experience 
of ours as being n o n - v e r i d i c a l : f o r example, i t seemed t o me 
as though X, but i n f a c t i t was the case t h a t Y. ( I do not 
mean t o r u l e out here the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t we could do without 
the s e l f , and c l i n g only t o t h a t s e l f - r e f l e x i v e n e s s of experience 
which f o r Strawson c o n s t i t u t e s the core of empiri c a l s e l f -
consciousness; 22. but only t o throw some l i g h t on the reasons 
f o r h i s choice of concept.) 
Thus can we understand the p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n t e r e s t of a 
concept of experience i n t o which the p o s s i b i l i t y of s e l f -
a s c r i p t i o n i s b u i l t , r a t h e r than a less s o p h i s t i c a t e d form of 
sentience, say of dogs or babies, which does not involve such 
s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n . And i f experience i s t o provide a k i n d of 
a l t e r n a t i v e t o successful c o g n i t i o n of an o b j e c t i v e world, on 
the basis of which we can c a l l f o r the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of 
knowledge-claims, then i t must have the dual character Strawson 
t a l k s o f , a t l e a s t i n s o f a r as i t must comprise some k i n d of 
awareness or consciousness of some k i n d of item, which recognises 
t h a t itemg,as f a l l i n g under a general concept. 
We now have a f u l l e r grasp of the purposes i n whose l i g h t 
Strawson's concept of experience i s of i n t e r e s t to us. What I 
wish to show now, i s t h a t i f we develop t h i s r e f l e c t i o n on the 
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c o n d i t i o n s of the p o s s i b i l i t y of a concern w i t h the j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
of knowledge-claims, i t enables us to pre-empt the Strawsonian 
p r o j e c t . For look again a t the 'accusatives' of experience. 
We have seen t h a t Strawson needs to avoid presupposing from the 
s t a r t t h a t these items must be conceived o f , i n experience, as 
independent of experience; were he t o make such a presupposition, 
he would h a r d l y r e q u i r e an argument t o the e f f e c t t h a t concepts 
of the o b j e c t i v e must be employed i n experience. But i t i s 
p r e c i s e l y t h i s presupposition which must be made i f the concept 
of experience i s t o be adequate t o the ph i l o s o p h i c a l purposes 
i t i s t o serve. For unless experience i s of items conceived 
of as independent of experience i t s e l f , there would be no 
p o s s i b i l i t y of opening up a gap between how things are and how 
they are experienced as being, and so no p o s s i b i l i t y of c r i t i c a l e m p i r i c i s t 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l thought. I f experience involved nothing more 
than an awareness of an item which made no claim to be independent 
of experience, f o r example, the red patches and t i c k l i n g sensations 
of the sense-datum t h e o r i s t s , 2 - 3 - then there could be no d i s p a r i t y 
between how things are experienced as being and how they are, 
since there would be nothing more t o how things are than how 
they are experienced as being. I t must be already b u i l t i n t o 
t h a t concept of experience which i s t o be of fundamental i n t e r e s t 
to us, t h a t experience i s , a t l e a s t i n p a r t , of items conceived 
of as e x i s t i n g independently of experience i t s e l f ; t h a t those 
items are, i n other words, brought under "concepts of the o b j e c t i v e " . 
Without t h i s as the primary concept of experience, Kant could never 
have faced a scandal, nor Strawson h i s sceptic. Strawson's 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the Transcendental Deduction can succeed only 
i n reaching the p o i n t which i t f i r s t s t a r t e d from. 
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Although t h i s account r e t a i n s the value of some of 
Kant's A n a l y t i c , p a r t i c u l a r l y the Analogies which l a y out 
the necessary s t r u c t u r e of the conception of an o b j e c t i v e 
world i n terms of substance and c a u s a l i t y , and although the 
k i n d of considerations prompted by Kant's argument have a 
value which transcends t h i s argument i t s e l f , i t nevertheless 
takes a major thread of the Deduction - the argument i n 
Strawson's words, t h a t experience must be brought under 
concepts of the o b j e c t i v e - t o be, a t bottom, i d l e . I t 
i s pre-empted by a r e f l e c t i o n on the features required f o r 
the concept of experience t o play i t s a l l o t t e d r o l e . I t 
might seem t h a t t h i s aspect of my account c a l l s f o r more 
discussi o n ; f o r how could Kant, and then Strawson, have f a i l e d 
t o recognise t h i s point? The answer l i e s i n a f o r g e t f u l n e s s 
of the provenance of t h e i r concept of experience i n s c r i b e d i n 
t h e i r work. We have already seen something of the underlying 
tendency t o confuse the question of the l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s 
between a s t r i c t account of experience and the claims to 
knowledge i m p l i c i t i n t h a t experience, w i t h the issue of a 
quasi-psychological genetic account of how we a r r i v e a t t h i s 
everyday r e a l i s t p i c t u r e ; a tendency which l e d the c l a s s i c a l 
e m p i r i c i s t s i n t o t h e i r t a l k of simple se n s e - q u a l i t i e s , and Kant 
(and Strawson) t o take up t h e i r stance i n opp o s i t i o n . I t i s not 
then d i f f i c u l t t o focus, i n a s p i r i t of s c i e n t i f i c n e u t r a l i t y , on 
a generalised concept of experience as an awareness of an item, 
where nothing i s presupposed about the nature of t h a t item. 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , a l l t h i s occurs a t the cost of a gradual amnesia 
concerning the circumstances i n which i t emerged, and the features 
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needed f o r the primary concept t o serve i t s p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
purpose. Now there i s c e r t a i n l y some i n t r i n s i c i n t e r e s t 
i n showing t h a t i f one s t a r t s w i t h t h i s concept, then the 
contents of experience must be brought, at l e a s t i n p a r t , 
under concepts of the o b j e c t i v e . I t nevertheless remains 
the case t h a t t h i s requirement must be b u i l t i n t o any concept 
of experience which, as the ground of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the 
demand f o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n , can be of fundamental s i g n i f i c a n c e 
to c r i t i c a l philosophy, and so ex p l a i n the ph i l o s o p h i c a l 
i n t e r e s t which Strawson speaks vaguely o f . That the Transcendental 
Deduction can be held t o have secured very great and novel gains 
i n philosophy, i s thus a mark of the thoroughness w i t h which 
c r i t i c a l philosophy f o r g e t s i t s beginnings, and so of the need 
f o r the k i n d of p h i l o s o p h i c a l s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n we are attempting 
here. 
We have established t h a t the conclusion of Strawson's 
argument - t h a t experience must be brought i n p a r t under concepts 
of the o b j e c t i v e - i n f a c t states p a r t of what i s required f o r the 
concept of experience t o be of c r i t i c a l e m p i r i c a l use a t a l l . But 
a b r i e f c o n s ideration shows t h a t we need to go f u r t h e r ; more i s 
needed f o r the concept of experience t o play i t s a l l o t t e d r o l e . 
I n order t o make possible the emergence of the question of the 
l e g i t i m a t i o n of claims t o knowledge i n the l i g h t of the possible 
d i s p a r i t y between how things are and how they are experienced as 
being, we need more than the concept of experience as an awareness 
of t h i n g s conceived of as e x i s t i n g independently of the experience 
of them. For, as i t stands, f a r from providing us w i t h a c r i t i c a l 
a l t e r n a t i v e t o the ord i n a r y r e a l i s t view of t h i n g s , t h i s concept 
enshrines t h a t view. 
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I t gives us a general n o t i o n of awareness, where the 
question of the v e r i d i c a l i t y of t h a t awareness i s unquestioned. 
I t i s , we can say, the naive, r a t h e r than the c r i t i c a l concept 
of experience; closer t o the concept used when we say t h a t we 
have experienced, say, a thunder-storm, where t h i s c a r r i e s w i t h 
i t the unquestioned assumption t h a t the storm, of course, e x i s t s . 
But the p o i n t of c r i t i c a l e m p i r i c i s t questioning i s p r e c i s e l y 
t h a t t h i s assumption can be f a l s e , and should therefore be 
placed i n abeyance. I f a claim to knowledge i s t o be questioned 
on the grounds t h a t how things are experienced as being may be 
at variance w i t h how they are^ then the naive concept of experience, 
w i t h the b u i l t - i n unquestioned assumption t h a t how things are 
experienced as being i s i n accord w i t h how they are, i s useless. 
The concept of experience r e q u i r e d f o r such a r o l e must be one 
which does not b r i n g t h i s assumption w i t h i t , but leaves open 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of epistemological d i s p a r i t y . Indeed, i t was 
the n ecessity of l e a v i n g open t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y which c a l l e d f o r 
the employment w i t h i n experience of concepts of the o b j e c t i v e . 
Only t h i s c r i t i c a l concept of experience can allow the e m p i r i c i s t 
t o make sense of the idea t h a t although i t seemed t h a t there was 
a thunderstorm - t h i s was how things were experienced - there may, i n 
f a c t , not have been one a t a l l . I n sh o r t , t h i s c r i t i c a l concept of 
experience i s required f o r the e m p i r i c i s t s c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
purposes. 
We now have a c l e a r grasp of the concept of experience i n 
question. This grasp has been achieved not by i n d i v i d u a l f i a t , 
or a n a l y s i s of ordinary language, or t a c i t convention, but by 
analysing what the concept must be i n order to serve the c r i t i c a l 
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p h i l o s o p h i c a l purposes r e q u i r e d of i t . Without t h i s concept, 
those purposes cannot be f u l f i l l e d . We now have enough of 
the concept t o attempt, by means of an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the 
necessary conditions of i t s p o s s i b i l i t y , a genuine r e f u t a t i o n 
of r a d i c a l empiricism and the scepticism associated w i t h i t . 
This i s the task of Chapter Three. 
Appendix; Experience and Thought 
A t e r m i n o l o g i c a l p o i n t leads on t o an issue which w i l l be 
important l a t e r on. I t w i l l be u s e f u l t o be able to speak of 
experience as ' i n t e n t i o n a l l y ' o f , say, m a t e r i a l objects; where 
the ' i n t e n t i o n a l * helps t o i n d i c a t e the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t how 
thin g s are experienced as being may d i f f e r from how they are. 
I t i s important t o c l a r i f y t h i s use of the term i n r e l a t i o n 
e s p e c i a l l y t o Husserl's. For Husserl,we can specify the 
i n t e n t i o n a l object of an experience - f o r example, a table -
wi t h o u t s p e c i f y i n g what he c a l l s the ' p o s i t i o n a l ' character of 
the experience. Thus the same t a b l e can be the i n t e n t i o n a l 
o b j e c t of a perceptual experience, i n which i t i s perhaps 
p o s i t e d as a c t u a l l y e x i s t i n g ; a memory experience, i n which 
i t i s perhaps posited as having e x i s t e d ; a d e s i r e , i n which i t 
i s perhaps not posited as e x i s t i n g a t a l l , and so on. 
Now i f we have an experience which consists of imagining 
seeing a t a b l e , of a p a r t i c u l a r shape, design and so on, then 
although the i n t e n t i o n a l o b j e c t of the experience i s an example 
of a medium-sized m a t e r i a l o b j e c t - one which, i f i t e x i s t s , 
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e x i s t s independently of the experience of i t - t h a t object 
i s not p o s i t e d as a c t u a l l y e x i s t i n g . Given t h i s , the question 
of a d i s p a r i t y between how t h i n g s are experienced as being and 
how t h i n g s are, does not a r i s e : things are not experienced 
as being such and such a way, here. 
I f we are t o be i n t e r e s t e d i n the n o t i o n of how things are 
experienced as being, then t h a t n o t i o n w i l l have to c a r r y w i t h 
i t the assumption t h a t t h i n g s are posited i n experience i n such 
a way t h a t there can be a divergence between how things are 
experienced as being, and how they are. Thus, when I say "the 
experience i s i n t e n t i o n a l l y of a t a b l e " , I s h a l l normally be 
c o n f l a t i n g two aspects of the experience: the f a c t t h a t the 
i n t e n t i o n a l o b j e c t of the experience i s a t a b l e , and the f a c t 
t h a t the p o s i t i o n a l character of the experience i s such as t o 
render i t capable of c o n f l i c t i n g w i t h how things are. 
This brings out the f a c t t h a t what i s r e a l l y a t the core 
of the c r i t i c a l concept of experience i s t h a t i t a t l e a s t i m p l i c i t l y 
c a r r i e s w i t h i t a c e r t a i n claim, thought or b e l i e f about how things 
are. I t i s t h i s which can c o n f l i c t w i t h how t h i n g s , i n f a c t , are, 
and so provide the basis f o r the c r i t i c a l questioning of 
knowledge-claims. The question as to whether c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
q u e s t i o n i n g can do without the concept of experience, and keep 
in s t e a d to the concept of a ( p o s s i b l y f a l s e ) thought - t h a t which 
has t o be a t l e a s t i m p l i c i t i n experience - w i l l be discussed i n 
Chapter 4. I t i s to the question of the coherence of a r a d i c a l 
e m p i r i c i s t c r i t i c a l philosophy t h a t we now t u r n . 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The R e f u t a t i o n of Empiri c i s m 
I n t r o d u c t i o n 
I f the argument of the preceding chapter i s s u c c e s s f u l , 
then we have some grasp of the concept of experience which the 
e m p i r i c i s t must use i n order to make p o s s i b l e the concern with 
the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of knowledge-claims. B r i e f l y , i t i s the 
concept of experience a s , i n t e n t i o n a l l y , of items i n an o b j e c t i v e 
world, such t h a t how t h i n g s are experienced as being may be a t 
v a r i a n c e with how thin g s r e a l l y a r e . On t h i s b a s i s , I want to 
pre s e n t two attempts a t a r e f u t a t i o n of r a d i c a l empiricism; the 
f i r s t i n v o l v i n g conceptual entailment, the second i n v o l v i n g 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n . An o b j e c t i o n to the f i r s t attempt w i l l lead us 
to the second. The second attempt i s intended to succeed. 
The F i r s t Attempt 
The o u t l i n e of the concept of experience given i n the previous 
chapter seems to open the way immediately to a c o n c l u s i v e r e f u t a t i o n 
of r a d i c a l empiricism, by making use of a conceptual entailment 
which now seems to be a s s o c i a t e d with the c r i t i c a l concept of 
ex p e r i e n c e . I f the concept of experience c a r r i e s a c e n t r a l 
r e f e r e n c e to an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , then, i f there i s experience, then 
there must be an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y - o b j e c t i v e p r e c i s e l y i n th a t how 
th i n g s are with i t may d i f f e r from how they are experienced as being. 
So, given our grasp of the concept of experience, i f there i s 
experience - which the e m p i r i c i s t can ha r d l y deny - then there i s 
an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . The t r u t h of the e m p i r i c i s t c l a i m t h a t there 
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i s e x p e r i e n c e , r e q u i r e s the t r u t h of the claim t h a t there i s 
an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . E m p i r i c i s t s c e p t i c i s m about the 
e x i s t e n c e of such a r e a l i t y (though not n e c e s s a r i l y s c e p t i c i s m 
concerning the e x i s t e n c e of p a r t i c u l a r items w i t h i n t h a t r e a l i t y ) , 
i s t h e r e f o r e i n c o n s i s t e n t : i t i s true only i f i t i s f a l s e . 
T h i s way with e m p i r i c i s t s c e p t i c i s m i s a l l too quick, i t 
may be f e l t . C e r t a i n l y i t r e l i e s on what might be c a l l e d the 
a n a l y s i s of the concept of experience; but i f so i t would seem 
merely to show t h a t conceptual a n a l y s i s i s not s u f f i c i e n t i n t h i s 
a r e a . Before c o n s i d e r i n g o b j e c t i o n s to the argument i n more 
d e t a i l , I need to make a b r i e f excursus. 
E x c u r s u s : T r a n s p o s i t i o n of the D i s c u s s i o n 
For convenience, I want here to make a v a i l a b l e a t r a n s p o s i t i o n 
of the d i s c u s s i o n i n t o terms of the word "experience", r a t h e r than 
the concept of experience. I n s t e a d of j u s t t a l k i n g of what 
concept of experience i s r e q u i r e d f o r c r i t i c a l empiricism, I want 
to be able to t a l k a l s o of what meaning the word "experience" must 
have i n order to p l a y i t s a l l o t t e d r o l e i n c r i t i c a l empiricism. 
T h i s t r a n s p o s i t i o n i s not e s s e n t i a l to the argument a g a i n s t r a d i c a l 
e mpiricism, but w i l l , I hope, make some of the going e a s i e r . 
T h i s t r a n s p o s i t i o n w i l l enable us to s t e e r a course through some 
awkward language regarding concepts - f o r example, the notion of 
the 'content' of a concept, and the problems with t h i s metaphor -
by r e l a t i n g i t to the l e s s awkward language of semantics which runs 
p a r a l l e l to i t - f o r example, t a l k of the meaning of a word, which 
a. 
I i n t e n d to p a r a l l e l e x a c t l y t a l k of the content of a concept. 
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T h i s i s done by t a k i n g the word as the e x p r e s s i o n 
of the s a l i e n t concept, and without begging any questions 
about the e x i s t e n c e of embodied speaking s u b j e c t s making 
p e r c e p t i b l e marks or n o i s e s towards an embodied hearing 
s u b j e c t i n the ord i n a r y world. We s h a l l , f o r the present, 
take the r e a l p h y s i c a l e x i s t e n c e of an expression as i n e s s e n t i a l 
to the e x p r e s s i o n as such, thus allowing even f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of p r i v a t e 'marks of concepts' (as pas t philosophers, i n c l u d i n g 
Kant, seem to have done). The b r i e f argument a g a i n s t r a d i c a l 
e m p i r i c i s m given above w i l l now be a v a i l a b l e i n the form of the 
c l a i m t h a t i f the term 'experience* i s to play i t s r o l e i n 
c r i t i c a l philosophy - t h a t i s , i f i t i s to serve as an expression 
f o r the r e q u i s i t e concept - then i t s meaning must be such as to 
give r i s e to c e r t a i n semantic entailments. I n p a r t i c u l a r , i f 
"There i s experience" i s t r u e , i t must, by v i r t u e of the meaning 
of "experience", be true t h a t there i s a r e a l i t y w ith which 
experience may be a t v a r i a n c e . For u n l e s s the meaning of 
"experience" has t h i s consequence, there i s no p o s s i b i l i t y 
of making the d i s t i n c t i o n between how things are experienced 
as being, and how they r e a l l y are; and i t i s t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n 
which makes p o s s i b l e the q u e s t i o n of the l e g i t i m a t i o n of claims 
to knowledge which u n d e r l i e s a l l c r i t i c a l e m p i r i c i s t philosophy.3-
I f t h e r e i s experience, there must be a r e a l i t y independent of i t . 
I n making t h i s t r a n s p o s i t i o n a v a i l a b l e , I do not commit 
myself to any view concerning the p r i o r i t y of the concept of a 
concept, and the concept of language; I j u s t want to use the 
p a r a l l e l s . I n the f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n , I s h a l l t a l k of e i t h e r 
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the concept of experience, or the term "experience", according 
to which seems most h e l p f u l . Wherever a s i g n i f i c a n t problem 
i s r a i s e d by t h i s t a c t i c , I s h a l l draw a t t e n t i o n to i t . L e t 
us r e t u r n to the argument a g a i n s t e m p i r i c i s t s c e p t i c i s m , and a 
f i r s t o b j e c t i o n to i t . 
F i r s t O b j e c t i o n and Reply 
Here are grouped a number of attempts to avoid, or n e u t r a l i s e , 
the r e f e r e n c e to an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , and so to avoid the commitment 
i t a p p a r e n t l y lands us w i t h . A f t e r a l l , having got our concept 
of experience, expressed by the term "experience", are we not to 
use i t i n an e m p i r i c i s t account of t h i s supposed r e a l i t y ? Can we 
not, with an ear to the h i s t o r y of empiricism, give an account of 
r e a l i t y as a t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t , to help enable us e x p l a i n why 
experience has the c h a r a c t e r i t does? Or perhaps as merely the 
general i n t e n t i o n a l c o r r e l a t e of experience? Or even as a l o g i c a l 
4-. 
c o n s t r u c t out of experience? Notwithstanding the s o p h i s t i c a t i o n 
of t h e i r development i n e m p i r i c i s t philosphy, none of these accounts 
can succeed. T h i s i s f o r the simple reason t h a t , i n accepting that 
there i s experience,these attempts a t r e c a s t i n g o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y 
i n terms of experience are f o r c e d to accept the commitment to an 
o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y which comes with i t . The conceptual, and 
corresponding semantic, entailment here cannot be severed by any 
means which assume t h a t t h e r e i s , i n the r e q u i r e d sense, experience. 
- 53 -
Responses t o the Reply to the F i r s t Objection 
1. A number of responses ( w i t h v a r i a t i o n s ) t o t h i s r e p l y are 
c u r r e n t . Let us look f i r s t a t one which stems from Quine's 
argument against the notions of meaning, synonymy and others 
i n the c i r c l e ; and the associated attack on the a n a l y t i c / s y n t h e t i c 
d i s t i n c t i o n . ^' The response i s t h a t t h i s n o t i o n of semantic 
(o r conceptual) entailment i s as shaky as the r e s t . There 
are no entailments of the k i n d needed here, only more or less 
entrenched a s c r i p t i o n s of truth-values t o sentences. I t i s 
open to the e m p i r i c i s t , the response continues, to accept t h a t 
there i s experience and r e j e c t the purported entailment concerning 
the existence of an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . 
I b e l i e v e t h a t there are sound general arguments against the 
Quinean position,^'but here I w i l l r e s t r i c t the discussion to 
a p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t . This concerns the p r i c e the e m p i r i c i s t 
pays f o r holding t h a t there i s experience, w h i l s t r e j e c t i n g 
t h a t there i s an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . For i f there i s no 
o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y w i t h which experience can be a t odds, then 
there i s no p o s s i b i l i t y of opening up the epistemological gap 
between experience and r e a l i t y which makes c r i t i c a l empiricism 
p o s s i b l e . The p r i c e the e m p i r i c i s t must pay f o r r e j e c t i n g 
the entailment, i s the e n t i r e c r i t i c a l e m p i r i c i s t p r o j e c t , 
i n c l u d i n g the scepticism t h a t accompanies i t . This, i t seems 
reasonable to say, i s not a p r i c e the e m p i r i c i s t w i l l f i n d 
worth paying. Instead, we may be d i r e c t e d to a second 
response. 
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2. This consists i n an in s i s t e n c e t h a t we can do r a d i c a l 
e m p i r i c i s t philosophy w i t h a concept of experience which 
does not b r i n g w i t h i t the commitment t o the existence 
of an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . That i s , i t i s possible t o get 
a concept of experience poorer i n entailments, but s u f f i c i e n t 
f o r the task r e q u i r e d . We might t r y , f o r example, a concept 
of experience as awareness of an item, where nothing i s 
presupposed about e i t h e r the nature of the item, or the 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t how i t appears may d i f f e r from how i t i n 
f a c t i s . This would be, i n e f f e c t , the naive concept of 
7 
experience discussed i n Chapter Two. ' I n the face of such 
i n s i s t e n c e we can only take steps we have already taken. 
I f experience involved nothing more than an awareness of 
an item which made no claim to be independent of experience, 
then there could be no d i s p a r i t y between how things are 
experienced as being, and how they are; there could not, 
then, be any c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l thought provoked by 
r e f l e c t i o n on such d i s p a r i t y . Such thought i s possible 
only i f we move from the naive concept of experience t o the 
c r i t i c a l concept, t h a t i s , only i f we take i n t o account the 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t how things are experienced can be d i f f e r e n t 
from how they are. To cast i t i n Carnap 1s 'material mode': 
experience must con t a i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of d i f f e r i n g from 
r e a l i t y . I f i t d i d n o t , then no e m p i r i c i s t c r i t i c a l 
philosophy would be possible. 
3. I n the normal run of t h i n g s , I would leave t h a t discussion as 
i t stands, but the response t h e r e i n dismissed might seem t o 
receive s t i f f e r backing from arguments i n the recent philosophy 
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of language associated most c l o s e l y w i t h Kripke. 
For could we not understand the term "experience" as 
having the ki n d of ' r i g i d i t y ' ascribed t o general terms? 
Thus w i t h the term "water" we draw a t t e n t i o n to t h i s s t u f f , 
whatever i t s necessary p r o p e r t i e s might t u r n out to be, 
and can then go on t o discover t h a t a necessary property 
possessed by water i s a p a r t i c u l a r molecular s t r u c t u r e . 
Could we not s i m i l a r l y use the term "experience" to draw 
a t t e n t i o n to naive experience, and then go on t o discover 
t h a t a necessary property of experience was t h a t i t could 
d i f f e r from o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y ? Even i f we accept the 
u n d e r l y i n g theory of general terms - and t h i s c o n f l i c t s w i t h 
a 
more t r a d i t i o n a l t h e o r i e s - the s i t u a t i o n s are s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
d i f f e r e n t . The necessary pr o p e r t i e s ascribed t o water are 
e m p i r i c a l l y discoverable: these are the p r o p e r t i e s which 
water - t h i s s t u f f - turns out t o have. I n the meantime we 
can go on using the term "water" i n ways p e r f e c t l y s u i t e d to 
our purposes. But the necessary property of experience -
t h a t i t can d i f f e r from r e a l i t y - i s not e m p i r i c a l l y discoverable. 
I t i s necessary i n t h a t without i t the term "experience" cannot 
be used t o s u i t our purposes. With the naive concept, the 
epistemological r e l a t i o n s h i p between experience and r e a l i t y 
i s unquestioned. The r a i s i n g of the question of t h i s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , which i s the cornerstone of c r i t i c a l empiricism, 
requires p r e c i s e l y a concept of experience which takes on board 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of epistemological d i s p a r i t y . By v i r t u e of 
t h i s alone, i t can no longer be the naive concept, but the 
c r i t i c a l concept which must be employed. I p r e f e r to hold 
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t h a t t h i s shows t h a t t h i s 'necessary property' of 
experience i s an a - p r i o r i conceptually necessary property, 
b r i n g i n g w i t h i t the c r u c i a l conceptual entailments. Even 
so, f o r those who p r e f e r t o see i t as merely a necessary 
presupposition of the c r i t i c a l e m p i r i c i s t use of the concept, 
t h a t how things are experienced as being may d i f f e r from how 
they are, I s h a l l show i n a discussion of Ayer's response 
t h a t t h i s makes no s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e to the c e n t r a l 
argument. 
4. Ayer's favoured method of i n t r o d u c i n g the sense-data, or 
percepts, which are the elements of h i s theories of perception 
and the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the o b j e c t i v e world, i s based on the 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t how th i n g s seem, or are experienced as being, 
may d i f f e r from how they are. Here he t a l k s of the f a m i l i a r 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t although i t seems t h a t there i s a cigarette-case 
on the t a b l e , there may not i n f a c t be one. I t may be, say, an 
lO 
h a l l u c i n a t i o n . Having the concept of experience, we can t a l k 
of sense-data as items w i t h i n the ' f i e l d ' of t h a t experience, 
but the concept of experience i s c l e a r l y a necessary p r e - r e q u i s i t e . 1 
Now Ayer i s c a r e f u l not t o o f f e r a d e f i n i t i o n of "sense-datum" 
or "percept", using terms from our ordinary language, w i t h t h e i r 
commitment t o the existence of an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y ; f o r t h i s 
would immediately e n t a i l t h a t , i f there are percepts, then 
there i s an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . The t a l k about cigarette-cases 
and so on i s designed merely t o exp l a i n , not de f i n e , the u n f a m i l i a r 
terms: 1 2' here we can use any means at our disposal, as long as 
no l o g i c a l entailment i s b u i l t i n . 1 3 - Thus although we use 
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language which presupposes t h a t the o b j e c t i v e world of 
our ordinary perceptual judgements e x i s t s , i n order to 
e x p l a i n the meaning of "percept" (and t h i s w i l l be true 
of "experience" a l s o ) , we are t o l d t h a t t h i s does not 
i n v o l v e us i n any unpleasant l o g i c a l entailments, and 
t h a t any apparent i m p l i c a t i o n s concerning the existence 
of an o b j e c t i v e world can be severed. Now as f a r concerns 
the concept of experience, we have argued t h a t there i s a 
conceptual ( ' l o g i c a l ' ) entailment here. But even i f we 
accepted the p o s i t i o n described i n the previous paragraph, 
where i t i s decreed t h a t the commitment to the existence of 
the o b j e c t i v e world i s not a matter of conceptual entailment, 
we cannot escape t h a t commitment. For we have seen t h a t , 
f o r the concept of experience to be of use to c r i t i c a l 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l enquiry, i t must necessarily be presupposed t h a t 
experience may diverge from o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . I t i s thus 
a necessary presupposition of a l l e m p i r i c i s t employment of the 
concept t h a t , where there i s experience, there i s an o b j e c t i v e 
r e a l i t y from which i t may d i f f e r . We cannot then r e t r a c t t h i s 
presupposition - f o r example, by arguing t h a t t h i s r e a l i t y i s 
only some s o r t of t h e o r e t i c a l , or f i c t i o n a l , or l o g i c a l 
c o n s t r u c t i o n out of experience - without depriving ourselves 
of the concept. For i f asked to explain t h i s l a t t e r employment 
of the concept, we can, again, only do so on the necessary 
presupposition of the existence of an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y from 
which experience may diverge. Without t h i s presupposition, the employ-
ment of the concept f o r e m p i r i c i s t purposes i s not possible, and so 
n e i t h e r i s the r e t r a c t i o n of the commitment to an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y 
on e m p i r i c i s t grounds. 
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Ayer himself i s concerned e x p l i c i t l y more w i t h the 
concept of a percept, or sense-datum, (although he 
makes i t clear t h a t the e s s e n t i a l n o t i o n i s t h a t of 
how th i n g s seem, or are experienced as being, as capable 
of d i f f e r i n g from how they are Here the question of 
a conceptual entailment t o the existence of an ob j e c t i v e 
r e a l i t y i s at l e a s t removed a step. But the basic 
p o s i t i o n i s unchanged. Even i f we accept the absence 
of an important conceptual entailment here - and i t should 
be c l e a r from the preceding discussion t h a t there are good 
reasons f o r not accepting t h i s - we again r e t u r n to the 
argument concerning the presuppositions of the use of the 
concept. I f we can use the concept of a percept only on 
the presupposition t h a t i t i s p a r t of an experience which 
may d i f f e r from o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , then we cannot construe 
t h a t r e a l i t y as merely some k i n d of t h e o r e t i c a l construct 
out of percepts, and so as perhaps not r e a l l y e x i s t i n g at a l l . 
For t h i s would again be to deprive ourselves of the use of the 
concept required f o r t h i s c o n s t r u a l . Without t h a t necessary 
presupposition no c r i t i c a l e m p i r i c i s t use of the concept i s 
pos s i b l e ; and so no e m p i r i c i s t r e t r a c t i o n of the commitment 
to the existence of an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , using t h a t concept, 
i s p o s s i b l e . We cannot take away a necessary c o n d i t i o n of 
the use of a concept, or the roeaningfulness of the appropriate 
term, and s t i l l use t h a t concept or term. Whether as an 
entailment of the concept or as a necessary presupposition 
of i t s employment, we must accept t h a t , i f there i s experience, 
then there i s an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y from which i t may diverge. 
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5. But a f u r t h e r modulation of t h i s response suggests t h a t 
t h i s commitment to the existence of an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y -
whether as a conceptual or semantic entailment, or as a 
necessary presupposition of the e m p i r i c i s t use of the 
concept - i s imported only i f we give an account of the 
concept of experience i n terms of other concepts, or of 
the word "experience" i n terms of other words. I f , instead, 
we accept such explanations only as helping us i n t o a 
s i t u a t i o n where we confront the experience d i r e c t l y - t h i s , 
here, now - then we can achieve an ostensive grasp of the 
concept, or of the meaning of the word, which avoids t h a t 
commitment. I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n we can r e f l e c t , i n hallowed 
e m p i r i c i s t fashion, on what i s immediately present and say, 
"That i s an experience". The concept i s thus made possible 
by v i r t u e of d i r e c t acquaintance w i t h i t s instances. Philosophers 
are now generally warier of such explanations of c e n t r a l concepts, 
and w i t h good reason. To see what i s wrong w i t h t h i s suggestion 
as t o how an ostensive grasp of the word "experience" can avoid 
unwanted entailments, we must f i r s t recognise t h a t an ostensive 
account of the meaning of a word presupposes a pre-understanding 
of t h a t which i s being ostended as something or other. 1 5' Consider 
an example. I f I say " t h a t i s k i n d " i n order to explain the 
meaning of the word " k i n d " , I succeed i n s e t t i n g up the appropriate 
l i n k only i f the r e f e r e n t of the demonstrative " t h a t " i s understood 
as an a c t i o n , say of g i v i n g up a seat to an i n f i r m person, rather 
than as, say, the person's body, the colour of the person's coat, 
or the expression on the person's face. With a term l i k e " c a t " , 
the r e f e r e n t of the demonstrative must be understood as a m a t e r i a l 
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o b j e c t . I n each case of ostensive explanation, 
we must already understand the r e f e r e n t as f a l l i n g 
under a c e r t a i n general category. Without such an 
understanding, the term i n question cannot acquire i t s 
meaning os t e n s i v e l y . 
What k i n d of 'understanding' i s involved here? I t i s 
perhaps c l e a r t h a t i t i s not an e x p l i c i t l y a r t i c u l a t e d 
understanding of the r e f e r e n t , as f a l l i n g under a c e r t a i n 
general category, which i s necessary here. No c h i l d learns 
the term " m a t e r i a l o b j e c t " before l e a r n i n g terms f o r p a r t i c u l a r 
kinds of m a t e r i a l o b j e c t . What i s required i s the k i n d 
of understanding of things possessed by a c h i l d who handles, 
and t a l k s o f , c h a i r s and t a b l e s , and i m p l i c i t l y understands 
them as things which can be seen and touched, which p e r s i s t 
through space and time, and so on: i n short, a c h i l d who 
i m p l i c i t y understands them as m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s . This k i n d 
of understanding provides the context w i t h i n which alone ostensive 
explanation of terms f o r p a r t i c u l a r kinds of m a t e r i a l objects 
can succeed., I use the expressions "understanding something 
as such-and-such", "conceiving something as such-and-such" and 
" b r i n g i n g something under the concept of such-and-such" as 
equivalents. Each expression can be used i n connection 
w i t h e i t h e r i m p l i c i t or e x p l i c i t understanding/concept-use. 
Thus the c h i l d above w i l l be said to i m p l i c i t l y understand 
c e r t a i n things as m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s , t o conceive of them as 
m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s , and t o b r i n g them under the concept of a 
m a t e r i a l object - w i t h o u t possessing the l i n g u i s t i c resources 
w i t h which t o e x p l i c i t l y a r t i c u l a t e t h i s understanding/conceptualisation. 
When such resources become a v a i l a b l e , t h a t i m p l i c i t understanding/ 
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c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n can be made e x p l i c i t : the c h i l d w i l l be 
able t o say t h a t some things are ma t e r i a l o b j e c t s , and so 
on. Now we speak f a i r l y e a s i l y of adults i m p l i c i t l y 
understanding/conceiving of something as such-and-such, 
where we know t h a t the l i n g u i s t i c resources f o r the e x p l i c i t 
a r t i c u l a t i o n of such conceivings/understandings are a v a i l a b l e 
i f r e q u i r e d . I f a hunter sees a f u r r y o bject and shoots i t , 
only t o f i n d t h a t she has shot someone's coat, then we are happy 
to say t h a t she brought t h a t o b j e c t , i m p l i c i t l y , under the 
concept of an animal. No e x p l i c i t conceptualisation or 
judgement need have been made, though she possessed the l i n g u i s t i c 
resources necessary f o r such e x p l i c i t a t i o n . Philosophers 
are, i n general, less happy t o speak of beings who do not 
have the relev a n t resources as b r i n g i n g t h i n g s , i m p l i c i t l y , 
under c e r t a i n concepts. Even here there i s a d i s t i n c t i o n 
t o be made between those beings (e.g. c h i l d r e n ) who w i l l come 
to have the a b i l i t i e s r e q u i r e d , and those (e.g. dogs) who w i l l 
n ot. I w i l l take up the question of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
language and co n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n i n more d e t a i l i n Chapter Five. 
Here, I only want t o say t h a t the ostensive explanation of 
a l i n g u i s t i c term requires f o r i t s success an understanding 
of i t s r e f e r e n t j i s being i n a c e r t a i n general category ( f o r 
example, as an animal, colour, a c t i o n , m a t e r i a l o b j e c t ) ; and 
f u r t h e r t h a t i n the case of l i n g u i s t i c terms f o r the general 
categories themselves, t h i s understanding w i l l of necessity 
be i m p l i c i t , r a t h e r than e x p l i c i t l y a r t i c u l a t e d . Let us look 
at the argument f o r t h i s . 
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I f ostensive explanations of terms require a p r i o r 
understanding of the ostensive r e f e r e n t s as f a l l i n g 
under a c e r t a i n general category, then what can we say 
about ostensive explanations of the category terms 
themselves? Take " m a t e r i a l o b j e c t " : we cannot successfully 
provide an ostensive l i n k between the term and instances of 
i t , unless those instances are already ( i m p l i c i t l y ) understood 
as m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s . Without t h i s pre-understanding, the 
term w i l l not possess i t s appropriate meaning. The concept 
must already be i m p l i c i t l y employed, i f the term i s t o be 
s u c c e s s f u l l y explained. 
The term "experience" puts us i n a s i m i l a r p o s i t i o n . I t 
can be ostensively explained only i n connection w i t h examples 
which are already ( i m p l i c i t l y ) understood as f a l l i n g under 
the concept of experience. Without t h i s p r i o r understanding, 
no ostensive explanation can succeed. Indeed, the l i n g u i s t i c 
term i s t h a t through which t h a t understanding comes to e x p l i c i t 
a r t i c u l a t i o n . 1 6 . The problem here i s t h i s : I have argued 
t h a t a necessary c o n d i t i o n of the success of the ostensive 
explanation of the term "experience" i s t h a t the r e f e r e n t be 
already understood ( i f only i m p l i c i t l y ) j i s an experience. 
Consequently, the entailments c a r r i e d by the use of the 
concept of experience are also c a r r i e d , i m p l i c i t l y , by t h i s 
i m p l i c i t use of the concept. Of course, we can only 
e x p l i c i t l y draw out these i m p l i c a t i o n s a f t e r we can e x p l i c i t l y 
use the concept; but those i m p l i c a t i o n s must already be 
present i n the i m p l i c i t use of the concept, i n t h a t pre-
understanding of the ostensive r e f e r e n t as an experience, 
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or i t could not be the pre-understanding whose e x p l i c i t 
a r t i c u l a t i o n i n the term "experience" plays such a 
c r u c i a l r o l e i n c r i t i c a l empiricism. The entailments 
concerning the existence of an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y 
remain. 
I should note a p o i n t which arises from t h i s : we are i n 
a s i t u a t i o n where the p a r a l l e l between t a l k of concepts 
and t a l k of l i n g u i s t i c expressions of those concepts 
breaks down.1-* I said e a r l i e r t h a t I would t r e a t as 
equivalents the formulations "understanding something as 
such-and-such", "conceiving something as such-and-such", 
and "subsuming something under the concept of such-and-such". 
Each f o r m u l a t i o n can be used t o cover e i t h e r i m p l i c i t or 
e x p l i c i t concept-use. " L i n g u i s t i c expression", on the 
other hand, can be used only t o cover e x p l i c i t concept-use -
the ostensive explanation of a l i n g u i s t i c expression can provide 
the means through which i m p l i c i t understanding/use of concepts 
reaches e x p l i c i t a r t i c u l a t i o n . There i s then a sense 
i n which the i m p l i c i t use of concepts takes p r i o r i t y over 
t h e i r l i n g u i s t i c expression. ( i w i l l discuss t h i s f u r t h e r 
i n Chapter Five.) 
Let me summarise the stage we have reached a f t e r the discussions 
of the F i r s t Objection t o our F i r s t Attempt a t a r e f u t a t i o n of 
empiricism. I have argued t h a t i f the explanation of the term 
"experience" i s to succeed, i t requires t h a t the r e f e r e n t of the 
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ostension be a t l e a s t i m p l i c i t l y conceived o f , or understood as, 
an experience. This concept, or understanding, i s t h a t which 
i s expressed, or a r t i c u l a t e d , by means of the term. For the term 
to be t h a t which i s r e q u i r e d by c r i t i c a l empiricism, the concept 
or understanding of the r e f e r e n t of the ostensive explanation 
must have a p a r t i c u l a r nature. That concept or understanding 
must be of experience as, i n t e n t i o n a l l y , of an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y 
w i t h which i t may f a i l t o achieve c o g n i t i v e consummation. Thus 
even i n an ostensive explanation of the term "experience", i t i s 
t h i s concept, or understanding, which i s thereby expressed or 
a r t i c u l a t e d by means of t h a t term: and t h i s involves the e m p i r i c i s t 
i n the f a m i l i a r commitments. For the claim t h a t there i s experience, 
e n t a i l s , given the explanation of the meaning of the term "experience" 
v i a d i r e c t ostension of examples, t h a t there i s an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y 
which may be other than how i t i s experienced as being. There 
cannot j u s t be experience, f o r the term "experience" can play i t s 
r e q u i r e d r o l e only i f i t expresses the concept of experience as 
r e l a t e d t o an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y w i t h which i t may f a i l to agree. 
I f , on the other hand, we t r y to l i m i t the pre-understanding of 
the r e f e r e n t of the ostension so as not t o burden ourselves w i t h 
these entailments, we encounter the same problem as before. That 
i s , we w i l l a r r i v e a t an account of the term "experience", which 
makes i t inadequate f o r i t s e m p i r i c i s t purposes. 
Neither an ostensive nor a l e x i c a l explanation of the meaning 
of "experience" can escape t h i s f a c t . For the term t o be able to 
f u l f i l i t s r e q u i r e d c r i t i c a l r o l e i n e m p i r i c i s t thought, i t must 
be accepted t h a t , as a matter of conceptual entailment, i f there 
i s experience, then there i s an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y from which i t 
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may diverge. 1^ i s not then open t o us t o claim t h a t the 
existence of t h i s r e a l i t y i s not on a par w i t h the existence 
of experience, but i s only some kin d of co n s t r u c t i o n out of 
experience; and t h a t t h e r e f o r e t h i s r e a l i t y does not , perhaps, 
r e a l l y e x i s t a t a l l . For t h i s would be to leave us unable 
to a t t a c h the required meaning t o the word. I f asked to 
e x p l a i n the word "experience", we necessarily r e - i n s t a t e 
o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y as t h a t from which experience may d i f f e r . 
I n whatever sense, and t o whatever extent, experience e x i s t s , 
so too does o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . We cannot shed conceptual or 
semantic entailments as a snake sheds unwanted skins. None of 
the ela b o r a t i o n s of the F i r s t Objection enumerated i n t h i s section 
can escape t h i s conclusion. But, before we accept the ominously 
t i t l e d F i r s t Attempt a t r e f u t i n g empiricism, we need t o consider a 
Second Objection to i t , which w i l l force us to deepen the argument 
against c r i t i c a l empiricism. 
The Second Objection 
The second o b j e c t i o n to the r e f u t a t i o n of r a d i c a l empiricism 
o f f e r e d above develops the argument by means of a very simple 
suggestion. Let us accept the commitment t o an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y 
c a r r i e d by the e m p i r i c i s t use of the concept of experience. Even 
so, t h i s does not s e t t l e scepticism about any p a r t i c u l a r claim 
concerning t h a t r e a l i t y : f o r example, about the claim t h a t I am 
doing the washing i n the k i t c h e n . Indeed, the suggestion runs, 
t h i s t a l k o f an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y i s only a s u b s t a n t i v i s i n g of 
t a l k of how things r e a l l y are ( i n possible c o n t r a s t w i t h how they 
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are experienced as b e i n g ) ; and i t may be t h a t i t i s r e a l l y 
the case t h a t there e x i s t no actual items which are independent 
of experience. What t h i s brings out i s the f a c t t h a t we want 
more than j u s t a s u b s t a n t i v i s a t i o n of how things are: we want 
items which a c t u a l l y e x i s t , and whose existence i s not merely 
a matter of t h e i r being experienced, but something which can 
c a r r y on whether they are experienced or not. Correlated with 
t h i s ' o n t o l o g i c a l ' independence i s the n o t i o n of epistemological 
o b j e c t i v i t y w i t h regard t o these items; t h a t i s , t h a t how things 
are w i t h such items w i l l not necessarily coincide w i t h how they 
are experienced as being. The o b j e c t i o n presented here i s t h a t 
i t may be the case t h a t the o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , which we have 
secured w i t h such p a i n f u l argument, i s empty of any actual items 
independent of experience. That i s , i t may be t h a t how things 
are d i f f e r s from how they are experienced as being i n t h i s way: 
i t seems t h a t there are o b j e c t s , people and so on, i n a world whose 
existence i s independent of experience; whereas r e a l l y there i s 
a b s o l u t e l y nothing beyond experience i t s e l f - no people, objects 
and so f o r t h - j u s t n o t h i n g . The e m p i r i c i s t sceptic may 
understandably f e e l t h a t an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y w i t h nothing i n 
i t w i l l do as w e l l as no o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y at a l l ; indeed, may 
f e e l t h a t t h i s was the p o i n t a l l along - perhaps experience i s 
a l l there i s . The commitment to the existence of an epi9temologically 
o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y has not been shown to involve a commitment to the 
act u a l existence of anything independent of experience, and without 
t h i s t r a n s i t i o n , the s u b s t a n t i v i s i n g of t a l k about how things r e a l l y 
are gives us an ' o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y ' i n f a r too meagre a sense. 
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I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , where the existence of experience 
i s acknowledged along w i t h a r e a l i t y about which nothing has 
been e s t a b l i s h e d , the space f o r t h e o r i e s about the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between experience and claims about the existence of mater i a l 
objects ( r a t h e r than of 'o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y ' i n general) i s 
merely re-opened. Perhaps our ordinary view of the m a t e r i a l 
world has u l t i m a t e l y the st a t u s of a theory to account f o r the 
character of experience. And so on. Semantic or conceptual 
entailments, i t can be argued, cannot by themselves get us very 
f a r . 
What are we t o do i n face of the s i m p l i c i t y of t h i s objection? 
The arguments about whether the use of the concept of experience 
c a r r i e s , v i a conceptual entailments, inescapable commitments to 
the existence of an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y seem t o have no force here. 
For t h i s o b j e c t o r can accept a l l those arguments, and a l l those 
commitments, and j u s t say t h a t they do not amount t o very much. 
The phrase " o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y " , w i t h i t s f a m i l i a r s o l i d i t y , has 
misled us i n t o t h i n k i n g t h a t we have established the existence of 
the e x t e r n a l world, and i t s f u l l - b l o o d e d i n h a b i t a n t s , whereas what 
we have i n f a c t i s a phrase which merely substantivises one side 
of the epistemological d i s t i n c t i o n between how things are, and 
how they are experienced as being. This r a t h e r ghostly 'objective 
r e a l i t y ' may not be i n h a b i t e d a t a l l , and yet could s t i l l play the 
re q u i r e d r o l e i n c r i t i c a l e m p i r i c i s t philosophy. I f we are t o 
get a commitment to the existence of t h a t world, w i t h i t s peoples 
and t h i n g s , which we know and lov e , then we need a second attempt 
a t a r e f u t a t i o n - an attempt which takes i n t o account t h i s o b j e c t i o n 
and thereby deepens the discussion. I aim to show t h a t t h i s second 
attempt succeeds. 
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The Second Attempt 
To see how we can begin to counter the second o b j e c t i o n 
t o the f i r s t attempt at a r e f u t a t i o n , and so t o move towards 
a conclusive r e f u t a t i o n , consider the f o l l o w i n g thought: "There 
i s experience". No e m p i r i c i s t can deny t h i s , and remain an 
e m p i r i c i s t . We have seen moreover t h a t , given our account of 
the concept of experience r e q u i r e d f o r the c r i t i c a l purposes of 
empiricism, t h i s e n t a i l s t h a t there i s an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . 
This entailment claim was defended against v a r i a n t s of one 
o b j e c t i o n . The second o b j e c t i o n above showed us, however, t h a t 
t h i s does not help us much against the scepticism associated w i t h 
r a d i c a l empiricism. I f the discovery of conceptual entailments 
advances the cause h a r d l y a t a l l , what other options are open? 
At work i n much of the t h i n k i n g concerned w i t h transcendental 
arguments i s the n o t i o n of a presuppositional argument. 1 9' I n 
developing such an argument against r a d i c a l empiricism, I s h a l l 
make some b r i e f comments as to the nature of t h i s k i n d of 
argument. 
Presuppositional Arguments 
The n o t i o n of presupposition does work i n such a v a r i e t y of 
contexts - the l i n k s between which are sometimes obscure - t h a t 
there seems l i t t l e chance of p r o v i d i n g a general account of 
presupposition which w i l l f i t them a l l . S t i l l , i f we i n v e s t i g a t e 
a l i t t l e t h i s v a r i e t y , i t may give us some poi n t e r s relevant to our 
present purposes. Let us look a t some well-known examples. 
Strawson, i n arguing against Russell's analysis of r e f e r r i n g 
expressions, claims i n e f f e c t t h a t , i n an a s c r i p t i o n of e i t h e r 
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t r u t h or f a l s i t y t o the sentence "The King of Prance i s wise", 
i t i s presupposed, r a t h e r than asserted, t h a t there i s at present 
a King of France.1*' We could say t h a t the existence of such a k i n g 
i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n of both the t r u t h , and the ' s t r a i g h t - f o r w a r d ' 
or 'minimal' f a l s i t y of the sentence. 2 0" I n h i s examination of 
speech-acts, 2 t Searle can be taken as arguing t h a t the f e l i c i t o u s 
performance of i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts presupposes t h a t c e r t a i n 
'preparatory' conditions o b t a i n : f o r example, the f e l i c i t o u s 
performance of the act of asking someone to open the door presupposes 
t h a t the door i s not already open. I f t h i s c o n d i t i o n does not obtain, 
the order f a l l s f l a t on i t s face. More ge n e r a l l y , i t can be argued 
t h a t any serious utterance presupposes t h a t the words are being used 
w i t h c e r t a i n meanings r a t h e r than o t h e r s . ^ Unless t h i s c o n d i t i o n 
obtains the utterance w i l l not have any p a r t i c u l a r meaning, and so 
h a r d l y q u a l i f i e s as serious. A f u r t h e r step w i l l b r i n g us closer 
to our main concerns. 
Any thought or statement presupposes the existence of concepts 
which are d i f f e r e n t i a l l y l i n k e d w i t h an extra-conceptual realm 
( i . e . a realm which c o n s i s t s of something besides concepts themselves). 
How can t h i s claim be j u s t i f i e d ? We can s t a r t by saying t h a t a 
thought or statement must have a s p e c i f i a b l e content. This i s not 
t o be taken i n the sense of an empi r i c a l 'cash-value'; but as a 
way of saying t h a t thoughts and statements must be thoughts or 
statements t h a t something or other. Thus r a d i c a l empiricism claims 
t h a t i t i s possible t h a t there e x i s t no m a t e r i a l objects. But i n 
order f o r a thought or statement t o be about something i n t h i s way, 
there must be some k i n d of r e l a t i o n s h i p between the thought and what 
i t i s about. That i s , i n order t o be a p a r t i c u l a r thought or 
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statement, the thought or statement must r e f e r beyond i t s e l f . 
To do t h i s i n a p a r t i c u l a r way, and so to be a p a r t i c u l a r thought, 
the thought must have a p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h what i s beyond 
i t - u l t i m a t e l y , w i t h an extra-conceptual realm. I n s o f a r as a 
thought i s s t r u c t u r e d ( i n t h a t i t comprises c e r t a i n components, 
which can also be components of other thoughts) we can say t h a t 
each component concept must be l i n k e d w i t h a realm beyond i t s e l f 
i n a way which d i f f e r e n t i a t e s i t from other concepts. These 
l i n k s may be w i t h other thoughts or statements (the s e n t e n t i a l 
connectives, f o r example), or w i t h other concepts (a bachelor i s 
an unmarried man), or d i r e c t l y w i t h features of the realm about 
which such thoughts, composed of such concepts, are. Without 
f u l l y s p e c i f y i n g the nature of t h i s l i n k , or the nature of t h i s 
extra-conceptual realm, we have to accept t h a t thoughts and 
concepts must be somehow l i n k e d w i t h something other than thoughts 
or concepts. * Otherwise, they would not be thoughts or concepts 
at a l l . This i s not t o say t h a t , when t h i n k i n g about a unicorn 
(which I perhaps mistakenly thought I saw), there must be a unicorn 
t h a t my thought i s about. The p o i n t i s t h a t i n order f o r me to 
have the thought at a l l , the concept "unicorn" must be somehow 
r e l a t e d t o an extra-conceptual realm (concepts of m a t e r i a l objects 
which are themselves more d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o such a realm, such as 
"horse" and "horn", or patterns of sense-data associated w i t h the 
concept "unicorn", are two of the candidates f o r the p o s t ) . For 
now, we can say t h a t t h i s l i n k , between concepts and an extra-conceptual 
realm, i s t o be understood by analogy w i t h the semantic l i n k between 
words and the e x t r a - l i n g u i s t i c realm. Without i t , the concepts are 
vacuous, j u s t as the words would be meaningless. Just as the 
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semantic l i n k makes possible t a l k about the e x t r a - l i n g u i s t i c 
realm, i n p a r t i c u l a r about those aspects w i t h which the 
semantic l i n k i s esta b l i s h e d , so the l i n k w i t h concepts makes 
possible thought about the extra-conceptual realm, i n p a r t i c u l a r 
about those aspects w i t h which t h a t l i n k i s established: those 
aspects are subsumed under the r e l e v a n t concepts. I n v i r t u e 
of the analogy I s h a l l h e r e a f t e r use the term 'semantic' i n 
i n v e r t e d commas when t a l k i n g of the required l i n k between concepts 
and the extra-conceptual realm. 
I t may be worth l o o k i n g at l e a s t f o r f a m i l y resemblances 
between t h i s l a s t argument, and the other arguments concerning 
presuppositions mentioned e a r l i e r . I n each case we have a 
s t a r t i n g - p o i n t , and move t o a c o n d i t i o n which must hold f o r the 
o r i g i n a l f e a t u r e to e x i s t . We could not, f o r example, have the 
' s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d ' f a l s i t y of a statement w i t h a r e f e r r i n g expression 
unless t h a t expression genuinely r e f e r s . I t i s by our concept 
of t h i s f e a t u r e (of ' s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d ' f a l s i t y , a successful 
speech-act, etc.) t h a t we can judge whether a c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n 
i s necessary f o r i t s existence or not, and these concepts are fiarroly 
set i n the context of a c t i v i t i e s which give them t h e i r p o i n t . 
Thus the way people communicate w i t h each other provides us with 
the concept of a successful ( f e l i c i t o u s ) speech-act, and Searle's 
c o n t r i b u t i o n i s to b r i n g out what i s a t l e a s t i m p l i c i t i n t h a t 
concept, and present i t as a set of conditions without which a 
p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of successful speech-act would not succeed. These 
arguments a l l aim t o make more e x p l i c i t our grasp of c e r t a i n features, 
and, c o r r e l a t i v e l y , t o show us the necessary foundations, or 
presuppositions, on which they r e s t . 
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Even so, i t i s no p a r t of my case t h a t a l l contexts, 
i n which we are tempted t o t a l k of presuppositions, can be 
t i d i e d up i n t o one neat box. There are important d i s t i n c t i o n s . 
For example, the presupposition t h a t there i s a k i n g of France, 
which i s sai d t o be made by both the statement "The King of 
France i s wise" and i t s i n t e r n a l negation, has sometimes seemed 
t o be a matter of the l o g i c a l form of the relev a n t statements, 
and so p r o p e r l y grasped as an entailment.^*"' There seems l i t t l e 
chance of dealing i n the same way w i t h the argument t h a t the 
thought "There i s experience" presupposes t h a t i t s component 
concepts are 'semantically' l i n k e d w i t h some extra-conceptual 
realm. Indeed, I should l i k e now t o b r i n g out f u r t h e r the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between t h i s l a s t argument, and cases which r e l y 
p r i m a r i l y on considerations of conceptual i m p l i c a t i o n , or l o g i c a l 
form. 
Consider again the thought "There i s experience". I have 
argued t h a t t h i s thought, i n common w i t h any thought, presupposes 
t h a t i t s component concepts are 1 semantically' l i n k e d w i t h something 
beyond themselves. I have already mentioned the d i f f i c u l t y i n 
understanding t h i s p resupposition as a matter of l o g i c a l form. 
N e i t h e r , however, can i t be seen as r e s t i n g on the entailments 
c a r r i e d by the concepts themselves which c o n s t i t u t e the thought. 
F u r t h e r , the f a c t t h a t i t i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n of the thoughts 
being a thought at a l l , t h a t i t s concepts possess the above-mentioned 
•semantic' l i n k , i s not on a par w i t h the necessary conditions of 
m a t e r i a l i m p l i c a t i o n . We are dealing w i t h what might be c a l l e d 
" e s s e n t i a l l y necessary c o n d i t i o n s " . But i f these do not stem from 
any of the three sources so f a r mentioned, on what are they founded? 
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To give ourselves more of a perspective on t h i s question, 
l e t us look a t another example. ^  The statement " I t h i n k " 
says very l i t t l e ; i t e n t a i l s v i r t u a l l y nothing i n view of 
e i t h e r i t s l o g i c a l form or the meaning of the words. Nevertheless, 
i t presupposes a great deal. The very existence of t h a t statement -
and of any other - presupposes the existence of a language containing 
general concepts and r e f e r r i n g expressions, which i n t u r n presuppose 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of using words i n a rule-governed way, which i n t u r n 
presupposes t h a t memory can sometimes be r e l i e d on. I do not want 
here t o evaluate t h i s argument (though I f i n d much t o recommend i t ) , 
but t o work out on what grounds t h i s chain of presuppositions i s 
es t a b l i s h e d . I t i s not l o g i c a l form or word-meaning which allows 
us t o trace these necessary c o n d i t i o n s . Rather, i t i s an u n f o l d i n g 
of our understanding of what i t i s to be a statement. Perhaps our 
general, e x p l i c i t , concept of a statement concerns the saying of 
something about something. But the transcendental argument sketched 
above does not r e l y only on the e x p l i c i t concept and i t s entailments. 
I t goes f u r t h e r to uncover some of the conditions without which 
no t h i n g could be said about anything. How could we make statements, 
and so say something about something, unless those statements 
contained a t l e a s t two components: a r e f e r r i n g expression which 
i d e n t i f i e s what i s being t a l k e d about, and a general term through 
which what i s t o be said about i t gets said? The argument then 
takes up t h i s n o t i o n of a general concept, and unfolds i t t o reveal 
t h a t unless they can be used i n a rule-governed way, general terms 
could not be used t o say anything about anything. How could they, 
i f n o thing governed what counted as c o r r e c t and i n c o r r e c t use? 
I n t h i s s o r t of way, we can uncover some of the presuppositions 
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of the statement " I t h i n k " , by deepening our understanding of 
what i s i n v o l v e d i n the n o t i o n of a statement, and uncovering 
the necessary conditions of something being a statement. We 
check the r e s u l t s of the deduction by seeing whether, i f those 
c o n d i t i o n s do not o b t a i n , i t i s possible f o r there t o be a 
statement. 
Having said a l l t h a t , i t i s cle a r t h a t t h i s k i n d of 
pr e s u p p o s i t i o n a l argument r e l i e s h e a v i l y on the i n i t i a l grasp 
of the concept which sets everything i n motion. I n t h i s case, 
i t i s the concept of a statement. And we might want to ask what 
happens when people seem t o have d i f f e r e n t , even c o n f l i c t i n g , 
understandings of t h a t f i r s t concept. How would we j u s t i f y 
our understanding? This, as we have seen, i s a question which 
i s important w i t h regard t o the n o t i o n of experience, and w i l l be 
considered i n the next chapter i n connection w i t h the n o t i o n of 
thought. Since i t i s not my present purpose to evaluate or develop 
the argument o u t l i n e d above, I w i l l leave t h i s question, and t u r n 
back t o the e a r l i e r argument, concerning the thought "There i s 
experience". 
This argument can be seen as uncovering the presuppositions 
of the thought "There i s experience", not by looking a t i t s l o g i c a l 
form, or the 'content' of i t s concepts, but by u n f o l d i n g our 
i n i t i a l understanding of what i t i s to be a thought. Thus I 
suggested t h a t a thought must be a thought t h a t something or other, 
and t h a t t h i s cannot be possible unless the thought has components 
(concepts) which are *semantically' l i n k e d w i t h an extra-conceptual 
realm. Without t h a t l i n k , nothing could be thought at a l l ; there 
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could be no thought. ( i must again note t h a t I d i d not 
have i n mind any p a r t i c u l a r account of the nature of t h i s 
extra-conceptual realm, or of the 'semantic' l i n k ) . I f 
t h i s argument succeeds, however, a t t e n t i o n w i l l focus on i t s 
s t a r t i n g - p o i n t . Suppose someone else has a d i f f e r e n t i n i t i a l 
understanding of what i t i s to be a thought? My answer here 
i s t h a t e m p i r i c i s t s must conceive themselves as t h i n k i n g about 
something. I f n o t , there i s no case to answer: t h e i r 
'statements' would be only vocal emissions about nothing. 2 7' 
I f e m p i r i c i s t s accept t h a t they do not have thoughts about 
anything (not even about experience), we can j u s t i f i a b l y ignore 
them. We can only take them as presenting us w i t h a case to 
answer, i f we take them as having thoughts of the k i n d o u t l i n e d 
above. 
This account of the k i n d of presuppositional argument w i t h 
which I am concerned runs close t o Charles Taylor's account of 
the nature of transcendental arguments, and i t w i l l be h e l p f u l 
t o compare them, so as t o be c l e a r e r as t o the nature of the 
s t a r t i n g - p o i n t and argument of t h i s second attempt a t r e f u t i n g 
r a d i c a l empiricism. Taylor t a l k s of transcendental deductions 
as chains of i n d i s p e n s a b i l i t y chains, founded on features which 
are themselves indispensable t o experience as we conceive i t . 
Taylor says t h a t our understanding of the concept of experience 
i s such t h a t we " j u s t see t h a t experience must be of something, 
t o be experience"; 3 5' - and sees Kant as t a k i n g the argument from 
there t o the necessary employment i n experience of the categories. 
I want t o make the f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s . F i r s t ; the s t r u c t u r e of 
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Taylor's argument i s l i k e t h a t of the two presuppositional 
arguments already i n t r o d u c e d : 3 0 , i t aims to a r t i c u l a t e our 
understanding of what i t i s f o r something to be, i n t h i s 
case, an experience, and t o trace those conditions without 
which something could not be an experience. I t begins w i t h 
the grasp we have of the n o t i o n of experience, and gradually 
unfolds i t , thereby deepening t h a t grasp. Taylor argues t h a t 
t h i s was Kant's s t r a t e g y , and t h a t i t crops up also i n the 
w r i t i n g s of people such as Merleau-Ponty and W i t t g e n s t e i n . 
Second: the s t a r t i n g - p o i n t of Taylor's transcendental arguments 
d i f f e r s from t h a t of the arguments discussed e a r l i e r . He begins 
w i t h our i n i t i a l conception of experience, whereas the e a r l i e r 
arguments began w i t h our i n i t i a l conceptions of thought and 
statement, r e s p e c t i v e l y . I w i l l discuss the issue of where 
to begin transcendental philosophy at length i n Chapter Four. 
T h i r d : Taylor does not f o l l o w up the question of how we could 
j u s t i f y h o l d i n g on to a p a r t i c u l a r conception of what i t i s to 
be an experience: "we j u s t see t h a t experience must be of 
31 
something t o be experience" - though he does suggest t h a t t h i s 
represents "an i n s i g h t we have i n t o our own a c t i v i t y " . ' I n 
Chapter Two I developed an account of t h i s ' i n s i g h t ' to show 
t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r concept of experience must be used i f c r i t i c a l 
e m p i r i c i s t philosophy i s t o be possible: i t i s an i n s i g h t i n t o 
the nature of c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l a c t i v i t y t h a t i s required 
here. Fourth: Taylor comes to a conclusion l i k e t h a t of Chapter 
One; namely, t h a t arguments which begin by considering experience 
cannot hope t o r e f u t e e m p i r i c i s t scepticism. The most they can 
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achieve i s an account of how things must be experienced as 
being, as Kant himself f u l l y recognised. I n t h i s second 
attempt a t r e f u t i n g empiricism, I aim t o provide an argument 
which, by beginning w i t h a c o n s i d e r a t i o n , not of experience 
i t s e l f , but of the thought " t h e r e i s experience", w i l l 
genuinely r e f u t e the s c e p t i c . By s t a r t i n g from a thought 
whose very existence i s e s s e n t i a l t o e m p i r i c i s t philosophy, 
we can show t h a t there must be an external world populated w i t h 
e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s . E m p i r i c i s t scepticism i s possible only i f 
f a l s e . Let us now look a t the argument. 
The P o s s i b i l i t y of Empiricism 
Let us take up the threads again. I argued i n the l a s t 
s e c t i o n t h a t a necessary c o n d i t i o n of the very existence of the 
thought t h a t there i s experience - as of any other thought - was t h a t 
i t s component concepts be 'semantically 1 l i n k e d t o an extra-conceptual 
realm. Without saying more about the nature of t h i s l i n k , or of 
t h i s realm, I argued t h a t w i t h o u t the l i n k nothing could be thought 
about anything: there could be no thought, i n f a c t , a t a l l . I f 
t h a t argument succeeds, then i t leads us t o consider i t s a p p l i c a t i o n 
to the concept of experience i t s e l f . This concept - a component 
of the thought "There i s experience" - i s a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l t o 
empiricism. I t must t h e r e f o r e possess a 'semantic* l i n k w i t h 
something beyond i t , i f empiricism i s t o be p o s s i b l e . 3 5 - We can 
now develop our argument by asking f o r the necessary conditions 
of the p o s s i b i l i t y of such a l i n k . Since the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
'being a necessary c o n d i t i o n of* i s t r a n s i t i v e , these conditions 
w i l l be necessary c o n d i t i o n s of the p o s s i b i l i t y of empiricism and 
e m p i r i c i s t scepticism themselves. Let us, i n preparation f o r t h i s 
development, remind ourselves of the nature of the concept w i t h which 
we are d e a l i n g . 
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I n Chapter Two, I argued t h a t the concept of experience, 
i f i t i s t o play i t s p a r t i n c r i t i c a l e m p i r i c i s t philosophy, 
must i n v o l v e a c e n t r a l reference to r e a l i t y , as t h a t from 
which experience may diverge. I f t h i s i s so, does i t not 
o f f e r us a quick s o l u t i o n t o the problem? Can we not say 
t h a t the 'semantic' l i n k , between the concept of experience 
and an extra-conceptual realm, i s established through t h a t 
concept being explained as " t h a t which may diverge from r e a l i t y " , 
and through the concept of r e a l i t y having i t s own 'semantic' 
l i n k w i t h an extra-conceptual realm? We need t o look at t h i s 
c l o s e l y . This suggestion takes f o r granted t h a t the concept 
of r e a l i t y has, independently of the concept of experience, a 
'semantic' l i n k w i t h something beyond i t . But i s t h i s so? 
C e r t a i n l y we have concepts of r e a l i t y ( o r perhaps aspects of 
one t o t a l concept) which are apparently independent of the concept 
of experience: For example, what i s the case, as against what 
should be the case, or against what could be the case. But 
n e i t h e r of these i s the epistemological concept of r e a l i t y which 
we need, i n order t o make possible the concept of experience as 
p o s s i b l y d i v e r g i n g from r e a l i t y , and so t o open up the issue of 
j u s t i f y i n g our claims t o knowledge. This epistemological concept 
of how t h i n g s r e a l l y are cannot, however, have any sense - i t 
cannot be a concept - unless i t i s grasped i n i t s , possibly 
d i v e r g e n t , r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h how things are experienced as being. 
The reference from the concept of experience to t h a t of r e a l i t y 
must be r e c i p r o c a t e d , or n e i t h e r concept i s p o s s i b l e . The 
e m p i r i c i s t must work w i t h t h i s conceptually interdependent p a i r . 
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We are now l e f t w i t h the question: how i s the 'semantic' 
l i n k , between t h i s p a i r of concepts ( o r , words w i t h the 
requ i r e d meaning), and an extra-conceptual realm, possible? 
Neither the concept of experience, nor t h a t of r e a l i t y , can 
be 'semantically 1 l i n k e d w i t h an extra-conceptual realm 
independently of the other concept. Such a l i n k must then 
be made between the interdependent p a i r of concepts and t h a t 
realm. How? 
Not, c e r t a i n l y , by v i r t u e of each being understood i n 
terms of the other. I f experience were understood merely as 
t h a t which may f a i l t o match up w i t h r e a l i t y , and r e a l i t y were 
understood merely as t h a t w i t h which experience may f a i l to 
match up, then we would have merely an empty c i r c l e . There 
must be a l i n k between the concepts and something other than 
the concepts themselves, or there w i l l be no concepts at a l l . 
I f the words are explained only i n terms of each other, w i t h 
no semantic l i n k t o something beyond them, they can have no 
meaning. But i f t h i s does not work, are there not other 
concepts which can mediate between the concept of experience 
and an extra-conceptual realm? For example, could we not t a l k 
of experience as a mental state of persons? C l e a r l y , we could 
t r y t o do t h i s , but i t w i l l run up against a d i f f i c u l t y which i s 
insuperable f o r the e m p i r i c i s t . For i f we use ordinary concepts 
l i k e these t o account f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of 
experience, we w i l l be i n a p o s i t i o n l i k e t h a t which arose i n 
discussing the F i r s t Attempt a t r e f u t i n g empiricism. That i s , 
the use of these everyday concepts w i l l carry everyday commitments 
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i n t h i s example, to the existence of persons - which an 
e m p i r i c i s t must t r y to keep c l e a r of. Generally, the 
r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s t t r i e s t o remove the commitment t o the 
existence of independent objects i n an external world, which 
i s made by using ordinary everyday concepts. The e m p i r i c i s t 
does t h i s by r e c a s t i n g o r d i n a r y thought and t a l k i n t o terms of 
the concept of experience. 3^* But i f the concept of experience 
i s i t s e l f possible only by v i r t u e of i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h 
such concepts, then the commitment they carry cannot be l a t e r 
recast i n t h a t way. The r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s t ' s p o s i t i o n , t h a t 
perhaps a l l there i s , i s experience, would be untenable. 
I f the 'semantic' l i n k between the conceptual p a i r of experience 
and r e a l i t y , and an extra-conceptual realm, cannot be provided 
e i t h e r by way of t h e i r conceptual i n t e r d e f i n i t i o n or by d e f i n i n g them 
i n terms of other concepts, can we not t r y a more d i r e c t route? 
Could we not t r y t o e s t a b l i s h one or other of these concepts 
independently, by p r o v i d i n g a d i r e c t l i n k w i t h an extra-conceptual 
realm ( f o r example, w i t h a case of how things r e a l l y are, or of how 
they are experienced as b e i n g ) , and then g i v i n g an understanding 
of the other i n terms of the f i r s t ? This w i l l not work. To 
begin w i t h , i t w i l l run i n t o problems l i k e those which emerged 
during the F i r s t Attempt a t r e f u t i n g empiricism, concerning the 
way ostensive accounts of the concept of experience already 
presuppose the, a l b e i t i m p l i c i t , use of t h a t concept. Second, 
i t ignores the f a c t t h a t , as argued above, each concept i s what 
i t i s only by v i r t u e of i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the other. 
I f we were i n possession of a concept of experience, or of 
r e a l i t y , which d i d not already contain t h i s i n t e r n a l reference, 
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then i t could not be the concept we r e q u i r e . Neither concept 
can be established independently of the other and then pushed 
i n t o a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the other: they come together, or 
not a t a l l . The conclusion we seem drawn t o , i s t h a t the 
re q u i r e d 'semantic* l i n k between the concept of experience 
and an extra-conceptual realm i s possible n e i t h e r by means of 
d i r e c t ostension, nor of mutual d e f i n i t i o n i n terms of the 
concept of r e a l i t y , nor of d e f i n i t i o n i n terms of other concepts. 
The prospect i s bleak: s u r e l y we cannot conclude t h a t the concept 
of experience, and so empiricism i t s e l f , i s not possible a t a l l . 
But what a l t e r n a t i v e s are there? 
We can get out of t h i s corner only i n t h i s way. We must 
recognise t h a t the conceptual p a i r - " e x p e r i e n c e " / " r e a l i t y " -
can avoid being vacuous only by being 'semantically' l i n k e d , 
as a p a i r , w i t h an extra-conceptual realm. But the relevant 
f e a t u r e of t h i s extra-conceptual realm cannot be .just an instance 
of how th i n g s are experienced as being, or .just an instance of how 
thin g s r e a l l y are. We have seen t h a t n e i t h e r of these can by 
themselves provide f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of e i t h e r one of the concepts, 
l e t alone f o r the i n t e r r e l a t e d p a i r . I f t h i s p a i r of concepts i s 
to escape v a c u i t y (and i f the corresponding l i n g u i s t i c terms are to 
possess t h e i r required meaning), then the s a l i e n t feature of t h a t 
extra-conceptual realm must be a s i t u a t i o n , w i t h i n which how things 
are, and how they are experienced as being, are d i s t i n c t but 
i n t e r r e l a t e d aspects. That i s , not only are the concepts of 
experience and r e a l i t y inescapably i n t e r r e l a t e d ; but how things 
are experienced as being, and how they r e a l l y are, must be 
i n t e r r e l a t e d aspects of the extra-conceptual realm. I t i s the 
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'semantic' l i n k between the conceptual p a i r on the one hand, 
and the s i t u a t i o n i n which how things are and how they are 
experienced as being are themselves i n t e r r e l a t e d on the 
other, which makes t h a t conceptual p a i r possible. The 
concepts come together, i n r e l a t i o n t o such s i t u a t i o n s -
indeed, the understanding of these s i t u a t i o n s w i l l be a r t i c u l a t e d 
through these concepts. Having exhausted the a l t e r n a t i v e accounts 
of how the 'semantic' l i n k between the concept of experience and 
an extra-conceptual realm i s pos s i b l e , the above account i s the 
only p o s s i b i l i t y l e f t . The l i n k between s i t u a t i o n s l i k e t h a t 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d above, and the interdependent p a i r of concepts of 
experience and r e a l i t y , i s thus a necessary c o n d i t i o n of the 
existence of the thought t h a t there i s experience, and so of 
empiricism i t s e l f . But given the c r i t i c a l a t t e n t i o n accorded 
to those a l t e r n a t i v e accounts, I can hardly leave the matter there: 
indeed, i t i s not a t a l l c l e a r what would be gained by doing so. 
Let us have a closer look at the type of s i t u a t i o n which i s to be 
so important t o the argument. 
The concept of experience i s t o be possible i n y i r t u e of a 
'semantic' l i n k w i t h a s i t u a t i o n , w i t h i n which how things are and 
how they are experienced as being are d i s t i n c t , but i n t e r r e l a t e d , 
aspects. What more can we say about t h i s ? F i r s t , we can say 
t h a t i f i t i s to be the k i n d of s i t u a t i o n i n connection w i t h which 
the concepts of experience and r e a l i t y are made possible, and i n 
connection w i t h which the words possess t h e i r r e q u i red meaning, 
then there must be some d i s t i n c t i o n to be made, i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n , 
between how things are., and how things are experienced as being. 
As long as there i s no such d i s t i n c t i o n t o be made - t h a t i s , as 
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long as experience matches r e a l i t y - then there i s nothing 
f o r the concepts expressed by the terms "experience" and 
" r e a l i t y " t o l a t c h on t o . They can have no purchase on 
an extra-conceptual realm such as would rescue them from 
v a c u i t y : the concepts cannot e x i s t i n such circumstances, nor 
the words have t h e i r r e q u i r e d meaning. The words "experience" 
and " r e a l i t y " , then, can have t h e i r meaning - can express the 
r e l e v a n t concepts - only by being semantically l i n k e d w i t h the 
k i n d of s i t u a t i o n i n which how things r e a l l y are a c t u a l l y diverges 
from how things are experienced as being: t h a t i s , the k i n d of 
s i t u a t i o n which we c a l l e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r . Only by being 
'se m a n t i c a l l y 1 l i n k e d w i t h s i t u a t i o n s of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r , 
where there i s an actual divergence between experience and r e a l i t y , 
i s the concept of experience possible. Without such a l i n k , 
t h e r e f o r e , empiricism i t s e l f would not be possible. We have 
reached a stage which marks a considerable advance on the idea 
t h a t we can account f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of experience 
i n terms of a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n w i t h ' t h i s , here, now'; but before 
developing the argument, l e t me say two things about the nature of 
t h i s requirement f o r a 'semantic' l i n k . 
F i r s t : the need f o r t h i s l i n k i s atemporal. I t i s not of a 
merely causal nature: t h a t i s , i t i s not .just the case, f o r example, 
t h a t no-one can a r r i v e at the concept of experience without t h e i r 
mind being stimulated by a few cases of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r . I t i s 
r a t h e r a f o r m a l , atemporal requirement uncovered by t r a c i n g the 
e s s e n t i a l l y necessary c o n d i t i o n s of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept 
of experience. Even so, such atemporality c a r r i e s consequences 
regarding temporal sequences. That i s , i f the concept of experience 
must be 'semantically' l i n k e d w i t h cases of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r , i t 
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i s c l e a r t h a t the emergence of the concept cannot temporally 
precede the occurrence of such case: at the very l e a s t they 
a r i s e simultaneously. 3 5 . Second, semantic theory can sometimes 
give the impression t h a t semantic r e l a t i o n s h i p s between words 
and things are an autonomous a f f a i r , independent of the f a c t 
t h a t words are involved i n t h i n k i n g and speaking about t h i n g s . 
We need here t o keep s i g h t of the f a c t t h a t the f u n c t i o n of 
words, and of the concepts they express, has been determined 
by the argument so f a r as being t h a t of enabling thought and 
discussion t o occur. I t i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of r a d i c a l 
e m p i r i c i s t thought or discourse which i s a t stake. This simple 
p o i n t has an i m p l i c a t i o n f o r the argument of the f o l l o w i n g sections. 
I can have the concept of something - say, of a unicorn,- without 
having any d i r e c t awareness of i t , i f the 'semantic' l i n k between 
concept and world i s made i n d i r e c t l y (by means, f o r example, of 
other concepts, such as those of a horse and a horn ) . But the 
present s i t u a t i o n i s one where the l i n k between the concept and instances 
o f i t m u s t be d i r e c t , as i n d i r e c t l i n k s cannot s a t i s f y the 
r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s t s purpose. A d i r e c t 'semantic' l i n k must 
be such as t o enable the thought "That i s an experience" to occur -
or the p o i n t of the l i n k , t o make r a d i c a l empiricism possible, i s 
l o s t . I f the 'semantic' l i n k i s l i k e t h i s , i t must involve an 
awareness ( o f some ki n d ) of the instance of the concept w i t h 
which the l i n k i s t o o b t a i n . I n the present case, a d i r e c t 
l i n k between the concept of experience, and instances of experience 
as components of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r , must involve an awareness of 
how t h i n g s are, and of how they are experienced as being, so t h a t 
the l a t t e r can be r e j e c t e d . That i s , i f the l i n k i s to make 
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possible thought about experience (and thence r a d i c a l 
empiricism i t s e l f ) , i t must be a l i n k between the instance 
of experience and the concept, where the l a t t e r i s a co n s t i t u e n t 
of a judgement (e.g. "That was j u s t how things seemed to be") 
which i s embodied i n an awareness of how things are experienced 
as being. Now i t may t u r n out t h a t t h i s supposed awareness of 
how t h i n g s r e a l l y are, on the basis of which how thi n g s are 
experienced as being i s r e j e c t e d , i s i n f a c t n o n - v e r i d i c a l . 
I t might be f o r example, t h a t I r e j e c t an experience of seeing 
a piece of brown mat on the f l o o r , on the basis of touching i t 
and being made aware t h a t i t was a f u r r y animal. This would 
provide an instance of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r , which would make 
possible a 'semantic' l i n k between the concept of experience and 
an instance of i t . Nevertheless, f u r t h e r i n s p e c t i o n might l a t e r 
r eveal t h a t there was not a f u r r y animal on the f l o o r , but only a 
warm f u r coat. The 'awareness' of how things r e a l l y are, would 
t u r n out t o be n o n - v e r i d i c a l . We can imagine a long succession 
of such 'undeceptions'. I t i s c l e a r , then, t h a t the use of the 
concept of how things r e a l l y are, does not of i t s e l f guarantee 
the t r u t h of the judgement i n which i t i s employed. I t i s not 
by t h i s route t h a t the existence of the extern a l world i s achieved. 
( I s h a l l say more about t h i s s h o r t l y ) . Without such a guarantee, 
the term •'awareness", might be misleading, since i t normally c a r r i e s 
an i m p l i c a t i o n of t r u t h : i f I am aware t h a t X, then i t i s true 
t h a t X. To remove t h i s normal i m p l i c a t i o n of the term "awareness" 
t h a t t h i n g s are as they are taken t o be i n the awareness - I s h a l l 
t a l k i n f u t u r e of a (presumed) awareness of how things are. The 
main p o i n t here, though, i s t h a t without such a (presumed) awareness 
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of how thi n g s are, and of how they are experienced as being, 
the 'semantic' l i n k between the concept of experience and 
instances of i t would not make thought about experience possible. 
Without t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , there can be no r a d i c a l empiricism, so 
t h a t the purpose of making the l i n k would be negated. Having 
made these two p o i n t s , l e t us r e t u r n t o consider a response t o the 
argument so f a r . 
A Response t o the argument (so f a r ) of the Second Attempt - the 
'Incoherence' theory of e r r o r 
I n t h i s Second Attempt at r e f u t i n g r a d i c a l empiricism, I 
have argued t h a t the concept of experience i s possible only i n 
v i r t u e of a 'semantic' l i n k w i t h s i t u a t i o n s of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r , 
where how thi n g s are i s d i f f e r e n t from how they are experienced as 
being. One response t o t h i s argument takes the form of t r y i n g 
t o recast t a l k of e r r o r i n t o terms of experience i t s e l f . I t goes 
l i k e t h i s . I n t a l k i n g about e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r , I have used the 
terms/concepts "experience" and " r e a l i t y " . Now, possessing the 
concept of experience, we can, t h i s response argues, construe cases 
of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r i n the f o l l o w i n g way. We can say (along 
w i t h , f o r example, Kant, Husserl and Ayer), t h a t one experience 
has f a i l e d t o f i t i n w i t h others, so as to maintain a coherent 
view of the world. This experience i s therefore t o be re j e c t e d 
as n o n - v e r i d i c a l ; the judgement i m p l i c i t i n i t denied. This 
response thus t r i e s t o show how we can have a grasp of the n o t i o n 
of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r i n terms of experience alone. Error i s to 
be understood e s s e n t i a l l y i n terms of lack of coherence among 
experiences; and v e r i d i c a l i t y i n terms of such coherence as gives 
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us a u n i f i e d view of the world. We do not r e a l l y need 
the n o t i o n of r e a l i t y , t h i s response continues, since the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between how things are experienced as being, 
and how they are i n r e a l i t y , can be provided f o r i n terms 
of experience alone. A f t e r a l l , i n r e j e c t i n g an experience 
on the basis of a presumed awareness of how things r e a l l y are 
( " i t seemed as though there was a mat the r e , but i n f a c t i t 
was a dog"), we are merely r e j e c t i n g one experience on the 
basis of i t s lack of coherence w i t h another (the presumed awareness) 
Indeed, as we have already seen, t h a t presumed awareness may i t s e l f 
be r e j e c t e d as merely an experience, on the basis of a f u r t h e r 
presumed awareness ( " i t wasn't r e a l l y aidog, but a warm c o a t " ) . 
Nor does there seem t o be a f i x e d l i m i t to such a succession of 
'undeceptions 1. Considerations l i k e t h i s lead e m p i r i c i s t s t o 
say t h a t a l l we have here i s a series of experiences, none of which 
c a r r i e s an i n t r i n s i c guarantee of v e r i d i c a l i t y . The e m p i r i c i s t s 
add t h a t our notions of t r u t h and falsehood can then only amount 
to the coherence and incoherence of experiences i n such a se r i e s . 
E r r o r , t h e r e f o r e , f o r such an e m p i r i c i s t , consists merely i n the 
f a i l u r e of an experience t o ' f i t i n 1 w i t h other experiences i n a 
s e r i e s . We cannot, however, accept t h i s response to the argument 
against r a d i c a l empiricism, f o r reasons already foreshadowed. 
The account t h i s response o f f e r s of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r cannot 
adequately represent the s i t u a t i o n here. For t h a t account 
presupposes the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the concept of experience; and 
t h i s concept i s possible only i n v i r t u e of a 'semantic* r e l a t i o n 
t o cases of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r , of which there must be some p r i o r 
grasp. Any attempt t o analyse our primary grasp of e x p e r i e n t i a l 
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e r r o r i n terms of experience i t s e l f , e f f e c t i v e l y removes one 
of the e s s e n t i a l l y necessary c o n d i t i o n s of the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
the concept of experience, and consequently of t h a t attempt 
i t s e l f . Any e m p i r i c i s t attempt t o recover the e s s e n t i a l l y 
necessary conditions of empiricism i n terms of the concept 
of experience - p u l l i n g i t s e l f up by i t s own bootstraps -
presupposes t h a t which i t seeks to account f o r , and so cannot 
provide an adequate account of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept 
of experience. We can, then, r e j e c t t h i s response to the 
Second Attempt at r e f u t i n g r a d i c a l empiricism. 
Before I consider a development of our argument - which 
w i l l lead us t o a successful r e f u t a t i o n of r a d i c a l empiricism -
l e t me o f f e r a b r i e f reminder of what has been sai d of the 
concepts t h a t must be used w i t h i n experience; i n other words, 
of the i n t e n t i o n a l character of experience. I n order f o r a 
d i s t i n c t i o n between how things are and how they are experienced 
as being t o be p o s s i b l e , experience must be a r t i c u l a t e d by 
concepts of items such t h a t how things are w i t h them may d i f f e r 
from how they are experienced as being (Strawson's "concepts of the 
o b j e c t i v e " ) * Further, since the concept of experience i s possibl 
only i f such concepts are employed w i t h i n experience, these concept 
themselves cannot themselves contain any i m p l i c i t or e x p l i c i t 
reference, or be r e d u c i b l e , t o the concept of experience. They 
must be, f o r example, concepts of rocks, trees and such t h i n g s , 
whose conception does not presuppose the concept of experience. 
For i f t h i s were not the case, the question of the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of the concept of experience would j u s t be pushed back a stage, 
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r a t h e r than answered. Experience must be, i n t e n t i o n a l l y , 
of items such t h a t how th i n g s are, w i t h regard t o t h e i r 
existence, q u a l i t i e s and operations, i s independent of how 
they are experienced as being. Experience must be, 
i n t e n t i o n a l l y , of an 'external world' i n the sense we want. 
With t h i s i n mind, l e t us consider a development of the argument 
against r a d i c a l empiricism. 
Experience a n d - i t s Negation 
To approach t h i s development of the argument of the Second 
Attempt a t r e f u t i n g r a d i c a l empiricism, consider two examples 
of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r : ( l ) " I t seemed t h a t there was an 
oasis before me, but r e a l l y there was nothing t h e r e " . (2) " I t 
looked as though i t was my coat, but t h a t was not i n f a c t the case". 
I n such cases, how th i n g s are experienced as being i s r e j e c t e d on 
the basis of a (presumed) awareness of how things are. But t h i s 
awareness of how things are i s not merely negative, i t i s not j u s t 
an awareness t h a t how t h i n g s are experienced as being i s not , i n 
f a c t , the case. Consider the "n o t h i n g " i n the f i r s t example. 3 ? -
Was there a b s o l u t e l y nothing there? No; there was plenty of 
sand, and the sun beating down, but, c r u c i a l l y , no oasis. The 
"no t h i n g " plays i t s p a r t only w i t h i n a wider context. Or consider 
the f i n a l clause i n the second example. I s t h i s a bare negation 
of the renegade experience? No; i t was brown, and f u r r y , but 
i t was a sleeping dog and not my coat. I n such cases, the r e j e c t i o n 
of how t h i n g s are experienced as being i s not based on a bare 
awareness t h a t t h i s i s not the case. I t i s based on a determinate 
- 90 -
awareness of how things are, which i s i n i t s e l f p o s i t i v e , 
but which excludes how things are experienced as being. For 
instance, i f t h a t brown, f u r r y t h i n g on the c h a i r i s a dog, 
then i t cannot be my coat; and my seeming t o see my coat was 
merely a n o n - v e r i d i c a l experience. Now i t i s , I hope, cl e a r 
from the argument of the l a s t paragraph, t h a t t h i s awareness of 
how t h i n g s , p o s i t i v e l y , are, must be a r t i c u l a t e d through "concepts 
of the o b j e c t i v e " ; t h a t i s concepts of items such t h a t t h e i r 
existence, operations, and ge n e r a l l y how things are w i t h them, 
i s independent of how they are experienced as being.*'" I n such 
cases, then, an understanding of how things are experienced as 
being, as d i f f e r i n g from how they r e a l l y are, i s based on an 
awareness of how things are w i t h c e r t a i n independent items i n the 
'external world'. 
Now t h i s seems t o open up a u s e f u l development of the argument 
so f a r . For i t suggests t h a t cases of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r must, i f 
they are t o provide f o r the 'semantic' l i n k w i t h the concept of 
experience, be s i t u a t i o n s i n which how things are experienced as 
being, diverges from how things r e a l l y are w i t h independent items 
i n an e x t e r n a l world. I n accordance w i t h previous arguments, we 
cannot, on pain of c i r c u l a r i t y , recast e i t h e r t a l k of t h i s divergence, 
or t a l k of these independent items, i n t o terms of experience. 
The concept of experience already presupposes the use of concepts 
of such items. Consequently, i t would look, according t o t h i s 
development of the argument, as i f we are committed to the existence 
of an 'external world' c o n t a i n i n g independent items. That i s , i t 
seems t h a t we have a case f o r saying t h a t the concept of experience 
i s possible only by v i r t u e of a 'semantic' l i n k w i t h instances of 
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e r r o r , where how things are w i t h actual independent items 
i n an e x t e r n a l world d i f f e r s from how they are experienced 
as being. So t h a t i t seems t h a t the existence of such items 
and such a world, i s presupposed as an e s s e n t i a l l y necessary 
c o n d i t i o n of the very p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of experience, 
and so of r a d i c a l empiricism i t s e l f . Radical empiricism would 
be thereby r e f u t e d , since i t s very existence (the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of i t s c e n t r a l concept) would r e q u i r e the f a l s i t y of the claim 
t h a t there i s , perhaps, only experience. The o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , 
fro 
t o which the e m p i r i c i s t i s committed, would have been shown to 
be not empty, but populated. This i s the conclusion we want; 
but i f i t i s based only on a b r i e f consideration of two examples 
of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r , then i t i s by no means c l e a r t h a t we have 
indeed established a chain of necessary conditions here. To 
assess whether we can indeed e s t a b l i s h t h a t the f a l s i t y of r a d i c a l 
empiricism i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n of i t s very p o s s i b i l i t y , we 
need to t e s t t h i s suggested development of the argument. 
We can t e s t i t f i r s t against an o b j e c t i o n t h a t looks l i k e 
t h i s . We may accept, the o b j e c t i o n runs, t h a t the concept of 
experience i s possible only i n v i r t u e of a 'semantic' l i n k w i t h 
cases of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r , i n which how things are, and how they 
are experienced as being, are already r e l a t e d . You have then 
suggested t h a t these cases must be such t h a t how things are 
experienced as being, diverges from how they are, i n respect of 
independent items i n an e x t e r n a l world; so t h a t the existence of 
the concept of experience presupposes the existence of an external 
world i n the f u l l - b l o o d e d sense you want. However, the o b j e c t i o n 
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continues, t h i s development of the Second Attempt a t 
r e f u t i n g r a d i c a l empiricism remains at the l e v e l of a 
suggestion, r a t h e r than an argument, since you have not 
f u l l y considered whether there may be a l t e r n a t i v e accounts 
of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r , which provide f o r the 'semantic' l i n k 
w i t h the concept of experience without i n v o l v i n g a commitment 
t o the existence of an e x t e r n a l world. I n the face of t h i s 
o b j e c t i o n , we must then look at what a l t e r n a t i v e accounts of 
e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r there may be. 
So f a r , t h e suggestion has b u i l t on the argument t h a t the 
concepts i n which experience i s a r t i c u l a t e d must be concepts of 
items such t h a t , f i r s t , how things are w i t h regard to those items 
i s independent of experience; and second, these concepts cannot 
co n t a i n any reference, or be r e d u c i b l e , t o the concept of experience. 
The suggestion i s then t h a t the cases of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r we need, 
are cases i n which how things are experienced as being i s r e j e c t e d 
on the basis of a (presumed) p o s i t i v e awareness of how things 
a c t u a l l y are w i t h regard t o those independent items. But the 
o b j e c t i o n above r a i s e s the issue of whether t h i s i s reasonably so. 
What a l t e r n a t i v e i s there? The only a l t e r n a t i v e account would be 
one where how things are experienced as being was dismissed on the 
b a s i s , not of a p o s i t i v e awareness of how things are w i t h independent items 
i n an e x t e r n a l world, but of a bare (presumed) awareness t h a t how things 
are, i s j u s t t h a t there e x i s t s nothing other than experience: the 
'external w o r l d 1 i s empty. I f e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r could be l i k e 
t h i s , we would have the l i n k between the concept of experience and 
instances of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r , without the commitment to things i n 
an e x t e r n a l world: we would j u s t have t h a t commitment to an 
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e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y o b j e c t i v e , but empty, world which f i r s t 
prompted t h i s Second Attempt a t r e f u t i n g r a d i c a l empiricism. 
The r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s t could then claim t h a t how things r e a l l y 
are may be d i f f e r e n t from how they are experienced as .being, 
and t h a t i t i s a t l e a s t possible t h a t there e x i s t s only experience, 
w i t h no a c t u a l independent items i n an o b j e c t i v e realm. This 
claim would depend on the suggestion t h a t there could be cases 
of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r which involved both how things are experienced 
as being ( " i t seemed as i f my coat was on the f l o o r " ) , and how things 
are - where the grasp of how things are consists merely i n the bare 
awareness t h a t there i s no i n h a b i t e d 'external world' at a l l . I 
want to make two p r e l i m i n a r y points here. F i r s t , I f i n d i t 
extremely hard t o make any sense of the n o t i o n of a bare awareness 
t h a t there e x i s t s nothing other than experience. Second, i f the 
r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s t case depends on such a p o s s i b i l i t y , then i t 
presumably leads, not j u s t to the conclusion t h a t there may e x i s t 
n othing other than experience, but t o the conclusion t h a t there 
i s i n f a c t nothing other than experience. This would be a stronger 
c l a i m than most e m p i r i c i s t s would want to make. Nevertheless, i n 
order t o e s t a b l i s h the development of the Second Attempt suggested 
above, we need to show t h a t t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e i s not a v a i l a b l e . 
Let us consider t h i s n o t i o n of a bare awareness t h a t there 
i s n othing (beyond experience) more c l o s e l y . A n a t u r a l way to 
approach i t , might be as a p a r t i c u l a r s o r t of sensory a\irareness, 
i n which nothing i s seen, heard, f e l t , touched or t a s t e d . An 
immediate d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h i s approach i s t h a t i t presupposes the 
existence of the body, a t a stage such t h a t t h i s existence cannot, 
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f o r f a m i l i a r reasons, be l a t e r recast i n terms of the concept 
of experience. This would then give us a t l e a s t one e n t i t y 
independent of experience, and so involve the k i n d of commitment 
t h a t the present a l t e r n a t i v e aims t o avoid. But i f we drop 
t h i s n a t u r a l approach (which also runs i n t o the problems about 
to be discussed), what sense can we make of the n o t i o n of an 
awareness t h a t there e x i s t s nothing (other than experience)? 
A l l we can be l e f t w i t h i s some k i n d of i n t e l l e c t u a l r e v e l a t i o n 
of non-being, i n the l i g h t of which the p u t a t i v e awareness - t h a t , 
say, my coat i s on the c h a i r i n the k i t c h e n - i s r e j e c t e d as merely 
a n o n - v e r i d i c a l experience. Hard as I f i n d i t t o make anything 
sensible of t h i s idea, I want t o make sure t h a t i t does not provide 
a tenable a l t e r n a t i v e t o the account of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r put 
forward i n developing the Second Attempt. 
To do t h i s , look f i r s t a t some everyday examples of judgements 
t h a t there i s nothing. 1. My daughter wants something t o d r i n k , 
I look a l l over the house, i n and out of cupboards, but f i n d 
n o t h i n g . 2. A teacher has been t o l d t h a t a c e r t a i n c h i l d 
may be a b u l l y . She observes her behaviour i n school a c t i v i t i e s , 
play and work, but f i n d s nothing t o confirm the suggestion. Each 
of the cases shares two f e a t u r e s . F i r s t , the • n o t h i n g 1 , of which 
awareness i s reached, i s determined w i t h reference t o a p a r t i c u l a r 
concept (which governs the search). Thus i n case 1, I do not f i n d 
n o thing a t a l l , but nothing t o d r i n k - or even, t o specify i t 
f u r t h e r , nothing which i s s u i t a b l e f o r my daughter t o d r i n k . I n 
case 2, the teacher does not f i n d nothing a t a l l , but no evidence 
of b u l l y i n g . Second, there i s i n each case a c e r t a i n horizon 
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w i t h i n which 'nothing' i s discovered. I n case 1, my 
search i s l i m i t e d t o the house - I e i t h e r have not thought 
of going, or cannot be bothered t o go, to the shops. I n 
case 2, the teacher l i m i t s her observations t o behaviour a t 
school - she does not f o l l o w the c h i l d home to seek evidence of 
her b u l l y i n g her neighbours, or f a m i l y ; nor does she seek out 
h i s t o r i c a l evidence of such behaviour. I n the l i g h t of these 
features - the p a r t i c u l a r respect, and the l i m i t e d horizon, i n 
which nothing i s found - we can see the problems of the bare 
awareness of nothing, proposed as p a r t of an a l t e r n a t i v e account 
of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r . For i t seems t h a t we are considering the 
idea of an awareness of nothing which i s n e i t h e r w i t h i n a l i m i t e d 
h o r i z o n , nor determined i n a p a r t i c u l a r respect. Let me b r i e f l y 
consider the f i r s t of these p o i n t s . The idea of an awareness of 
nothing which i s not l i m i t e d to a c e r t a i n horizon (e.g. "nothing 
i n t h i s house", "nothing i n t h i s person's behaviour at school"), 
has as a necessary c o r r e l a t e the idea of u n l i m i t e d , or i n f i n i t e , 
awareness: of an awareness which scans the whole realm of possible 
being. While some t h i n k e r s would argue t h a t i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s 
s o r t of awareness t h a t i s a t t r i b u t e d t o God, I , along with others 
such as Hegel and Sartre, regard t h i s n o t i o n as an untenable 
a b s t r a c t i o n . Rather than arguing f o r t h i s claim ( w i t h which 
most e m p i r i c i s t s would, I imagine, agree), I should l i k e instead 
t o focus the discussion more on the second p o i n t (concerning a 
'nothing' which i s not determined i n a p a r t i c u l a r r e s p e c t ) , by 
making the f o l l o w i n g remark. A r e p l y t o the discussion of the 
f i r s t p o i n t might be t h a t the proposed awareness of nothing, i s 
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not w i t h i n an u n l i m i t e d h o r i z o n , but r a t h e r l i m i t e d t o the 
context of the exter n a l world. I t i s the awareness t h a t 
there i s nothing i n the e x t e r n a l world which i s a t issue. 
This r e p l y , however, ra i s e s the question of whether an awareness 
which i s l i m i t e d t o the horizon of the o b j e c t i v e , e x t e r n a l world, 
already presupposes the concept of experience. Let us now 
consider t h i s question i n connection w i t h the second of the 
above p o i n t s . 
This p o i n t concerns the idea of an awareness of absolutely 
nothing; t h a t i s , of an awareness of nothing which i s not determined 
i n respect of a p a r t i c u l a r concept (e.g. "nothing t o d r i n k " , "no 
behavioural evidence of b u l l y i n g " ) : i t i s i n the l i g h t of t h i s 
awareness of nothing, t h a t how things are experienced as being i s 
dismissed as n o n - v e r i d i c a l . I f we look c l o s e r , however, i t begins 
to emerge t h a t an awareness t h a t there i s abs o l u t e l y nothing w i l l 
not f i t the b i l l . I f there were such an awareness (and I should 
r e c a l l my d i f f i c u l t y w i t h making something sensible of t h i s i d e a ) , 
then i t could not provide the basis f o r dismissing how things are 
experienced as being, as merely n o n - v e r i d i c a l experience. For 
t h i s dismissal involves acceptance t h a t there i s not absolutely 
nothing - there i s , a t the very l e a s t , how things are experienced 
as being. An awareness of abs o l u t e l y nothing could not accommodate 
experience i t s e l f : i t could not provide f o r the account of e x p e r i e n t i a l 
e r r o r which i s required here. This awareness t h a t there i s absolutely 
nothing r e q u i r e s q u a l i f i c a t i o n i f i t i s to serve i t s intended purpose. 
The q u a l i f i c a t i o n i t needs - which provides the concept w i t h 
respect t o which the 'nothing* i s found - must be t h i s : there must 
be an awareness t h a t there e x i s t s absolutely nothing other than 
experience i t s e l f . I t i s on t h i s basis t h a t any p o s i t i v e claim 
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about independent items i n an o b j e c t i v e world would be 
r e j e c t e d , thus making possible instances of e x p e r i e n t i a l 
e r r o r . 'Semantic' l i n k i n g w i t h these instances would i n 
t u r n make possible the concept of experience. But t h i s 
w i l l not do. This q u a l i f i c a t i o n of the awareness of nothing, 
does save us from the waste land of an absolute, unconditioned 
non-being. But i t does so only a t the cost of presupposing 
e x a c t l y t h a t which i t was t o provide f o r , namely, the existence 
of the concept of experience. This proposed awareness t h a t 
there i s nothing other than experience must, i f i t i s t o do i t s 
j o b , employ, i f only i m p l i c i t l y , the concept of experience. I t 
cannot then provide p a r t of an adequate account of the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of t h a t concept. The a l t e r n a t i v e account of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r 
has thus been shown to be untenable. The development of the 
Second Attempt has survived i t s f i r s t t e s t . Let us r e f l e c t on 
the p o s i t i o n so f a r . 
The concept of experience, and hence r a d i c a l empiricism i t s e l f , 
i s possible only i n v i r t u e of a 'semantic' l i n k w i t h cases of 
e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r . These are cases where how things are experienced 
as being diverges from how they are. What the recent argument has 
t r i e d t o show i s t h a t these must be cases, where how things are 
experienced as being i s dismissed as n o n - v e r i d i c a l , on the basis 
of a p o s i t i v e (presumed) awareness of how things are w i t h actual 
independent items i n an e x t e r n a l , o b j e c t i v e world. Such awareness 
c a r r i e s a commitment t o the existence of t h a t 'external world', 
as n e c e s s a r i l y presupposed by any use of the concept of experience. 
Talk of t h a t world and i t s i n h a b i t a n t s cannot, then, be recast 
i n t o terms of t h a t concept. The very meaningfulness of r a d i c a l 
e m p i r i c i s t discourse (and s c e p t i c i s m ) , thus presupposes i t s own 
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f a l s i t y . The concept of experience i s not possible unless 
there i s an external world i n the f u l l - b o d i e d sense we want. 
I f t h i s i s the argument of the Second Attempt a t r e f u t i n g 
r a d i c a l empiricism, l e t us give i t a second t e s t . 
This second t e s t involves f a c i n g the o b j e c t i o n t h a t , 
having got the concept of experience, we can then employ 
i t i n a reassessment of our awareness of how things are, 
i n such a way as to cancel the apparent commitment to the 
e x t e r n a l world. For r e c a l l the examples of e x p e r i e n t i a l 
e r r o r given e a r l i e r . ^ I s i t not possible t h a t i n each case 
we were r i g h t the f i r s t time, and t h a t our presumed awareness 
of how things are was n o t , i n f a c t , v e r i d i c a l ? Or even t h a t 
we were wrong both times? ( i t was n e i t h e r a coat, nor a piece 
of carpet, but a sleeping dog.) Further r e f l e c t i o n along these 
l i n e s seems t o lead us to the conclusion t h a t we can r e t r a c t any 
p a r t i c u l a r judgement as to how t h i n g s are; and i f so, surely i t 
i s possible t h a t a l l these p a r t i c u l a r , p o s i t i v e awarenesses may 
be f a u l t y , and so possible also t h a t there e x i s t no actual items 
independent of experience. This o b j e c t i o n has a long h i s t o r y , 
w i t h a corresponding amount of c r i t i c i s m , but we need to be clear 
as t o what e x a c t l y i s wrong w i t h i t , as f o l l o w s . The suggestion 
t h a t any presumed awareness of how things are i s merely an 
experience, i t s e l f uses the concept of experience. This concept 
i s p o ssible only by v i r t u e of being 'semantically' l i n k e d w i t h 
cases of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r , where how things are experienced as 
being d i f f e r s from how they are and where how they are must be 
taken on i t s own terms, and as i r r e d u c i b l e to terms of experience. 
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I n respect of these cases, the (presumed) awareness of how 
things r e a l l y are, must be taken at face value. I t must be 
unquestioningly accepted as v e r i d i c a l . To question t h a t 
awareness, i n the l i g h t of the p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s being a 
n o n - v e r i d i c a l experience, would presuppose the a v a i l a b i l i t y 
of the concept we are t r y i n g to account f o r . When we have 
the concept of experience, we can go on to re-assess any 
p a r t i c u l a r (presumed) awareness of how things are. With any 
p a r t i c u l a r awareness, we can r a i s e the p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s being 
merely a n o n - v e r i d i c a l experience. E m p i r i c i s t s philosophers, 
anxious f o r g e n e r a l i s a t i o n , are a t t h i s p o i n t prone t o argue 
t h a t , since nothing i n t r i n s i c a l l y marks o f f a p a r t i c u l a r 
awareness/experience as v e r i d i c a l or n o n - v e r i d i c a l , then perhaps 
they are a l l j u s t experiences. Perhaps we need to suspend 
judgement on a l l claims about the o b j e c t i v e world, which are 
embodied i n awarenesses/experiences. Perhaps, they continue, 
there e x i s t s nothing other than t h i s series of experiences. 
Perhaps no p a r t i c u l a r (presumed) awareness of how things are w i t h 
items i n the o b j e c t i v e world i s , i n f a c t , v e r i d i c a l . We cannot 
allow the e m p i r i c i s t ' s move here. For i f a l l awarenesses are t o 
be re-assessed as merely experiences, so t h a t none are to be 
accepted a t face value, then we presuppose the a v a i l a b i l i t y of 
the concept of experience. But t h i s concept presupposes, as a 
necessary c o n d i t i o n of i t s p o s s i b i l i t y , a 'semantic' l i n k w i t h at 
l e a s t one case of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r , i n which the (presumed) 
awareness of how things are i s taken at face value. We can 
re-assess t h i s p a r t i c u l a r awareness, as a n o n - v e r i d i c a l experience, 
as long as we can l i n k the concept of experience t o other cases i n 
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which the (presumed) awareness of how things are, i s taken 
at face value. I f we t r y t o suspend judgement on a l l such 
awarenesses a t once, we remove the p o s s i b i l i t y of a. 'semantic' 
l i n k between the concept of experience and an extra-conceptual 
realm. We thereby deprive the concept of i t s very p o s s i b i l i t y -
the concept cannot e x i s t - and the term "experience" of i t s 
meaning. I f t h i s i s r i g h t - t h a t we can re-assess any p a r t i c u l a r 
(presumed) awareness of how things are, but not the whole l o t at 
once - then to what are we committed? 
We are not committed t o the s a n c t i t y of the instance of 
e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r i n connection w i t h which we f i r s t gain the 
concept of experience ( i f indeed there ever i s one such instance). 
For even i f I f i r s t grasped "the concept of experience i n connection 
w i t h an awareness t h a t what I thought was a rug was i n f a c t a 
f u r r y animal, I may l a t e r re-assess t h a t awareness - i t was not 
an animal, but a warm f u r coat. What we are inescapably committed 
t o , i s the existence of a t l e a s t one awareness, of how things 
p o s i t i v e l y are w i t h independent items i n an o b j e c t i v e world, which 
i s beyond question. We are thereby committed t o the existence of 
such a world and such items, though not as yet t o the t r u t h of any 
p a r t i c u l a r claims about them. I n l a t e r chapters, I w i l l argue t h a t 
we can go much f u r t h e r than t h i s ; but t h i s i n i t s e l f i s s u f f i c i e n t 
to r e f u t e r a d i c a l empiricism. 
We have shown t h a t the c e n t r a l e m p i r i c i s t concept, t h a t of 
experience, i s possible, - and so the c e n t r a l term of e m p i r i c i s t 
discourse, "experience", has i t s required meaning - only i f there 
are items i n an 'external world' which are e s s e n t i a l l y independent 
of experience. This r e f u t e s e m p i r i c i s t scepticism concerning the 
'external world', i n general, since such scepticism i s possible only 
i f f a l s e . 
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But t h i s answer leads only t o a f u r t h e r - though h o p e f u l l y 
f i n a l - o b j e c t i o n ; a t h i r d t e s t \irhich w i l l help us formulate 
the main argument of t h i s chapter i n r e l a t i o n to an older argument 
against empiricism. 
The Recursive Paradigm Case Argument 
We can imagine the f o l l o w i n g response to our counter to the 
o b j e c t i o n j u s t r a i s e d . "Surely", i t runs, " a l l t h i s t a l k of 
a 'semantic' l i n k w i t h a c t u a l instances of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r 
amounts only t o a r e v i v a l of the o l d , d i s c r e d i t e d , Paradigm Case 
Argument". That i s , we are i l l e g i t i m a t e l y b r i d g i n g a gap 
between meaning and existence. Just because c e r t a i n paradigm 
cases, i n r e l a t i o n t o which the term "experience" has i t s meaning, 
must be conceived of as cases where an experience which i s , 
i n t e n t i o n a l l y , of independent items i n an o b j e c t i v e world i s re j e c t e d 
on the basis of a p o s i t i v e awareness of how things r e a l l y are, we 
are not e n t i t l e d t o conclude t h a t such items, i n such a r e a l i t y , 
a c t u a l l y e x i s t . For i t w i l l do j u s t as w e l l f o r the meaning 
of the term, i f there j u s t seem t o be such cases of e x p e r i e n t i a l 
e r r o r , i n v o l v i n g the awareness of how things are i n an ob j e c t i v e 
world. We do not need the actual existence of these cases, and 
so do not need the ac t u a l existence of an inh a b i t e d o b j e c t i v e world. 
What can we say t o t h i s objection? 
Let us look a t i t from another angle. Consider the term 
" m a t e r i a l o b j e c t " . We can accept t h a t f o r a d i r e c t semantic 
l i n k t o h o l d , t h a t w i t h which i t holds must be conceived of, or 
understood as a m a t e r i a l o b j e c t . But t h a t does not license the 
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conclusion t h a t such an ob j e c t a c t u a l l y e x i s t s . I t w i l l 
be enough t o e s t a b l i s h the meaning of the term i f i t j u s t 
seems as i f there i s a m a t e r i a l o b j e c t , i f t h i s i s how things 
are experienced as being. S i m i l a r l y w i t h "experience": 
although we must understand the r e f e r e n t of an ostensive 
account of i t s meaning as r e l a t e d t o an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , ^ , 
s u r e l y i t w i l l do as w e l l i f i t only seems as i f the experience 
i s so r e l a t e d ; i f t h i s i s only how things are experienced as 
being r a t h e r than how they r e a l l y are. But here we must dig 
i n our heels. While we cannot bridge the gap between meaning 
and existence i n the case of " m a t e r i a l o b j e c t " , t h i s i s only 
because we presuppose t h a t "experience" has i t s required meaning; 
so t h a t experience of a c e r t a i n k i n d , i . e . i n t e n t i o n a l l y of 
m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s , provides an a l t e r n a t i v e to the actual existence 
of such objects s u f f i c i e n t to account f o r the meaningfulness of 
the term. Thus, the e m p i r i c i s t can argue, the f a c t t h a t 
experience takes the form i t does ( w i t h rule-governed r e g u l a r i t i e s , 
i n the Kantian mode), provides f o r the emergence of e x p l i c i t 
concepts of p a r t i c u l a r kinds of m a t e r i a l o b j e c t , without presupposing 
the a c t u a l existence of m a t e r i a l objects. By a r t i c u l a t i n g the 
i m p l i c i t general understanding of a ma t e r i a l o b j e c t , which i s 
presupposed by those e x p l i c i t concepts, we can a r r i v e at the term 
" m a t e r i a l o b j e c t " , w i t h o u t presupposing the actual existence of 
m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s . We can thus account f o r the meaningfulness of 
the term i n question, while presupposing nothing more than the 
existence of a c e r t a i n k i n d of experience. We have the meaning 
of the term, without the existence of the objects themselves. 
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This i s the a l t e r n a t i v e which the r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s t proposes. 
With 11 experience" i t s e l f , however, the e m p i r i c i s t cannot adopt 
the same s t r a t e g y . I f we t r y to withdraw the commitment to the 
existence of an independent world i n t h i s way, we are caught i n 
an i n f i n i t e regress. For i f the l i n k which makes i t possible 
f o r "experience" t o have i t s required meaning, i s w i t h a s i t u a t i o n 
i n which how things are experienced as being, i s at variance w i t h 
a p o s i t i v e awareness of how things are w i t h c e r t a i n items 
independent of experience, then an e m p i r i c i s t counter i s r u l e d 
out. I f the e m p i r i c i s t t r i e s to re-assessthe commitment t o a 
populated o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , t h i s presupposes t h a t the term 
"experience" already has i t s required meaning, and so i s already 
l i n k e d w i t h a 'paradigm case 1, i n which a commitment t o such a 
r e a l i t y i s already made. This commitment can be withdrawn, only 
i f these presuppositions are already made a t a p r i o r stage, and 
so on. The regress i s d e s t r u c t i v e , because i t makes i t impossible 
f o r the e m p i r i c i s t t o give an account of the semantic l i n k s which 
make empiricism i t s e l f p o s s i b l e . Unless we stop the regress by 
accepting the commitment t o an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y populated w i t h 
independent items, we are l e f t t r y i n g to use the term "experience", 
while severing the necessary conditions of i t s meaningfulness. 
The e m p i r i c i s t must t h e r e f o r e accept the presupposed commitment 
to a populated o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , as the p r i c e f o r being able to 
speak a t a l l . 
This discussion provides us w i t h what may be a useful reformulation 
of the argument. What we have o f f e r e d i s , i n f a c t , a recursive 
a p p l i c a t i o n of the paradigm-case argument, i n the context of a r e f l e c t i o n 
on the conditions of the p o s s i b i l i t y of empiricism i t s e l f . For while 
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the e a r l y paradigm-case t h e o r i s t s , as w i t h the Kantian and 
W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n t h i n k e r s already discussed, concerned themselves 
w i t h the language or concepts through which experience was 
a r t i c u l a t e d , they could reach v a l i d conclusions only about the 
s t r u c t u r e of experience, how things must be experienced as being, 
or how they must seem. I t i s only when the e m p i r i c i s t premise, 
t h a t there i s experience, i s not taken f o r granted, but r a t h e r 
i n v e s t i g a t e d as to the conditions of i t s p o s s i b i l i t y , t h a t we 
can bridge the gap between meaning and existence, by applying 
the arguments t o the e m p i r i c i s t ' s own discourse. 
I f we can revive one of what Gellner c a l l s the " p i l l a r s of 
l i n g u i s t i c philosophy", why not the other? The Argument from 
Polar Opposites has been perhaps even less successful than the 
Paradigm Case Argument. Nevertheless, from the above discussion 
i t can be seen t h a t we have here p r e c i s e l y what one commentator 
sees as the only c o n d i t i o n s under which the argument can succeed, 
namely a case where one of the p o l a r opposites - the term 
"experience" - can have meaning only i n r e l a t i o n t o actual 
instance of the a p p l i c a t i o n of the other^- the term "(populated) 
o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y " . I n t h i s k i n d of case i t i s impossible t h a t 
only the f i r s t term has a p p l i c a t i o n , and so impossible t h a t a l l 
there i s , i s experience. 
R e c a p i t u l a t i o n . 
I would hardly t h i n k a l l t h i s discussion t o be worth the 
t r o u b l e , i f i t succeeded only i n breathing l i f e i n t o an o l d 
argument or two. I t i s not these o l d arguments, however, but 
r a t h e r the thorough examination of the necessary conditions of 
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the p o s s i b i l i t y of r a d i c a l empiricism, t h a t has been important 
i n these three chapters. I n Chapter One, I c r i t i c i s e d e x i s t i n g 
attempts t o r e f u t e r a d i c a l empiricism. I n Chapter Two, I argued 
t h a t the r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s t i s committed t o the use of a p a r t i c u l a r 
concept of experience. I n Chapter Three, I argued t h a t the 
necessary conditions of the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h a t concept, and so 
of r a d i c a l empiricism i t s e l f , include the falseness of the claim 
t h a t there might e x i s t nothing other than experience. Radical 
empiricism, I have argued, i s the r e f o r e fundamentally incoherent, 
and so untenable. I t i s on the basis of t h i s k i n d of argument 
(which has, almost p a r e n t h e t i c a l l y , r e f u t e d scepticism about the 
existence of the ex t e r n a l w o r l d ) , t h a t I f e e l we can move towards a 
foundation of ethics i n the f o l l o w i n g chapters. I want t o end t h i s 
chapter w i t h two questions. The f i r s t , I introduce l i k e t h i s . Let 
us accept t h a t the argument so f a r has uncovered enough of the 
e s s e n t i a l l y necessary con d i t i o n s of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept 
of experience, to enable us t o show the basic incoherence of r a d i c a l 
empiricism. Nevertheless, t h i s s t i l l leaves open the question of 
how the concept of experience i s possible. For i f the argument 
of these chapters has not set out i t s own account of how t h i s concept 
i s p o s s i b l e , i t might be thought t h a t , no matter how compelling the 
argument has seemed t o be, we need t o be s a t i s f i e d t h a t some such 
account i s possible. Can t h i s be done? The argument t o show 
t h a t t h i s can be done i s important to the argument of the chapters 
t o f o l l o w . I aim t o provide i t i n the f i n a l s e c t i o n of t h i s chapter. 
The second question i s also c e n t r a l to the argument t h a t i s t o 
come. So f a r , i f i t has succeeded, the discussion has shown t h a t r a d i c a l 
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empiricism and i t s scepticism are untenable. But t h i s has 
been very much an ad hominem argument, even i f a t a very 
general l e v e l , against e m p i r i c i s t scepticism. But how can 
t h i s argument help us against other v a r i a n t s of scepticism, 
which are not based on empiricism? More g e n e r a l l y , how can 
t h i s argument serve as a s t a r t i n g - p o i n t from which t o advance 
to a transcendental foundation of e t h i c s . I want t o discuss 
t h i s l a t t e r question i n the next chapter. 
I wish then to conclude the present chapter w i t h a section 
which deals to some extent w i t h a c e r t a i n uneasiness t h a t might 
be f e l t a b o u t what has been presented so f a r . Suppose t h a t i t 
i s accepted t h a t r a d i c a l empiricism i s untenable, because i t s 
c e n t r a l concept i s possible only i f i t s major claims are f a l s e . 
Even so, I have not given any i n d i c a t i o n of how we can account 
f o r the concept of experience without already presupposing i t s 
a v a i l a b i l i t y . I f no such account i s possible, we might f e e l 
t h a t the argument against r a d i c a l empiricism, whatever i t s 
apparent cogency, diminishes i n f o r c e . I now wish to p o i n t 
to an account of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of experience 
which, as w e l l as s e t t l i n g some of t h i s increase, w i l l help an 
understanding of the argument of Chapter Four. 
But how i s the concept of experience possible? 
So f a r i n t h i s chapter, I have argued t h a t the concept of 
experience requires f o r i t s p o s s i b i l i t y - and the term "experience" 
r e q u i r e s f o r i t s meaning - a 'semantic* l i n k w i t h instances of 
e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r . But while we have thus uncovered some of the 
- 107 -
e s s e n t i a l l y necessary con d i t i o n s of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the 
concept of experience, there remain questions concerning how 
t h i s concept i s possible. Indeed, t h i s i s bound t o be the 
case, since we have not attempted to provide s u f f i c i e n t 
c o n d i t i o n s f o r the existence of the concept of experience. 
One question, however, seems e s p e c i a l l y awkward, although i t s 
answer gives r i s e to some i n t e r e s t i n g consequences. I have 
argued t h a t the term "experience" gets i t s meaning, and the 
concept of experience i s po s s i b l e , only i n v i r t u e of a 'semantic' 
l i n k w i t h instances of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r . Further, I argued t h a t 
t h i s l i n k r equires a p r i o r grasp, or understanding of such instances 
Only on the basis of such a primary grasp of cases of e x p e r i e n t i a l 
e r r o r , can the l i n k be made w i t h the concept of experience (as the 
concept of one aspect of the s i t u a t i o n ) . But how can such a 
primary grasp of cases of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r - i n r e l a t i o n t o 
which the concepts of experience and r e a l i t y are alone possible -
i t s e l f be possible? And what form does t h i s primary grasp take? 
These questions deserve a t l e a s t something i n r e p l y . I n t h i s 
s e c t i o n I aim t o provide a p i c t u r e of how the concept of experience 
i s p o s s i b l e . I believe t h a t a set of no n - c i r c u l a r s u f f i c i e n t 
c o n d i t i o n s f o r i t s p o s s i b i l i t y cannot, i n p r i n c i p l e , be given. 
The p i c t u r e I give i s intended to be a no n - c i r c u l a r account of 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of experience, which also comes 
close t o our n a t u r a l r e f l e c t i o n s on t h i s issue. The argument 
w i l l be t h i s . I have already argued t h a t the c r i t i c a l concept 
of experience i s possible only i n v i r t u e of a 'semantic' l i n k 
w i t h instances of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r . I n t h i s s e c t i o n , I w i l l 
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argue t h a t the primary understanding of such instances of e r r o r 
must be of them as t o t a l i t i e s ; r a t h e r than an understanding which 
i s synthesised from the understanding of t h e i r components - how 
things are, and how they are experienced as being. I w i l l then 
argue t h a t a t o t a l i t y of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r can be p r i m a r i l y 
grasped only i n r e l a t i o n t o an 'outside' context, from which i t 
i s d e l i m i t e d , or marked o f f . This outside context i s one of 
c o g n i t i v e harmony, which the s i t u a t i o n of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r f a i l s 
t o achieve. This d e l i m i t a t i o n , I w i l l argue, cannot be a matter 
of an a b s t r a c t comparison of two s i t u a t i o n s - c o g n i t i v e harmony, 
and e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r - but one of concrete breakdown i n t h a t 
harmony. Although I do not wish to take the argument f u r t h e r i n 
connection w i t h r a d i c a l empiricism, p a r t of the argument of Chapter 
Four w i l l p a r a l l e l the argument i n t h i s s e c t i o n , and pave the way 
f o r f u r t h e r developments. Let us address the problem. 
The d i f f i c u l t y here a r i s e s from the f a c t t h a t we cannot i n 
the present context, o f f e r our ordinary understanding of e r r o r as 
the primary one. For our ordinary understanding of cases of e x p e r i e n t i a l 
e r r o r , i s of cases where how things are, and how they are experienced as 
being, f a i l t o match up; but t h i s ordinary understanding employs the 
very concepts which the grasp of cases of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r i s to 
help make po s s i b l e . So despite the f a c t t h a t our p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
s t r a t e g y has shown the need f o r a l i n k w i t h s i t u a t i o n s i n which 
experience and r e a l i t y are at odds, these cases of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r 
cannot be p r i m a r i l y understood i n terms of experience f a i l i n g t o agree 
w i t h r e a l i t y . Here, the order of primary understandings reverses 
t h a t of the stages i n the p h i l o s o p h i c a l strategy. But i f the primary 
grasp of cases of e r r o r cannot employ these concepts, then how i s such 
a grasp possible a t a l l ? From our vantage-point, as ordinary adults 
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who have gone through the process of acq u i r i n g the c r i t i c a l 
concepts of experience and r e a l i t y , we can understand these 
cases as s i t u a t i o n s i n which how things are experienced as 
being d i f f e r s from how they r e a l l y are. But t h i s understanding 
c l e a r l y presupposes the a v a i l a b i l i t y of those concepts. How can 
there be a grasp of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r when the c r i t i c a l concepts 
of experience and r e a l i t y are not available? How could a being 
wit h o u t those concepts, have a grasp of e x p e r i e n t i a l error? 
Once possessed of the c r i t i c a l concept of experience, we can discuss 
instances of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r , as cases where one experience i s r e j e c t e d 
as n o n - v e r i d i c a l on the basis of another, which i s presumed v e r i d i c a l . 
But such an account cannot, of course, help us uncover the necessary 
cond i t i o n s of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the c r i t i c a l concept of experience. 
I w i l l now look at another suggestion as t o how we may account f o r the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of the c r i t i c a l concept of thought. I w i l l argue t h a t 
t h i s suggestion i s inadequate; but i t s f a i l u r e w i l l a t l e a s t help 
us t o recognise the s e v e r i t y of the problem t h a t confronts us. The 
suggestion i s t h i s . Suppose t h a t we take these experiences n a i v e l y , 
as d i r e c t , perceptual contacts w i t h r e a l i t y . Then the question of 
whether these experiences i n f a c t match up w i t h r e a l i t y , or are merely 
n o n - v e r i d i c a l experiences, has not been, and indeed cannot a t t h a t 
stage be, asked. We take them, as i t were, a t face value. Surely, 
i t may be suggested, even a t t h i s naive stage, the conjunction of two 
'naive' experiences, which from our vantage-point, can be seen to c o n f l i c t 
w i t h each other, must provoke the r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t at l e a s t one of them 
must be n o n - v e r i d i c a l : That i s , t h a t a t l e a s t one of these experiences 
must be merely an experience. Consider t h i s example: V i s i t i n g a 
f r i e n d , I accept the o f f e r of a cup of coffee. I reach f o r the china 
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cup. As I take i t , I r e a l i s e t h a t the cup i s f u r r y , and drop 
i t i n shock. (My f r i e n d i s a p r a c t i c a l student of the S u r r e a l i s t s . ) 
Now from our present vantage-point, possessing the c r i t i c a l concept 
of experience, we could consider t h i s encounter i n terms of two 
experiences: I . the v i s u a l experience, i n t e n t i o n a l l y , of a china 
cup. I I . the t a c t i l e experience, i n t e n t i o n a l l y , of a f u r r y cup. 
We could say t h a t these experiences are i n c o n f l i c t w i t h each other; 
and i n the l i g h t of f u r t h e r experiences may r u l e one out as non-
v e r i d i c a l , since i t f a i l s to f i t i n t o a coherent p a t t e r n w i t h the 
other. But we have seen t h a t such considerations are not avai l a b l e 
t o us i n an account of how the concept of experience i s possible, 
since they presuppose the c r i t i c a l concept of experience which the 
grasp of a s i t u a t i o n of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r was to make possible. 
Well, then, l e t us s t i c k w i t h our idea. Let us take these experiences 
i n the naive manner, as unquestioned perceptual awarenesses of r e a l i t y , 
so t h a t the question of whether they match up w i t h r e a l i t y , or are 
aberrant experiences, has not, and cannot y e t , be asked. There i s 
then an awareness of a china cup, followed by an awareness t h a t the 
cup i s f u r r y . Surely t h i s succession of naive experiences, of 
unquestioned perceptual awarenesses, forces us i n t o t h i n k i n g t h a t 
at l e a s t one of them must be wrong, i n error? But t h i s i s not 
the case. For not only does t h i s conjunction of naive awarenesses 
f a i l t o force us t o the concept of e r r o r , i t i s not possible f o r 
t h i s conclusion to a r i s e merely from t h a t c onjunction. For t o 
move t o the conclusion t h a t here was a case of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r , 
there would have to be an understanding of the f a c t t h a t the two 
naive awarenesses were i n c o n f l i c t , such t h a t a t l e a s t one of them 
was n o n - v e r i d i c a l . For the understanding of the experiences as 
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i n mutual c o n f l i c t amounts t o t h i s . I f e i t h e r experience 
i s v e r i d i c a l , then the other cannot be - i t must be a no n - v e r i d i c a l 
experience. I f how t h i n g s are experienced as being i s r i g h t i n 
one case, i t cannot be i n the other. The understanding of the 
experiences as c o n f l i c t i n g w i t h each other t h e r e f o r e presupposes 
the c r i t i c a l concept of experience, and the concept of r e a l i t y 
as t h a t w i t h which i t may diverge. I t cannot, then, be employed 
i n the grasp of cases of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r which i s t o help make 
these concepts themselves p o s s i b l e . Whilst we, possessing the 
concepts of e r r o r , experience and r e a l i t y , can judge t h a t a t l e a s t 
one of these experiences i s i n e r r o r , such a view i s not a v a i l a b l e 
from the vantage-point of unquestioned acceptance of the two 
perceptual awarenesses themselves. Nothing i n the mere j u x t a p o s i t i o n 
of such experiences - which we can regard as c o n f l i c t i n g w i t h each 
other - can generate of i t s e l f the grasp of the s i t u a t i o n as one 
of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r . Nothing here forces the concepts of e r r o r , 
experience or r e a l i t y t o emerge. We might note two supporting 
considerations here. F i r s t , i t i s n o t o r i o u s l y the case t h a t 
people can possess c o n t r a d i c t o r y b e l i e f s (though perhaps not i f 
they are aware of the c o n t r a d i c t i o n ) . Second, i n r e f l e c t i n g on 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the successive experiences, we could reach 
a d i f f e r e n t conclusion. There i s nothing to prevent the conclusion 
t h a t the cup was china, and the next moment turned to f u r . An 
account of the experiences i s thus a v a i l a b l e which does not even 
take them to be i n mutual c o n f l i c t , but allows f o r the v e r i d i c a l i t y 
of both. 
I f t h i s i s a c o r r e c t assessment of the s i t u a t i o n , then we seem 
to be stuck i n a hopeless c i r c l e . The p o s s i b i l i t y of the c r i t i c a l 
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concepts of experience and r e a l i t y depends on a 'semantic' 
l i n k w i t h instances of e r r o r , i n which how things are experienced 
as being, and how they are, are i n t e r r e l a t e d aspects. But the 
understanding of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r which we have from our present 
vantage-point, requires the c r i t i c a l concept of experience, as 
t h a t which may f a i l t o match up w i t h r e a l i t y . This understanding 
of s i t u a t i o n s of e r r o r cannot, then, be the primary one: i t cannot 
provide f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of those concepts whose a v a i l a b i l i t y 
i t already presupposes. Further, we have seen t h a t the conjunction 
of experiences taken at a naive l e v e l , as perceptual awarenesses 
whose agreement w i t h r e a l i t y cannot at t h a t stage be questioned, 
cannot of i t s e l f give r i s e t o the primary grasp of a s i t u a t i o n as 
one of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r . How can we escape from a l l t h i s ? 
Let us take stock. I t i s c l e a r t h a t the primary grasp of 
e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r cannot take the form of some s o r t of synthesis 
of the grasp of i t s components - t h a t i s , of how things are, and of 
how they are experienced as being - since the grasp of those components 
i t s e l f presupposes the primary grasp of e r r o r . But i f the primary 
grasp of the s i t u a t i o n of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r cannot be synthesised 
from the grasp of i t s components, then i t must be a grasp of 
e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r as a t o t a l i t y . That i s , the s i t u a t i o n of e r r o r 
cannot be p r i m a r i l y understood by p u t t i n g together an understanding 
of i t s component p a r t s . The only a l t e r n a t i v e i s t h a t i t be 
understood as a whole. A l l t h a t i s meant by t a l k of t h i s t o t a l i t y , 
i s the t o t a l s i t u a t i o n w i t h i n which experience and r e a l i t y gre 
r e l a t e d . This r e l a t i o n s h i p i s one i n which how things are experienced 
as being d i f f e r s from how they r e a l l y are. Having grasped such a 
t o t a l i t y , subsequent r e f l e c t i v e analysis can d i s t i n g u i s h , w i t h i n 
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t h a t t o t a l i t y , how things are experienced as being from how they 
r e a l l y are. The grasp of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r as a t o t a l i t y must 
precede the c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n of i t s i n t e r n a l components.^ They 
can only be grasped on the basis of a p r i o r grasp of the t o t a l i t y 
w i t h i n which they are r e l a t e d . 
Now t h i s t o t a l i t y has a s p e c i f i c nature. 1^ . i s not j u s t any 
o l d t o t a l i t y , or even the t o t a l i t y of a l l t h a t i s . I t must be a 
t o t a l i t y which can l a t e r be analysed as one w i t h i n which experience 
and r e a l i t y are at odds w i t h each other. But how i s a grasp of 
t h i s t o t a l i t y possible? I t cannot be grasped, i n i t s s p e c i f i c 
nature, from the 'i n s i d e ' - as a co n s t r u c t i o n from, or synthesis o f , 
i t s components - since t h i s would presuppose the a v a i l a b i l i t y of 
the concepts which i t i s t o make possible. But i f i t cannot be 
p r i m a r i l y grasped from the ' i n s i d e ' , then the s i t u a t i o n of 
e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r can only be grasped i n i t s s p e c i f i c nature from 
'outside'. But i f the whole i s to be a s p e c i f i c t o t a l i t y ( r a t h e r 
than, say, the t o t a l i t y of a l l there i s ) , then i t must be marked o f f , 
or d e l i m i t e d , from t h a t which i s 'outside' i t . I f i t were not so 
d e l i m i t e d , then - since i t cannot be grasped from the 'inside' -
there would be no way of grasping i t as a whole, at a l l . The l i m i t 
of the t o t a l i t y cannot be drawn from the ' i n s i d e ' ; i t can only be 
drawn from w i t h o u t . Thus, the primary grasp, or understanding, of 
the t o t a l i t y of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r , must be of i t i n r e l a t i o n to a 
context from which i t i s d e l i m i t e d . We can continue the s p a t i a l 
metaphor i n terms of drawing boundaries, t o give some more f l a v o u r 
t o the argument. Consider the two approaches here: we could, as 
i t were, c o l l e c t a l l the components required f o r the t o t a l i t y to be 
of the r i g h t k i n d , draw a boundary l i n e round them, and then say 
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t h a t the l i n e d e l i m i t s the t o t a l i t y . This corresponds to 
a grasp of a t o t a l i t y of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r on the basis of 
a grasp of i t s i n t e r n a l components. Or we could f i r s t draw 
the boundary to mark i t o f f from another area, and say t h a t the 
l i n e d e l i m i t s the t o t a l i t y , and t h a t we can then s t a r t to look 
at i t s i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e . This corresponds t o a grasp of the 
t o t a l i t y of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r i n r e l a t i o n t o i t s d e l i m i t a t i o n 
from something outside i t , w i t h a consequent analysis of i t s 
i n t e r r e l a t e d components. My argument i s t h a t the f i r s t approach 
already presupposes the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the concepts i t i s to make 
poss i b l e . Only the second approach does not make t h a t presupposition, 
and so only the second approach makes a grasp of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r 
(and so the concept of experience) possible. Let us take t h i s 
approach f u r t h e r . 
The way i n which t h i s t o t a l i t y i s 'delimited from without' has 
to be such t h a t the t o t a l i t y thus d e l i m i t e d i s indeed one of 
e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r (and n o t , f o r example, one of the f a i l u r e t o 
s a t i s f y a d e s i r e ) . The t o t a l i t y thus d e l i m i t e d must be one which 
can be r e f l e c t i v e l y analysed as a case i n which how things are 
experienced as being f a i l s to match up w i t h how they r e a l l y are. 
This i s the c r u c i a l p o i n t f o r c r i t i c a l e m p i r i c i s t philosophy. 
Some questions now a r i s e . What s o r t of grasp of the t o t a l i t y 
of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r i s possible? What i s the character of t h i s 
'outside' from which a t o t a l i t y of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r i s t o be 
marked o f f , or delimited? How does t h i s d e l i m i t a t i o n come about? 
I f we t a c k l e the f i r s t question, I hope the others w i l l be answered 
en r o u t e . 
What s o r t of grasp of t h i s t o t a l i t y of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r i s 
po s s i b l e , given t h a t the t o t a l i t y i s i n some sense d e l i m i t e d from 
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i t s 'outside'? I n order t o see what t h i s question i s g e t t i n g 
a t , and then t o get an answer to i t , l e t us look a t some other 
examples of ' t o t a l i t i e s ' , or 'wholes' w i t h which we are acquainted. 
Our c a t e g o r i s a t i o n of items w i t h i n the world d i s t i n g u i s h e s such 
things as people, t r e e s , and s o c i e t i e s . I n possession of c r i t e r i a 
of i n d i v i d u a t i o n c a r r i e d by the appropriate s o r t a l concept, we can 
scour the world f o r such e n t i t i e s ; f i n d them; and then study the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e i r component p a r t s . We can t r e a t each 
of these e n t i t i e s as a t o t a l i t y , and discover how i t maintains 
i t s e l f , performs c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n s , and so on. We have a grasp 
of the t o t a l i t y as something p o s i t i v e i n i t s e l f , and more or less 
s e l f - c o n t a i n e d . This i s not the s o r t of grasp we can have of a 
t o t a l i t y of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r . The primary grasp of e x p e r i e n t i a l 
e r r o r cannot presuppose the concept of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r , since 
t h a t concept i t s e l f presupposes the concepts of experience and 
r e a l i t y which are a t issue. But without the concept of e x p e r i e n t i a l 
e r r o r , how can we come by a grasp of a t o t a l i t y of e x p e r i e n t i a l 
error? How can we get a g r i p on a t o t a l i t y w i t h i n which experience 
and r e a l i t y are a t odds? We know t h a t such a grasp of t h i s t o t a l i t y 
cannot be by means of a d i r e c t comparison between how things are, and 
how they are experienced as being, so as to uncover the d i f f e r e n c e . 
For such a comparison would already presuppose the a v a i l a b i l i t y of 
the concepts of experience and r e a l i t y . I t could not, then, play 
a p a r t i n an account of how those concepts are possible. There 
seems t o be no way of grasping a t o t a l i t y of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r as 
a p o s i t i v e s e l f - c o n t a i n e d e n t i t y , d e l i m i t e d from the outside world 
w i t h o u t presupposing such a grasp of i t s components as we cannot a t 
t h i s stage allow ourselves. But what i s the a l t e r n a t i v e t o a l l 
t h i s ? What could we mean by grasping the t o t a l i t y of e x p e r i e n t i a l 
e r r o r i n a negative manner? To c l a r i f y the p o i n t a t issue, consider 
f i r s t an analogy. 
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Take, as analogous t o the s i t u a t i o n of e x p e r i e n t i a l 
e r r o r , the case of an inadequate c a r b u r e t t o r . The s i t u a t i o n 
here i s one where the c a r b u r e t t o r i n a car cannot do i t s j o b . 
What s o r t of grasp of t h i s t o t a l s i t u a t i o n can we have? Look 
a t the a l t e r n a t i v e s . F i r s t : we could analyse the component 
par t s of the c a r b u r e t t o r , and r e a l i s e t h a t the size of the holes 
(or whatever else goes on i n s i d e a c a r b u r e t t o r ) w i l l not match 
up t o the amount of p e t r o l r e q u ired f o r the engine t o work 
c o r r e c t l y . Our grasp of the t o t a l i t y (the inadequacy of the 
c a r b u r e t t o r ) i s achieved by synthesising our grasp of i t s 
component pa r t s and t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s . I t i s a grasp 
of t h a t t o t a l i t y from the ' i n s i d e * . I t i s worth p o i n t i n g out 
t h a t t h i s synthesis of our understanding of the components 
cannot of i t s e l f give us a grasp of the inadequacy of the carburetto 
A l l we have i s a d i r e c t comparison between the amount of p e t r o l 
t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r c a r b u r e t t o r w i l l l e t through, and the amount 
of p e t r o l r e q u i r e d f o r a p a r t i c u l a r engine t o f u n c t i o n i n a 
p a r t i c u l a r manner. That comparison does not i n i t s e l f show the 
c a r b u r e t t o r to be inadequate ( i t might be p e r f e c t l y s a t i s f a c t o r y 
i n a d i f f e r e n t c a r ) . We can only grasp i t as inadequate i n 
r e l a t i o n t o the smooth f u n c t i o n i n g of the r e s t of the car. We 
cannot, then, have a p o s i t i v e grasp of the t o t a l i t y as an e n t i t y 
i n i t s own r i g h t ( l i k e t r e e s , or people). Mechanical f a i l u r e 
i s not an e n t i t y i n i t s e l f , but r e f e r s us e s s e n t i a l l y t o a wider 
f u n c t i o n a l context i n which i t can be grasped as a f a i l u r e . 
Second: we are d r i v i n g along when the car slows of i t s own accord 
t o a stop. The car engine f a i l s t o work pro p e r l y . We trace the 
problem t o a lack of s u f f i c i e n t p e t r o l entering the c y l i n d e r s . We 
- 117 -
then discover t h a t the fl o w of p e t r o l from the tank up t o the 
ca r b u r e t t o r i s s u f f i c i e n t . Our conclusion i s then t h a t the 
c a r b u r e t t o r i s inadequate: i t cannot do i t s j o b . We can then 
take i t t o pieces and f i n d out why. I n t h i s case, our grasp 
of the t o t a l i t y a t issue i s achieved, not by a p o s i t i v e synthesis 
of our grasp of i t s component p a r t s , but through d e l i m i t i n g t h a t 
t o t a l i t y i n r e l a t i o n to a wider context - an 'outside*. Here, 
the c a r b u r e t t o r ' s inadequacy i s grasped i n r e l a t i o n t o t h a t 
outside context: i t i s a f a i l u r e t o achieve a c e r t a i n mechanical 
harmony w i t h other parts of the car, which leads to a mechanical 
breakdown. 
Let us now look again at the t o t a l i t y of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r . 
What s o r t of grasp of t h i s t o t a l i t y can we have? Corresponding t o 
the f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e i n the case of the c a r b u r e t t o r , i s the grasp 
of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r from the ' i n s i d e ' . That i s , the t o t a l i t y 
i s grasped by means of a synthesis of our understanding of i t s 
component p a r t s - how t h i n g s are, and how they are experienced as 
being - and t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s . This approach we have 
r e j e c t e d , as already presupposing the concepts i t i s t o help 
make p o s s i b l e . What corresponds t o the second approach taken 
t o the problem of the carb u r e t t o r ? Playing f o o t b a l l , the b a l l 
vanishes i n t o some long grass. Chasing a f t e r i t , I see the b a l l 
and d e l i v e r a huge k i c k . My f o o t explodes w i t h pain on contact 
w i t h what i s , i n f a c t , the top of a d e r e l i c t , stone, gatepost. 
The problem i n the smooth running of my l i f e i s traced t o a co g n i t i v e 
f a i l u r e ( n o t , f o r example, to the weakness of my f o o t ) . R e f l e c t i v e 
a nalysis uncovers the components of t h i s f a i l u r e ( i t looked l i k e the 
b a l l , but was i n f a c t made of stone). Here, the t o t a l i t y of 
e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r i s grasped i n i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a wider context: 
i t i s a f a i l u r e to achieve a c e r t a i n c o g n i t i v e harmony which leads to a 
d i s r u p t i o n i n my a c t i v e l i f e . 
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So f a r , we have two analogous s t o r i e s . What we need now 
i s t o sharpen our understanding of how the second s t o r y helps 
answer the questions about our grasp of the t o t a l i t y of e x p e r i e n t i a l 
e r r o r . Let me t r y to c l a r i f y the issue. We have already r e j e c t e d 
the f i r s t approach towards understanding the t o t a l s i t u a t i o n of 
e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r - understanding i t by means of a synthesis of 
an understanding of i t s components. But l e t us look .at a f u r t h e r 
d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h i s approach. This approach co n s i s t s , e s s e n t i a l l y , 
i n seeing how things are, and comparing i t w i t h how things are 
experienced as being. I f we do t h i s , however, a l l we get i s a 
comparison between the i n t e n t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of an experience and, 
as i t were, the s t r u c t u r e of r e a l i t y . The comparison h i g h l i g h t s a 
d i f f e r e n c e between the two. But even i f we help ourselves 
i l l e g i t i m a t e l y to the concepts of experience and r e a l i t y required 
f o r such a comparison, the comparison of how thi n g s are w i t h how 
thin g s are experienced as being leaves out an e s s e n t i a l feature of 
e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r . This i s the idea t h a t the divergence between 
experience and r e a l i t y c o n s t i t u t e s a co g n i t i v e f a i l u r e . For i t i s 
p r e c i s e l y t h i s concern w i t h the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o g n i t i v e f a i l u r e , 
which i s c e n t r a l to the c r i t i c a l e m p i r i c i s t i n t e r r o g a t i o n of naive 
r e a l i s m . For t h i s i n t e r r o g a t i o n implies a c r i t i q u e of knowledge, 
r a t h e r than r e a l i t y . The lack of f i t between experience and r e a l i t y 
i s construed as a f a i l u r e i n the experience t o match the r e a l i t y . 
(Compare the way i n which a lack of f i t between a moral imperative and 
r e a l i t y i s construed as a f a i l u r e of r e a l i t y t o match up wi t h our 
i d e a l s . I t i s r e a l i t y which i s being questioned.) This sense 
of f a i l u r e could not be generated by a mere comparison of two 
s t r u c t u r e s , even i f we allowed ourselves the concepts of experience 
and r e a l i t y . Now i f we were t o add the idea t h a t , i m p l i c i t i n the 
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experience, i s a claim t h a t t h i s i s how things r e a l l y are, 
then i t might seem t h a t we would have the required understanding 
of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r as a f a i l u r e . But t h a t understanding 
would nevertheless already presuppose the concepts of experience 
and r e a l i t y , and could not help us w i t h an account of the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of those concepts. The con s i d e r a t i o n of the f i r s t approach h i g h l i g h t s 
the d i f f i c u l t y of accounting f o r the primary grasp of the t o t a l i t y 
of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r . How can the second approach towards 
grasping t h a t t o t a l i t y - understanding e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r i n the 
l i g h t of i t s place i n a wider context - help us t o cope w i t h t h i s 
d i f f i c u l t y ? 
I n t h i s way: The t o t a l i t y of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r d e l i m i t e d 
from o u t s i d e , must be a t o t a l i t y which can subsequently be analysed 
as a f a i l u r e of experience t o match up wi t h r e a l i t y . How can t h i s 
f a i l u r e be grasped? I t can be p r i m a r i l y grasped only through 
reference t o t h a t which i t f a i l s t o achieve, namely, a cog n i t i v e 
harmony. We cannot p r i m a r i l y grasp e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r as a p o s i t i v e , 
more or less s e l f - c o n t a i n e d e n t i t y ( l i k e people, trees and s o c i e t i e s ) , 
because the grasp of i t as a f a i l u r e r e f e r s us e s s e n t i a l l y t o t h a t 
which i t f a i l s to achieve. I t f a i l s to achieve c o g n i t i v e harmony. 
The primary grasp of the t o t a l i t y of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r can, then, 
only be achieved through the negative d e l i m i t a t i o n of t h a t t o t a l i t y 
from an 'outside' context of c o g n i t i v e harmony. Although t h i s 
second approach allows room f o r the primary grasp of e x p e r i e n t i a l 
e r r o r as a f a i l u r e t o achieve c o g n i t i v e harmony, i t may seem 
u n s a t i s f y i n g . Although i t aims to provide a grasp of the t o t a l i t y 
of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r from outside, without presupposing the concepts 
of experience and r e a l i t y , i t seems only to s h i f t the burden to the 
n o t i o n of c o g n i t i v e harmony. To a r r i v e a t a s a t i s f a c t o r y p i c t u r e 
- 120 -
of how the concept of experience i s possible, we need, then, 
to consider a f u r t h e r p o i n t . 
The f u r t h e r p o i n t concerns the a v a i l a b i l i t y of t h i s notion 
of a c o g n i t i v e harmony between how things are, and how they are 
experienced as being. So f a r , I have argued t h a t the t o t a l i t y 
of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r must p r i m a r i l y be grasped from the 'outside': 
t h a t i s , i n v i r t u e of i t s negative r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a wider context 
i t s f a i l u r e t o keep up a c o g n i t i v e harmony. I t has already been 
argued t h a t t h i s grasp of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r i s i n t u r n a necessary 
c o n d i t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of experience. Now the 
n o t i o n of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r a v a i l a b l e to possessors of the concepts 
of experience and r e a l i t y , i s of cases where how things are i s at 
variance w i t h how they are experienced as being. S i m i l a r l y , the 
n o t i o n of c o g n i t i v e harmony here, amounts to t h a t of a coincidence 
of how th i n g s are w i t h how they are experienced as being. I t 
f o l l o w s t h a t the d e l i m i t a t i o n of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r from the context 
of c o g n i t i v e harmony i s l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the 
n o t i o n of a c o g n i t i v e harmony. P r i o r t o t h a t d e l i m i t a t i o n , t h a t 
c o g n i t i v e harmony i s unquestioned and unquestionable: f o r t o 
question i t would r e q u i r e j u s t those c r i t i c a l concepts of experience 
and r e a l i t y which are a t t h a t stage u n a v a i l a b l e . ^ ' I f t h i s p o i n t 
i s taken, then a c e r t a i n exasperation may emerge. How on earth 
does t h i s supposed d e l i m i t a t i o n of the t o t a l i t y of e x p e r i e n t i a l 
e r r o r , from a context of c o g n i t i v e harmony, happen? 
I n answering t h i s question, we need to see more c l e a r l y what 
the d i f f i c u l t y i s . Let us see t h i s i n r e l a t i o n t o what might 
seem a f a i r l y obvious r e p l y t o the question. This would be the 
suggestion t h a t e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r i s marked o f f from co g n i t i v e 
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harmony by v i r t u e of a comparison of the two s i t u a t i o n s : on 
the one side , how things are experienced as being accords w i t h 
how they are; on the other si d e , i t does not. But of course 
such a comparison would presuppose the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the 
concepts of experience and r e a l i t y which i t i s supposed to help 
make po s s i b l e . We must r e j e c t t h i s suggestion. But i f we 
cannot l e g i t i m a t e l y employ these concepts i n d e l i m i t i n g e x p e r i e n t i a l 
e r r o r from i t s 'outside' context, then what a l t e r n a t i v e can there 
be? For no other concepts could do t h i s j o b . The only 
a l t e r n a t i v e i s t h i s : the d e l i m i t a t i o n , from the context of 
c o g n i t i v e harmony, which makes possible the primary grasp of 
e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r must be non-conceptual. For any conceptual 
grasp of the r e l a t i o n between e r r o r and harmony presupposes the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of the very concepts at issue. Thus what we have here, 
can be no a b s t r a c t conceptual marking o f f of the one from the other. 
But how are we t o make sense of the no t i o n of a non-conceptual 
grasp of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r i n i t s negative r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h 
c o g n i t i v e harmony? 
Let us look a t the s i t u a t i o n again. The t o t a l i t y of e x p e r i e n t i a l 
e r r o r cannot be p r i m a r i l y grasped from w i t h i n , but only from 'outside', 
i n r e l a t i o n t o a context of c o g n i t i v e harmony which i t f a i l s to achieve. 
But the grasp of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , between e r r o r and harmony, cannot 
take the form of understanding the case of e r r o r as a f a i l u r e t o l i v e 
up t o an a b s t r a c t i d e a l of c o g n i t i v e harmony, which we already have i n 
mind. To understand the r e l a t i o n s h i p as one i n which the actual 
case f a i l s t o l i v e up t o the i d e a l , would require t h a t the i d e a l was 
already conceived i n terms of how things are, c o i n c i d i n g w i t h how they 
are experienced as being - which presuppose the concepts of experience 
and r e a l i t y a t issue. The t o t a l s i t u a t i o n of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r 
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cannot be d e l i m i t e d from the context of co g n i t i v e harmony 
i n any ab s t r a c t manner which requires the concepts we are 
t r y i n g t o account f o r . That d e l i m i t a t i o n of e x p e r i e n t i a l 
e r r o r from c o g n i t i v e harmony can only take the concrete form 
of an actu a l rupture i n t h a t harmony. Or, ta k i n g a cue from 
the previous analogy, i t can only take the form of a breakdown 
i n c o g n i t i v e h a r m o n y . T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between e x p e r i e n t i a l 
e r r o r and c o g n i t i v e harmony i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p of e r r o r t o t h a t 
i n which i t c o n s t i t u t e s a r u p t u r e , or breakdown. I t i s t h i s 
d e l i m i t a t i o n of the t o t a l i t y of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r from i t s 
'outside', which makes possible the primary grasp of t h a t t o t a l i t y . 
The f a c t t h a t t h i s d e l i m i t a t i o n of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r , as a rupture 
i n c o g n i t i v e harmony, i s not an abstra c t r e l a t i o n s h i p but a concrete 
breakdown, makes possible a non-conceptual grasp of the t o t a l i t y 
of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r . Let us i l l u s t r a t e t h i s w i t h the case of 
the f u r r y cup. 
When the cup i s f i r s t o f f e r e d , no question as to the v e r a c i t y 
of the perceptual experience of the cup as an ordinary china one 
i s r a i s e d . Indeed, i f t h i s were p r i o r t o the emergence of the 
c r i t i c a l concept of experience, the question could not be raise d . 
When I touch the cup, the shock on f e e l i n g the f u r r y surface leads 
me t o drop i t . Here, the f e e l i n g of shock i s the non-conceptual 
r e g i s t r a t i o n of a c o g n i t i v e r u p t u r e , of the breakdown of an 
unquestioned perceptual r e l a t i o n w i t h r e a l i t y , i n t o e x p e r i e n t i a l 
e r r o r . R e f l e c t i o n on t h i s breakdown can give r i s e t o i t s analysis 
i n terms of a f a i l u r e of experience t o match up w i t h r e a l i t y , and 
thence of the breakdown as a-breakdown of co g n i t i v e harmony: 
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nevertheless, i t i s only the non-conceptual grasp, or 
r e g i s t r a t i o n , of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p between c o g n i t i v e harmony 
and e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r , which makes the c r i t i c a l concepts of 
experience and r e a l i t y a t a l l possible. A f u r t h e r p o i n t i s 
worth making here. I f a non-conceptual r e g i s t r a t i o n of 
breakdown i n c o g n i t i v e harmony i s to be possible, then t h a t 
c o g n i t i v e harmony must have a non-conceptual aspect. I f t h a t 
harmony consisted merely i n an a b s t r a c t coincidence of how things 
are, w i t h the ab s t r a c t content of a claim i m p l i c i t i n experience, 
then the breakdown i n t h a t a b s t r a c t r e l a t i o n s h i p could only be 
r e g i s t e r e d conceptually. The non-conceptual aspect of t h a t 
harmonious r e l a t i o n s h i p can be provided f o r by i t s p r a c t i c a l 
s i g n i f i c a n c e : the unquestioned harmony of experience and r e a l i t y 
informs p r a c t i c a l l i f e . Thus i n the examples of e x p e r i e n t i a l 
e r r o r introduced e a r l i e r , i t i s the f a c t t h a t how things are 
experienced as being informs our p r a c t i c a l involvement w i t h r e a l i t y , 
which provides the basis f o r a non-conceptual r e g i s t r a t i o n of the 
breakdown i n t h a t unquestioned c o g n i t i v e harmony. 
This provides us w i t h an idea of how the 'semantic' l i n k 
between the concept of experience and cases of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r 
i s p o s s i b l e . I t i s not t h a t a concept (or i t s l i n g u i s t i c expression 
i s somehow brought along and put i n contact w i t h such a case. Rather 
the concepts are the way i n \vhich the non-conceptual r e g i s t r a t i o n 
of a breakdown i n c o g n i t i v e harmony gets a r t i c u l a t e d . Their 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h instances of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r i s thus more 
i n t i m a t e than the current theories of semantics tend to suggest.^ 0 . 
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To conclude t h i s s e c t i o n , I should l i k e t o make a p o i n t 
about t e m p o r a l i t y . I w i l l argue t h a t the process of r e j e c t i n g 
how thi n g s are experienced as being, on the basis of a (presumed) 
awareness of how thi n g s are, i s necessarily a temporal one ( a t 
l e a s t , i n s o f a r as the primary grasp of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r i s 
concerned). Let me introduce the argument l i k e t h i s . I have 
spoken i n t h i s s e c t i o n of a d i s r u p t i o n i n the non-conceptual 
involvement of how things are experienced as being, which provides 
the basis f o r a non-conceptual r e g i s t r a t i o n of the f a c t t h a t an 
unquestioned c o g n i t i v e harmony has broken down. Thus the sudden 
i n t e r r u p t i o n i n my game of f o o t b a l l , was the occasion f o r a 
non-conceptual r e g i s t r a t i o n of the f a c t t h a t the unquestioned 
harmony between my experience of the object before me and i t s 
r e a l i t y had broken down. I t was not a f o o t b a l l , but a piece of 
stone. I have also spoken of the r e j e c t i o n of how things are 
experienced as being, on the basis of a (presumed) awareness of 
how thi n g s are. I have argued t h a t t h i s r e j e c t i o n cannot come 
about as the outcome of an ab s t r a c t comparison between how things 
are experienced as being, and how they are, since t h i s would 
r e q u i r e the very concepts which are at issue here. The primary 
grasp of having f a l l e n i n t o e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r , must be a non-
conceptual one. We are now i n a p o s i t i o n t o recognise c e r t a i n 
i m p l i c a t i o n s regarding t e m p o r a l i t y . 
The i m p l i c a t i o n s are as f o l l o w s . I f how things are experienc 
as being were co-temporaneous w i t h the (presumed) awareness of how 
things are, on the basis of which the experience i s r e j e c t e d as 
n o n - v e r i d i c a l ; then t h a t r e j e c t i o n could only be the r e s u l t of 
- 125 -
an a b s t r a c t comparison between the two, checking o f f experience 
against r e a l i t y . There could not be the required non-conceptual 
grasp of the f a c t t h a t how things are experienced as being d i f f e r s 
from how they are, only a comparison which requires the very concepts 
at issue here. For a non-conceptual grasp of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r 
t o be p o s s i b l e , the d e l i m i t a t i o n of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r from an 
unquestioned c o g n i t i v e harmony must have a temporal character. 
Something l i k e the f o l l o w i n g must be involved. To begin w i t h , 
there i s an unquestioned presupposition of harmony between experience 
and r e a l i t y . This unquestioned harmony then breaks down i n the 
face of a new (presumed) awareness of how things are (the b a l l 
i s s o l i d , the cup made of f u r ) . The non-conceptual r e g i s t r a t i o n 
of t h i s breakdown (a c e r t a i n f e e l i n g of shock) makes room f o r a 
r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t how things were experienced as being i s not how 
th i n g s r e a l l y are. The (presumed) awareness of how things r e a l l y 
are, temporally displaces how things are experienced as being. I f 
t h i s were not the case, i f there were not t h i s temporal heterogeneity, 
then there could be no non-conceptual r e g i s t r a t i o n of the unquestioned 
harmony between experience and r e a l i t y having broken down. There 
would be only the p o s s i b i l i t y of a b s t r a c t l y comparing experience 
side by side w i t h r e a l i t y ; a process which would i t s e l f require 
the c r i t i c a l concepts of experience and r e a l i t y , and so cannot form p a r t 
of an account of t h e i r p o s s i b i l i t y . Whenever the non-conceptual 
r e g i s t r a t i o n of a concrete rupture i n an unquestioned harmony i s 
r e q u i r e d , t e m p o r a l i t y i s e s s e n t i a l l y involved. 
This argument allows us t o say something more about the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between l o g i c a l and genetic p r i o r i t i e s i n t h i s chapter. So f a r I have 
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argued t h a t the l o g i c a l p r i o r i t i e s a t l e a s t set l i m i t s on 
the genetic p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I f concept A l o g i c a l l y presupposes 
concept B, then concept A cannot be acquired before concept B. 
We can now see t h a t the p o s i t i o n i s more complex. For the concept 
of experience i s p o s s i b l y only as an outcome of a temporal process, 
which r e s u l t s i n the non-conceptual r e g i s t r a t i o n of the f a c t t h a t 
c o g n i t i v e harmony has broken down i n t o e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r . This 
r e g i s t r a t i o n requires a (presumed) awareness of how things are 
("The cup i s f u r r y " ) , which cannot be merely co-temporaneous w i t h 
how t h i n g s are experienced as being, but which must temporally 
displace experience. The primary grasp of e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r 
i s consequently a grasp of how t h i n g s were experienced as being,as 
not matching up t o how things r e a l l y are. This has repercussions 
f o r what has been termed "the metaphysics of presence". 5 1' For the 
primary grasp of experience i s not of i t as something given as 
immediately present, but r a t h e r as something which i s temporally 
displaced from the present, by a (presumed) awareness of how things 
r e a l l y are. What some philosophers have done i n the past, i s 
to f o r g e t , or f a i l t o uncover, the necessary temporal process 
which r e s u l t s i n t h e i r possession of the c r i t i c a l concept of 
experience; and then t o f l a t t e n out the temporal s t r u c t u r e of 
t h a t process, so t h a t experience i s understood as t h a t which i s 
given - t h i s , here, now - even i f the existence of the external 
world can be questioned. But I do not have the space to pursue 
these r e f l e c t i o n s on the h i s t o r y of philosophy. Here, I r e s t r i c t 
myself t o p o i n t i n g out the necessary temporal character of a concrete 
ru p t u r e i n c o g n i t i v e harmony. 
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I hope t o have given i n t h i s s e c t i o n some idea of the 
conditions i n which the concept of experience i s a c t u a l l y 
p o s s i b l e . There i s much more to be said, of course, and 
some of t h i s w i l l emerge i n l a t e r chapters. I n Chapter 
Four, I hope t o take up issues which go beyond r a d i c a l empiricism 
to c r i t i c a l philosophy i n general. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
BEGINNING PHILOSOPHY 
Search f o r a S t a r t i n g P o i n t i n Philosophy 
The argument of the previous chapters has been t h a t 
e m p i r i c i s t scepticism i s incoherent. The c e n t r a l term of 
i t s discourse, "experience", can have i t s required meaning 
only i f there e x i s t s an 'external world' containing items whose 
existence and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are independent of experience. 
( C o r r e l a t i v e l y , the concept of experience i s possible only on 
t h i s c o n d i t i o n . ) Radical empiricism i s meaningful only i f 
f a l s e . I n t h i s chapter I wish t o take up the question of whether, 
i f r a d i c a l empiricism f a i l s to f i l l the r o l e , there can be any other 
s t a r t i n g - p o i n t i n philosophy. I w i l l look a t some of the candidates 
f o r the post. This discussion w i l l lead on t o an i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
of the p a r a l l e l discussion of the guiding i n t e r e s t of c r i t i c a l 
e m p i r i c i s t philosophy; t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n w i l l uncover some of the 
e s s e n t i a l features of the concept of thought which l i e s a t the heart 
of t h a t i n q u i r y . I aim t o show t h a t t h i s provides us w i t h an 
unchallengeable s t a r t i n g - p o i n t f o r philosophy. I n an argument 
which p a r a l l e l s the r e f u t a t i o n of r a d i c a l empiricism i n Chapter 
Three, I w i l l go on t o claim t h a t , by uncovering the necessary 
co n d i t i o n s of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of thought, we can 
show t h a t any general scepticism about the existence of an objective 
world must be incoherent. 
I f the argument of Chapter Three i s successful, i t rules out 
r a d i c a l empiricism as a coherent philosophy. But i t i s not clear what 
should happen next. There are many avenues open to philosophers 
disenchanted w i t h r a d i c a l empiricism as a? comprehensive ph i l o s o p h i c a l 
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outlook. The 'commonsensical 1 realism of G.E. Moore, the 
d e s c r i p t i o n of language-games by Wittgenstein, the ' n a t u r a l i s e d ' 
epistemology of Quine, the abandonment of epistemology by Rorty, 
are evidence enough of the v a r i e t y here. But i f we put a l i m i t 
on the c r i t i c a l a s p i r a t i o n s of r a d i c a l empiricism - r u l i n g out 
e m p i r i c i s t scepticism about the existence of an 'external world' -
we should consider i t s more p o s i t i v e aspect. Many e m p i r i c i s t s 
have coupled the negative, c r i t i c a l element of empiricism, w i t h 
a p o s i t i v e focus on experience as the foundation of our ordinary 
b e l i e f s and s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s . To what extent does the r e f u t a t i o n 
of r a d i c a l empiricism e n t a i l a r e j e c t i o n of t h i s attempt to provide 
a secure beginning f o r our philosophies? Let us f i r s t note t h a t 
t h i s form of foundationalism derives o r i g i n a l l y from a k i n d of 
naive i r r i t a t i o n . I t accepts t h a t what we take f o r p o s i t i v e 
knowledge of the world can be mistaken. 1^ then wants to argue 
t h a t even i f we are f o r e v e r denied our epistemological innocence, 
we can a t l e a s t e s t a b l i s h something p o s i t i v e , i f only concerning 
how t h i n g s are experienced as being, and t r y to b u i l d on t h a t . 
Here, t h i s foundationalism argues, we have a secure, i n d u b i t a b l e 
foundation f o r f u r t h e r d e l i b e r a t i o n . Now I have already argued, i n 
an e a r l i e r chapter,*'that the c r i t i c a l f u n c t i o n of r a d i c a l empiricism 
does not r e q u i r e t h i s n o t i o n of experience as something to which we 
have i n f a l l i b l e and absolute access. We have also seen t h a t the 
concentration on experience leads to i n c r e a s i n g l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d 
accounts of i t s nature and s t r u c t u r e , and of the k i n d of j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
which experience can provide f o r our ordinary and our s c i e n t i f i c 
b e l i e f s . This s o p h i s t i c a t i o n i s achieved at the cost of a f a i l u r e 
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t o r e f l e c t adequately on the necessary conditions of the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of the c r i t i c a l , i n t e r r o g a t i v e , e m p i r i c i s t p r o j e c t . 
Such r e f l e c t i o n , undertaken i n the l a s t two chapters, showed 
t h a t the r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s t ' s claim - t h a t there e x i s t s , perhaps, 
nothing other than experience - i s incoherent. I now want to 
consider more c l o s e l y the claim of many e m p i r i c i s t s t h a t experience 
provides us w i t h a p o s i t i v e i n d u b i t a b l e s t a r t i n g - p o i n t f o r philosophy. 
How i s experience supposed to do t h i s ? I t i s claimed t h a t 
pure experience, w i t h regard to i t s nature and i t s existence, 
provides us w i t h a p o d i c t i c evidence, brooking no doubt. " This 
supposed i n d u b i t a b i l i t y then seems to mark the s u i t a b i l i t y of 
r e f l e c t i o n on experience as the place at which t o begin philosophy. 
This i s t r u e not only f o r philosophers who have t r i e d t o construct 
our o r d i n a r y view of the world on t h i s basis, but also f o r those 
i n t e r e s t e d i n g i v i n g transcendental arguments to e s t a b l i s h the 
necessary conditions of the p o s s i b i l i t y of experience.^* But 
such a p o s i t i v e beginning brings w i t h i t the problem of i t s own 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n . For how can we j u s t i f y the claim t h a t our reports 
of pure experience are indubitable? How can we be c e r t a i n t h a t 
we can be c e r t a i n here? Such questions were asked of Descartes, 
and are s t i l l asked of e m p i r i c i s t s such as A y e r . ^ The d i f f i c u l t y 
w i t h answering these questions.is t h a t no answer can be accepted 
which depends on the proposed s t a r t i n g - p o i n t . Such an answer 
would presuppose the s t a r t i n g - p o i n t , and so could not serve to 
j u s t i f y i t . Nor can they be given p r i o r to the s t a r t i n g - p o i n t , 
preparing the way f o r i t s acceptance: we would then have a new 
s t a r t i n g - p o i n t whose own v a l i d i t y would be questioned. What can 
we say i n the face of such a dilemma? 
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Let us look a t what happens i f one argues against the 
a p o d i c t i c i t y of immediate r e f l e c t i o n on pure experience. 
Take an example: suppose t h a t I have an experience, i n t e n t i o n a l l y , 
of a cup. I can now t r y to set t h i s experience up i n a phenomenological 
'seeing', so t h a t the experience i s given immediately and i n d u b i t a b l y 
t o t h i s awareness. ' Now i t seems to me t h a t when I do t h i s , the 
phenomenological awareness temporally succeeds the experience of 
which i t i s an awareness. There i s the experience of the cup, 
and then the awareness of t h a t experience. But when the experience 
i t s e l f becomes an object of consciousness, i t seems t o displace the 
previous o b j e c t of consciousness - the cup - so t h a t while I attend 
t o the experience, I no longer a c t u a l l y have t h a t experience. I t 
i s j u s t past, not immediately present to the phenomenological gaze. . 
I f t h i s i s so, then i t would seem t o introduce some r e l i a n c e on memory 
into any r e p o r t of the experience, so t h a t the apodeictic q u a l i t y of 
such a r e p o r t i s removed. Without immediacy, i n d u b i t a b i l i t y seems 
to go too. Now although things do i n f a c t seem t o me to be as 
described above, my concern i s not here to defend t h i s view against 
what we may c a l l the t h e s i s of immediacy of experience.^' I want 
instead to see what k i n d of r e p l y the e m p i r i c i s t can make to i t . 
And i t i s c l e a r t h a t , faced w i t h such opposition, a l l we get from 
the e m p i r i c i s t i s a dogmatic r e - a s s e r t i o n of the case.^* Things are 
l i k e t h i s , we are t o l d , and, while we may be helped and encouraged to 
see them l i k e w i s e , i f we do not, r a t i o n a l discussion i s at an end. 
U l t i m a t e l y , any philosophy which begins by claiming an immediate 
p o s i t i v e awareness i s dogmatic: i t cannot j u s t i f y i t s claim t o 
i n d u b i t a b i l i t y , only r e - a s s e r t i t more vi g o r o u s l y . 
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I t would be wrong t o t h i n k t h a t t h i s conclusion 
would n e c e s s a r i l y discountenance a l l e m p i r i c i s t s , or those 
transcendental arguers who begin from the same place. 
E m p i r i c i s t s may e i t h e r accept t h a t dogmatism i s i n e v i t a b l e 
a t t h i s stage, or give other reasons f o r focussing on 
experience despite i t s possible f a l l i b i l i t y . Proponents 
of transcendental arguments, even i f accepting the f a l l i b i l i t y 
of f i r s t - p e r s o n r e p o r t s on experience, w i l l f i n d i t almost 
unthinkable t h a t anyone should doubt the actual existence of 
experience, and w i l l claim t h a t t h i s i s a l l t h a t i s required 
f o r arguments as t o the necessary conditions of the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of experience t o get a h o l d . ' 
Nevertheless, there has been s u f f i c i e n t i n t e r e s t i n achieving 
an a b s o l u t e l y unchallengeable s t a r t i n g - p o i n t , f o r philosophers to 
pursue a d i f f e r e n t t r a i n of thought. I f there i s no way of 
ensuring t h a t a p o s i t i v e s t a r t i n g - p o i n t f o r philosophy i s beyond 
doubt, and i f there are no c e r t a i n means of convincing someone 
t h a t they should adopt i t , then i t has seemed t h a t some kin d of 
ad hominem argument i s i n order. That i s , a p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n 
can be defended against an o b j e c t i o n by arguing t h a t the ob j e c t i o n 
i t s e l f i n some way presupposes the t r u t h of t h a t t o which i t objects. 
Indeed a frequent t a c t i c i n philosophy has been t o appeal to an 
immediate p o s i t i v e awareness, say of experience, and then throw 
i n ad hominem arguments against any objections which then a r i s e . 
But, deprived of a p o s i t i v e s t a r t i n g - p o i n t , can ad hominem arguments 
themselves provide us w i t h a s t a r t i n g - p o i n t i n philsophy? I s t h e i r 
use not l i m i t e d to countering t h a t f i n i t e number of p a r t i c u l a r 
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objections which i n f a c t a r i s e from an i n f i n i t u d e of 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s ? These questions d i r e c t us t o the goal of 
f i n d i n g a s t a r t i n g - p o i n t such t h a t a l l doubt or deni a l of 
t h a t s t a r t i n g - p o i n t i s r u l e d out, since i t i n some way 
presupposes the t r u t h of t h a t s t a r t i n g - p o i n t i t s e l f . I f 
we can discover i t , such a s t a r t i n g - p o i n t w i l l be s e l f - p r o t e c t i n g . 
I t w i l l be s e l f - p r o t e c t i n g i n the sense t h a t any proposed doubt 
or d e n i a l of the s t a r t i n g - p o i n t w i l l be s e l f - d e f e a t i n g -
presupposing the t r u t h of t h a t which they aim t o question. 
A general ad honiinem argument must show t h i s t o be the case. 
Candidates f o r the s t a r t i n g - p o i n t 
Let us look a t some of the candidates. Perhaps the most 
f a m i l i a r i s " I e x i s t " . Does an o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s claim presuppose 
i t s t r u t h ? I t has o f t e n been thought so, on the grounds t h a t f o r 
someone t o t h i n k "Perhaps I do not e x i s t " , they must themselves 
e x i s t . " I do not e x i s t " can never be t r u e , and so we seem to 
have an unchallengeable s e l f - p r o t e c t i n g s t a r t i n g - p o i n t . But t o 
those min d f u l of the c r i t i c i s m made of the Cartesian c o g i t o by 
Ru s s e l l , t h i s w i l l seem too q u i c k . ^ This c r i t i c i s m , t h a t the 
" I " i n Descartes' " I t h i n k " was merely a grammatical convenience 
c a r r y i n g no substantive i m p l i c a t i o n s , brings out the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of c o n s i s t e n t l y doubting whether " I e x i s t " i s t r u e . For such a 
doubt, or the denial t h a t " I e x i s t " i s t r u e , can be based on the 
idea t h a t a thought does not require a t h i n k e r . I f there can be 
a thought wi t h o u t a t h i n k e r , then the doubt whether the statement 
" I e x i s t " i s t r u e , need not presuppose the t r u t h of t h a t statement. 
Unless we can show t h a t doubts or objections presuppose the existence 
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of doubters and o b j e c t o r s , i t seems the r e f o r e possible f o r 
there t o be a consistent o b j e c t i o n to " I e x i s t " . Perhaps 
we can show t h i s , but the argument threatens to be long and 
invo l v e d . Let us look a t another possible s t a r t i n g - p o i n t . 
What about "There i s experience"? We have noted already 
the problems i n p o s i t i v e l y e s t a b l i s h i n g t h i s claim, by means of 
the immediate awareness of experience. But we also noted a 
suggestion t h a t proponents of transcendental arguments, concerning 
the necessary c o n d i t i o n s of the p o s s i b i l i t y of experience, would 
consider any o b j e c t i o n t o the claim incoherent. W i l l t h i s 
suggestion provide us w i t h a general ad hominem argument? 
I s n o t , f o r example, any doubt or denial t h a t there i s experience 
i t s e l f n e c e s s a r i l y an experience, so t h a t objections presuppose 
the t r u t h of t h a t to which they object? I f i t were the case t h a t 
an o b j e c t i o n or doubt were nec e s s a r i l y an e x p e r i e n t i a l occurrence, 
then t h i s would indeed be so. But, e s p e c i a l l y over the l a s t 
century, philosophers have fastened on to the ab s t r a c t nature of 
the content of thought, as being n e i t h e r a m a t e r i a l nor an 
e x p e r i e n t i a l e n t i t y , but as belonging t o some quasi-Platonic 
' t h i r d world'. ' I n the l i g h t of such developments, i t seems 
a possible o p t i o n t o say t h a t the doubt t h a t there i s experience 
can e x i s t , i n i t s a b s t r a c t , ^.temporal s o r t of way, without 
n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v i n g the existence of an experience, or any kind 
of 'doubt-event'. Perhaps here, too, an argument can be found to 
show t h a t doubts, denials and so on must indeed be e x p e r i e n t i a l 
occurrences; or t h a t they presuppose the existence of experience 
i n some other manner. But again the way ahead looks u n i v i t i n g . 
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"There i s language". Surely t h i s i s unquestionable. 
I t s being w r i t t e n t e s t i f i e s , of i t s e l f , to i t s t r u t h , and 
any o b j e c t i o n t o i t s u r e l y presupposes the existence of the 
language i n which i t i s expressed. Let us be c a r e f u l here. 
Again, philosophers of a P l a t o n i s t i n c l i n a t i o n appear to have 
en t e r t a i n e d the p o s s i b i l i t y of thought e x i s t i n g i n a b s t r a c t i o n 
from i t s l i n g u i s t i c expression. How much sense can we make 
of t h i s ? Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , such a n o t i o n i s g e n e r a l l y 
introduced i n r e l a t i o n t o language. Thus Frege, wi t h o u t 
d e f i n i n g 'thought' suggests t h a t a thought i s the sense of a 
sentence. 1 1* Further, we can only grasp the thought i n language.1***' 
Nevertheless, the thought i t s e l f seems, f o r Frege, t o be 
independent of language. I t seems t h a t thoughts can e x i s t 
independently of language, and indeed pre-date i t . 1 3 ' Now we can 
understand some of the reasons f o r h o l d i n g t h i s n o t i o n . I t seems 
t h a t i n t r a n s l a t i n g a sentence from one language to another, we 
express the 'same t h i n g ' i n d i f f e r e n t languages. We can even 
express the 'same t h i n g ' i n d i f f e r e n t ways w i t h i n a s i n g l e language. 
Such considerations seem t o lead us t o the idea of thought i n 
a b s t r a c t i o n from any l i n g u i s t i c expression, as w a i t i n g naked 
somewhere t o be clothed i n order t h a t we may apprehend i t . 1 / K Such 
t o t a l a b s t r a c t i o n now seems suspicious to many philosophers. I t 
leaves us w i t h the problem of t r y i n g t o understand, without reference 
to i t s l i n g u i s t i c expression, or i t s 'embodiment' i n any 'thought-event 
what a thought can be. For what i s l e f t of t h i s n o t i o n of thought? 
Having abstracted from i t s sensible and temporal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , a l l 
we can have i s the idea of ' e n t i t i e s ' which ' i n h a b i t ' a non-temporal, 
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non-sensible 'realm', and which can be non-sensibly 'grasped' 
or ' i n t u i t e d ' . I t may seem here t h a t unless t h i s n o t i o n of 
thought i s understood _as an a b s t r a c t i o n (and so as presupposing 
the existence of t h a t , e s p e c i a l l y i t s l i n g u i s t i c expression, 
from which i t i s a b s t r a c t e d ) , the terms i n scare-quotes are 
e n t i r e l y unanchored metaphors. They may w e l l give us no 
n o t i o n a t a l l . 
I n advance of a d e t a i l e d argument to t h i s e f f e c t , we must 
at l e a s t respect the P l a t o n i c , Fregean n o t i o n of a thought. I n 
t h a t case, i t i s possible t h a t the thought (though n o t , of course, 
the statement) t h a t there i s language, i s f a l s e . I t i s possible 
t h a t there are only a b s t r a c t thoughts i n a P l a t o n i c ' t h i r d realm'. 
The doubt t h a t there i s language i s not obviously s e l f - d e f e a t i n g . 
I t does not obviously presuppose the t r u t h of t h a t which i t doubts, 
since t h a t doubt can e x i s t as an abstract thought-content, devoid 
of l i n g u i s t i c c l o t h i n g . Let us look elsewhere f o r our s t a r t i n g -
p o i n t . 
The i d e n t i t y of the f i n a l candidate i s perhaps c l e a r . For 
any o b j e c t i o n t o any claim must at the very l e a s t be i t s e l f a thought, 
or j u d g e m e n t . I t must a t l e a s t be the thought or judgement t h a t , 
f o r example, perhaps there i s no m a t e r i a l world. 
The s t a r t i n g - p o i n t t h a t w i l l s a t i s f y us looks to be, then, 
"There are thoughts". "Thought" here must be understood i n the 
sense of an a b s t r a c t P l a t o n i c thought-content. I t must be a 
' t h i r d realm' e n t i t y , i n a b s t r a c t i o n from any l i n g u i s t i c expression, 
thought-event, or t h i n k e r . Any o b j e c t i o n , doubt or denial 
concerning t h i s claim must i t s e l f be a thought, and so presuppose 
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the t r u t h of the s t a r t i n g - p o i n t . I t i s immune from r e v i s i o n , 
since any r e v i s i o n presupposes i t s t r u t h . The g e n e r a l i t y of 
the ad hominem argument thus guarantees the u n a s s a i l a b i l i t y of 
t h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l beginning. But where can we go from here? 
Consider f u r t h e r the nature of t h i s proposed s t a r t i n g - p o i n t . 
Although not a l o g i c a l l y necessary t r u t h , i t cannot c o n s i s t e n t l y 
be doubted, since the existence of any doubt i t s e l f presupposes 
i t s t r u t h . I t i s thus f u l l y s e l f - p r o t e c t i n g , and i s indeed 
self-guaranteeing i n the sense t h a t i t i s i t s e l f a thought, and 
so adequate evidence of i t s own t r u t h . But granted i t s 
u n c h a l l e n g e a b i l i t y , i t i s a very meagre s o r t of beginning: what 
can we hope to gain from i t ? I t has been thought t h a t arguments 
s t a r t i n g from such general beginnings must r e s u l t i n conclusions 
e i t h e r t r i v i a l or suspect.^* Before discussing a deeper o b j e c t i o n 
t o the s t a r t i n g - p o i n t so f a r e n t e r t a i n e d , I w i l l t r y to give some 
idea of how such an argument might proceed. As w e l l as showing 
t h a t we can get a t l e a s t somewhere from our miserable beginning, 
we s h a l l also encounter the grounds of the deeper o b j e c t i o n . 
A Possible Argument 
An argument might go l i k e t h i s . Notwithstanding the abstract 
conception of thought used i n the proposed s t a r t i n g - p o i n t , i t i s 
a t l e a s t c l e a r t h a t any thought must be about something or other. 
Unless a doubt i s about something, so t h a t i t has what we can c a l l 
a c o n t e n t , 1 7 , i t can h a r d l y pose a problem f o r any knowledge-claim. 
We can be a l i t t l e more s p e c i f i c here. There must be a t l e a s t 
some thoughts which concern things other than thought i t s e l f . To 
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take a p a r t i c u l a r example, there could not j u s t be a 
s e l f - t h i n k i n g , or s e l f - r e f l e x i v e thought such as "This i s a 
thought". For t h i s supposed thought has no content. I f 
we ask what "This" r e f e r s t o , we are t o l d t h a t i t r e f e r s t o 
t h i s thought, i . e . the thought t h a t t h i s i s a thought. I f 
we ask f o r the content of the thought, what thought t h i s i s , 
we can only be t o l d t h a t i t i s t h i s thought i t s e l f . And so 
on. We are caught i n a process of et e r n a l s e l f - r e f e r e n c e which 
can never succeed i n determining a content f o r the thought. And 
i f such an immediately s e l f - r e f l e x i v e thought has no determinable 
content, i f i t sets us o f f merely on an i n f i n i t e process of 
d e f e r r a l , then i t f a i l s t o be a thought a t a l l . 
More g e n e r a l l y , there cannot only be thoughts, such as the 
proposed s t a r t i n g - p o i n t i t s e l f , which concern only thoughts. 
For the concept of thought would not, under such c o n d i t i o n s , be 
possible. I f the concept we have expressed by the term "thought" 
i s to be po s s i b l e , i t must be 1 semantically' l i n k e d w i t h something 
other than i t s e l f ( o r the term w i l l not possess i t s meaning, and the 
concept w i l l be vacuous, i . e . , no concept a t a l l ) . ' U l t i m a t e l y , 
t h i s w i l l r e q u i r e examples of thoughts which i n s t a n t i a t e the concept 
Now i f these examples themselves employ the concept of thought, then 
the task j u s t begins again; since the question of the l i n k between 
the concept of thought and t h a t extra-conceptual realm which makes 
i t p o s s i b l e , would have already been begged. Such a l i n k can be 
est a b l i s h e d only i f there are a t l e a s t some thoughts which do not 
themselves use the concept of thought. Nor, t o pursue t h i s f u r t h e r 
can the concepts i n terms of which these thoughts are a r t i c u l a t e d , 
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themselves i n v o l v e any i n t r i n s i c reference to thoughts, or 
be i n any way reducible t o the concept of thought. For t h i s 
would again e f f e c t i v e l y remove a necessary c o n d i t i o n of the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of thought. These concepts must 
instead be of items which are i n t h i s sense independent of 
thought; t h a t i s , whose existence and operations cannot be 
understood i n , or reduced t o , terms of thought. These are 
our everyday concepts; concepts of things l i k e c a t s , cabbages 
and k i n g s . 
Let us take t h i s a l i t t l e f u r t h e r . So f a r the argument 
has been t h a t a necessary c o n d i t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the 
concept of thought, and hence of the proposed s t a r t i n g - p o i n t 
i t s e l f , i s the existence of at l e a s t some thoughts about things 
which are e s s e n t i a l l y independent of thought. Now i f the concepts 
i n which such thoughts are a r t i c u l a t e d are themselves t o be 
possible (and so t h e i r l i n g u i s t i c expressions meaningful), then 
there must, as I argued before, be some 'semantic* l i n k between 
them and an extra-conceptual realm. The nature of t h i s l i n k 
must be such t h a t items i n t h i s realm are subsumed under the 
concepts a r t i c u l a t i n g the s a l i e n t thoughts. I t seems, then, 
t h a t such thought-independent items must e x i s t , as a necessary 
c o n d i t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of our proposed s t a r t i n g - p o i n t . 
Here, though, we can expect a f a m i l i a r o b j e c t i o n . For i t need 
not be the case t h a t there a c t u a l l y e x i s t such items, as long as 
there seem t o be such i t e m s . 2 0 . I f there i s experience, i n t e n t i o n a l l y , 
of such items, t h i s w i l l provide content f o r the s a l i e n t concepts, 
w i t h o u t e n t a i l i n g the ac t u a l existence of the items which are 
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subsumed under them. The thought t h a t these items a c t u a l l y 
e x i s t may be f a l s e . Room w i l l be l e f t f o r the claim t h a t a l l 
there i s , i s experience, and no 'external world' at a l l . I 
hope t o have already shown t h a t such a p o s i t i o n i s not coherent. 
But i nstead of t a k i n g t h i s envisaged argument about the necessary 
con d i t i o n s of the s t a r t i n g - p o i n t proposed above any f u r t h e r , I 
want t o consider a deeper o b j e c t i o n t o t h a t s t a r t i n g - p o i n t , p a r t l y 
i n the l i g h t of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the k i n d of s c e p t i c a l challenge 
we have j u s t seen. "There are thoughts". This was presented 
as an a b s o l u t e l y unchallengeable, self-guaranteeing, t r u t h . I t 
was also argued t h a t we may even be able to get somewhere, by 
i n v e s t i g a t i n g the necessary conditions of i t s p o s s i b i l i t y . 
What o b j e c t i o n could there possibly be? The o b j e c t i o n I wish 
to develop i s t h a t , i n a very important sense, t h i s i s no s t a r t i n g -
p o i n t a t a l l . 
Beginning w i t h Hegel 
As an approach t o the issue of whether the thought "There are 
thoughts" can be p r o p e r l y adopted as a s t a r t i n g - p o i n t f o r philosophy, 
consider the f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s . 
F i r s t : the concept of thought employed above was a c t u a l l y 
obtained only as a r e s u l t of a f a i r l y lengthy process, i n v o l v i n g 
successive a b s t r a c t i o n s from our ordinary n o t i o n of thought. 
Perhaps, then, we should take f o r our s t a r t i n g - p o i n t the beginning 
of t h a t process, as a necessary c o n d i t i o n of the emergence of t h a t 
concept? But i t i s not c l e a r t h a t t h i s process i s a necessary 
c o n d i t i o n , r a t h e r than merely a de f a c t o precursor, of t h a t emergence. 
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I t w i l l n ot be easy, i f possible a t a l l , to overcome the 
f e e l i n g t h a t , given the existence of the concept, nothing 
about the necessity of the process by which i t , i n f a c t , 
emerged, can be v a l i d l y concluded. S t i l l , t h i s leads us 
to a deeper question. For the movement of discussion which 
r e s u l t e d i n the proposed s t a r t i n g - p o i n t was generated by 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the e s s e n t i a l features of a doubt. Could 
there be a doubt wit h o u t a doubter? Without the occurrence 
of an ac t u a l doubt-event? And so on. 2 2" Should we not then 
take up the question of why t h i s should be the moving consideration. 
This w i l l i n t u r n mean t a k i n g up the question of the i n t e r e s t which 
u n d e r l i e s the search f o r an absolute s t a r t i n g - p o i n t , and which 
guides a l l c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l questioning. Hegel raises 
the issue thus: 
I f the f e a r of f a l l i n g i n t o e r r o r sets up 
a m i s t r u s t of Science, which i n the absence 
of such scruples gets on w i t h the work i t s e l f , 
and a c t u a l l y cognizes something, i t i s hard to 
see why we should not t u r n round and m i s t r u s t 
t h i s very m i s t r u s t . Should we not be concerned 
as t o whether t h i s f e a r of e r r o r i s not j u s t the 
e r r o r i t s e l f ? Indeed, t h i s fear takes something -
a great deal i n f a c t - f o r granted. i 3 -
C r i t i c a l philosophy does not erupt, f u l l y formed and presuppositionless 
from nowhere. The c r i t i c a l questioning of knowledge-claims, and the 
consequent quest f o r an unchallengeable s t a r t i n g - p o i n t , are guided by 
an i n t e r e s t i n t r u e thought, i n the l i g h t of the p o s s i b i l i t y of f a l s e 
thought. Perhaps philosophy should begin w i t h r e f l e c t i o n on t h i s 
i n t e r e s t , and on the necessary conditions of i t s p o s s i b i l i t y ? 
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Before attempting an answer to t h i s , l e t us b r i e f l y 
r e c a l l what happens when such r e f l e c t i o n i s l a c k i n g . We 
saw e a r l i e r how Strawson's f a i l u r e to i n v e s t i g a t e the nature 
of the i n t e r e s t which governs h i s choice of a concept of 
experience, not only makes t h a t choice appear r e l a t i v e l y 
a r b i t r a r y , but also prevents him from seeing t h a t a major 
strand of h i s argument i n The Bounds of Sense i s i n f a c t 
pre-empted by such r e f l e c t i o n . ' More s u r p r i s i n g l y , perhaps, 
i n view of h i s work on Hegel, the same lack of r e f l e c t i o n r e s u l t s 
i n a s i m i l a r dogmatism concerning the concept of experience i n 
the w r i t i n g of Charles Taylor. He takes the s t r u c t u r e of 
transcendental arguments to be such t h a t the f i r s t step amounts 
t o an u n c r i t i c a l a s s e r t i o n concerning the concept of experience: 
"We j u s t see t h a t experience must be of_ something t o be experience". 
But by what r i g h t are, say, j o y or boredom, which are not obviously 
of something ( i n the sense Taylor intends here) to be r u l e d out? 
What j u s t i f i e s the use of t h i s concept of experience? Of course, 
I do not here wish t o deny t h a t experience i s , even necessarily, j ) f 
something. I want instead t o show t h a t i n order t o see what counts 
and what does not count, as an experience, we need to know the po i n t 
of the concept, the r o l e i t i s to play. Only i n t h i s way can we 
understand i t s l i m i t s (determined by i t s r o l e ) , and so get a g r i p 
on the concept, the necessary conditions of whose p o s s i b i l i t y , we 
are t o investigate.- 2^-
Returning t o the question of a r e f l e c t i o n on the i n t e r e s t 
which guides c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l questioning, we have seen 
reason t o l i n k t h i s question w i t h t h a t of the c e n t r a l concepts 
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a t work i n such questioning. That guiding i n t e r e s t determines 
the r o l e the s a l i e n t concepts are t o play. This i n t u r n 
provides a basis f o r judgements about what those concepts must 
be, i n order t o play t h a t r o l e . What i m p l i c a t i o n s can we 
discover i n the present case? A l l c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
q u e s t i o n i n g , i t was suggested, i s guided by an i n t e r e s t i n t r u t h , 
i n t h e l i g h t of the p o s s i b i l i t y of f a l s i t y . How much are we 
to make of t h i s , and how i s i t r e l a t e d t o the c e n t r a l concepts 
of p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n q u i r y ? Are we t o deal w i t h i t d i r e c t l y , 
f o r example, as an a c t i v e i n t e r e s t of human beings i n s o c i a l 
i n t e r a c t i o n ? This would be t o move too q u i c k l y , and to 
presuppose too much. What we can say, i s t h a t any doubt, 
or c r i t i c a l question of a knowledge-claim, r a i s e s , i n connection 
w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r thought, the p o s s i b i l i t y of thought being f a l s e . 
This n o t i o n , of thought as p o s s i b l y f a l s e , or as pos s i b l y d i f f e r i n g 
from how th i n g s are, i s e s s e n t i a l . Without i t , a doubt would 
not be a doubt; there could be no questioning of knowledge-claims. 
Such claims could only be accepted a t face-value. C r i t i c a l 
philosophy would not be possible. 
This p o i n t i s c l e a r l y r e l a t e d to t h a t made e a r l i e r w i t h 
regard t o the concept of experience required f o r e m p i r i c i s t 
c r i t i c a l philosophy t o be pos s i b l e . ' Why should we now concern 
ourselves w i t h the concept of thought, rather than experience? 
F i r s t , i t w i l l be u s e f u l t o note b r i e f l y some of the reasons why 
c r i t i c a l philosophy has so o f t e n centred on the concept of experience, 
r a t h e r than t h a t of thought; e s p e c i a l l y , i n view of the f a c t t h a t 
i t i s the thought, or judgement, i m p l i c i t i n experience which 
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enables the concept of experience t o play i t s r o l e i n the 
c r i t i c a l e m p i r i c i s t ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l s t r a t e g y . We can mention, 
f o r example, the t r a d i t i o n a l focus on the senses as a primary 
source of knowledge; the important r o l e of observation i n 
science; and the f a c t t h a t an important r o l e i n the genesis 
of the concept of thought i s , i n f a c t , played by r e f l e c t i o n 
on e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r (though i t i s not here my concern to 
argue t h a t t h i s i s n e c e s s a r i l y the case). But perhaps the most 
important reason i n the present context i s the f a c t t h a t the concept 
of experience plays a dual r o l e i n the c r i t i c a l e m p i r i c i s t strategy. 
F i r s t ; i t provides, by v i r t u e of the thought or judgement i m p l i c i t 
i n i t , an epistemological a l t e r n a t i v e t o what i s o f t e n c a l l e d naive 
r e a l i s m : r a t h e r than accept the claim t h a t X, we can o f f e r , as an 
a l t e r n a t i v e , the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t i t merely seemed t h a t X. Second: 
a bare d e n i a l , or doubt, of the t r u t h of a claim cannot provide an 
account of the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h a t claim w i t h regard t o i t s 
meaningfulness. I f the e m p i r i c i s t wants a t l e a s t t o suspend 
judgement as t o the existence of t h a t ordinary world t h a t our 
thought and discourse g e n e r a l l y takes f o r granted, then she needs 
to provide an a l t e r n a t i v e account of what i t i s i n r e l a t i o n w i t h 
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which such discourse has meaning. Experience then plays i t s 
second r o l e of p r o v i d i n g an extra-conceptual realm which w i l l give 
'content' t o thoughts, and hence enable them to be thoughts a t a l l . 
Although such considerations may give us an idea of why the 
concept of experience has been so important i n modern philosophy, 
there are good reasons f o r us t o focus on the concept of thought 
(as p o s s i b l y f a l s e ) . Not only does t h i s take us t o the heart of 
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c r i t i c a l philosophy i n general, i t w i l l help us t o overcome 
scepticism about the existence of moral values which are 
not r e l a t i v e to p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l wants, preferences, and 
so on. For some of t h i s scepticism i s not, or a t l e a s t not 
obviously, based on r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s t t h i n k i n g . ' D e t a i l e d 
discussion of these issues w i l l f o l l o w i n Chapter Seven. 
We concentrate now on the concept of thought as possibly 
d i f f e r i n g from how th i n g s r e a l l y are. This i s the conceptual 
core of what Hegel has c a l l e d 'the fear of e r r o r ' . Given t h a t 
Hegel has a t l e a s t r a i s e d the question of the presuppositions 
of c r i t i c a l philosophy, should we not f o l l o w him i n attempting 
t o t r a c e the d i a l e c t i c a l movement which a r r i v e s at (and then 
surpasses) the stage of c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l questioning? 
Let us r e t u r n b r i e f l y to the I n t r o d u c t i o n t o the Phenomenology 
of S p i r i t . Here we see t h a t Hegel's concern w i t h 'the fear 
of e r r o r ' as such, i s c l o s e l y t i e d up w i t h h i s c r i t i q u e of 
Kant's epistemology. For Hegel i d e n t i f i e s one of the 
presuppositions of the concern w i t h f a l l i n g i n t o e r r o r , as the 
view of knowledge as a medium or instrument. Furthermore, he 
has already argued t h a t such a view i l l e g i t i m a t e l y presupposes 
a theory about the r e l a t i o n s between subject and o b j e c t , and 
about the p o s s i b i l i t y or otherwise of knowledge of the absolute.*^' 
I n s h o r t , he claims t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of theory of knowledge 
i s presupposed by any c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l questioning. This 
i s s u r e l y not the case. Whatever the merits (and they seem to 
me considerable) of Hegel's objections to Kantian epistemology, 
i t must be possible f o r there t o be r e f l e c t i o n on the p o s s i b i l i t y 
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of e r r o r , and f o r there t o be concern t o avoid e r r o r , p r i o r 
t o the assumption of any s p e c i f i c epistemology. Indeed, 
I would argue t h a t any s p e c i f i c epistemology presupposes 
the concern w i t h f a l l i n g i n t o e r r o r , r a t h e r than the other 
way round. For an epistemology presupposes the concept of 
c o g n i t i o n , or knowledge. This concept i s i n t u r n possible 
only i n r e l a t i o n t o a grasp of the p o s s i b i l i t y of being i n 
e r r o r . We can see t h i s e s p e c i a l l y c l e a r l y where knowledge i s 
understood as something along the l i n e s of j u s t i f i e d true 
b e l i e f . We cannot have the concept of t r u t h here, without 
the concept of f a l s e b e l i e f . This l a s t concept i s , as we s h a l l 
see, i n t u r n possible only i n v i r t u e of a 'semantic' l i n k w i t h 
cases of e r r o r . Hegel i s wrong, then, to i d e n t i f y the 
presuppositions of c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l questioning i n general, 
w i t h the Kantian C r i t i c a l Philosophy i n p a r t i c u l a r . S t i l l , the 
question as t o the presuppositions of c r i t i c a l philosophy remains; 
and Hegel i s c l e a r on the c e n t r a l issue here. For him, such 
questioning occurs only a t a determinate stage i n the h i s t o r y of 
the s e l f - f o r m a t i o n of consciousness. The f i r s t task of philosophy 
as Hegel sees i t , must then be t o trace t h i s process of s e l f -
formation from i t s beginnings ( i n 'sense-certainty', f o r Hegel). 
(This may even include an account of the process of a b s t r a c t i o n 
through which the concept of a b s t r a c t thought, employed i n the 
s t a r t i n g - p o i n t proposed e a r l i e r , emerged.) 
But t h i s concern w i t h processes of genesis misses the chance 
of a t r u l y immanent c r i t i q u e of c r i t i c a l p h i l s o p h i c a l questioning. 
I t misses the chance of showing how the presuppositions of c r i t i c a l 
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philosophy i n general can be accommodated only by a 
philosophy which transcends the l i m i t a t i o n s of t h a t 
questioning i t s e l f (and e s t a b l i s h e s , as Hegel desired, 
p o s i t i v e r e s u l t s ) . Hegel's Phenomenology i n e v i t a b l y lands 
i t s e l f i n s t e a d w i t h i n t r a c t a b l e d i f f i c u l t i e s . We can, as 
many have already, question the necessity of each movement 
i n the d i a l e c t i c . Even more important, we can ask why such 
a process of s e l f - f o r m a t i o n i s necessary at a l l f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of the c r i t i c a l concept of thought (as possibly f a l s e ) . For 
a t the stage we have reached i n our r e f l e c t i o n , we have the concept 
of a b s t r a c t thought (which may p o s s i b l y diverge from how things 
a r e ) , but no consciousness, l e t alone a s e l f . No matter how 
precious t h i s concept may appear, i n the l i g h t of what we 
understand about the processes which i n f a c t l e d to i t s emergence, 
we need f a r more argument than Hegel gives us, i f we are t o show 
t h a t such processes of s e l f - f o r m a t i o n are a necessary c o n d i t i o n 
of t h a t emergence. Let us then leave Hegel's discussion, and 
take up a more r a d i c a l stance. 
The Concept of Thought as an unchallengeable s t a r t i n g - p o i n t 
Let us look again a t the r e f l e c t i o n on the concept of thought 
which has a r i s e n as a candidate f o r a more thorough-going philosophical 
s t a r t i n g - p o i n t . I t provides us w i t h a s t a r t i n g - p o i n t i n two important 
senses. F i r s t : expressed as "Thoughts can be f a l s e " i t i s 
unchallengeable, i n so f a r as i t s t r u t h i s presupposed by any doubt, 
since doubt i s p r e c i s e l y the r a i s i n g of the issue of the possible 
f a l s i t y of a thought. Second: i t takes up the conceptual core of 
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t h a t i n t e r e s t which guided the process which r e s u l t e d i n i t s 
own emergence as a p h i l o s o p h i c a l s t a r t i n g - p o i n t : t o t h i s extent 
i t takes i n t o account the conditions of i t s own existence. 
Nevertheless, we s t i l l do not have a s t a r t i n g - p o i n t without 
presuppositions; f o r any claim, thought or concept necessarily 
presupposes t h a t the necessary conditions of i t s meaningfulness 
o b t a i n . And a meaningless claim, thought or concept i s not a 
claim, thought or concept a t a l l . What we do have i s an absolutely 
unchallengeable s t a r t i n g - p o i n t . Any attempt t o challenge i t s 
v a l i d i t y must i t s e l f presuppose the existence of the concept of 
thought (as p o s s i b l y f a l s e ) ; and must presuppose i n t u r n the 
necessary conditions of the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h a t concept. This 
i s an ad hominem argument a t the highest l e v e l of g e n e r a l i t y . 
Any attempt t o challenge t h i s s t a r t i n g - p o i n t must i t s e l f presuppose 
i t . I t i s now e s s e n t i a l t o i n v e s t i g a t e the necessary conditions 
of the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h i s concept (and of the meaningfulness of 
the l i n g u i s t i c term i n which i t i s expressed) - a k i n d of i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
w i t h which Hegel d i d not p a r t i c u l a r l y concern himself, but which has 
i n c r e a s i n g l y concerned twent i e t h - c e n t u r y philosophers. By 
discovering the necessary conditions of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the 
concept of thought, we overcome i n advance any scepticism or doubt, 
since such scepticism n e c e s s a r i l y employs t h a t concept, and so 
n e c e s s a r i l y presupposes t h a t the necessary conditions of i t s 
p o s s i b i l i t y o b t a i n . 
There are close p a r a l l e l s between the argument of t h i s chapter, 
and the argument traced through Chapters Two and Three. I w i l l 
o u t l i n e them here, w i t h the hope t h a t they w i l l shed some l i g h t 
on each other. I n Chapter Two, I argued t h a t the c r i t i c a l e m p i r i c i s t 
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p h i l o s o p h e r has a g u i d i n g i n t e r e s t i n t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f 
c l a i m s t o knowledge. The q u e s t i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s r a i s e d 
i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t how t h i n g s are e x p e r i e n c e d 
as b e i n g may d i f f e r f r o m how t h e y r e a l l y a r e . F u r t h e r , i t was 
argued t h a t , i n o r d e r t o p l a y i t s p a r t i n t h e c r i t i c a l e m p i r i c i s t 
p r o j e c t , t h e c o n c e p t o f e x p e r i e n c e must have c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s . 
W i t h o u t t h e s e f e a t u r e s , the c o n c e p t would n o t be a b l e t o f u l f i l 
i t s p h i l o s o p h i c a l f u n c t i o n , and c r i t i c a l e m p i r i c i s m would n o t 
be p o s s i b l e . To summarise t h e outcome o f t h a t d i s c u s s i o n : the 
c o n c e p t o f e x p e r i e n c e r e q u i r e d i s t h e concept o f e x p e r i e n c e as, 
i n t e n t i o n a l l y , o f i t e m s i n an o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , such t h a t how 
t h i n g s are e x p e r i e n c e d as b e i n g may be a t v a r i a n c e w i t h how t h i n g s 
r e a l l y a r e . I n t h e p r e s e n t c h a p t e r , we have t r i e d t o f i n d an 
a b s o l u t e l y u n c h a l l e n g e a b l e s t a r t i n g - p o i n t f o r p h i l o s o p h y . 
C o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e argument o f Chapter Two, we have uncovered 
t h e g u i d i n g i n t e r e s t o f a l l c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y ( i n d e e d , a l l 
c r i t i c a l e n q u i r y ) . T h i s i s t h e i s s u e o f t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f 
c l a i m s t o knowledge, i n t h e l i g h t m e r e l y o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
t h o s e c l a i m s b e i n g f a l s e . A g a i n , i t was argued t h a t t h i s p r o j e c t 
r e q u i r e s f o r i t s p o s s i b i l i t y a concept w i t h c e r t a i n e s s e n t i a l 
f e a t u r e s . Here i t i s t h e concept of t h o u g h t , as p o s s i b l y 
d i v e r g i n g f r o m r e a l i t y . How t h i n g s are t h o u g h t ( o r c l a i m e d ) 
t o be, may d i f f e r f rom how t h e y r e a l l y a r e . The b a s i s f o r t h e 
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p a r a l l e l so f a r , i s f a i r l y c l e a r . As o u t l i n e d e a r l i e r , 'the 
concept o f e x p e r i e n c e f u n c t i o n s i n p a r t as an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l 
a l t e r n a t i v e t o n a i v e r e a l i s m . I t can do t h i s o n l y because t h e r e 
i s i m p l i c i t i n t h e e x p e r i e n c e a t h o u g h t , judgement o r c l a i m as t o 
how t h i n g s a r e . The p r e s e n t c h a p t e r has f o c u s s e d , and w i l l 
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c o n t i n u e t o f o c u s , on t h a t element of t h o u g h t or judgement 
i t s e l f , a b s t r a c t i n g from what we m i g h t c a l l t h e s t u f f , o r 
m a t t e r o f e x p e r i e n c e . ' Not s u r p r i s i n g l y t h e n , when t h e 
argument concerns t h e a s p e c t o f t h o u g h t i t s e l f - r a t h e r t h a n , 
f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e i s s u e o f s e n s e - c o n t e n t s as p r o v i d i n g f o r t h e 
meaning o f words - t h e p a r a l l e l i s c l o s e . L e t us t a k e i t 
f u r t h e r . 
I n Chapter Three, we saw t h a t among th e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s 
o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f the concept o f e x p e r i e n c e , i s the e x i s t e n c e 
o f i n d e p e n d e n t i t e m s i n an o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . Since t h e concept 
o f e x p e r i e n c e i s e s s e n t i a l t o e m p i r i c i s m , the e x i s t e n c e of such 
i t e m s i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f e m p i r i c i s m 
i t s e l f . I f such i t e m s e x i s t , t h e n t h e c l a i m o f the r a d i c a l 
e m p i r i c i s t - t h a t perhaps t h e r e e x i s t s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n e x p e r i e n c e -
must be f a l s e . R a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s m and i t s a t t e n d a n t s c e p t i c i s m are 
t h e r e f o r e p o s s i b l e o n l y i f f a l s e . They are t h u s f u n d a m e n t a l l y 
i n c o h e r e n t , and so u n t e n a b l e . I n t h e p r e s e n t c h a p t e r , the''aim 
i s t h e even more g e n e r a l ad hominem argument o u t l i n e d above. T h i s 
i s an argument t o show t h a t any c r i t i c a l q u e s t i o n i n g has c e r t a i n 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . These p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s concern t h e p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f t h e c o n c e p t o f t h o u g h t . The i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e necessary 
c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h a t concept has, as I hope t o 
show i n l a t e r c h a p t e r s , c o n s i d e r a b l e p o t e n t i a l . 1^. w i l l l e a d t o 
t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f c e r t a i n n o n - r e l a t i v e moral v a l u e s . For the 
r e s t o f t h i s c h a p t e r , I w i l l argue t h a t , p a r a l l e l t o the r e f u t a t i o n 
o f r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s m , we can a c h i e v e a r e f u t a t i o n o f a k i n d o f 
r a d i c a l i d e a l i s m . T h i s argument w i l l conclude t h a t any s c e p t i c i s m , 
- 151 -
e m p i r i c i s t o r n o t , about t h e e x i s t e n c e of a real m o t h e r t h a n 
t h a t o f t h o u g h t i t s e l f , must be f u n d a m e n t a l l y i n c o h e r e n t . 
The argument w i l l c l o s e l y p a r a l l e l t h a t g i v e n i n Chapter Three 
a g a i n s t r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s m . I s h a l l t a k e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t h a t 
t h i s p a r a l l e l p r o v i d e s , f o r a b b r e v i a t i n g t h e argument. 
The R e f u t a t i o n o f R a d i c a l I d e a l i s m 
Such a hea d i n g c l e a r l y needs e l a b o r a t i o n . There have 
been many forms o f i d e a l i s m . Some o f these have been c l o s e l y 
l i n k e d w i t h what I have been c a l l i n g r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s m - I have 
i n mind e s p e c i a l l y Edmund H u s s e r l , b u t a l s o B e r k e l e y and Kant. 
Some, th o s e o f H e g e l , o r F i c h t e , l e s s so. , My aim i n t h i s s e c t i o n 
i s n o t t o c l a s s i f y v a r i e t i e s o f i d e a l i s m , n o r t o defend a p a r t i c u l a r 
a ccount o f what i d e a l i s m c o n s i s t s i n , b u t r a t h e r t o produce an 
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argument p a r a l l e l t o t h a t i n Chapter Three. ' There, I argued t h a t 
t h e r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s m which h o l d s t h a t perhaps t h e r e e x i s t s o n l y 
e x p e r i e n c e , i s i n c o h e r e n t , Here, I w i s h t o argue t h a t a r a d i c a l 
i d e a l i s m which h o l d s t h a t perhaps t h e r e e x i s t s o n l y t h o u g h t , i s 
i n c o h e r e n t i n a p r e c i s e l y s i m i l a r way. I t may seem d i f f i c u l t t o 
f i n d an adh e r e n t t o t h i s d o c t r i n e o f r a d i c a l i d e a l i s m , and I am 
n o t p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned w i t h f i n d i n g one. I am more i n t e r e s t e d 
i n showing how an argument c o n c e r n i n g the necessary c o n d i t i o n s o f 
t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h o u g h t can g e t s t a r t e d . The l a b e l " r a d i c a l 
i d e a l i s m " i s chosen so as t o p o i n t up t h e p a r a l l e l w i t h r a d i c a l 
e m p i r i c i s m , r a t h e r t h a n as a name f o r a s u b s t a n t i a l chunk o f 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . Even so, some i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r more 
t r a d i t i o n a l i d e a l i s t d o c t r i n e s w i l l emerge. 
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B e f o r e g e t t i n g on w i t h t h e argument, l e t me a g a i n 
s t a t e t h e b a s i s f o r t h e p a r a l l e l w i t h the argument t o 
r e f u t e r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s m . The g u i d i n g i n t e r e s t o f c r i t i c a l 
e m p i r i c i s t p h i l o s o p h y i s t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n o f c l a i m s t o knowledge, 
i n t h e l i g h t o f the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t e x p e r i e n c e may d i f f e r from 
r e a l i t y . S i m i l a r l y , t h e g u i d i n g i n t e r e s t o f c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y 
i n g e n e r a l , i s the i n t e r r o g a t i o n o f c l a i m s t o knowledge, i n t h e 
l i g h t o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h o u g h t s and c l a i m s may be f a l s e . 
That i s , t h a t how t h i n g s a r e t h o u g h t o r c l a i m e d t o be, may d i f f e r 
f r om how t h e y r e a l l y a r e . I n each case, we are g i v e n an 
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e t o n a i v e r e a l i s m . I n t h e case o f 
e m p i r i c i s m , i t i s t h e t h o u g h t or judgement i m p l i c t i n e x p e r i e n c e , 
t h a t p r o v i d e s f o r the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e . I n t h e case 
of what I am c a l l i n g R a d i c a l I d e a l i s m , i t i s t h e t h o u g h t i t s e l f , 
a b s t r a c t e d f r o m any e x p e r i e n t i a l ' m a t t e r ' , t h a t does t h e j o b . 
I n each case, i t i s t h e f a c t t h a t the concept a t i s s u e - whether 
o f e x p e r i e n c e , o r t h o u g h t - p r o v i d e s an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e 
t o n a i v e r e a l i s m t h a t opens up t h e p o s s i b i l i t y f o r c r i t i c a l t h o u g h t . 
I n each case, i t i s on t h i s p o i n t t h a t t h e b a s i c argument t u r n s . 
L e t us see how f a r t h e p a r a l l e l r u n s . 
The f i r s t a t t e m p t a t a r e f u t a t i o n o f r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s m was 
based on t r y i n g t o a n a l y s e t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e concept o f 
e x p e r i e n c e . I t was argued i n Chapter Two. t h a t t h i s , must be t h e 
concep t o f e x p e r i e n c e as, i n t e n t i o n a l l y , o f independent items i n 
an o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , such t h a t t h i s e x p e r i e n c e may d i f f e r from t h e 
r e a l i t y . S i m i l a r l y , t h e concept o f t h o u g h t , i n o r d e r t o do i t s 
work i n c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y , must be the concept of t h o u g h t as 
p o s s i b l y d i f f e r i n g f r o m r e a l i t y . I n each case, the c e n t r a l 
c o n c e p t o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o j e c t i n v o l v e s an e s s e n t i a l r e f e r e n c e 
t o an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , as p o s s i b l y a t v a r i a n c e w i t h how t h i n g s 
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are t h o u g h t / e x p e r i e n c e d t o be. Since t h e e m p i r i c i s t i s 
committed t o the c l a i m t h a t t h e r e i s e x p e r i e n c e , i t f o l l o w s 
by c o n c e p t u a l i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t she i s committed t o t h e 
e x i s t e n c e o f an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . T h i s , i n essence, was 
the argument o f t h e F i r s t A t t e m p t t o r e f u t e r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s m . 
S i m i l a r l y , i f a c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y i s committed t o t h e c l a i m t h a t 
t h e r e i s t h o u g h t t h e n , i n v i r t u e o f t h e p a r a l l e l c o n c e p t u a l 
i m p l i c a t i o n , i t i s committed t o the e x i s t e n c e o f an o b j e c t i v e 
r e a l i t y . T h i s c o u l d be t h e f i r s t a t t e m p t a t r e f u t i n g r a d i c a l 
i d e a l i s m . 
T h i s F i r s t A t t e m p t r a n i n t o i t s F i r s t O b j e c t i o n . This was 
t h a t t h e r e f e r e n c e t o o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y c o u l d be a v o i d e d , o r 
n e u t r a l i s e d ; so t h a t t h e commitment t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o f an 
o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y c o u l d i t s e l f be s i d e - s t e p p e d . The r e p l y t o 
t h i s F i r s t O b j e c t i o n , was t h a t any a t t e m p t t o r e c a s t t a l k o f 
o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y i n t o terms o f t h e concept o f e x p e r i e n c e would 
o n l y r e - i n t r o d u c e the commitment t o the e x i s t e n c e o f t h a t r e a l i t y . 
S e v e r a l responses t o t h i s r e p l y were i n t r o d u c e d and d e a l t w i t h . 
P a r a l l e l t o a l l t h i s , would be an o b j e c t i o n t o our a t t e m p t a t 
r e f u t i n g r a d i c a l i d e a l i s m , which t r i e d t o a v o i d o r n e u t r a l i s e t h e 
r e f e r e n c e t o o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y c a r r i e d by the c r i t i c a l concept 
o f t h o u g h t . T h i s c o u l d be done by r e c a s t i n g t a l k o f an o b j e c t i v e 
r e a l i t y i n t o terms o f t h e concept of t h o u g h t i t s e l f . R e a l i t y 
c o u l d be t r e a t e d as a k i n d o f ' t h o u g h t - c o n s t r u c t ' , f o r example. 
Our r e p l y would t h e n be t h a t such an a t t e m p t t o remove t h e commitment 
t o an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y would o n l y succeed i n r e i n t r o d u c i n g i t , whenever 
t h e c o n c e p t o f t h o u g h t was employed. Conceptual i m p l i c a t i o n s cannot 
be d i s c a r d e d a t w i l l , and w i t h o u t t h e r e f e r e n c e t o o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y 
we c o u l d n o t have t h e r e q u i r e d concept o f t h o u g h t a t a l l . We c o u l d 
t h e n d e a l w i t h any response t o t h i s r e p l y i n a manner p a r a l l e l t o t h a t 
a dopted i n Chapter Three. 
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So f a r , t h e p a r a l l e l seems t o h o l d . Having r a i s e d 
and o v e r r u l e d a f i r s t o b j e c t i o n t o the a t t e m p t t o r e f u t e 
r a d i c a l i d e a l i s m , we can now t a k e up a deeper o b j e c t i o n . 
T h i s w i l l p a r a l l e l t h e Second O b j e c t i o n made a g a i n s t t h e 
r e f u t a t i o n o f r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s m . That o b j e c t i o n began 
by a c c e p t i n g t h a t t h e r e must be an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y o b j e c t i v e 
r e a l i t y , i f t h e r e i s t o be any c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l use o f 
t h e c o n c e p t o f e x p e r i e n c e . I t t h e n argued t h a t t h i s does n o t 
show t h a t t h e r e needs t o e x i s t any a c t u a l i t e m s i n h a b i t i n g t h a t 
r e a l i t y . A p r e c i s e l y p a r a l l e l o b j e c t i o n can be made i n 
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e concept o f t h o u g h t . I f , t h e o b j e c t i o n 
c o n t i n u e s , t a l k o f such a r e a l i t y i s m e r e l y a s u b s t a n t i v i s i n g o f 
t a l k about how t h i n g s r e a l l y a r e ( i n p o s s i b l e c o n t r a s t w i t h how 
t h e y are t h o u g h t t o b e ) , t h e n i t may w e l l be t h e case t h a t how 
t h i n g s a r e i s t h a t t h e r e e x i s t no a c t u a l independent i n h a b i t a n t s 
o f t h a t r e a l i t y . That i s , i t may be t h a t t h e r e a r e no items -
such as m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s , or people - whose e x i s t e n c e and 
o p e r a t i o n s a re independent o f how t h e y are t h o u g h t t o be. What 
are we t o make o f t h i s o b j e c t i o n ? As i n t h e case o f t h e 
e m p i r i c i s t , t h i s deeper o b j e c t i o n f o r c e s us t o c o n s i d e r t h e 
ne c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e c e n t r a l concept 
a t i s s u e ( h e r e , t h e concep t o f t h o u g h t ) . I t i s a t t h i s l e v e l , 
a l s o , t h a t we have i d e n t i f i e d t h e s t a r t i n g - p o i n t f o r p h i l o s o p h y . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , t h i s o b j e c t i o n b r i n g s w i t h i t the s c e p t i c a l o p t i o n 
o f c l a i m i n g t h a t we know n o t h i n g o f any a c t u a l i t e m s i n any 
e x t e r n a l w o r l d . To combat t h i s , we need t o go beyond t h e 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a c o n c e p t u a l e n t a i l m e n t l i n k i n g t h o u g h t w i t h 
r e a l i t y . We have t o c o n s i d e r how t h e concept o f t h o u g h t (as 
p o s s i b l y f a l s e , d i v e r g i n g f r o m r e a l i t y ) i s p o s s i b l e . 
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The f i r s t s t e p towards m e e t i n g t h i s second main 
o b j e c t i o n t o t h e r e f u t a t i o n o f r a d i c a l i d e a l i s m p a r a l l e l s 
t h a t o f t h e argument a g a i n s t r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s m . We need 
t o n o t e a c o n c e p t u a l i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . We have e s t a b l i s h e d 
t h a t t h e c o n c e p t o f t h o u g h t i n v o l v e s a r e f e r e n c e t o o b j e c t i v e 
r e a l i t y as t h a t from w h i c h t h o u g h t may d i v e r g e . We a l s o need 
t o n o t e t h a t t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l concept o f r e a l i t y i n v o l v e s 
a r e c i p r o c a t i n g r e f e r e n c e t o t h o u g h t , as t h a t which may d i v e r g e 
f r o m r e a l i t y i t s e l f . T h i s r e c i p r o c a l r e f e r e n c e p a r a l l e l s t h a t 
between t h e concepts o f t h o u g h t and r e a l i t y made i n Chapter Three 
between t h e concept o f r e a l i t y and e x p e r i e n c e . I n d e e d , i n each 
case i t i s t h e n o t i o n o f t h o u g h t - e i t h e r i n i t s e l f , o r i m p l i c i t 
i n e x p e r i e n c e - w h i c h i s t h e e s s e n t i a l element, and which p r o v i d e s 
t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e t o n a i v e r e a l i s m . C r i t i c a l 
p h i l o s o p h y , t h e n , must work w i t h t h i s i n t e r d e p e n d e n t c o n c e p t u a l 
p a i r . 
The q u e s t i o n we must d e a l w i t h now becomes "How i s t h i s 
c o n c e p t u a l p a i r p o s s i b l e ? " . This i n t u r n l e a d s us t o ask how 
t h e r e q u i r e d 'semantic' l i n k w i t h an e x t r a - c o n c e p t u a l r e a l m i s 
p o s s i b l e . The argument here e x a c t l y p a r a l l e l s t h a t g i v e n i n 
r e f u t i n g r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s m . That i s , t o b e g i n w i t h , n e i t h e r 
concept can be p o s s i b l e m e r e l y by v i r t u e o f b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d 
i n terms o f t h e o t h e r . (Thought u n d e r s t o o d as t h a t which may 
f a i l t o match r e a l i t y , and v i c e v e r s a . ) We w o u l d have an 
empty c i r c l e . To a v o i d t h i s , t h e r e must be a l i n k between 
t h e c o n c e p t s and something o t h e r t h a n t h e concepts themselves. 
But t h i s l i n k cannot be p r o v i d e d by o t h e r c o n c e p t s , which mediate 
between t h e concepts o f t h o u g h t / r e a l i t y and an e x t r a - c o n c e p t u a l 
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r e a l m . ( F o r example, t h o u g h t as the a b s t r a c t c o n t e n t o f 
c e r t a i n m e n t a l e v e n t s o c c u r r i n g i n p e o p l e . ) For the use 
o f such everyday m e d i a t i n g concepts would c a r r y commitments 
t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o f i t e m s independent o f t h o u g h t . R a d i c a l 
i d e a l i s m , as I have d e s c r i b e d i t , i s a t t e m p t i n g t o eschew such 
commitments. Nor can we e s t a b l i s h one o f our c o n c e p t u a l p a i r 
i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e o t h e r , by d i r e c t l y l i n k i n g i t w i t h an 
i n s t a n c e i n t h e e x t r a - c o n c e p t u a l r e a l m , and t h e n p r o v i d i n g 
an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e o t h e r concept i n terms o f t h e f i r s t . 
For i f we had a concept o f t h o u g h t , or o f r e a l i t y , which d i d 
n o t a l r e a d y c o n t a i n an i n t e r n a l r e f e r e n c e t o t h e o t h e r , t h e n 
i t c annot be t h e concept we r e q u i r e . N e i t h e r one o f our 
c o n c e p t u a l p a i r can be e s t a b l i s h e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y , and t h e n 
pushed i n t o a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e o t h e r : t h e y come t o g e t h e r 
o r n o t a t a l l . The c o n c l u s i o n o f t h i s argument p a r a l l e l s t h e 
c o n c l u s i o n o f the argument a t t h i s stage o f t h e r e f u t a t i o n o f 
r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s m . I t i s t h a t t h e 'semantic' l i n k w i t h an 
e x t r a - c o n c e p t u a l r e a l m , r e q u i r e d f o r the concept o f t h o u g h t t o 
be p o s s i b l e , i s i t s e l f p r o v i d e d f o r by none o f t h e f o l l o w i n g 
means: m u t u a l d e f i n i t i o n o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n terms o f t h e 
concept o f r e a l i t y ; d e f i n i t i o n or u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n terms o f 
o t h e r , m e d i a t i n g , c o n c e p t s ; an independent d i r e c t l i n k w i t h 
i n s t a n c e s o f t h o u g h t . 
We can escape f r o m t h i s a pparent impasse o n l y i n a way 
w h i c h p a r a l l e l s t h a t t a k e n i n Chapter Three. That i s , we must 
r e c o g n i s e t h a t t h e c o n c e p t u a l p a i r - " t h o u g h t " / " r e a l i t y " - i s 
p o s s i b l e o n l y i n v i r t u e o f b e i n g ' s e m a n t i c a l l y ' l i n k e d , as a p a i 
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w i t h an e x t r a - c o n c e p t u a l r e a l m . Only i n t h i s way can t h e 
p a i r o f concepts escape v a c u i t y . But the r e l e v a n t f e a t u r e 
o f t h i s e x t r a - c o n c e p t u a l r e a l m cannot be .just an i n s t a n c e o f 
how t h i n g s a re t h o u g h t t o be, or .just an i n s t a n c e o f how t h i n g s 
r e a l l y a r e . We have seen t h a t n e i t h e r o f t h e s e can by themselves 
p r o v i d e f o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f e i t h e r one o f t h e conc e p t s , l e t 
alone f o r t h e i n t e r r e l a t e d p a i r . I f t h i s p a i r o f concepts i s 
t o escape v a c u i t y (and i f t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g l i n g u i s t i c terms 
are t o possess t h e i r r e q u i r e d meaning), t h e n t h e s a l i e n t f e a t u r e 
o f t h a t e x t r a - c o n c e p t u a l r e a l m must be a s i t u a t i o n , w i t h i n which 
how t h i n g s a r e , and how t h e y a re t h o u g h t t o be, are d i s t i n c t b u t 
i n t e r r e l a t e d a s p e c t s . That i s , n o t o n l y are t h e concepts o f 
t h o u g h t and r e a l i t y i n e s c a p a b l y i n t e r r e l a t e d ; b u t how t h i n g s 
a r e t h o u g h t t o be, and how t h e y r e a l l y a r e , must be i n t e r r e l a t e d 
a s p e c t s o f t h e e x t r a c o n c e p t u a l r e a l m . I t i s t h e 'semantic' 
l i n k between the c o n c e p t u a l p a i r on t h e one hand, and the a c t u a l 
s i t u a t i o n i n which t h o u g h t and r e a l i t y are themselves i n t e r r e l a t e d 
on t h e o t h e r , which makes t h a t c o n c e p t u a l p a i r p o s s i b l e . The 
concepts come t o g e t h e r , i n r e l a t i o n t o such s i t u a t i o n s - i n d e e d , 
th e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e s e s i t u a t i o n s w i l l be a r t i c u l a t e d t h r o u g h 
t h e s e c o n c e p t s . H a v i n g exhausted t h e a l t e r n a t i v e accounts o f how 
t h e 'semantic' l i n k between the concept o f t h o u g h t and an e x t r a -
c o n c e p t u a l r e a l m i s p o s s i b l e , the above account i s t h e o n l y 
p o s s i b i l i t y l e f t . The l i n k between s i t u a t i o n s l i k e t h a t 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d above, and t h e i n t e r d e p e n d e n t p a i r o f concepts o f 
t h o u g h t and r e a l i t y , i s t h u s a necessary c o n d i t i o n o f t h e concept 
o f t h o u g h t . I t i s t h e r e b y a l s o a necessary c o n d i t i o n o f r a d i c a l 
i d e a l i s m , and indeed o f a l l c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n q u i r y . To 
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c o n t i n u e t h e p a r a l l e l w i t h t h e r e f u t a t i o n o f r a d i c a l 
e m p i r i c i s m , l e t us now have a c l o s e r l o o k a t the t y p e o f 
s i t u a t i o n w h i c h seems t o f i g u r e so l a r g e l y i n t h e argument. 
We have seen t h a t t h e concept o f t h o u g h t i s p o s s i b l e 
o n l y i n v i r t u e o f a 'semantic' l i n k w i t h a s i t u a t i o n i n which 
how t h i n g s a r e , and how t h e y are t h o u g h t t o be, are d i s t i n c t b u t 
i n t e r r e l a t e d a s p e c t s . As i n t h e case o f t h e concept of e x p e r i e n c e , 
we can say more about t h i s . I f i t i s t o be t h e k i n d of s i t u a t i o n 
i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h which the concepts o f t h o u g h t and r e a l i t y a r e 
made p o s s i b l e , t h e n t h e r e must be some d i s t i n c t i o n t o be made i n 
t h a t s i t u a t i o n , between how t h i n g s are and how t h e y are t h o u g h t t o 
be. As l o n g as t h e r e i s no such d i s t i n c t i o n t o be made - t h a t 
i s , as l o n g as t h o u g h t matches r e a l i t y - t h e n t h e r e i s n o t h i n g 
f o r t h e concepts expressed b y t h e terms ' t h o u g h t ' and ' r e a l i t y ' 
t o l a t c h on t o . They can have no g r i p on an e x t r a - c o n c e p t u a l 
r e a l m t h a t would save them from b e i n g m e r e l y vacuous. The 
concepts cannot e x i s t i n such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , nor the words have 
t h e i r r e q u i r e d meaning. The words " t h o u g h t " and " r e a l i t y " can 
express the r e q u i r e d concepts o n l y by b e i n g s e m a n t i c a l l y l i n k e d 
w i t h t h e k i n d o f s i t u a t i o n , i n whic h how t h i n g s r e a l l y a r e a c t u a l l y 
d i v e r g e s f r o m how t h i n g s a r e t h o u g h t t o be: t h a t i s , the k i n d of 
s i t u a t i o n we c a l l " e r r o r " . Only by v i r t u e of a 'semantic' l i n k 
w i t h s i t u a t i o n s o f e r r o r , where t h e r e i s an a c t u a l d i v e r g e n c e between 
t h o u g h t and r e a l i t y , i s t h e concept o f t h o u g h t p o s s i b l e . W i t h o u t 
such a l i n k , t h e r e f o r e , r a d i c a l i d e a l i s m - i n d e e d , any c r i t i c a l 
p h i l o s o p h y - would n o t be p o s s i b l e . A g a i n , we have reached a 
sta g e p a r a l l e l t o t h a t reached i n the r e f u t a t i o n o f r a d i c a l 
e m p i r i c i s m . There, t h e foc u s was on e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r ; t h a t 
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i s , on s i t u a t i o n s where how t h i n g s a re e x p e r i e n c e d as 
b e i n g i s a t v a r i a n c e w i t h how t h e y r e a l l y a r e . Here, 
however, we can a t t e n d t o e r r o r i n g e n e r a l ; t h o s e s i t u a t i o n s 
i n w h i c h t h o u g h t i s f a l s e . L e t us now l o o k a t a response t o 
the argument o f t h i s r e f u t a t i o n so f a r : a response which 
r a i s e s echoes o f a t r a d i t i o n a l l y i d e a l i s t i c p o s i t i o n . 
The Coherence Theory o f T r u t h : a response t o the argument so f a r . 
I n t h e r e f u t a t i o n o f r a d i c a l i d e a l i s m , I have so f a r argued 
t h a t t h e concept of t h o u g h t i s p o s s i b l e o n l y i n v i r t u e of a 
'semantic' l i n k w i t h s i t u a t i o n s o f e r r o r , i n whi c h how t h i n g s 
are d i v e r g e s from how t h e y are t h o u g h t t o be. One response t o 
t h i s argument takes t h e fo r m o f t r y i n g t o r e c a s t t a l k of e r r o r 
i n t o terms o f t h o u g h t i t s e l f . I t runs as f o l l o w s . I n t a l k i n g 
o f e r r o r , I have used the terms and concept " t h o u g h t " and " r e a l i t y " . 
Now, t h i s response a r g u e s , once i n pos s e s s i o n o f t h e concept o f 
t h o u g h t we can c o n s t r u e cases o f e r r o r i n the f o l l o w i n g way. We 
can say t h a t we have a case o f e r r o r when one t h o u g h t f a i l s t o 
f i t i n , o r cohere, w i t h the main body o f o t h e r t h o u g h t s . T h i s 
t h o u g h t i s t h e r e f o r e t o be r e j e c t e d as f a l s e . Where e r r o r i s 
u n d e r s t o o d i n terms o f a l a c k o f coherence among t h o u g h t s , t r u t h 
i s c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y grasped as coherence. We do n o t t h e n need 
t h e concept o f how t h i n g s r e a l l y a r e , the response c o n t i n u e s , 
s i n c e t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between how t h i n g s are t h o u g h t t o be, and 
how t h e y a r e , can be p r o v i d e d f o r i n terms o f t h e concept o f t h o u g h t 
a l o n e . A f t e r a l l , i n r e j e c t i n g one t h o u g h t on t h e b a s i s o f a 
(presumed) awareness o f how t h i n g s r e a l l y a r e , we are j u s t r e j e c t i n g 
one t h o u g h t on the b a s i s o f i t s l a c k o f coherence w i t h a n o t h e r 
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( t h e presumed awareness). I n d e e d , t h a t presumed awareness 
may i t s e l f l a t e r be r e j e c t e d as a f a l s e t h o u g h t , on t h e b a s i s 
o f a f u r t h e r presumed awareness. Nor does such a s e r i e s o f 
'u n d e c e p t i o n s ' have any apparent l i m i t . Such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s 
g i v e r i s e t o t h e n o t i o n t h a t we have a s e r i e s o f t h o u g h t s , w i t h 
no i n t r i n s i c g u a rantee o f any 'correspondence* w i t h an o b j e c t i v e 
r e a l i t y . The n o t i o n s o f t r u t h and f a l s e h o o d can t h e n o n l y amount 
t o t h e coherence and l a c k o f coherence among those t h o u g h t s . 
T h i s response i s most a c c e p t a b l e t o i d e a l i s t p h i l o s o p h e r s . 3 ^ -
N e v e r t h e l e s s , as t h e p a r a l l e l w i t h t he response a t t h i s stage 
i n t h e r e f u t a t i o n o f r a d i c a l i d e a l i s m s u g g e s t s , i t i s a l s o one 
t o w h i c h c e r t a i n e m p i r i c i s t s can be d r a w n . W e are i n a p o s i t i o n 
t o see why t h i s response i s u n a c c e p t a b l e . The account o f e r r o r 
(and t r u t h ) o f f e r e d h e r e cannot succeed. For t h a t account 
presupposes t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f the concept o f t h o u g h t . T h i s 
concept i s i n t u r n p o s s i b l e o n l y i n v i r t u e o f a 'semantic' l i n k 
w i t h cases o f e r r o r . The p r i m a r y grasp o f e r r o r cannot t h e n be 
g i v e n i n terms o f t h e concept o f t h o u g h t , s i n c e t h a t would be t o 
presuppose e x a c t l y t h a t w h i c h t h e argument seeks t o account f o r . 
We can r e j e c t t h i s response. L e t us t u r n t o a f u r t h e r development 
o f t h e argument a g a i n s t r a d i c a l i d e a l i s m . J • 
Thought and i t s r e j e c t i o n 
I want now t o d e v e l o p the argument i n a way which p a r a l l e l s 
t h a t o f t h e r e f u t a t i o n o f r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s m , and whic h leads t o 
t h e f i n a l r e f u t a t i o n o f r a d i c a l i d e a l i s m . 
I n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h i s development o f t h e argument, we can 
make a n o t h e r p o i n t w i t h a p a r a l l e l i n the r e f u t a t i o n o f e m p i r i c i s m . 
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I f t h e r e i s t o be a d i s t i n c t i o n between how t h i n g s are 
and how t h e y are t h o u g h t t o be, t h e n the concepts which 
a r t i c u l a t e t h e s a l i e n t t h o u g h t s must be what Strawson c a l l s 
•concepts o f t h e o b j e c t i v e ' . I f t h o u g h t were, i n s t e a d , 
o n l y about i t e m s such t h a t no d i s t i n c t i o n c o u l d be drawn 
between how t h e y were, and how t h e y were t h o u g h t t o be, t h e n 
t h e r e would be no p o s s i b i l i t y o f e r r o r . F u r t h e r , as concepts 
o f t h e o b j e c t i v e must be used w i t h i n t h o u g h t , these concepts 
must n o t c o n t a i n any i m p l i c i t o r e x p l i c i t r e f e r e n c e t o t h o u g h t 
i t s e l f . Nor must t h e y be r e d u c i b l e i n any way t o t h e concept 
o f t h o u g h t . For t h i s would be t o push the q u e s t i o n o f the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e concept o f t h o u g h t one stage f a r t h e r back, 
r a t h e r t h a n t o answer i t . Thought must be, a t l e a s t i n p a r t , 
o f i t e m s such t h a t how t h i n g s are w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e i r e x i s t e n c e 
and o p e r a t i o n s , i s i n d e p e n d e n t o f how t h e y are t h o u g h t t o be. 
Thought must be, i n t e n t i o n a l l y , of an ' e x t e r n a l w o r l d ' i n as 
s t r o n g a sense as we c o u l d w i s h . What i m p l i c a t i o n s f o l l o w ? 
On t h e b a s i s o f what has been s a i d about the concepts t h r o u g h 
w h i c h t h o u g h t must be a r t i c u l a t e d , l e t us l o o k f u r t h e r a t the 
n a t u r e o f e r r o r . C o n s i d e r two examples. 
A. I p a r k my b i c y c l e o u t s i d e t h e l i b r a r y , and g e t o u t 
some books. Emerging from t h e l i b r a r y , I r e a l i s e t h a t t h e 
b i c y c l e has been t a k e n . B. D u r i n g a break from r e v i s i n g f o r 
t h e a f t e r n o o n ' s e x a m i n a t i o n , I g l a n c e a t the t i m e t a b l e and 
n o t e w i t h h o r r o r t h a t t h e e x a m i n a t i o n i s b e i n g h e l d r i g h t now -
t h i s m o r n i n g r a t h e r t h a n t h i s a f t e r n o o n . These examples expand 
t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f e x p e r i e n t i a l e r r o r u n d e r t a k e n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h 
t h e c o n c e p t o f e x p e r i e n c e , t o a more g e n e r a l n o t i o n o f e r r o r . I n 
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A. we do n o t need a p e r c e p t u a l e x p e r i e n c e , i n t e n t i o n a l l y , o f t h e 
b i c y c l e , which i s t h e n r e j e c t e d as, say, an h a l l u c i n a t i o n . I t 
i s r a t h e r t h a t t h e t h o u g h t , o r b e l i e f , t h a t t h e b i c y c l e i s t h e r e 
( w h i c h may n e v e r have e x p l i c i t l y e n t e r e d my mind, o r i n f o r m e d a 
p a r t i c u l a r p e r c e p t u a l e x p e r i e n c e ) , i s b r o u g h t t o r e c o g n i t i o n by 
my r e a c t i o n t o how t h i n g s r e a l l y a r e . I n B., we have an example 
w h i c h shows t h a t the awareness o f how t h i n g s r e a l l y a r e , which 
grounds our r e j e c t i o n o f how t h i n g s are t h o u g h t t o be as f a l s e , 
need n o t be a d i r e c t p e r c e p t u a l one. 
Now i n p a r a l l e l w i t h the d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e concept of 
e x p e r i e n c e , we can see t h a t how t h i n g s are t h o u g h t t o be, i s 
r e j e c t e d i n these examples on the b a s i s o f a (presumed) awareness 
32? 
o f how t h i n g s a r e . ' T h i s i s n o t a bare awareness t h a t how t h i n g s 
are d i f f e r s f r o m how t h e y are t h o u g h t t o be. I t i s a d e t e r m i n a t e 
awareness o f how t h i n g s p o s i t i v e l y a r e , which e x c l u d e s - how t h i n g s 
a r e t h o u g h t t o be f r o m b e i n g t r u e . So t h a t , f o r example, i f t h e 
e x a m i n a t i o n i s t h i s m o r n i n g , i t cannot be t h i s a f t e r n o o n . We have 
seen t h a t , f o r such a c o n f l i c t t o be p o s s i b l e , t h e awareness o f how 
t h i n g s r e a l l y a re ( a s w e l l as the awareness o f how t h i n g s are t h o u g h t 
t o b e ) , must be a r t i c t i l a t e d i n "concepts o f t h e o b j e c t i v e " . ' I n 
t h e s e examples of e r r o r , t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f how t h i n g s are t h o u g h t 
t o be, as d i f f e r i n g f r o m how t h e y r e a l l y a r e , i s based on a 
(presumed) awareness o f how t h i n g s a r e w i t h c e r t a i n independent 
i t e m s i n an o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . T h i s now seems t o open the way t o 
a development o f t h e argument p a r a l l e l t o t h a t suggested i n t h e 
r e f u t a t i o n o f r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s m . 
The suggested development i s t h a t cases of e r r o r , i f t h e y 
a r e t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e 'semantic' l i n k w i t h t h e concept of t h o u g h t , 
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must be s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h how t h i n g s a r e t h o u g h t t o be, 
i s a t v a r i a n c e w i t h how t h e y r e a l l y are w i t h independent 
i t e m s i n an e x t e r n a l w o r l d . 1^ t h e n l o o k s as i f we a r e 
committed t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o f such i t e m s and such a w o r l d , 
as an e s s e n t i a l l y n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f t h e c r i t i c a l concept o f t h o u g h t , and so o f r a d i c a l i d e a l i s m , 
and c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y i n g e n e r a l . The r a d i c a l i d e a l i s m 
d e s c r i b e d above would be r e f u t e d , s i n c e i t s e x i s t e n c e would 
r e q u i r e t h e f a l s i t y o f t h e c l a i m t h a t perhaps t h e r e e x i s t s 
n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h o u g h t . The o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y argued 
f o r e a r l i e r , w o u l d have been shown t o be i n h a b i t e d . T h i s i s 
the c o n c l u s i o n we want, b u t , as i n the r e f u t a t i o n o f r a d i c a l 
e m p i r i c i s m , t h e argument needs t e s t i n g . 
I n Chapter Three, t h e argument a t t h i s s t a g e was t e s t e d 
a g a i n s t t h e o b j e c t i o n t h a t an a l t e r n a t i v e account o f e x p e r i e n t i a l 
e r r o r was p o s s i b l e , w h i c h would p r o v i d e f o r t h e 'semantic' l i n k 
w i t h t h e concept o f e x p e r i e n c e w i t h o u t i n v o l v i n g a commitment 
t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a p o p u l a t e d e x t e r n a l w o r l d . The a l t e r n a t i v e 
a c c o u n t t h e r e proposed was t h a t t h e r e c o u l d be cases o f e x p e r i e n t i a l 
e r r o r where the g r a s p o f how t h i n g s r e a l l y a r e c o n s i s t e d m e r e l y o f 
t h e bare awareness t h a t t h e r e i s no i n h a b i t e d o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y 
a t a l l ; t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n e x p e r i e n c e . The 
p a r a l l e l s u g g e s t i o n h e r e , would be t h a t t h e r e c o u l d be cases o f 
e r r o r where how t h i n g s a r e t h o u g h t t o be i s r e j e c t e d on the b a s i s 
o f a (presumed) awareness o f how t h i n g s a r e ; and t h a t t h i s (presume^ 
awareness c o u l d c o n s i s t i n t h e bare awareness t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s 
n o t h i n g ( o t h e r t h a n t h o u g h t i t s e l f ) : t h a t t h e o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y 
was u n i n h a b i t e d . As b e f o r e , I f i n d i t e x t r e m e l y h a r d t o make much 
o f t h i s s u g g e s t i o n , b u t t h e argument a g a i n s t i t i s the same as t h a t 
advanced i n Chapter Three. 
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B r i e f l y , t h e argument i s t h i s . Our o r d i n a r y everyday 
awareness t h a t t h e r e i s n o t h i n g , "has two f e a t u r e s . F i r s t : 
t h e ' n o t h i n g ' o f which we become aiirare, i s n o t a b s o l u t e and 
u n c o n d i t i o n e d , b u t i s d e t e r m i n e d i n r e l a t i o n t o a p a r t i c u l a r 
c o n c e p t . Thus, i n l o o k i n g f o r something t o d r i n k , I f i n d 
f o o d , c l o t h e s and empty cupboards: b u t n o t h i n g t o d r i n k . 
Second: t h e r e i s a c e r t a i n h o r i z o n w i t h i n which n o t h i n g i s 
d i s c o v e r e d . Thus t h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n t h e house t o d r i n k , b u t 
p l e n t y t o d r i n k i n t h e shops and pubs. Now i t seems t h a t what 
i s b e i n g proposed above, as p a r t o f t h e o b j e c t i o n t o t h e argument 
a g a i n s t r a d i c a l i d e a l i s m , i s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f an awareness t h a t 
t h e r e i s n o t h i n g w h i c h has n e i t h e r o f these f e a t u r e s . That i s , 
i t i s suggested t h a t t h e r e can be an awareness t h a t t h e r e i s 
n o t h i n g , w h i c h i s n e i t h e r l i m i t e d t o a c e r t a i n h o r i z o n , n o r 
d e t e r m i n e d i n r e s p e c t o f a p a r t i c u l a r concept. I s i t p o s s i b l e 
t h a t t h e r e be an awareness w h i c h l a c k s these f e a t u r e s ? I t 
m i g h t be argued t h a t t h e proposed awareness o f n o t h i n g i s , i n 
f a c t , l i m i t e d t o a c e r t a i n h o r i z o n , namely, t h a t o f o b j e c t i v e 
r e a l i t y i t s e l f . The awareness t h a t t h e r e i s n o t h i n g a t l e a s t 
c o n f i n e s i t s e l f t o t h i s boundary. What i s more c r i t i c a l , i s 
t h e p o i n t c o n c e r n i n g t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e ' n o t h i n g ' i n r e s p e c t 
o f a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t . Here, the i d e a seems t o be t h a t o f an 
awareness o f a b s o l u t e l y n o t h i n g : t h a t i s , an awareness o f n o t h i n g , 
w h i c h i s n o t d e t e r m i n e d i n r e s p e c t o f a p a r t i c u l a r concept ( e . g . 
n o t h i n g t o d r i n k ) . The s u g g e s t i o n we have t o d e a l w i t h , i s t h a t 
t h e r e can be cases o f e r r o r i n which how t h i n g s are t h o u g h t t o be 
i s r e j e c t e d as f a l s e , on the b a s i s o f an awareness t h a t t h e r e i s 
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a b s o l u t e l y n o t h i n g . But i t emerges (as i t d i d i n Chapter 
Three) t h a t an awareness t h a t there i s a b s o l u t e l y nothing 
w i l l not work here. For one t h i n g , such a (presumed) 
awareness must be f a l s e , since the awareness i s i t s e l f 
something. Nor could such an awareness provide f o r an 
account of e r r o r , since e r r o r requires a thought, and t h i s 
proposed awareness would r u l e out the existence of anything. 
The awareness t h a t there i s nothing has to be q u a l i f i e d - i t 
cannot be awareness of an absolute nothingness. 
ifhe q u a l i f i c a t i o n t h a t i s required here - which provides 
the concept w i t h respect t o which the 'nothing' i s determined -
must be t h i s : there must be an awareness t h a t there e x i s t s 
nothing other than thought i t s e l f . I t i s on t h i s basis, t h a t 
any p o s i t i v e claim about independent items i n an o b j e c t i v e world 
would be r e j e c t e d as mere f a l s e thoughts, thus making possible 
instances of e r r o r . 'Semantic' l i n k i n g w i t h such instances 
would i n t u r n make possible the concept of thought. But t h i s 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n of the 'nothing' raises a problem. For i t saves 
us from an awareness of absolute non-being, only at the cost of 
presupposing e x a c t l y t h a t which i t was t o provide f o r , namely, 
the existence of the concept of thought. The proposed awareness, 
t h a t there i s nothing other than thought, must employ ( i f only 
i m p l i c i t l y ) the concept of thought. I t cannot then form p a r t 
of an adequate account of the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h a t concept. This 
a l t e r n a t i v e account of e r r o r i s therefore untenable, and the 
o b j e c t i o n based on i t i s met. Our argument above, p a r a l l e l l i n g 
t h a t of the r e f u t a t i o n of empiricism, shows t h a t there must be 
cases of e r r o r i n which how things are thought t o be i s dismissed 
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as f a l s e on the basis of a p o s i t i v e (presumed) awareness 
of how things r e a l l y are w i t h independent items i n an 
o b j e c t i v e 'external' world. This awareness c a r r i e s a 
commitment t o the existence of such a world and i t s i n h a b i t a n t s . 
'Radical idealism i s t h e r e f o r e incoherent, since i t s very 
p o s s i b i l i t y (the p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s c e n t r a l concept) presupposes 
the falsehood of i t s c e n t r a l claim, t h a t perhaps there e x i s t s 
only thought. I f t h i s gives us the argument f o r r e j e c t i n g 
r a d i c a l i d e a l i s m , l e t us give i t a f u r t h e r t e s t . 
This second t e s t , p a r a l l e l i n g the t e s t presented i n the 
r e f u t a t i o n of r a d i c a l empiricism, involves f a c i n g the o b j e c t i o n 
t h a t , having got the concept of thought, we can then use i t i n 
a reassessment of our (presumed) awareness of how things are, 
so as to cancel the apparent commitment to an e x t e r n a l , o b j e c t i v e 
world. For r e c a l l the examples of e r r o r we have looked a t . ^ ' 
Perhaps i n each case we were r i g h t the f i r s t time, and our 
presumed awareness of how things are was not, i n f a c t , v e r i d i c a l . 
Or perhaps we were wrong both times. R e f l e c t i o n along these 
l i n e s seems to lead t o the conclusion t h a t we can r e t r a c t any 
p a r t i c u l a r judgement as t o how things are i n the world. I f we 
can do t h i s , then s u r e l y i t i s possible t h a t a l l these p a r t i c u l a r , 
p o s i t i v e awarenesses are f a l s e , and t h a t there e x i s t no actual 
items independent of thought. 
The argument against t h i s o b j e c t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l l y the same 
as t h a t presented i n Chapter Three. B r i e f l y , i t i s t h i s . I f 
a l l (presumed) awarenesses of how things r e a l l y are, are to be 
re-assessed as merely thoughts, so t h a t judgement as t o t h e i r 
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v e r i d i c a l i t y i s suspended, then we presuppose the a v a i l a b i l i t y 
of the concept of thought. But t h i s concept presupposes, as 
a necessary c o n d i t i o n of i t s p o s s i b i l i t y , a 'semantic' l i n k 
w i t h a t l e a s t one instance of e r r o r , i n which the (presumed) 
awareness of how t h i n g s are i s taken at face-value. We can 
then re-assess t h i s p a r t i c u l a r awareness, as long as we can 
l i n k the concept of thought t o other cases, i n which the 
(presumed) awareness of how things are i s taken a t face-value. 
I f we t r y t o suspend judgement on a l l such awarenesses at once, we 
sever the p o s s i b i l i t y of a 'semantic' l i n k between the concept of 
thought and an extra-conceptual realm. This i n t u r n deprives 
the concept of i t s very p o s s i b i l i t y , and the term "thought" of 
i t s r e q u i r e d meaning. I f t h i s argument succeeds, then i t e n t a i l s 
a c e r t a i n commitment. That i s , although we are not committed to 
the t r u t h of any p a r t i c u l a r (presumed) awareness of how things are 
w i t h independent items i n an o b j e c t i v e world, we are inescapably 
committed to the existence of at l e a s t one such awareness as beyond 
question. We are t h e r e f o r e committed to the existence of such a 
world and i t s i n h a b i t a n t s , though not as yet t o the t r u t h of more 
p a r t i c u l a r claims about them. Radical idealism i s r e f u t e d . 
I f t h i s argument i s successful, then i t establishes the 
existence of the e x t e r n a l world as immune from any scepticism. 
Such scepticism would i t s e l f necessarily presuppose the existence 
of the concept of thought (as p o s s i b l y f a l s e ) , and hence, i n t u r n , 
the existence of the e x t e r n a l world i t s e l f . By t r a c i n g the 
necessary conditions of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the c e n t r a l concept 
of c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n q u i r y , we can thus set l i m i t s on what 
can l e g i t i m a t e l y be c a l l e d a question. But we s t i l l have the 
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problem of what comes next. I f the external world e x i s t s , 
so what? Have we gone through a l l t h i s j u s t t o r e - e s t a b l i s h 
what only philosophers have doubted i n the f i r s t place? I am 
glad t o be able t o say "No", here. Although we have so f a r 
concentrated on an issue which concerns p e c u l i a r l y philosophers 
of a c e r t a i n psychological stamp, the argument has more i n store. 
For we have not come anywhere near the end of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
i n t o the necessary conditions of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept 
of thought. And a l l such conditions we uncover, w i l l also be 
immune from s c e p t i c a l questioning. I w i l l argue t h a t these 
c o n d i t i o n s include the existence of c e r t a i n n o n - r e l a t i v e moral 
values. The path t o t h a t conclusion begins w i t h the next section. 
How i s the concept of thought possible? 
The discussion here w i l l p a r a l l e l t h a t i n the l a s t s ection 
of Chapter Three. Faced w i t h the problems of g i v i n g an account 
of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of thought, which does not 
already presuppose t h a t concept, the question of whether any such 
account i s possible may a r i s e . I n t h i s s e c t i o n I want to provide 
a n o n - c i r c u l a r account of how the c r i t i c a l concept of thought i s 
po s s i b l e . This w i l l also help to set the scene f o r the account 
of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between thought, language and the subject 
which I take up i n Chapter Five. 
The problem here i s t h i s . The concept of thought requires 
f o r i t s p o s s i b i l i t y a 'semantic* l i n k w i t h instances of e r r o r . 
The primary grasp of cases of e r r o r cannot, however, be t h a t 
which we have from our ordinary everyday standpoint. Having 
access t o the concepts of thought and r e a l i t y , we can understand 
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e r r o r as a s i t u a t i o n i n which thought f a i l s to match r e a l i t y . 
B^t t h i s understanding c l e a r l y employs j u s t those concepts 
which the grasp of cases of e r r o r i s t o help make possible. 
While our p h i l o s o p h i c a l s t r a t e g y requires a l i n k w i t h s i t u a t i o n s 
i n which thought and r e a l i t y are a t odds, these cases of e r r o r 
cannot be p r i m a r i l y understood i n terms of thought f a i l i n g to 
agree w i t h r e a l i t y . Here, the order of primary understanding 
reverses t h a t of stages i n the ph i l o s o p h i c a l s t r a t e g y . But i f 
the primary grasp of e r r o r cannot use these concepts, then how i s such 
a grasp possible a t a l l ? Consider some of the suggestions, i n 
connection w i t h the example of the sto l e n b i c y c l e . ^ -
F i r s t : we must r e j e c t the idea t h a t we can grasp e r r o r i n terms 
of a lack of coherence among thoughts, f o r reasons given e a r l i e r . ^ -
Second: consider t h i s suggestion. I f we take the i n i t i a l thought 
( t h a t my b i c y c l e awaits me) and the (presumed) awareness of how things 
r e a l l y are (my b i c y c l e i s gone), as both naive awarenesses, such t h a t 
the question of t h e i r v e r i d i c a l i t y or otherwise has not, and cannot 
y e t , be asked. We then have an awareness t h a t my bike awaits me, 
fol l o w e d by an awareness t h a t my bike does not await me. Such 
c o n f l i c t i n g awarenesses, runs the suggestion, must surely generate 
a grasp of the s i t u a t i o n as one of e r r o r . But t h i s i s not so. I n 
order f o r t h i s series of awarenesses to lead t o the conclusion t h a t 
here was a case of e r r o r , there would have t o be an understanding of 
the f a c t t h a t the two naive awarenesses were i n c o n f l i c t , such t h a t 
a t l e a s t one of them was n o n - v e r i d i c a l . For the understanding of 
the awarenesses as i n mutual c o n f l i c t amounts t o t h i s . I f e i t h e r 
one i s v e r i d i c a l , then the other cannot be - i t must be a non - v e r i d i c a l 
thought. The understanding of the awarenesses as mutually c o n f l i c t i n g 
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t h e r e f o r e presupposes the c r i t i c a l concept of thought, and 
the concept of r e a l i t y as t h a t from which i t may diverge. 
I t cannot, then, be used i n the grasp of cases of e r r o r which 
i s t o help make these concepts themselves possible. Nothing 
i n the mere j u x t a p o s i t i o n of such awarenesses - which we, from 
our standpoint, can regard as mutually c o n f l i c t i n g - can generate 
of i t s e l f the grasp of the s i t u a t i o n as one of e r r o r . Nothing 
here forces t h a t understanding to emerge. 
We can see f u r t h e r i n t o our problem. The primary grasp of 
e r r o r cannot be our ord i n a r y one, nor one i n terms of lack of 
coherence among thoughts, nor one i n terms of mutually c o n f l i c t i n g 
'naive' awarenesses. How, then, i s a grasp of e r r o r possible 
a t a l l ? The way out of t h i s d i f f i c u l t y p a r a l l e l s t h a t taken 
i n Chapter Three. The primary grasp of e r r o r cannot take the 
form of some s o r t of synthesis of our understanding of i t s components -
t h a t i s , of how things are thought to be, and how they r e a l l y are -
since the understanding of those components i t s e l f presupposes the 
primary grasp of cases of e r r o r . But i f t h i s i s so, then the 
primary grasp of the s i t u a t i o n of e r r o r must be a grasp of i t as 
a t o t a l i t y ; as a whole. W i t h i n t h i s t o t a l i t y , as subsequent 
r e f l e c t i v e analysis can show, thought and r e a l i t y are i n t e r r e l a t e d . 
But the grasp of e r r o r as a t o t a l i t y must precede the conceptualisation 
of i t s i n t e r n a l components. 
How i s a grasp of t h i s s p e c i f i c kind of t o t a l i t y possible? 
I t cannot be grasped from the 'i n s i d e ' - as a synthesis of i t s 
components - since t h i s would presuppose the concepts at issue. 
The only a l t e r n a t i v e i s t h a t e r r o r be grasped as a t o t a l i t y from 
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the 'outside'. Further, t h i s whole i s to be a s p e c i f i c 
t o t a l i t y : one i n which thought and r e a l i t y are, as 
r e f l e c t i o n w i l l show, i n t e r r e l a t e d . I t must then be marked 
o f f or d e l i m i t e d , from t h a t which i s 'outside' i t . I f i t were 
not so d e l i m i t e d , then there would be no way of grasping the 
t o t a l i t y as a whole a t a l l . Thus the primary grasp of the 
t o t a l i t y which i s e r r o r , must be of i t i n r e l a t i o n to an 
'outside' context, from which i t i s d e l i m i t e d . We have to 
draw the boundary of the t o t a l i t y from the outside, as i t 
cannot be drawn from w i t h i n . 
Let us take t h i s approach f u r t h e r . The way i n which t h i s 
t o t a l i t y i s ' d e l i m i t e d from without' has to be such t h a t the 
t o t a l i t y thus d e l i m i t e d i s indeed one of e r r o r ( r a t h e r than, 
say, of f r u s t r a t e d d e s i r e ) . The t o t a l i t y thus d e l i m i t e d must 
be one which can be r e f l e c t i v e l y analysed as a case i n which how 
th i n g s are thought to be f a i l s t o match up w i t h how they r e a l l y 
are. How can t h i s t o t a l i t y be grasped from the 'outside'? 
I t cannot be grasped as a p o s i t i v e e n t i t y i n i t s own r i g h t , 
l i k e t r e e s , or people, f o r i t consists i n a f a i l u r e which r e f e r s 
to a wider context. But how could the t o t a l i t y which i s e r r o r 
be grasped i n a negative manner? 
The analogy w i t h an inadequate c a r b u r e t t o r was introduced 
a t t h i s stage of the argument i n Chapter Three, t o t r y to c l a r i f y 
the issue here. I n the analogy, i t was suggested t h a t the 
f a i l u r e of the c a r b u r e t t o r can be grasped i n i t s r e l a t i o n to an 
outside context: i t i s a f a i l u r e to achieve a mechanical harmony 
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w i t h other parts of the car, which generates a breakdown. 
S i m i l a r l y , a grasp of c o g n i t i v e f a i l u r e can be grasped i n 
i t s r e l a t i o n t o an 'outside' - i t i s a f a i l u r e to achieve 
a c o g n i t i v e harmony, which can lead to a breakdown i n the 
smooth running of my l i f e ( f o r example, my f a i l i n g t h i s 
morning's examination). This primary grasp of e r r o r as a 
c o g n i t i v e f a i l u r e r e l a t e d t o a wider context, allows f o r the 
subsequent analysis of i t s components - how things are thought 
to be, and how they r e a l l y are. The grasp of e r r o r cannot be 
obtained by the reverse course - beginning by grasping how things 
are, how they are thought to be, and seeing t h a t the s t r u c t u r e 
of the thought d i f f e r s from t h a t of r e a l i t y - f o r two reasons. 
One i s the f a m i l i a r one, t h a t i t would presuppose the concepts 
at issue. The second reason i s t h a t such a procedure would 
provide us only w i t h a comparison of the thought and the r e a l i t y . 
I t would not of i t s e l f give us a grasp of the s i t u a t i o n as one 
of f a i l u r e . I t i s the n o t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of f a i l u r e which 
gives c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l questioning i t s p o i n t . A divergence 
between thought and r e a l i t y does not of i t s e l f t e l l us where the 
f a u l t l i e s , i f anywhere. Such a divergence can only be of 
i n t e r e s t to the c r i t i q u e of knowledge, i f i t i s construed as 
a f a i l u r e of thought, r a t h e r than of r e a l i t y . These two points 
show t h a t the primary grasp of e r r o r can only be obtained through 
the negative d e l i m i t a t i o n of t h a t t o t a l i t y from an outside context 
of c o g n i t i v e harmony. 
A f u r t h e r p o i n t concerns the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the n o t i o n of 
c o g n i t i v e harmony. This n o t i o n amounts to t h a t of a coincidence 
of how t h i n g s are, w i t h how they are thought t o be. I t f o l l o w s 
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t h a t the d e l i m i t a t i o n of e r r o r from the context of c o g n i t i v e 
harmony i s l o g i c a l l y p r i o r t o the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the no t i o n 
of c o g n i t i v e harmony i t s e l f . P r i o r t o t h a t d e l i m i t a t i o n , 
t h a t c o g n i t i v e harmony i s unquestioned and unquestionable: 
f o r t o question i t would r e q u i r e j u s t those concepts of thought 
and r e a l i t y which are a t t h a t stage unavailable. This p o i n t 
leads, as i n Chapter Three, t o the question of how t h i s 
d e l i m i t a t i o n of the t o t a l i t y of e r r o r , from a context of cognitive 
harmony, i s supposed t o happen. 
The problem i n Chapter Three was focussed by looking a t the 
suggestion t h a t e r r o r i s marked o f f from c o g n i t i v e harmony by 
v i r t u e of a comparison of the two s i t u a t i o n s . On the one side, 
how things are thought t o be accords w i t h how they r e a l l y are: 
on the other side, i t does not. But such a comparison would 
presuppose the concepts of thought and r e a l i t y which i t was 
supposed to help make pos s i b l e . We must r e j e c t t h i s suggestion. 
But i f we cannot l e g i t i m a t e l y use these concepts i n d e l i m i t i n g 
e r r o r from i t s ' o u t s i d e 1 , what i s the a l t e r n a t i v e ? The only 
a l t e r n a t i v e i s t h i s : the d e l i m i t a t i o n , from the context of 
c o g n i t i v e harmony, which makes possible the primary grasp of 
e r r o r , must be non-conceptual. For any conceptual grasp of the 
r e l a t i o n between e r r o r and harmony presupposes the a v a i l a b i l i t y 
of the concepts at issue. We can have no a b s t r a c t , conceptual 
marking o f f of the one from the other. But what sense are we t o 
make of the n o t i o n of a non-conceptual grasp of e r r o r i n i t s 
negative r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h c o g n i t i v e harmony? 
The answer to t h i s question ( i n p a r a l l e l w i t h t h a t i n 
Chapter Three) involves recognising t h a t the t o t a l s i t u a t i o n 
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of e r r o r cannot be d e l i m i t e d from the context of c o g n i t i v e 
harmony i n any a b s t r a c t manner which requires the concepts 
we are t r y i n g t o account f o r . The grasp of the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between e r r o r and harmony cannot take the form of understanding 
the case of e r r o r as a f a i l u r e t o l i v e up to an a b s t r a c t i d e a l 
of c o g n i t i v e harmony, which we already have i n mind. That 
d e l i m i t a t i o n of e r r o r from c o g n i t i v e harmony can only take the 
form of an actual r u p t u r e , or breakdown, i n t h a t harmony. The 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between e r r o r and c o g n i t i v e harmony i s the r e l a t i o n s h 
of e r r o r t o t h a t i n which i t c o n s t i t u t e s a r u p t u r e , or breakdown. 
I t i s t h i s d e l i m i t a t i o n of e r r o r as a concrete breakdown i n 
c o g n i t i v e harmony - r a t h e r than as a f a i l u r e to l i v e up to an 
a b s t r a c t i d e a l - which makes possible a non-conceptual grasp 
of the t o t a l i t y of e r r o r . Let us use the case of the s t o l e n 
b i c y c l e as an i l l u s t r a t i o n . 
As I leave the l i b r a r y , no question as t o the t r u t h of the 
thought t h a t my b i c y c l e awaits me i s r a i s e d . When I perceive 
i t s absence, there i s a sense of shock. I t f e e l s as though a 
small sand-bag i s suspended from a p o i n t about an inch behind 
my navel. This shock i s the non-conceptual r e g i s t r a t i o n of a 
c o g n i t i v e r u p t u r e ; of the breakdown of an unquestioned c o g n i t i v e 
r e l a t i o n w i t h r e a l i t y i n t o e r r o r . R e f l e c t i o n on t h i s breakdown 
can lead t o i t s analysis as an instance of thought f a i l i n g t o 
match r e a l i t y . I t i s , however, only the non-conceptual grasp 
of the r e l a t i o n between c o g n i t i v e harmony and e r r o r , which makes 
the c r i t i c a l concepts of thought and r e a l i t y at a l l possible. 
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As i n Chapter Three, t h i s account gives us an idea 
of the 'semantic 1 l i n k between the concept of thought and 
instances of e r r o r . The concepts of thought and r e a l i t y 
are the way i n which the non-conceptual r e g i s t r a t i o n of a 
breakdown i n c o g n i t i v e harmony gets a r t i c u l a t e d . They are 
not somehow brought along and 'ostensively' put i n touch 
p a r t i c u l a r cases. Rather than f o l l o w up the i m p l i c a t i o n s 
of t h i s idea f o r the philosophy of language, I f e e l I must 
o f f e r an apology. 
This s e c t i o n , and indeed the whole of the second h a l f of 
t h i s chapter, has e s s e n t i a l l y involved the r e p e t i t i o n of the 
argument given i n Chapter Three; only i n connection w i t h the 
concept of thought, instead of the concept of experience. 
Although I f e e l i t important t o trace the necessary conditions 
of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of thought, and although i t i s 
important t o show how these conditions l i m i t the scope of what 
c r i t i c a l philosophy can c a l l i n question, the r e p e t i t i v e aspect 
of some of the present chapter i s bound t o be somewhat t r y i n g . 
I apologise f o r t h i s . Before leaving the chapter, however, there 
i s a p o i n t t o be made i n preparing f o r the discussion which follows 
i n Chapter Five. I t concerns the very a b s t r a c t concept of thought 
w i t h which we have so f a r been working. 
Thought and Thinking 
The argument i n t h i s chapter has focussed on the c r i t i c a l 
concept of thought as a k i n d of P l a t o n i c , ' t h i r d world' thought-content 
i n a b s t r a c t i o n from any actual t h i n k i n g . This, I argued, i s the bares 
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concept which can make c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l enquiry 
p o s s i b l e . As I suggested during the process of a b s t r a c t i o n 
through which t h i s concept was obtained, many philosophers 
would be unhappy w i t h the n o t i o n t h a t we can e n t e r t a i n t h a t 
concept i n t o t a l a b s t r a c t i o n from t h i n k i n g i t s e l f . We have 
now reached a stage i n the argument where we can r e t r a c e one 
step of t h a t process of a b s t r a c t i o n , and show t h a t the concept 
of thought i n i t s P l a t o n i c sense necessarily presupposes an 
understanding of t h a t thought-content as the content of some 
act u a l t h i n k i n g . We cannot remain w i t h the very abstract 
concept of thought, but must recognise the presuppositions 
i t b r i ngs w i t h i t . 
The argument i s this.''' 7 - The c r i t i c a l concept of thought 
i s possible only i n the context of r e f l e c t i o n on a breakdown 
i n c o g n i t i v e harmony which has been non-conceptually r e g i s t e r e d . 
So much was argued i n the preceding section. Now, from our 
conceptual vantage-point, as ordinary adults who have gone 
through the process of a c q u i r i n g the relevant concepts, we can 
t a l k of t h i s harmony i n terms of thought and r e a l i t y matching 
up: and here i t seems t h a t we need no more than the n o t i o n of 
a P l a t o n i c thought-content. But i f t h a t harmony consisted mere 
i n an a b s t r a c t r e l a t i o n between a Pla t o n i c thought-content and 
how th i n g s r e a l l y are, then no non-conceptual r e g i s t r a t i o n of 
i t s breakdown would be possible. For i f the harmony between 
thought and r e a l i t y obtains only a t the abst r a c t l e v e l of an 
a b s t r a c t r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 'contents 1 of thought and 
r e a l i t y , then a breakdown i n t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p can only be 
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r e g i s t e r e d conceptually: through an awareness of the 
ab s t r a c t thought-content, and of how t h a t content compares 
w i t h how t h i n g s r e a l l y are. But such a comparison of 
thought w i t h r e a l i t y would already presuppose the concepts 
of thought and r e a l i t y themselves, and so cannot form p a r t 
of an account of t h e i r p o s s i b i l i t y . For a non-conceptual 
r e g i s t r a t i o n of breakdown t o be possible - one which does not 
make the i l l i c i t p resupposition j u s t mentioned - then the 
c o g n i t i v e harmony must have a more concrete aspect. R e a l i t y 
i t s e l f , we might t h i n k , i s 'concrete' enough; but what i s i t 
f o r i t s harmonious r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h thought to be 'concrete' 
too? I f t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p i s t o consist i n more than an 
ab s t r a c t coincidence of how things are w i t h how they are thought 
to be, then i t must o b t a i n a t a d i f f e r e n t l e v e l a l s o . This 
other l e v e l a t which c o g n i t i v e harmony holds, must be such as 
to make possible subsequent a b s t r a c t i o n t o the a b s t r a c t l e v e l 
of comparison between thought and r e a l i t y . For t h a t to be 
pos s i b l e , i t must i n t u r n be the case t h a t the thought-content 
informs t h i s concrete l e v e l a t which c o g n i t i v e harmony obtains. 
What does a l l t h i s mean? The example of e r r o r we have previously 
introduced can help t o c l a r i f y the p o i n t . Recall the non-conceptual 
r e g i s t r a t i o n of a breakdown i n c o g n i t i v e harmony, which was 
occasioned by my awareness t h a t my b i c y c l e was no t , as I had 
bel i e v e d , outside the l i b r a r y . This r e g i s t r a t i o n was possible 
only because the a b s t r a c t thought-content "My b i c y c l e i s outside" 
informed my concrete r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h r e a l i t y . That thought 
informed my p r a c t i c a l involvements w i t h the world (had I not 
thought as I d i d , I would not have acted as I d i d ) . Without 
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t h i s very concrete aspect of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
thought and r e a l i t y , the r e g i s t r a t i o n of a breakdown i n 
c o g n i t i v e harmony could only have taken the form of a 
comparison between the a b s t r a c t thought-content and r e a l i t y . 
But such a comparison would presuppose the concepts of thought 
and r e a l i t y which we are t r y i n g t o account f o r . The r e l a t i o n s h 
of c o g n i t i v e harmony between thought and r e a l i t y , must then 
have a non-abstract, concrete aspect, i f a non-conceptual 
r e g i s t r a t i o n of i t s breakdown i s t o be possible. The abstract 
thought-content must inform a concrete t h i n k i n g about how things 
are. This concrete t h i n k i n g cannot consist merely i n the 
favourable e n t e r t a i n i n g of an abstract thought-content, but 
must take the form of what has sometimes been c a l l e d a ' l i v e d ' 
awareness or consciousness of the world. The conclusion to be 
drawn i s t h i s : the c r i t i c a l concept of thought, which our 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l s t r a t e g y took as i t s s t a r t i n g - p o i n t , necessarily 
presupposes the existence of consciousness, or t h i n k i n g , as 
t h a t of which i t i s the content. The concept of thought as a 
P l a t o n i c , t h i r d world e n t i t y cannot be sustained by i t s e l f , but 
r e f e r s us t o actual consciousness as a necessary c o n d i t i o n of 
i t s p o s s i b i l i t y . 
This conclusion, by p u t t i n g the n o t i o n of an abstract 
thought-content back i n t o the context of a c t u a l , concrete 
consciousness or t h i n k i n g , retraces one step i n the process of 
a b s t r a c t i o n undertaken e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter. I n Chapter 
Five, I want to continue the i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the necessary 
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conditions of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of thought, 
and t o r e t r a c e other steps i n t h a t process of a b s t r a c t i o n 
This w i l l take us i n t o a discussion of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
between the c r i t i c a l concept of thought (as possibly f a l s 
and the notions of subject, and of language. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUBJECT, THOUGHT, AND LANGUAGE 
I n t r o d u c t i o n 
I n discussing r a d i c a l empiricism, and then c r i t i c a l 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n q u i r y i n general, I have argued t h a t the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e i r c e n t r a l concepts requires a 'semantic' 
l i n k w i t h cases of e r r o r ; cases w i t h i n which how things are 
thought, or experienced, as being d i f f e r s from how they are. 
I have argued t h a t the necessary conditions f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of r e c o g n i t i o n of such cases of epistemic divergence include 
the existence of an independent, o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . This 
removes the p o s s i b i l i t y of a coherent scepticism about the 
existence of such a r e a l i t y , since t h a t existence i s a necessary 
c o n d i t i o n of t h a t scepticism. But we are now again faced w i t h 
the question of where, i f we accept the argument so f a r , to go 
next. Do we r e t u r n t o a naive realism? Surely there are 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r scepticism w i t h i n the framework of acceptance 
of the existence of the e x t e r n a l world. What i m p l i c a t i o n s does 
the argument so f a r presented have f o r , f o r example, scepticism 
about the existence of o b j e c t i v e causal powers, of other minds, 
or of n o n - r e l a t i v e moral values? Merely s t a t i n g the problems 
which e x i s t here i s enough t o r u l e out an acceptance of naive 
r e a l i s m . I n t h i s chapter I want to take a d i r e c t i o n suggested 
by the argument of the previous chapter. I wish to begin t o 
la y the foundation f o r a theory of moral value, by t r a c i n g the 
necessary con d i t i o n s of the p o s s i b i l i t y of scepticism concerning 
the existence of any moral values which are not r e l a t i v e to 
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i n d i v i d u a l needs, preferences and so on. A l l s c e p t i c i s m 
r e l i e s c r u c i a l l y on the c r i t i c a l concept of thought. The 
ne c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s of the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h a t concept thus 
provide us with a foundation which cannot coherently be put 
i n q u e s t i o n . The claim t h a t those conditions obtain cannot, 
i f the argument i s v a l i d , be coherently questioned, s i n c e such 
questioning i t s e l f presupposes the t r u t h of the c l a i m . I n t h i s 
chapter I s h a l l continue the i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o those necessary 
c o n d i t i o n s . 
To s e t the scene f o r the i n v e s t i g a t i o n t h a t f o l l o w s , l e t 
me r e c a p i t u l a t e some p o i n t s made i n the l a s t chapter, which w i l l 
prove r e l e v a n t to the concerns of the present chapter. I t was 
argued t h e r e t h a t the c r i t i c a l concept of thought i s p o s s i b l e only 
on c o n d i t i o n t h a t there e x i s t s a ^semantic' l i n k between t h a t 
concept and an extra-conceptual realm. Only such a l i n k can 
give the concept 'meaning 1, or 'cont e n t 1 . This l i n k cannot be 
e s t a b l i s h e d f o r e i t h e r concept independently of the other: the 
concepts come together. Nor can the r e l e v a n t f e a t u r e of the 
extra-conceptual realm be .just an i n s t a n c e of how things are 
thought to be, or .just an i n s t a n c e of how thin g s r e a l l y a r e . 
Th i s 'semantic' l i n k i s p o s s i b l e only where the interdependent 
p a i r of concepts, of thought and r e a l i t y , i s l i n k e d as a p a i r 
with a s i t u a t i o n i n which thought and r e a l i t y are themselves 
a l r e a d y r e l a t e d . I t was then argued t h a t we cannot continue 
with the n o t i o n of thought as an a b s t r a c t , P l a t o n i c , ' t h i r d 
world' e n t i t y , but t h a t t h a t notion from a b s t r a c t thought-content 
i s p o s s i b l e only by means of a b s t r a c t i o n from the concrete t h i n k i n g , 
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or consciousness, of which i t i s the content. One 
step i n the process of a b s t r a c t i o n , whereby the concept 
of thought as an a b s t r a c t content was obtained, was thereby 
r e t r a c e d . ' I n the present chapter I want to argue t h a t two 
other step s i n t h a t process can be s i m i l a r l y r e t r a c e d . I 
want to argue f i r s t , t h a t thought i s n e c e s s a r i l y a mode of 
e x i s t e n c e of something which 'has' i t , a ' s u b j e c t 1 ; and 
second, t h a t the conception of the t h i n k i n g s u b j e c t i s i n 
t u r n p o s s i b l e only by a b s t r a c t i o n from the p r i o r conception 
of the s u b j e c t as speaking. I w i l l conclude the chapter with 
some general remarks about the r e l a t i o n between thought and 
language. I begin by making some p r e l i m i n a r y h i s t o r i c a l 
remarks about the r e l a t i o n between thought and the s u b j e c t . 
The Thinking S u b j e c t : H i s t o r i c a l P r e l i m i n a r i e s 
The q u e s t i o n of the nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
thought or experience and a s u b j e c t - a t h i n k e r or experiencer 
has been the concern of a gr e a t many phil o s o p h e r s . I cannot 
hope here to review the d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i e s t h a t have been 
proposed; even l e s s to evaluate them. I n s t e a d , I should 
l i k e to l a y down what I see as some s i g n i f i c a n t h i s t o r i c a l 
markers i n t h i s a r e a . 
The argument i n modern philosophy begins with De s c a r t e s : 
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I n o t i c e d t h a t while I was t r y i n g to 
t h i n k e v e r y t h i n g f a l s e , i t must needs 
be t h a t I , who was t h i n k i n g t h i s , was 
something. And observing t h a t t h i s 
t r u t h " I am t h i n k i n g , t h e r e f o r e I e x i s t " 
was so s o l i d and secure t h a t the most 
extravagant su p p o s i t i o n s of the s c e p t i c s 
could not overthrow i t , I judged t h a t I 
need not s c r u p l e to accept i t as the f i r s t 
p r i n c i p l e of philosophy t h a t I was seeking. 2-
The C a r t e s i a n Cogito has a number of d i f f e r e n t formulations 
i n D e s c a r t e s ' own work, and even more i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s i n the 
work of commentators. L e t us look b r i e f l y a t one interpretation 
which i s to my mind the most i n t e r e s t i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , and 
one of the most p l a u s i b l e t e x t u a l l y . ^ -
The s t r u c t u r e of the Cogito according to t h i s interpretation 
i s as f o l l o w s : " I t h i n k " expresses the immediacy of a C a r t e s i a n 
c o g i t a t i o to immanent r e f l e c t i o n : i t i s thus i n d u b i t a b l e . The 
" I " here i s perhaps b e s t construed as merely a grammatical convenience, 
a f t e r R u s s e l l . This w i l l save the e n t e r p r i s e from t r i v i a l i t y , 
keep the importance of the c o g i t a t i o as t h a t which i s s t r i c t l y 
p r e s e n t , and render more i n t e l l i g i b l e D e s c a r t e s ' s t r e s s on "ego" 
i n the c o n c l u s i o n only of the Cogito. Now, f o r Descartes, the 
next s t e p i s taken with the a i d of the n a t u r a l l i g h t i n our s o u l s . 
T h i s l i g h t shows us t h a t thought i s an a t t r i b u t e , and thus belongs 
to a substance of which i t i s an a t t r i b u t e . By i n t e l l e c t u a l 
i n t u i t i o n - which need not use the p r i n c i p l e s of n a t u r a l l i g h t 
as e x p l i c i t premises - we gain " I e x i s t " as the necessary conclusion 
from " I t h i n k " . 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t the burden of v a l i d i t y of t h i s argument f a l l s 
l a r g e l y on the p r i n c i p l e s of n a t u r a l l i g h t which are supposed to 
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guide us to the i n t u i t i o n of the e x i s t e n c e of the ego. 
And, as Kenny notes, these p r i n c i p l e s are often expressions 
of d o c t r i n e s taught by the J e s u i t s a t La Fleche."^- How 
much weight can they bear? There are two i s s u e s which I 
want to keep as the focus of a t t e n t i o n i n t h i s s e c t i o n . 
The f i r s t , and most important f o r our argument, concerns 
the e x i s t e n c e of a s u b j e c t which has thoughts. The d i f f i c u l t y 
seems to me to be t h i s . If.we s t a r t o f f by t a k i n g the concept 
of thought ( o r c o g i t a t i o , or experience) f o r granted, perhaps 
as e s t a b l i s h e d by d i r e c t o s t e n s i o n , then the grounds fo r any 
in f e r e n c e or i n t u i t i o n as to the e x i s t e n c e of a s u b j e c t , w i l l 
seem shaky. I f we can begin by t a l k i n g about, and r e f l e c t i n g 
on, thoughts, whence comes the need f o r a s u b j e c t ? The 
p r i n c i p l e s of n a t u r a l l i g h t are i n need of some j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 
The second i s s u e i s t h a t of the i d e n t i t y of the s u b j e c t . This 
i s r a i s e d , with c l e a r r e l e v a n c e to Descartes, by Kant. I f we 
have an i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n of the ex i s t e n c e of the ego as 
the s u b j e c t of a p a r t i c u l a r thought, what makes i t the same ego 
as t h a t whose e x i s t e n c e i s i n t u i t e d on the b a s i s of r e f l e c t i o n 
on a d i f f e r e n t thought? Why could i t not be tha t we have here 
a s e r i e s of d i f f e r e n t substances, one f o r each thought, one a f t e r 
a n o t h e r ? 5 - Both these i s s u e s are taken up by Hume. 
I n the T r e a t i s e , Hume, c o n s i d e r i n g the notion of personal 
i d e n t i t y , c l a i m s t h a t we have no constant and i n v a r i a b l e 
i m p r e s s i o n as would provide f o r the idea of a s e l f which i s 
i d e n t i c a l throughout the f l u x of ideas and impressions. The 
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q u e s t i o n of the i d e n t i t y of the s e l f i s one to which he 
admits to having no answer. I n cons i d e r i n g the question 
of how we can move from a p a r t i c u l a r experience or thought, 
to the e x i s t e n c e of a s u b j e c t of t h a t experience or thought, 
Hume g i v e s us t h i s famous passage: 
A f t e r what manner, t h e r e f o r e , do our p a r t i c u l a r 
p e r c e p t i o n s belong to the s e l f ; and how are 
they connected with i t ? For my p a r t , when I 
ente r most i n t i m a t e l y i n t o what I c a l l myself, 
I always stumble on some p a r t i c u l a r p e r c e p t i o n 
or other, of heat or c o l d , l i g h t or shade, love 
or h a t r e d , pain or p l e a s u r e . I can never c a t c h 
myself a t any time without a perception, and can 
never observe anything but the perception. 6-
The only c o n c l u s i o n he can draw i s t h a t the s e l f i s nothing but 
a bundle of p e r c e p t i o n s . Hume puts h i s f i n g e r on the b a s i c 
problem here: 
Suppose the mind to be reduc'd even below the 
l e v e l of an o y s t e r . Suppose i t to have only 
one perception, as of t h i r s t or hunger. Consider 
i t i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n . Do you conceive anything 
but merely t h a t perception? Have you any notion 
of s e l f or substance? I f not, the a d d i t i o n of 
other perceptions can never give you t h a t notion.7. 
The point I take from t h i s , i s t h a t i f we assume t h a t we have 
a grasp of thoughts or experiences ( p e r c e p t i o n s ) independently 
of the concept of a s u b j e c t which has them, then there i s no 
way of e s t a b l i s h i n g the e x i s t e n c e of such a s u b j e c t . We cannot 
get beyond the e x i s t e n c e of experience towards the s u b j e c t , j u s t 
as we could not get beyond the e x i s t e n c e of experience to the 
e x t e r n a l world i n Chapter One. These are both p o i n t s which 
occupied H u s s e r l f o r most of the working l i f e : here, we can look 
how he d e a l t with the quest i o n of the s u b j e c t . 
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H u s s e r l ' s thoughts on the ego, or s u b j e c t , have a 
very chequered c a r e e r . E a r l y on, i n the L o g i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , 
he o f f e r s the v e r y Humean c o n f e s s i o n " t h a t I am quit e unable to 
f i n d t h i s ego, t h i s p r i m i t i v e , n e c e s s a r y centre of r e l a t i o n s " . ^ -
He accompanies t h i s with the d e n i a l t h a t any such ego i s involved 
i n the essence of an i n t e n t i o n a l experience i t s e l f . T h i s 
Humean p o s i t i o n has changed by the time of t h i s f l a t footnote 
to the second e d i t i o n of the I n v e s t i g a t i o n s : 
I have s i n c e managed to f i n d t h i s ego , i . e . 
have l e a r n t not to be l e d a s t r a y from a pure 
grasp of the given through corrupt forms of 
ego-metaphysic. 1 0* 
What reasoning can l i e behind such a complete change of mind? 
H u s s e r l , throughout h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l work, takes h i s s t a r t i n g -
point as the C a r t e s i a n c o g i t a t i o . For H u s s e r l , as f o r Descartes, 
we can achieve p o s i t i v e r e s u l t s i n philosophy only by suspending 
judgement on the claims we make from the 'natural a t t i t u d e 1 . 
These are the ordinary everyday claims we make about o b j e c t s 
e x i s t i n g i n the e x t e r n a l world, and so f o r t h . A f t e r t h i s 
suspension of judgement ( o f t e n termed a "reduction", or "epoche'), 
we f i n d a r e s i d u e . The e x i s t e n c e and content of the pure 
c o g i t a t i o n e s are given, and i n d u b i t a b l e . But whereas i n the 
L o g i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s H u s s e r l was content with i n v e s t i g a t i n g 
t h i s realm of c o g i t a t i o n e s f o r t h e i r own sake, i n l a t e r works 
we f i n d t h a t , a f t e r the suspension of the n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e , we 
acq u i r e not j u s t the pure c o g i t a t i o n e s , but a l s o an ego as t h e i r s u b j e c t . 
Thus I a c q u i r e myself "as the pure ego, with the pure stream of my 
c o g i t a t i o n e s " . T h i s ego "always and n e c e s s a r i l y e x i s t s i n 
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c o g i t a t i o n e s " . 1 * - I t i s "grasped i n immediate i n t u i t i o n " . i 3 ' 
I t i s i d e n t i c a l through a l l a c t u a l and p o s s i b l e experiences. 1^' 
Thus, f o r H u s s e r l , i n r e f l e c t i o n on pure experience I 
apprehend the absolute s e l f as undeniably e x i s t i n g , as the 
pure s u b j e c t of the flowing conscious l i f e . The d i f f i c u l t y 
we have with a l l t h i s , i s to know how f a r t h i s takes us beyond 
D e s c a r t e s ' p r i n c i p l e s of n a t u r a l l i g h t . I f my grasping, with 
a p o d i c t i c evidence, the e x i s t e n c e of the pure ego as l i v i n g i n 
the c o g i t a t i o n e s , i s meant to be a matter of immediate 
i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n , then s u r e l y there can be no room f o r 
controversy. But t h e r e i s controversy. The H u s s e r l / D e s c a r t e s 
t h e s i s has been s e r i o u s l y disputed by philosophers l i k e Hume, 
S a r t r e , l 5and even the younger H u s s e r l h i m s e l f . Again, the b a s i c 
d i f f i c u l t y seems to be t h a t i f we take f o r granted an independent 
grasp of thought, or experience, then the move to the e x i s t e n c e 
of a s u b j e c t i s both superfluous - s i n c e we can i n v e s t i g a t e the 
c o g i t a t i o n e s without i t - and u n j u s t i f i e d . Indeed, i f we look 
at H u s s e r l ' s account of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the ego and pure 
c o g i t a t i o n e s , we tend to get a s e r i e s of s t r a i n e d and u n s a t i s f y i n g 
metaphors. The ego i s p r e s e n t i n a l l a c t s of consciousness as 
' l i v i n g ' i n them. I t 'shoots' i t s 'ray' through every a c t u a l 
c o g i t a t i o towards the o b j e c t . I t i s the ' i d e n t i c a l pole' of 
the stream of conscious l i f e . * ^ 1 Now there i s f a r more to H u s s e r l ' s 
theory of the s u b j e c t than a s e t of metaphors. The i s s u e becomes 
f a r too complex to deal with here.^' Nevertheless, i t i s true to 
say t h a t the two i s s u e s - the e x i s t e n c e and i d e n t i t y of the s u b j e c t 
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with which we are p r i m a r i l y concerned i n t h i s s e c t i o n , 
are never adequately r e s o l v e d i n H u s s e r l ' s work. L e t us 
t u r n , then, to the d i f f e r e n t approach opened up by Kant. I**-
U n derlying Kant's theory of the s u b j e c t i s the concept 
of experience as dependent on both s e n s i b i l i t y and understanding: 
Without s e n s i b i l i t y no o b j e c t would be 
g i v e n to us, without understanding no 
o b j e c t would be thought. Thoughts 
without content are empty, i n t u i t i o n s 
without concepts are b l i n d , i?. 
I n h i s own argument, Kant agrees with Hume t h a t no necessary 
connection between experiences i s provided by the experiences 
themselves. He moves on to say that any such s y n t h e s i s can 
only be e f f e c t e d by the s u b j e c t . I want to c o n s i d e r not t h i s 
argument i t s e l f , but the v e r s i o n of i t o f f e r e d by Strawson. 2- 0 , 
Strawson r e j e c t s what he sees as Kant's t r a n s c e n d e n t a l psychologism, 
and looks f o r a deeper ground f o r the e x i s t e n c e of the transcendental 
ego. 
His argument i s t h i s . ^ * - Any experience r e q u i r e s both p a r t i c u l a r 
i n t u i t i o n s and general concepts. There can be no experience which 
does not i n v o l v e the r e c o g n i t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r items as being of 
such and such a k i n d . I t must then be p o s s i b l e to d i s t i n g u i s h , 
i n any experience, a "component of r e c o g n i t i o n , or judgement, 
which i s not i d e n t i c a l with, or wholly absorbed by, the p a r t i c u l a r 
item which i s recognized, which forms the t o p i c of judgement". 
But t h i s e s s e n t i a l r e c o g n i t i o n a l component can be present i n 
experience only because i t i s p o s s i b l e to r e f e r d i f f e r e n t experiences 
to one i d e n t i c a l s u b j e c t . What t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y of the s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n 
of experiences i t s e l f i m p l i e s then f o l l o w s : 
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The minimum i m p l i e d i s t h a t some a t l e a s t 
of the concepts under which p a r t i c u l a r 
experienced items are recognized as f a l l i n g 
should be such t h a t the experiences themselves 
c o n t a i n the b a s i s f o r c e r t a i n a l l i e d d i s t i n c t i o n s : 
i n d i v i d u a l l y the d i s t i n c t i o n of a s u b j e c t i v e 
component w i t h i n a judgement of experience ...; 
c o l l e c t i v e l y , the d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
s u b j e c t i v e order and arrangement of a s e r i e s of 
such experiences on the one hand and the o b j e c t i v e 
order and arrangement of the items of which they 
are experiences on the other. 23» 
The d i f f i c u l t y with t h i s argument i s t h a t the r e f e r e n c e to a s u b j e c t , 
to which experiences can be a s c r i b e d , seems e n t i r e l y i d l e . Indeed 
Strawson h i m s e l f r e c o g n i s e s t h i s i n the f o l l o w i n g passage: 
The n e c e s s i t y of s a v i n g the r e c o g n i t i o n a l 
component i n an^experience from absorption 
i n t o i t s s e n s i b l e a c c u s a t i v e (and thereby 
s a v i n g the s t a t u s of the experience as experience) 
i s simply i d e n t i c a l with the n e c e s s i t y of providing 
room, i n experience, f o r the thought of experience 
i t s e l f ; and i t i s j u s t t h i s n e c e s s i t y which c a l l s 
d i r e c t l y f o r the d i s t i n c t i o n between how things are 
and how they are experienced as being and hence f o r 
the employment, i n judgements of experience (though 
not i n every such judgement), of concepts of the 
o b j e c t i v e . 
I n t h i s r e f o r m u l a t i o n of the argument, r e f e r e n c e to e m p i r i c a l 
s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s of a s u b j e c t i s s h o r t - c i r c u i t e d . What remains 
i s what Strawson c a l l s "the n e c e s s a r y s e l f - r e f l e x i v e n e s s of experience"; 
t h a t i s , the p o s s i b i l i t y of providing room w i t h i n experience f o r the 
thought of experience i t s e l f . 2 ^ ' Strawson allows h i m s e l f to c a l l 
t h i s n e c e s s a r y s e l f - r e f l e x i v e n e s s "transcendental s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s " , ^ 
but i t i s c l e a r t h a t no s e l f i s r e q u i r e d here a t a l l . As Zemach 
has pointed out, a l l we need to e s t a b l i s h Strawson's point i s the 
f o l l o w i n g : 
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1. An item: a 
2. An experience of r e c o g n i t i o n of a as an X : b 
3. The r e f l e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t b i s an experience 
of a as an X : c 
a, b, and c together provide f o r the necessary s e l f - r e f l e x i v e n e s s 
of experience without any recourse to any kind of s e l f , to which 
experiences are to be r e f e r r e d . I t seems t h a t the argument of 
Kant's A n a l y t i c (and of Strawson's r e v i s e d v e r s i o n ) cannot succeed 
i n p r o v i d i n g a backing f o r the p r i n c i p l e s of n a t u r a l l i g h t 
advanced by De s c a r t e s . We s t i l l have no j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the 
cl a i m t h a t thoughts or experiences must be r e f e r r e d to a s u b j e c t . 
I n l o o k i n g back over these moments i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l time, i t 
seems c l e a r t h a t the i s s u e of the e x i s t e n c e of the s u b j e c t has not 
been s a t i s f a c t o r i l y d e a l t w i t h . I t i s hard not to have sympathy 
with adherents of the theory of n e u t r a l monism - the theory t h a t , 
once we accept experience as the only absolute given, then we can 
have no c e r t a i n knowledge of anything e l s e . The emphasis then 
turns towards g i v i n g an account of how we come to b e l i e v e i n 
o b j e c t s , bodies, s e l v e s and worlds, when there i s no s t r i c t 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n experience f o r such b e l i e f s . Although I w i l l 
not be f o l l o w i n g t h i s theory any f u r t h e r , i t i s u s e f u l to point 
out t h a t the theory of n e u t r a l monism can be understood as 
r e c o g n i s i n g what we have seen as a c e n t r a l d i f f i c u l t y i n t h i s area. 
T h i s i s the problem of j u s t i f y i n g any c l a i m about the e x i s t e n c e of 
a s u b j e c t , once the concept of thought or experience has been taken 
f o r granted. With t h i s l e s s o n i n mind, I s h a l l continue the l i n e 
of argument developed i n e a r l i e r c hapters. L e t us see i f the examination 
of the n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of thought 
can l e a d to a more s a t i s f y i n g c o n c l u s i o n . 
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The Thinking S u b j e c t 
Before the h i s t o r i c a l p r e l i m i n a r i e s above, I mentioned 
t h a t the argument a t the end of Chapter Four had r e t r a c e d one 
s t e p i n the process of a b s t r a c t i o n by which we a r r i e d a t the 
b a r e s t concept of thought which would make c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
enquiry p o s s i b l e : namely, the concept of a P l a t o n i c , ' t h i r d 
world' thought-content which could be f a l s e . That a b s t r a c t 
notion was shown to n e c e s s a r i l y presuppose the e x i s t e n c e of 
thought i n some concrete form, from which the thought-content 
could be a b s t r a c t e d . Thus we returned to something l i k e the 
n o t i o n of c o n s c i o u s n e s s : e i t h e r i n the form of experiencing, or 
t h i n k i n g , or b e l i e v i n g . The notion of an a b s t r a c t thought-
content thus presupposes the notion of what i s sometimes c a l l e d 
an a c t of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . Perhaps we a t l e a s t f e e l more 
comfortable here, with something l i k e our ordinary notions of 
t h i n k i n g and thought. But i n order to see i f we can move from 
here to something l i k e our o r d i n a r y notion of the t h i n k e r of 
thoughts, we need to pursue f u r t h e r the questions r a i s e d i n the 
l a s t s e c t i o n . I n t h i s s e c t i o n , I w i l l deal with the c e n t r a l 
i s s u e of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between thoughts and the s u b j e c t . 
We can begin the d i s c u s s i o n by asking a q u e s t i o n t h a t Heidegger 
asked of H u s s e r l . 
Understanding the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l r o l e of the concept of 
pure consciousness i n H u s s e r l ' s phenomenology, Heidegger marked 
the d i f f e r e n c e from h i s own guiding p e r s p e c t i v e by asking what 
i s the mode of being of t h i s c o n s c i o u s n e s s ? ^ ' We can focus t h i s 
q u e s t i o n on the present d i s c u s s i o n by asking what i t i s t h a t i s 
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r e f l e c t e d on, when t h a t r e f l e c t i o n on thought or experience, 
so e s s e n t i a l to the p o s s i b i l i t y of c r i t i c a l philosophy, occurs. 
I n any thought, there i s the content of the thought, and the 
t h i n k i n g of i t . I n an experience, there i s the content of the 
experience, and the ex p e r i e n c i n g of i t . We now need to focus 
on the l a t t e r aspect i n each case, the aspect of consciousness 
i t s e l f . But what i s there to r e f l e c t on here? The problem 
can be summarised i n S a r t r e ' s slogan: "consciousness i s nothing". 
McGinn e l a b o r a t e s on t h i s i n the f o l l o w i n g passage: 
There i s .... a way i n which consciousness i s 
e l u s i v e even to acquaintance, as an e x e r c i s e 
i n i n t r o s p e c t i o n w i l l r e v e a l . Consider your 
consciousness o>f some item - an e x t e r n a l o b j e c t , 
your own body, a s e n s a t i o n - and t r y to focus 
a t t e n t i o n on t h a t r e l a t i o n : as many philosophers 
have observed, t h i s r e l a t i o n of consciousness to 
i t s o b j e c t s i s p e c u l i a r l y impalpable and diaphanous -
a l l you come a c r o s s i n i n t r o s p e c t i o n are the o b j e c t s 
of consciousness, not consciousness i t s e l f . This 
f e a t u r e of consciousness has induced some t h i n k e r s 
to d e s c r i b e consciousness as a ki n d of i n n e r 
emptiness; i t i s nothing per se but a pure 
d i r e c t e d n e s s on to things other than i t s e l f . 
No wonder then t h a t i t i s hard to say what 
consciousness i n t r i n s i c a l l y i s . 3 ° -
I f consciousness i s a s o r t of " i n n e r emptiness", then how are we 
to a s c r i b e any o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s to i t ? Leading on from t h a t 
q u e s t i o n i s another. The r e f l e c t i v e awareness of thought i s 
e s s e n t i a l f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of thought. But 
i f c onsciousness i s nothing i n i t s e l f , then how i s r e f l e c t i o n 
on the t h i n k i n g p o s s i b l e ? L e t us look a t these d i f f i c u l t i e s 
f i r s t i n the case of e x p e r i e n c e , and then i n the case of thought. 
T a l k i n g of an experience we can describe the noematic 
a s p e c t ; what the experience i s , i n t e n t i o n a l l y , of. Suppose 
t h a t the experience i s , i n t e n t i o n a l l y , of a box with a back side 
(hidden from v i e w ) , an i n s i d e ( w i t h matches), a bottom, and so for 
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Thus the phenomenological d e s c r i p t i o n advocated by 
H u s s e r l begins. But l e t us now look towards the n o e t i c 
a s p e c t of the experience, c o r r e l a t e d with the noematic to 
provide, as H u s s e r l has i t , the u n i t y of the pure experience. 
Here we are to c o n s i d e r not the o b j e c t ( i n t e n t i o n a l l y ) experienced, 
but r a t h e r the experiencing i t s e l f . Now there are d i f f e r e n t 
modes of t h i s e x p e r i e n c i n g . The same box can be, i n t e n t i o n a l l y , 
p e r c e i v e d , remembered or f a n t a s i s e d , for example; and we can 
begin the n o e t i c s i d e of the phenomenological account of the 
experience. But what i s t h i s experiencing - so c l e a r l y an 
e s s e n t i a l a s p e c t of the t o t a l experience - i n i t s e l f ? What 
does i t c o n s i s t i n ? What grasp of i t i s a v a i l a b l e to us? 
L e t us look a t some a l t e r n a t i v e s . Could the experiencing i t s e l f 
be understood as an o b j e c t or content of experience, or as any 
s t r u c t u r e or arrangement of such contents? No, f o r such an 
understanding l e a v e s out p r e c i s e l y what i s e s s e n t i a l to i t : 
t h a t i t i s the ( p u t a t i v e ) awareness, or consciousness of o b j e c t s , 
the i n t e n t i o n a l d i r e c t i o n towards them. Without t h i s c o g n i t i v e 
asp e c t , the c r i t i c a l concept of experience could not serve as an 
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e to naive r e a l i s m . But what e l s e i s 
t h e r e to p o i n t to? When we r e s t r i c t o u r s e l v e s to a report of 
experience i t s e l f , foregoing any claims concerning the a c t u a l 
e x i s t e n c e of i t s i n t e n t i o n a l o b j e c t s , nothing changes. There 
i s no 'more' to experience, no serai-transparent container of 
the contents, no ray of l i g h t beaming down on the i n t e n t i o n a l 
o b j e c t : such notions are v e r y merely metaphorical, and cannot 
provide the grasp we need. How then i s r e f l e c t i v e awareness 
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of experience p o s s i b l e , when there appears to be a 
nothingness a t i t s v e r y h e a r t ? We can r e f l e c t on the 
i n t e n t i o n a l o b j e c t s of experience, the experienced; but 
a grasp of experiencing i t s e l f , and so of the experience 
as a whole, seems to elude us. 
One response to t h i s problem i s to say t h a t i t a r i s e s 
only because we have a r r i v e d a t our notion of experience by 
a process of r e i f i c a t i o n . I n s t e a d of t a l k i n g of experiences, 
we should t a l k of how thi n g s are experienced, i n an a d v e r b i a l 
manner. A f t e r a l l , t h i s way of t a l k i n g i s a l l t h a t i s requ i r e d 
f o r the c o n t r a s t with how t h i n g s a r e . The d i f f i c u l t y with t h i s 
suggestion i s t h a t i t l e a v e s unanswered the quest i o n as to what 
such e x p e r i e n c i n g c o n s i s t s i n , of how we are to understand i t s 
o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s , and so merely transposes the question i n t o 
a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t key. Having looked a t the question i n 
r e l a t i o n to the concept of experience, l e t us r e t u r n to the 
concept of thought. 
E s s e n t i a l l y the same problem confronts us when we consider 
the c r i t i c a l concept of thought. For while we may grasp the 
content of the thought - f o r example the thought t h a t a Chinese 
Z e l k o r a would look w e l l i n t h i s garden - we have not as y e t made 
c l e a r how we are to grasp the t h i n k i n g of t h i s content. As with 
experience, t h e r e i s no 'more' to the t o t a l thought than i t s 
content, so i n what does the t h i n k i n g of i t c o n s i s t ? Again, 
what i s e s s e n t i a l here i s , as i t were, the c o g n i t i v e appropriation 
of the content. Without t h i s we have a t most the a b s t r a c t 
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thought-content, and not t h a t a c t u a l b e l i e f which, as was 
argued i n the previous chapter, i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n of 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of a non-conceptual r e g i s t r a t i o n of c o g n i t i v e 
breakdown, which can i n t u r n be r e f l e c t i v e l y analysed i n terms 
of how t h i n g s are thought to be d i f f e r i n g from how they are. 
T h i s t h i n k i n g , or b e l i e v i n g , i s no t h i n g , i n i t s e l f , so how 
can we grasp i t s o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s ? I f consciousness i s , i n 
i t s e l f , nothing, then how i s r e f l e c t i o n on thought, or experience, 
p o s s i b l e ? 
The answer can l i e only i n our r e c o g n i t i o n of a l a c k of 
o n t o l o g i c a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y here. As t h i n k i n g and experiencing 
a r e , i n themselves, no o b j e c t s upon which we can r e f l e c t , they 
can be r e f l e c t e d on only as o n t o l o g i c a l l y dependent, as a t t r i b u t e s 
or m o d i f i c a t i o n s , on something e l s e . There i s no other way i n 
which we can account f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h a t r e f l e c t i v e 
awareness of thought, r e q u i r e d f o r the c r i t i c a l concept of thought 
to be p o s s i b l e . We can c a l l t h i s 'something e l s e ' , to which a 
thought or experience must, i n Hume's words, "be r e f e r r e d " , the"subje 
At t h i s stage, none of the u s u a l connotations of t h i s term are 
a v a i l a b l e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the way i n which r e f e r e n c e to the s u b j e c t 
of thought, or experience, has a r i s e n , now allows us to say something 
about i t s necessary f e a t u r e s . 
For i f the p o s s i b i l i t y of the c r i t i c a l concepts of thought, 
or experience, r e q u i r e s a r e f l e c t i v e awareness of thought, or 
experience; and i f such awareness i s i n turn p o s s i b l e only i f 
the thought or experience i s r e f e r r e d to a s u b j e c t , upon which 
i t i s o n t o l o g i c a l l y dependent; then an understanding of t h a t 
s u b j e c t i s presupposed by t h a t r e f l e c t i v e awareness, and so, i n 
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t u r n , by the concepts of thought or r e a l i t y themselves. 
T h i s means t h a t the s u b j e c t cannot be p r i m a r i l y understood 
i n terms of the c r i t i c a l concepts of experience, or thought. 
For example, the primary understanding of the s u b j e c t cannot be 
of i t jas t h a t which t h i n k s , or experiences, s i n c e t h i s employs 
the v e r y concept of thought, or experience, which the grasp of 
the s u b j e c t i s to h e l p make p o s s i b l e . The grasp of t h a t s u b j e c t , 
r e f e r e n c e to which makes r e f l e c t i o n on thought or experience 
p o s s i b l e , must be independent of the c r i t i c a l concepts of thought 
and experience, and cannot be i n any way reduced to t h e i r terms. 
I n t h i s way, we can see t h a t we are forced beyond the l i m i t s of 
thought or experience i n another d i r e c t i o n . Not only must there 
be an independent r e a l i t y of which there i s thought or experience; 
there must a l s o be a s u b j e c t which 'has' the thought or experience. 
I n each case the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of the e x i s t e n c e of something other 
than experience, or thought, i s immune from c r i t i c a l r e v i s i o n , 
s i n c e i t i s what makes such r e v i s i o n p o s s i b l e . 
T h i s argument t h e r e f o r e concludes t h a t there must be a s u b j e c t 
to which thoughts are r e f e r r e d , by r e f u s i n g to take the concept of 
thought f o r granted, and by i n v e s t i g a t i n g the n e c e s s a r y conditions 
of i t s p o s s i b i l i t y . The argument thereby provides us with a 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n of those p r i n c i p l e s of n a t u r a l l i g h t , or of t h a t 
immediate i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n , engaged i n by Descartes and 
H u s s e r l . We could not have even the concept of thought, without 
the e x i s t e n c e of a s u b j e c t which 'has' those thoughts of which we 
can become r e f l e c t i v e l y aware. We have thus r e t r a c e d a second 
s t e p i n the process of a b s t r a c t i o n which took us, i n Chapter Four, 
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to the concept of a pure thought content. We now have 
the concept of thought as the content of concrete t h i n k i n g , 
and as the content of the t h i n k i n g of a s u b j e c t . 
Having e s t a b l i s h e d the e x i s t e n c e of a s u b j e c t , we s t i l l 
need to be c l e a r e r on the sense i n which the s u b j e c t 'has' 
i t s thoughts. L e t us look a t t h i s i s s u e by c o n s i d e r i n g a 
f a m i l i a r , though inadequate, way of construing the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between the s u b j e c t and i t s thoughts. This c o n s t r u a l sees 
t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p along the l i n e s of some ki n d of property 
r e l a t i o n s h i p : t h a t i s , we have a grasp of the thought, a grasp 
of the s u b j e c t , and then t r y to j o i n them together. But such 
a c o n s t r u a l presupposes p r e c i s e l y the p o s s i b i l i t y of an independent 
grasp of thought which we have seen not to be p o s s i b l e . We 
cannot understand t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p as a j u x t a p o s i t i o n (no 
matter how s u b t l e ) of two e s s e n t i a l l y independent f a c t o r s . We 
need i n s t e a d to keep to our r e c o g n i t i o n of the o n t o l o g i c a l 
inadequacy of thought, and to see th a t to speak of a thought i s 
to r e i f y a mode of the s u b j e c t ' s e x i s t e n c e . Thus r a t h e r than 
say t h a t the s u b j e c t has a thought, t h i s o n t o l o g i c a l dependence 
would be more c l e a r l y expressed i n t a l k i n g of the s u b j e c t t h i n k i n g . 
I f t here i s a d i s t i n c t i o n between how thin g s are and how they are 
thought to be, the l a t t e r must be p r i m a r i l y grasped i n terms of 
how a s u b j e c t t h i n k s them to be. 
I f t h i s p i c t u r e of the r e l a t i o n s h i p which a s u b j e c t has with 
i t s thoughts i s adequate, i t a l s o brings with i t d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
We can formulate one of these as f o l l o w s . The r e f l e c t i v e awareness 
of thought which i s r e q u i r e d f o r the c r i t i c a l concept of thought 
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to be p o s s i b l e , presupposes an understanding of the s u b j e c t . 
But as we have seen, t h i s grasp of the s u b j e c t cannot j u s t 
be added on to an independent grasp of the thought. Our grasp 
of the s u b j e c t must a l r e a d y be of the s u b j e c t as t h i n k i n g . 
But i f such an understanding i s already presupposed by t h a t 
r e f l e c t i v e awareness of thought r e q u i r e d for the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of the c r i t i c a l concept of thought, then have we not trapped 
o u r s e l v e s i n a c i r c l e ? Are we not i n a p o s i t i o n where the 
concept of thought i s p o s s i b l e only i f there i s a l r e a d y a grasp 
of a s u b j e c t t h i n k i n g , and so a l r e a d y a concept of thought? 
Th i s i s , f o r t u n a t e l y , not the case. For there are two 
d i s t i n c t i s s u e s here. One i s s u e concerns the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
t h a t s p e c i f i c a l l y c r i t i c a l concept of thought - e s s e n t i a l to 
any c r i t i c a l i n q u i r y - which r e q u i r e s r e f l e c t i o n on c o g n i t i v e 
breakdown, and which was d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter Four. T h i s 
c r i t i c a l concept of thought a l s o , however, presupposes an 
understanding of the s u b j e c t as t h i n k i n g . Now the concept of 
t h i n k i n g i n v o l v e d here need not be the c r i t i c a l concept: i t may 
be only the n a i v e , p r e - c r i t i c a l concept of t h i n k i n g , such that 
the q u e s t i o n of i t s t r u t h or f a l s i t y cannot y e t be asked. The 
second i s s u e , the one with which we are d e a l i n g here, concerns 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept ( c r i t i c a l or p r e - c r i t i c a l ) of 
t h i n k i n g i n regard of the o n t o l o g i c a l inadequacy a t the h e a r t of 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s . So, while the c r i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n on how things 
are thought to be as f a i l i n g to match up with r e a l i t y presupposes 
a grasp of the t h i n k i n g s u b j e c t , t h i s grasp of the s u b j e c t ' s 
t h i n k i n g may be such t h a t the question of i t s t r u t h or f a l s i t y 
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cannot be asked. The c r i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n on breakdown 
of c o g n i t i v e harmony i n t o e r r o r r e s u l t s i n the r e c o g n i t i o n 
t h a t what i s thought may be f a l s e , and so gives r i s e to the 
s p e c i f i c a l l y c r i t i c a l concept of thought n e c e s s a r y f o r a l l 
c r i t i c a l i n q u i r y . The c r i t i c a l concept of thought t h e r e f o r e 
presupposes the understanding of the s u b j e c t as t h i n k i n g , but 
only where t h i s understanding of t h i n k i n g i s a t the naive 
p r e - c r i t i c a l l e v e l . We are not, then, drawn i n t o a v i c i o u s 
c i r c l e . Breakdown of c o g n i t i v e harmony makes p o s s i b l e the 
advance from the naive p r e - c r i t i c a l concept of thought, to the 
c r i t i c a l concept of thought r e q u i r e d f o r c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
i n q u i r y . The c r i t i c a l concept of thought presupposes only the 
p r e - c r i t i c a l understanding of the s u b j e c t as t h i n k i n g . Even 
so, i f we have succeeded i n c l e a r i n g up t h i s d i f f i c u l t y , i t seems 
only to h i g h l i g h t a f u r t h e r one. 
E a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter, i t was argued t h a t even i f we t r a c e 
any r e i f i c a t i o n of thought or experience back to i t s foundation 
i n the a d v e r b i a l grasp of how t h i n g s are thought to be, or 
experienced as being, we are s t i l l no c l e a r e r as to what such 
t h i n k i n g or ex p e r i e n c i n g c o n s i s t s i n . This argument now r e t u r n s . 
For given t h a t c r i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n on thought presupposes an 
understanding of the s u b j e c t t h i n k i n g , how, given the d i s c u s s i o n 
of the nothingness which seems to l i e a t the h e a r t of consciousness, 
i s such understanding p o s s i b l e ? Not only do we need to r e f e r 
t h i n k i n g to a s u b j e c t , as a mode of i t s e x i s t e n c e ; we need to 
understand what s o r t of mode of i t s e x i s t e n c e t h i s t h i n k i n g i s . 
One can imagine a c e r t a i n e x a s p e r a t i o n here. One might say 
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" I understand what t h i n k i n g i s . Here, now, I am t h i n k i n g . 
T h i s i s a ' s u b j e c t ' t h i n k i n g " . Of course, the point here 
i s not to deny t h i s , but to t r y and make c l e a r what t h i s 
understanding i s ; and given the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of l o c a t i n g 
a t h i n g , or an o b j e c t , which t h i n k i n g could c o n s i s t i n , 
i n t e r n a l o s t e n s i o n i s h a r d l y v i a b l e . Even p o i n t i n g to 
o n e s e l f and saying "This i s a s u b j e c t t h i n k i n g " cannot help, 
f o r i t i s no c l e a r e r i n what aspect of the s u b j e c t ' s e x i s t e n c e 
i t s t h i n k i n g i s supposed to e x i s t . I n t e r n a l o s t e n s i o n can 
succeed i n i t s r e f e r e n c e , only i f the concept of t h i n k i n g i s 
a l r e a d y presupposed. Without t h i s p r e supposition, there i s 
nothing there to be ostended. I n t e r n a l o s t e n s i o n cannot, then, 
provide the b a s i s f o r an account of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept 
of thought. 
We cannot gain the r e q u i r e d understanding of t h i n k i n g by a 
d i r e c t apprehension of cases of 'pure' ( t h a t i s , unembodied) 
t h i n k i n g . For of i t s e l f the t h i n k i n g of a thought presents 
nothing f o r such an apprehension to focus on. Thus although 
the n e c e s s a r y conceptual s t r u c t u r e of thought has been much 
d i s c u s s e d i n e a r l i e r c h a p t e r s , we seem to have l i t t l e i d e a as 
to what the a c t u a l t h i n k i n g of the thought amounts to; and so 
even l e s s i d e a as to how an understanding of the s u b j e c t , as 
in v o l v e d i n such a c t i v i t y , i s p o s s i b l e . ^ 2 - L e t us t u r n to consider 
t h i s i s s u e i n more d e t a i l i n the next s e c t i o n . 
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Thought and Speech 
L e t us consi d e r a path out of these d i f f i c u l t i e s , and 
towards an understanding of what th i n k i n g c o n s i s t s i n . The 
'semantic' l i n k with i n s t a n c e s of thought, which i s to provide 
the c r i t i c a l concept of thought with i t s 'meaning', r e q u i r e s 
an awareness of i n s t a n c e s of thought, so tha t they can he 
brought under the concept. T h i s awareness of thought as 
p o s s i b l y f a l s e can occur o r i g i n a l l y only i n the context of 
r e f l e c t i v e a n a l y s i s of a breakdown i n c o g n i t i v e harmony. This 
awareness i t s e l f presupposes an understanding of the s u b j e c t as 
t h i n k i n g - where t h i n k i n g i s here understood i n n a i v e _ f a s h i o n , such 
t h a t the quest i o n of i t s t r u t h or f a l s i t y cannot be asked. But 
the t h i n k i n g of a thought, l i k e the experiencing of the content 
of an e x p e r i e n c e , . o f f e r s of i t s e l f nothing which could serve as 
the o b j e c t of such an awareness. Ho\tf, then, i s the understanding 
of the s u b j e c t as t h i n k i n g p o s s i b l e , when there seems to be no 
p o s s i b i l i t y f o r an awareness of the thi n k i n g i t s e l f ? The re p l y 
must be as f o l l o w s . The s u b j e c t can be understood as t h i n k i n g 
only on t h i s c o n d i t i o n : the s u b j e c t must be grasped i n a mode 
of i t s e x i s t e n c e i n which t h i n k i n g i s , as i t were, embodied. 
T h i s embodiment of t h i n k i n g can then provide a foundation f o r 
a b s t r a c t i o n to the t h i n k i n g , or consciousness, i t s e l f - so 
ena b l i n g us to get a g r i p on what otherwise seems an e l u s i v e 
phantom,, But t h i s immediately r a i s e s the quest i o n of what s o r t 
of mode of the s u b j e c t ' s e x i s t e n c e can s a t i s f a c t o r i l y embody 
t h i n k i n g ? L e t us look a t some suggestions. 
Two suggestions as to the mode of embodiment of thinking 
q u i c k l y present themselves. The f i r s t i s t h a t t h i n k i n g i s 
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embodied i n s p e c i f i c a l l y l i n g u i s t i c behaviour, i n speech. 
I s h a l l argue t h a t the primary understanding of the s u b j e c t 
as t h i n k i n g n e c e s s a r i l y presupposes an understanding of the 
s u b j e c t as speaking. I t i s speech alone which can provide 
the embodiment we r e q u i r e a t t h i s stage i n our s t r a t e g y . 
T h i s i s a strong c l a i m , and one which c o n f l i c t s with how 
many people spontaneously respond to t h i s i s s u e . They would 
say, f o r example, t h a t we f r e q u e n t l y a s c r i b e thoughts to people 
or even animals, on the b a s i s of n o n - l i n g u i s t i c behaviour alone 
Indeed, they might continue, such a s c r i p t i o n s are oft e n b e t t e r 
founded than a s c r i p t i o n s of thought based only on l i n g u i s t i c 
behaviour. S u r e l y then, the response concludes, thoughts are 
embodied i n n o n - l i n g u i s t i c behaviour, and we can understand the 
s u b j e c t as t h i n k i n g on the b a s i s of an understanding of the 
s u b j e c t ' s n o n - l i n g u i s t i c behaviour. Despite the prima f a c i e 
p l a u s i b i l i t y of t h i s c l a i m , I now have to argue t h a t i t cannot 
provide us with an adequate account of how the understanding of 
the s u b j e c t as t h i n k i n g i s p o s s i b l e . 
Consider the s i t u a t i o n : we are looking f o r a mode of 
e x i s t e n c e of the s u b j e c t i n which t h i n k i n g i s embodied. This 
embodiment needs to be such as to allow a b s t r a c t i o n from i t to 
the t h i n k i n g i t s e l f (and, thence, to the a b s t r a c t content of 
such t h i n k i n g ) . I n thus a b s t r a c t i n g from the embodiment of 
t h i n k i n g , we w i l l be s t r i p p i n g o f f , as i t were, the m a t e r i a l 
c l o t h i n g of the t h i n k i n g . Nothing can be generated i n t h i s 
p r o c e s s , only the t h i n k i n g a b s t r a c t e d from i t s m a t e r i a l dross. 
T h i s i s an important p o i n t . For i f i t i s w e l l made, then any 
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formal p r o p e r t i e s possessed by the (disembodied) t h i n k i n g 
of the thought must a l s o be possessed by t h a t mode of the 
s u b j e c t ' s e x i s t e n c e from which a b s t r a c t i o n i s made. I f 
t h i s were not the cas e , so t h a t the t h i n k i n g possessed p r o p e r t i e s 
which were not present i n i t s m a t e r i a l l y embodied form, then i t 
would have to be the case t h a t c e r t a i n p r o p e r t i e s were generated 
merely by a b s t r a c t i n g from the m a t e r i a l i t y of t h a t embodiment. 
But mere a b s t r a c t i o n from the m a t e r i a l i t y of embodiment - the 
process of ta k i n g away the m a t e r i a l ' c l o t h i n g ' of t h i n k i n g -
cannot p o s i t i v e l y generate p r o p e r t i e s i n t h i s way. Perhaps 
we can be c l e a r e r on t h i s point i f we look a t what s o r t of 
p r o p e r t i e s are important here. I n p a r t i c u l a r , i n t h i n k i n g 
a thought the s u b j e c t must a t l e a s t i m p l i c i t l y be making a 
cla i m about how thin g s a r e i n the A ^ o r l d : a claim which may 
be t r u e or f a l s e . T h i s much i s r e q u i r e d to l a y the b a s i s f o r 
the move to the c r i t i c a l concept of thought. T h i s property 
of being true or f a l s e cannot be generated by a b s t r a c t i n g from 
the m a t e r i a l i t y of the embodiment of t h i n k i n g . I t must be a 
property a l r e a d y present i n the embodiment of t h i n k i n g . T h i s 
means t h a t the mode of the s u b j e c t ' s e x i s t e n c e from which, by 
a b s t r a c t i o n from the m a t e r i a l of i t s embodiment, we a r r i v e a t 
the bare t h i n k i n g - must i t s e l f be a making of a claim about 
how thin g s are i n the world: a c l a i m which may be e i t h e r true 
or f a l s e . The mere a b s t r a c t i o n from the matter i n which 
t h i n k i n g i s embodied can i n no way generate t h i s c a p a c i t y f o r 
t r u t h or f a l s i t y . T h i s c a p a c i t y can only be a l r e a d y present i n 
t h a t mode of the s u b j e c t ' s e x i s t e n c e i n which t h i n k i n g i s embodied. 
What consequences does t h i s remark have f o r the two suggestions f i r s t 
o f f e r e d f o r the mode of embodiment of the s u b j e c t ' s thinking? 
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C l e a r l y , i n speaking, a s u b j e c t may be making a, 
p o s s i b l y f a l s e , c l a i m about how things are i n the world. 
That i s , the speech may a l r e a d y embody the formal p r o p e r t i e s 
of a thought such t h a t , by a b s t r a c t i n g from the m a t e r i a l i t y 
of the speech, we can a r r i v e a t the notion of the bare t h i n k i n g , 
or c o n s c i o u s n e s s , i t s e l f . Although our ordi n a r y everyday 
no t i o n of speech w i l l do here, we must note t h a t the present 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l s t r a t e g y r e q u i r e s only such embodiment of thi n k i n g 
as makes p o s s i b l e r e f l e c t i v e awareness of t h i n k i n g . This i m p l i e s 
t h a t any mode of e x i s t e n c e which can embody the formal p r o p e r t i e s 
of t h i n k i n g w i l l s e r v e . Sign languages and semaphore, as w e l l 
as the w r i t t e n and spoken word, can f u l f i l the s t r a t e g i c r o l e of 
embodying t h i n k i n g . However, not a l l behaviour w i l l f i l l the 
b i l l h e r e, and our other o r i g i n a l suggestion - t h a t n o n - l i n g u i s t i c 
behaviour, on the b a s i s of which we normally a s c r i b e thoughts to 
the s u b j e c t , can provide the foundation for our primary understanding 
of the s u b j e c t as t h i n k i n g - i s inadequate. Such n o n - l i n g u i s t i c 
behaviour does not possess the formal p r o p e r t i e s which are required 
i f i t i s to f u n c t i o n as the embodiment of t h i n k i n g . L e t us see 
t h i s by looking a t an example. From the vantage-point of already 
p o s s e s s i n g the concept of t h i n k i n g , we can use observations of 
behaviour to provide the b a s i s f o r our a s c r i p t i o n s of thoughts and 
b e l i e f s to the s u b j e c t i n question. We may a s c r i b e to a s u b j e c t 
the b e l i e f t h a t the f r o n t door i s locked, on observing the s u b j e c t 
a r r i v i n g and i n s e r t i n g a key i n t o the loc k . Even so, t h i s s o r t 
of behaviour cannot provide us with the primary understanding of 
the s u b j e c t as t h i n k i n g . Although t h a t b e l i e f i n a sense informs 
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t h a t behaviour ( a t l e a s t i n t h a t , to account f o r the 
behaviour, we a s c r i b e the b e l i e f to the s u b j e c t ) , the 
behaviour does not i t s e l f make a clai m about how things 
a r e , which could tu r n out to be f a l s e . Once we have the 
concept of t h i n k i n g , we can render n o n - l i n g u i s t i c behaviour 
e x p l i c i t l y i n t e l l i g i b l e by a s c r i b i n g thoughts or b e l i e f s to 
the agent. On observing the behaviour of the person introduced 
above, we could say "She t h i n k s t h a t the door i s locked" - thus 
making sense of her l o o k i n g f o r her key, e t c e t e r a . But we 
can do t h i s only when a l r e a d y i n p o s s e s s i o n of the concept of 
t h i n k i n g . The n o n - l i n g u i s t i c behaviour does not i t s e l f c o n s t i t u t e 
a t r u e - o r - f a l s e claim about how things are with the world: we 
cannot, then, get to the concept of t h i n k i n g by a b s t r a c t i n g from 
the m a t e r i a l i t y of t h i s n o n - l i n g u i s t i c behaviour. Only when we 
have obtained the concept of t h i n k i n g from elsewhere, can we say 
t h a t someone's n o n - l i n g u i s t i c behaviour i n some sense 'embodies' 
t h e i r t h i n k i n g . So although we o r d i n a r i l y use our observations 
of n o n - l i n g u i s t i c behaviour as a b a s i s f o r a s c r i b i n g thoughts to 
people (and o t h e r s ) , t h a t behaviour does not i n general possess 
the formal p r o p e r t i e s which would make p o s s i b l e the a b s t r a c t i o n 
from the behaviour to the primary understanding of the t h i n k i n g 
which i t embodies. The primary understanding of the s u b j e c t as 
t h i n k i n g must be of the s u b j e c t as speaking. Only by subsequent 
a b s t r a c t i o n from the m a t e r i a l i t y of speech can we then a r r i v e a t 
the concept of bare thought (and thence, a t the concept of an 
a b s t r a c t thought-content). Thinking, by v i r t u e of the o n t o l o g i c a l 
inadequacy a t i t s h e a r t , must be p r i m a r i l y understood as the t h i n k i n g 
of a speaking s u b j e c t . 
- 206 -
I n a r r i v i n g a t t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , we have i n e f f e c t 
r e t r a c e d a t h i r d step of the process of a b s t r a c t i o n 
undertaken i n Chapter Four, which r e s u l t e d i n the concept 
of a pure, a b s t r a c t thought-content. We now have the 
notion of thought-content, as the content of concrete 
t h i n k i n g on the p a r t of a speaking s u b j e c t . The argument 
has proceded by t r a c i n g the nec e s s a r y conditions of the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of the c r i t i c a l concept of thought, which i s i n 
t u r n e s s e n t i a l to the p o s s i b i l i t y of any c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
i n q u i r y . I f the argument succeeds, i t e s t a b l i s h e s a t l e a s t 
the e x i s t e n c e of speaking s u b j e c t s , and a c e r t a i n p r i o r i t y 
among the concepts of thought and speech. But the i s s u e s 
surrounding the concepts of thought, language and behaviour 
are complicated and c o n t r o v e r s i a l . I s h a l l take the chance 
to expand a l i t t l e on th e s e , and to c l a r i f y somewhat the 
s t r u c t u r e of p r i o r i t i e s a t work i n the argument. 
Thinking and Speaking: P r i o r i t i e s 
I n the d i s c u s s i o n of the l a s t s e c t i o n , I seem to claim a 
c e r t a i n k i n d of p r i o r i t y f o r speech over thought. I n the l i g h t 
of c u r r e n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n s t h i s c l a i m needs c l a r i f i c a t i 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n I want to begin to d i s c u s s some of the questions 
r a i s e d i n those d i s c u s s i o n s , and then to r e l a t e them to the 
argument of the previous s e c t i o n . I w i l l r a i s e three questions 
i n t h i s s e c t i o n . Each of them deals with an aspect of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between thought and language. L e t me f i r s t say 
something to introduce t h i s t o p i c . 
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Donald Davidson, i n addressing hi m s e l f to the i s s u e 
of the connection between thought and language, con s i d e r s 
t h a t n e i t h e r has conceptual p r i o r i t y . He f e e l s t h a t the 
dependence of speaking on t h i n k i n g i s evident - " f o r to 
speak i s to express thoughts". He then aims to balance 
the equation by showing " t h a t a c r e a t u r e cannot have thoughts 
u n l e s s i t i s an i n t e r p r e t e r of the speech of another", w h i l s t 
33 
denying t h a t t h i s imputes any p r i o r i t y to language. ' L e t us 
begin not by d i s c u s s i n g Davidson's own arguments d i r e c t l y , but 
by looking a t how the k i n d of r e l a t i o n between thought and 
language which i s i m p l i e d by the l i n e of argument we have so 
f a r followed. 
To begin with, we assigned to the c r i t i c a l concept of thought 
a c e r t a i n s t r a t e g i c p r i o r i t y . That i s , i n order to develop a 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l theory immune to c r i t i c i s m , we began with the 
c r i t i c a l concept of thought as e s s e n t i a l to a l l c r i t i c a l i n q u i r y . 
By t r a c i n g the n e c e s s a r y conditions of the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h i s 
concept, we were able to e s t a b l i s h these c o n d i t i o n s as necessary 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of c r i t i c a l i n q u i r y , and hence as proof a g a i n s t 
any s c e p t i c a l q uestioning of them. I n the present chapter, I 
have argued t h a t a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of even 
the n a i v e , u n c r i t i c a l concept of thought (and so, a f o r t i o r i , of 
the c r i t i c a l concept of thought), i s the understanding of a s u b j e c t 
as speaking. I t would seem c l e a r t h a t t h i s understanding of the 
s u b j e c t as speaking i n t u r n r e q u i r e s a t l e a s t the i m p l i c i t concept 
of speech.3**"' I t might now seem as i f the p o s i t i o n o u t l i n e d a t 
l e a s t l e a v e s space f o r the c l a i m t h a t the dependence of the concept 
of thought on the concept of speech i s mutual; t h a t i s , t h a t the 
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concept of speech i t s e l f presupposes, as a nec e s s a r y condition 
of i t s p o s s i b i l i t y , the concept of thought. I have, however, 
a l r e a d y argued t h a t t h i s i s not the case; but t h a t the concept 
of thought i s l o g i c a l l y p o s t e r i o r to th a t of speech, and 
obtainable only as the r e s u l t of a process of a b s t r a c t i o n . 
The primary understanding of the s u b j e c t as speaking cannot 
be of the s u b j e c t as e x p r e s s i n g or embodying i t s thoughts, s i n c e 
t h i s would employ the concept of thought which t h a t understanding 
i s to h e l p make p o s s i b l e . The l i n e of development of the 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l s t r a t e g y r e v e r s e s the l i n e of o r i g i n a l conceptual 
development here. Thus although.the p h i l o s o p h i c a l s t r a t e g y we 
are f o l l o w i n g begins with the c r i t i c a l concept of thought and 
works back to the concept of i t s embodiment i n speech, i n the 
l i n e of development of understanding, the concept of speech i s 
n e c e s s a r i l y p r i o r to t h a t of thought. Thus the primary grasp 
of the s u b j e c t as speaking must be independent of, and i r r e d u c i b l e 
to, the concept of thought. I f t h i s argument i s to be convincing, 
i t w i l l now have to answer some awkward questions. Does the 
argument imply t h a t there can be speech without thought? Or 
t h a t t h e r e can be no thought without speech? What would thought 
c o n s i s t i n , i n the absence of speech? These are the questions 
with which t h i s s e c t i o n i s concerned. 
L e t us begin with the f i r s t q uestion. Does the framework 
of conceptual p r i o r i t i e s I have o u t l i n e d above mean that there 
can be speech without thought? S u r e l y , i t may be argued, i f 
we have reason to b e l i e v e t h a t a crea t u r e cannot t h i n k , then we 
have s u f f i c i e n t reason to deny t h a t i t can speak. P a r r o t s are 
normally excluded from the l i n g u i s t i c community. Furthermore, 
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speech has been introduced i n my own argument as the 
embodiment of thought, with no h i n t t h a t we can f i n d 
speech without i t . Both these points are sound, and I 
have no wish to deny t h a t where there i s speech, there i s 
thought. However, t h i s i n no way a f f e c t s the question 
of the l o g i c a l p r i o r i t y of the concept of speech over the 
concept of thought, as d e s c r i b e d above. Once we possess 
both concepts, we can say, r i g h t l y , t h a t speech r e q u i r e s 
thought; t h a t i f a being cannot think, i t cannot speak; 
and so on. But t h i s t e l l s us nothing about which concept 
has l o g i c a l p r i o r i t y . I t i n no way c o n f l i c t s with the view 
t h a t we can have the concept of speech without the concept of 
thought (though i f we do have the concept of thought i t may 
h e l p us to e l u c i d a t e the former concept, and to draw out some 
of i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s and l i m i t a t i o n s ) . When i n p o s s e s s i o n of 
both concepts, we are i n a p o s i t i o n to say t h a t speech i s the 
e x p r e s s i o n of thoughts; but t h i s achievement should not stop 
us r e c o g n i s i n g t h a t our primary grasp of the s u b j e c t as speaking 
i s , and must be, independent of and p r i o r to the concept of 
thought. The l o g i c a l p r i o r i t i e s which, I have argued, obtain 
between the concepts of speech and thought, do not then imply 
t h a t there can be speech without thought. They do imply t h a t 
without the concept of speech there could not be the concept of 
thought; and a l s o t h a t there i s room for the notion of a being 
which has the concept of speech, but not the concept of thought, 
and so i s incapable of r e c o g n i s i n g t h a t there can be no speech 
without thought. Once such a being acquires the concept of thought, 
as t h a t which i s embodied i n speech, i t i s i n a p o s i t i o n to recognise 
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t h a t there cannot he speech without thoughts which are embodied 
t h e r e i n . But t h i s i s not to say anything which c o n f l i c t s with 
what I have argued about the p r i o r i t i e s which obtain between the 
concepts themselves. Perhaps we can best express the p o s i t i o n 
l i k e t h i s . Speech n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e s thought. This answers 
our f i r s t q uestion. The converse - thought n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e s 
speech - i s the t o p i c of our second question, and has not y e t 
been d i s c u s s e d . The concept of thought n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e s the 
concept of speech: the converse - the concept of speech n e c e s s a r i l y 
r e q u i r e s the concept of thought - does not obtain. Although the 
f i r s t q u e s t i o n has been answered, the s e t of conceptual p r i o r i t i e s 
j u s t d e s c r i b e d leads to complications with the second question. 
The second question i s now more awkward. For we must be 
concerned with the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the s e t of conceptual 
p r i o r i t i e s I have o u t l i n e d above, and the question of whether 
there can be thought without speech. I f t h i n k i n g i s p r i m a r i l y 
grasped only by a b s t r a c t i o n from speaking, so th a t t h i n k i n g i s 
p r i m a r i l y grasped as the t h i n k i n g of a speaking s u b j e c t , does 
t h i s not r u l e out the p o s s i b i l i t y of thought without speech? 
And i f so, what are we to say about the babies and animals to 
which thought and b e l i e f i s so f r e q u e n t l y a s c r i b e d ? A t r a d i t i o n a l 
response to the i d e a of thought without speech i s the change of 
anthropomorphism, but t h i s has often seemed inadequate without the 
backing of some general account of the r e l a t i o n between thought and 
language. L e t me begin the d i s c u s s i o n by s p e l l i n g out f u r t h e r the 
o b s t a c l e s my argument has s e t f o r me. 
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We often a s c r i b e to o u r s e l v e s and other people - l e t 
alone animals - thoughts or b e l i e f s i n the absence of t h e i r 
l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n on the p a r t of the s u b j e c t i n question. 
That i s , t here are c a s e s i n which the concept of thought i s 
a p p l i e d , where no l i n g u i s t i c embodiment of the thought e x i s t s , 
from which we might a b s t r a c t the thought i t s e l f . How can we 
j u s t i f y such a p p l i c a t i o n s ? One view i s t h a t such cases are 
i n s t a n c e s of i n t e r n a l speech, of the s u b j e c t s i l e n t l y t a l k i n g 
things over: but t h i s w i l l not do. ' For there are perhaps 
even more occasions when we a s c r i b e thoughts or b e l i e f s i n the 
absence of the appropriate i n t e r n a l v e r b a l i s a t i o n . But these 
o r d i n a r y a s c r i p t i o n s seem to come i n t o c o n f l i c t with the argument 
of the present chapter. I f our grasp of the s u b j e c t as t h i n k i n g 
must be p r i m a r i l y based on an understanding of the s u b j e c t as 
speaking, then what room i s there f o r the claim t h a t there can 
be thought without speech? To be able to get anywhere with t h i s 
q u e stion, we need to d i s c u s s a t h i r d question to which i t n a t u r a l l y 
l e a d s . 
The t h i r d question a r i s e s l i k e t h i s ; I f we have to f i n d 
some way of accounting f o r our everyday a s c r i p t i o n s of thoughts 
and b e l i e f s i n the absence of t h e i r l i n g u i s t i c m a n i f e s t a t i o n , 
then we need to have an answer to the question of what thought 
c o n s i s t s i n , i n the absence of speech. So f a r , i t might seem 
t h a t the argument of the present chapter leads n a t u r a l l y to the 
view t h a t t h i n k i n g i s j u s t t h a t which speech embodies. But t h i s 
cannot be a f u l l y adequate account. For i f we take away the 
m a t e r i a l embodiment provided by speech f o r thought, what remains? 
Are we not l e f t with t h a t 'emptiness', or 'nothingness' which 
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seemed e a r l i e r to c h a r a c t e r i s e consciousness? What, then, 
are we doing when we a s c r i b e thoughts i n the absence of 
speech; and what does thought c o n s i s t i n ? I suggest that , 
i n order to approach these questions, we look c l o s e r a t the 
process of a b s t r a c t i o n of the concept of thought from t h a t of 
speech, and a t the concept of thought which r e s u l t s . I w i l l 
undertake t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n the next s e c t i o n , and then r e t u r n to 
see how i t s concl u s i o n s h e l p us t a c k l e the i s s u e s r a i s e d here. 
The A b s t r a c t i o n of Thought from Speech 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n I want to c a r r y on the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the 
n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of thought. 
Having shown t h a t the concept of thought i s p o s s i b l e only by 
a b s t r a c t i o n from an understanding of a s u b j e c t as speaking, I 
want to look a t the n e c e s s a r y conditions of t h a t a b s t r a c t i o n . 
T h i s w i l l t e l l us more about the conditions under which the 
c r i t i c a l concept of thought i s p o s s i b l e . I t w i l l a l s o suggest 
a foundation f o r an account of the nature of thought, with which 
to approach the questions r a i s e d i n the previous s e c t i o n . R e c a l l 
b r i e f l y the context i n which t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s to be undertaken. 
The c r i t i c a l concept of thought i s p o s s i b l e - i t gets i t s 
'meaning' - only by v i r t u e of a 'semantic' l i n k with i n s t a n c e s 
of e r r o r i n which thought and r e a l i t y f a i l to match up. The 
primary grasp of e r r o r cannot be i n terms of the concepts of 
thought and r e a l i t y , but must take the form of a non-conceptual 
r e g i s t r a t i o n of a breakdown i n an unquestioned c o g n i t i v e harmony. 
R e f l e c t i o n on t h i s breakdown makes p o s s i b l e the c r i t i c a l concept 
of thought ( a s p o s s i b l y d i v e r g i n g from r e a l i t y ) , which emerges 
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as the means by which the non-conceptual r e g i s t r a t i o n of 
breakdown i s a r t i c u l a t e d , and by which the breakdown i t s e l f 
a nalysed ( a s a coming a p a r t of thought and r e a l i t y ) . For the 
non-conceptual r e g i s t r a t i o n of t h a t breakdown to be p o s s i b l e , 
the thought which (as the subsequent r e f l e c t i v e a n a l y s i s of 
the breakdown w i l l show) f a i l s to match up with r e a l i t y , cannot 
be understood as a p u r e l y a b s t r a c t P l a t o n i c thought-content: 
i t must be grasped as the content of a c t u a l t h i n k i n g . The 
r e f l e c t i v e awareness of how th i n g s are thought to be thus 
r e q u i r e s a r e f l e c t i v e awareness of a c t u a l t h i n k i n g . This 
awareness i s i n turn p o s s i b l e only i f t h a t t h i n k i n g i s understood 
as the t h i n k i n g of a t h i n k i n g s u b j e c t . This understanding of 
the s u b j e c t as t h i n k i n g , which i s presupposed by the c r i t i c a l 
concept of thought, must i n v o l v e only the n a i v e , u n c r i t i c a l 
understanding of t h i n k i n g : an understanding according to which 
the q u e s t i o n of the t r u t h or f a l s i t y of what i s thought cannot 
y e t be asked. Even so, t h i s n aive understanding of the s u b j e c t 
as t h i n k i n g i t s e l f n e c e s s a r i l y presupposes an understanding of 
the s u b j e c t as speaking. The r o l e played by speech i n t h i s 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l s t r a t e g y i s t h a t of overcoming the o n t o l o g i c a l 
inadequacy a t the h e a r t of the consciousness, by g i v i n g i t m a t e r i a l 
embodiment. I t i s a g a i n s t the backdrop of t h i s argument, th a t the 
question to which the p r e s e n t s e c t i o n i s addressed f o l l o w s . Given 
the r e q u i r e d understanding of the s u b j e c t as speaking, how i s the 
understanding of the s u b j e c t as t h i n k i n g , as e x i s t i n g i n a mode which 
i s embodied i n speech, p o s s i b l e ? How i s the d i s t i n c t i o n of thought 
from speech p o s s i b l e ? How does i t come about? L e t us look a t a 
f i r s t approach to these questions. Although inadequate, i t s f a i l u r e 
should h e l p us to a c l e a r e r understanding of the problem t h a t faces 
us. 
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T h i s approach bases i t s e l f s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y on the 
s t r a t e g i c requirements which l e d to the i n t r o d u c t i o n of 
speech as the embodiment of t h i n k i n g . The idea proposed 
by t h i s approach i s simple enough. I t i s t h a t , to a r r i v e 
a t the concept of t h i n k i n g , a l l we need to do i s s t r i p o f f 
the m a t e r i a l i t y of t h a t embodiment, the ' c l o t h i n g ' t h a t 
speech i s to provide, and focus our a t t e n t i o n on what remains. 
The problem with t h i s i d e a , hoAvever, i s t h a t i f , from an occurrence 
of a s u b j e c t speaking, we s u b t r a c t the speech, then we have nothing 
l e f t - except perhaps the cu r i o u s mouth-movements of the s u b j e c t 
i n q u e s t i o n . But how e l s e , i f t h i s approach f a i l s , are we to 
go about the t a s k ? And why i s i t t h a t t h i s apparently s t r a i g h t -
forward approach i s inadequate? What i s a t work i n t h i s f i r s t 
approach i s the t a c i t assumption t h a t we can a l r e a d y d i s t i n g u i s h 
the m a t e r i a l i t y of the speech - t h a t by means of which embodiment 
i s e f f e c t e d - from t h a t which itierabodies: the t h i n k i n g i t s e l f . 
Having made the d i s t i n c t i o n , the approach moves on to focus on 
t h a t which a b s t r a c t i o n from the m a t e r i a l i t y of speech leaves 
untouched. The problem here i s t h a t to d i s t i n g u i s h , w i t h i n 
speech, t h a t which does the embodying and that which i s embodied, 
a l r e a d y presupposes the concept of t h i n k i n g . A grasp of t h a t 
which does the embodying presupposes a grasp of t h a t (the thinking) 
which i s embodied; and v i c e v e r s a . We cannot grasp the m a t e r i a l i t y 
of speech independently of a grasp of t h a t which the m a t e r i a l 'clothe 
Now we, as ordinary a d u l t s ( l e t alone philosophers) who have gone 
through the process of a c q u i r i n g the r e l e v a n t concepts, are 
equipped to make t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n . But f o r someone who has not 
undergone t h a t process, these concepts and t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n are 
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u n a v a i l a b l e . The d i s t i n c t i o n , w i t h i n speech, of th a t which 
i s embodied and t h a t which embodies, cannot be used i n an 
account of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of t h i n k i n g : i t 
al r e a d y presupposes the concept. Without being able to make 
t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h i n speech, the process of a b s t r a c t i n g from 
the speech of the s u b j e c t can leave us contemplating only the 
s u b j e c t as not speaking. I t cannot make p o s s i b l e the concept 
of t h i n k i n g . But i f t h i s i s so, then how i s the concept of 
t h i n k i n g p o s s i b l e a t a l l ? How, from an understanding of the 
s u b j e c t as speaking, i s an understanding of the s u b j e c t as thinking 
d e l i v e r e d up? 
The argument which f o l l o w s has a s t r u c t u r e s i m i l a r i n 
important r e s p e c t s to t h a t of the arguments concerning the 
d i s t i n c t i o n s between experience and r e a l i t y , and thought and 
r e a l i t y . I t shows again t h a t a c e r t a i n n e g a t i v i t y i s r e q u i r e d 
f o r a p a r t i c u l a r concept to be p o s s i b l e . I t w i l l conclude that 
the concept of t h i n k i n g i s p o s s i b l e , only i n the context of 
r e f l e c t i o n on s i t u a t i o n s i n which t h a t which i s embodied i n speech 
f a i l s to match up with t h a t which does the embodying. Consider. 
Speaking from our own conceptual vantage-point, - a l r e a d y 
p o s s e s s i n g the concepts of t h i n k i n g , and of t h a t which embodies 
36. 
i t i n speech - we can say the fol l o w i n g about the conditions 
under which those concepts are p o s s i b l e . I n s o f a r as the thinking 
i s adequately embodied, or expressed, i n the speech, there i s no 
p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of t h i n k i n g emerging. As we have seen, 
i t cannot be gained by d i r e c t apprehension of examples of i t , or 
by t r y i n g to s t r i p o f f the m a t e r i a l i t y of speech to r e v e a l the 
t h i n k i n g beneath. N e v e r t h e l e s s , the d i s c u s s i o n i n the preceding 
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paragraph i n d i c a t e d a c e r t a i n conceptual interdependence 
which i t i s as w e l l to examine f u r t h e r . We could not have 
the concept of t h i n k i n g ( a s t h a t which i s embodied i n the 
speech) by i t s e l f . To grasp t h i n k i n g as t h a t which i s 
embodied i n the speech i s p o s s i b l e only on c o n d i t i o n of an 
understanding of the means of i t s embodiment, of the m a t e r i a l i t y 
of speech. For to d i s t i n g u i s h w i t h i n speech t h a t which i s 
embodied i n i t , r e q u i r e s a grasp of t h a t from which, w i t h i n 
the c o n t e x t of the speech, i t i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d ; namely, th a t 
which does the embodying. A grasp of t h a t which i s expressed 
i n speech r e q u i r e s a grasp of t h a t which expresses i t , and v i c e 
v e r s a . But how i s t h i s conceptual p a i r p o s s i b l e ? Neither 
concept can be e s t a b l i s h e d independently of the other. Nor 
can t h i n k i n g be understood merely i n terms of the concept of 
the m a t e r i a l i n which i t i s embodied; that i s , understood 
as t h a t which the m a t e r i a l i t y of speech embodies, Nor can the 
understanding of the m a t e r i a l i t y of speech be i n terms of the 
t h i n k i n g i t s e l f ; t h a t i s , ais t h a t which embodies the t h i n k i n g . 
Both of these attempts provide us with no more than a s t e r i l e 
c i r c u l a r i t y . What, then, are we to do? 
We have seen s i t u a t i o n s l i k e t h i s before. I n t r y i n g to 
account f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of the conceptual p a i r s 'experience'/ 
' r e a l i t y ' and ' t h o u g h t ' / ' r e a l i t y ' , the same d i f f i c u l t y arose. 
I n each of those s i t u a t i o n s we were de a l i n g with the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of an interdependent p a i r of concepts. N e i t h e r concept could 
be e s t a b l i s h e d independently of the other. Nor could e i t h e r 
concept be grasped merely i n terms of the other, s i n c e t h i s 
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would r e s u l t i n a s t e r i l e c i r l e , r a t h e r than an adequate 
account of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concepts. But each 
concept was p o s s i b l e only on c o n d i t i o n t h a t there was a 
'semantic' l i n k with something other than the concepts 
themselves - an 'extra-conceptual realm' - which provided 
the concept with i t s 'meaning', or 'content'. I n each of 
those s i t u a t i o n s , the concepts could be ' s e m a n t i c a l l y ' l i n k e d 
with a 'meaning - giving* extra-conceptual realm only as a 
p a i r . The concepts had to be l i n k e d , as a p a i r , with i n s t a n c e s 
where how t h i n g s are thought to be, or are experienced as being, 
was a l r e a d y r e l a t e d to how things a r e . For the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the concepts i n each case to be p o s s i b l e , t h i s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p had to be one of a c e r t a i n l a c k of f i t . The 
i n s t a n c e s had to be i n s t a n c e s of e r r o r , i n which thought or 
experience f a i l e d to match up with r e a l i t y . How can t h i s 
r e f l e c t i o n on those arguments help us i n the present d i s c u s s i o n ? 
The present case p r e s e n t s us with a s i m i l a r s t r u c t u r e . 
I f the concepts of t h i n k i n g ( t h a t which i s a r t i c u l a t e d i n the 
speech) and the m a t e r i a l i t y of speech ( t h a t which, i n the speech, 
does the a r t i c u l a t i n g ) , are to be p o s s i b l e , then they must be 
' s e m a n t i c a l l y ' l i n k e d to an a s p e c t of an extra-conceptual realm, 
w i t h i n which t h a t which a r t i c u l a t e s , and t h a t which i s a r t i c u l a t e d , 
are a l r e a d y r e l a t e d . Suppose, now, t h a t t h a t which i s a r t i c u l a t e d 
i s p e r f e c t l y matched by t h a t which a r t i c u l a t e s i t . (We could 
formulate t h i s i n Saussure's terms, by supposing t h a t the 
s i g n i f i e r matches the s i g n i f i e d . ) ' I f we suppose t h i s , then 
no d i s t i n c t i o n between the t h i n k i n g , and t h a t which expresses, 
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embodies or a r t i c u l a t e s i t i n speech, w i l l be p o s s i b l e . 
The d i s t i n c t i o n , and so the concepts a t i s s u e , w i l l be 
p o s s i b l e only where the s i t u a t i o n breaks down to r e v e a l a 
divergence between t h a t which i s a r t i c u l a t e d , and t h a t which 
a r t i c u l a t e s i t : t h a t i s , where the expression i n speech 
f a i l s to match the t h i n k i n g ( or the s i g n i f i e r the s i g n i f i e d ) . 
Without such a divergence w i t h i n speech, there i s no p o s s i b i l i t y 
of an understanding of the s u b j e c t as t h i n k i n g (and no p o s s i b i l i t y 
of the c r i t i c a l concept of thought, and so on). As i s the case 
with the c r i t i c a l concepts of thought and experience, the concepts 
a t i s s u e here - of t h i n k i n g and i t s embodiment - are p o s s i b l e 
only i n the context of r e f l e c t i o n on a breakdown or rupture i n 
the smooth running of the s u b j e c t ' s a f f a i r s . I n t h i s area we 
can l e a r n only from our m i s t a k e s . Again, we are l e d to the 
melancholy view t h a t conceptual progress depends not on a 
s y n t h e t i c c o n s t r u c t i o n of concepts on the b a s i s of what i s 
p o s i t i v e l y present to us, but r a t h e r n a n a l y s i s of our negative 
moments, on r e f l e c t i o n on our f a i l u r e s . L e t us have a c l o s e r 
look a t whether there are a l t e r n a t i v e s to that view. 
I n the present context we can t e s t the view t h a t conceptual 
progress depends on a r e f l e c t i o n on breakdown, by examining an 
a l t e r n a t i v e to the above explanation of how the concept of thinking 
i s p o s s i b l e . For s u r e l y , i t may be suggested, there are many 
cases i n our own language where two or more expressions w i l l 
a r t i c u l a t e our t h i n k i n g e q u a l l y w e l l . Can we not, r e f l e c t i n g 
on t h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s , a r r i v e at the concept of the t h i n k i n g 
which i s thus d i v e r s e l y embodied? As t h a t which remains the 
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same under i t s d i f f e r e n t g u i s e s ? L e t us c o n s i d e r how f a r t h i s 
proposal can go towards providing an a l t e r n a t i v e account of the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of t h i n k i n g . According to the 
proposal, we are to a r r i v e a t the concept of t h i n k i n g on the 
b a s i s of r e f l e c t i n g on a s i t u a t i o n i n which c e r t a i n , d i f f e r e n t , 
e x p r e s s i o n s are u t t e r e d . These expr e s s i o n s , as we can say 
from the vantage-point of p o s s e s s i n g the r e q u i s i t e concepts, 
a r t i c u l a t e the same t h i n k i n g . But the question we have to 
c o n s i d e r , i s how someone without the concept of t h i n k i n g could 
come to a c q u i r e i t through r e f l e c t i o n on these u t t e r a n c e s . L e t 
us look a t some suggestions, as to how t h i s can be accomplished, 
which are i n l i n e with the proposal under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . F i r s t : 
could t h a t r e f l e c t i o n take the form of a d i r e c t apprehension of 
the t h i n k i n g , coupled with an awareness of the embodiments i t 
r e c e i v e s from d i f f e r e n t e x p r e s s i o n s ? The answer must be no, 
s i n c e i t has a l r e a d y been shown t h a t such a d i r e c t apprehension 
of t h i n k i n g i s not p o s s i b l e without already presupposing the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of the concept of t h i n k i n g : i f i t were, we would 
not be faced with the present problem. Second: could i t be 
t h a t the u t t e r a n c e s are made i n s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s , so t h a t i t 
i s p o s s i b l e to recognise t h a t they embody the same thinking? 
Again, the answer i s no, f o r however s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s may 
be, people's t h i n k i n g about them may be d i f f e r e n t . F u r t h e r , 
many d i f f e r e n t u t t e r a n c e s , with d i f f e r e n t meanings, can be made 
i n s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s . Without a d i r e c t apprehension of the 
sameness of the t h i n k i n g which i s expressed - which apprehension 
we have a l r e a d y r u l e d out - t h i s suggestion cannot work. T h i r d : 
could there be a r e a l i s a t i o n on the p a r t of the s u b j e c t t h a t , i n 
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a c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n , i t could have u t t e r e d 'X', i n s t e a d of 
'Y', with e q u i v a l e n t e x p r e s s i v e e f f e c t ? So th a t a r e f l e c t i o n 
on the l i n g u i s t i c p o s s i b i l i t i e s a v a i l a b l e leads to a r e f l e c t i o n 
on the t h i n k i n g which could be d i v e r s e l y embodied? Let us 
look a t t h i s suggestion f u r t h e r . The r e c o g n i t i o n of the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of using e i t h e r of two expressions cannot be based 
here on a d i r e c t awareness of t h a t which i s to be embodied, 
coupled with a r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t e i t h e r of the two expressions 
would adequately embody i t . I t has already been argued that 
such an awareness cannot provide p a r t of an account of the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of t h i n k i n g , s i n c e i t a l r e a d y presupposes 
the a v a i l a b i l i t y of t h a t concept. The r e c o g n i t i o n of the l i n g u i s t i c 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s i s supposed to make p o s s i b l e the concept of thi n k i n g , 
and so cannot be based on i t . What, then, does the r e c o g n i t i o n 
of the p o s s i b i l i t y of u s i n g e i t h e r of two (or more) expressions 
amount to? Of course, i n any given s i t u a t i o n I can u t t e r whatever 
ex p r e s s i o n s I l i k e . The point of "could" i n " I could have s a i d 
•X' i n s t e a d of 'Y'", i s presumably to claim t h a t e i t h e r "X" or "Y" 
would do the job. To take a personal example: the s t r u c t u r e of 
my w r i t t e n sentences i s oft e n a consequence of how the thought 
develops i n my mind, r a t h e r than a consequence of considering 
how b e s t to communicate to a reader. I am f r e q u e n t l y i n a 
p o s i t i o n to say " I could have u t t e r e d 'X', i n s t e a d of 'Y* (and 
saved the reader unnecessary mental c o n t o r t i o n s ) " . E i t h e r 
"X" or "Y" would have done the job of expressing the s a l i e n t 
thought. I n t h i s example then, the r e c o g n i t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of u t t e r i n g e i t h e r of two s e m a n t i c a l l y e q u i v a l e n t expressions 
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presupposes the concept of the t h i n k i n g which they are to 
embody. I t cannot, t h e r e f o r e , l a y the foundation f o r an 
account of the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h a t concept. L e t us consider 
a f o u r t h and f i n a l suggestion as to how t h i s proposed 
a l t e r n a t i v e account of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of 
t h i n k i n g might be made to work. Consider a case where 
two members of separate s o c i e t i e s with d i f f e r e n t languages 
meet f o r the f i r s t time; n e i t h e r having, up to now, the 
vaguest s u s p i c i o n t h a t there might be other s o c i e t i e s or other 
languages. How w i l l they get on? W i l l they not be forced to 
a r e c o g n i t i o n that they have d i f f e r e n t ways of saying the same 
t h i n g , a r t i c u l a t i n g the same t h i n k i n g ? Assume t h a t they manage, 
un s u s p e c t i n g l y , a f r i e n d l y g r e e t i n g . One then asks the other 
where she i s going, and incomprehension begins. Now we can 
imagine t h a t these two g r a d u a l l y l e a r n each other's language, 
so t h a t each i s able to say to members of t h e i r own s o c i e t y 
"Where I say 'X' to you, I would say *Y* to my f r i e n d " , or 
"Where we say 'X', they say 'Y'". We might accept the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of r e c o g n i s i n g a d i f f e r e n c e i n language along these 
l i n e s , which does not r e q u i r e the concept of t h i n k i n g : perhaps 
evidence f o r t h i s could be provided by b i l i n g u a l c h i l d r e n . But 
where i s the concept of t h i n k i n g provided f o r here? What we 
have i s a s i t u a t i o n i n which people speak a p p r o p r i a t e l y , r e l a t i v e 
to t h e i r audience. The r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t , while I say " I t ' s 
r a i n i n g " to my c h i l d r e n , I say "Es regnet" to a German f r i e n d , 
n e i t h e r n e c e s s i t a t e s , nor of i t s e l f provide f o r , the concept of 
t h i n k i n g . That r e c o g n i t i o n r e l a t e s l i n g u i s t i c expressions to 
s i t u a t i o n s with d i f f e r e n t communicators, not l i n g u i s t i c expressions 
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to the t h i n k i n g expressed. Can we a t l e a s t conclude from 
t h i s example t h a t , i f the expressions are used i n the same 
s i t u a t i o n s , only with d i f f e r e n t audiences, then the thinking 
embodied i s the same? We can do t h i s only i f we a l r e a d y 
a v a i l o u r s e l v e s of the concept of t h i n k i n g . A being which 
l a c k s t h a t concept has only the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t when t a l k i n g 
to c e r t a i n people you say " I t ' s r a i n i n g " , and when t a l k i n g to 
c e r t a i n others "Es regnet". The concept of the t h i n k i n g which 
i s embodied by both e x p r e s s i o n s , i s n e i t h e r n e c e s s a r y for t h a t 
being's grasp of the s i t u a t i o n , nor made p o s s i b l e j u s t by 
r e f l e c t i n g on i t . 
I n the preceding paragraph we t e s t e d the argument to the 
c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the concept of t h i n k i n g i s p o s s i b l e only by 
v i r t u e of a 'semantic' l i n k with s i t u a t i o n s i n which there i s 
a l a c k of f i t between the m a t e r i a l embodiment of t h i n k i n g , and 
the t h i n k i n g i t s e l f ( o r between the l i n g u i s t i c expression, and 
the t h i n k i n g e x p r e s s e d ) . Other suggestions as to how the 
concept of t h i n k i n g could be p o s s i b l e were t r i e d out and r e j e c t e d . 
The o r i g i n a l argument remains, to t h a t extent, i n t a c t . I w i l l 
now e l a b o r a t e a b i t on i t s c o n c l u s i o n , i n p r e p a r a t i o n for a 
d i s c u s s i o n of how t h a t argument gives us a foundation for a 
theory of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between thought, language and 
behaviour. 
The concept of t h i n k i n g i s p o s s i b l e only i n v i r t u e of a 
'semantic' l i n k with an extra-conceptual realm which gives 
t h a t concept i t s 'meaning' or 'content'. T h i s l i n k cannot be 
with the concept of t h i n k i n g by i t s e l f , but only with the 
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interdependent p a i r of concepts " t h i n k i n g " / " t h a t which 
embodies t h i n k i n g " . The l i n k must be, at the other end, 
with a s i t u a t i o n i n which the t h i n k i n g , and t h a t which 
embodies i t , are a l r e a d y i n t e r r e l a t e d . Not only must they 
be a l r e a d y i n t e r r e l a t e d , but t h i s r e l a t i o n must be one of 
a l a c k of f i t . The t h i n k i n g must diverge from the m a t e r i a l 
of i t s embodiment. I f t h i n k i n g and i t s embodiment were 
p e r f e c t l y matched, th e r e would be no way of drawing the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the two: we could have the understanding 
of the s u b j e c t as speaking, but not the concepts of t h a t 
which i s embodied i n the speech, or of the m a t e r i a l i t y of 
speech which provides i t s embodiment. Only where the embodiment 
does not match the t h i n k i n g , can the primary grasp of speech 
s p l i t , as i t were, to produce the concepts of t h a t which i s 
embodied, and t h a t which i s the means of i t s embodiment. Or, 
to use the c l o s e l y p a r a l l e l terms of Saussure's l i n g u i s t i c s , 
only i n t h i s way can the concept of the s i g n s p l i t to produce 
the concepts of s i g n i f i e d and s i g n i f i e r . But how p r e c i s e l y are 
we to understand t h i s l a c k of f i t between the t h i n k i n g which i s 
a r t i c u l a t e d i n speech, and the l i n g u i s t i c s i g n i f i e r which a r t i c u l a t e s 
i t ? How can the e x p r e s s i o n f a i l to match the thinking? 
T h i s l a c k of f i t between t h i n k i n g and i t s embodiment i n 
speech can only be a matter of content: of what i s s a i d or 
expressed d i f f e r i n g from what i s thought. The 'semantic' l i n k 
i s between the p a i r of concepts " t h i n k i n g " / " t h a t which embodies 
t h i n k i n g " , and a s i t u a t i o n i n which the content of the speech 
d i f f e r s from the content of the t h i n k i n g ; so t h a t the expression 
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does not adequately embody, or a r t i c u l a t e , the t h i n k i n g . 
L e t us b r i e f l y note the p a r a l l e l here with the argument 
of Chapter Four. I n those chapters i t was argued, f i r s t l y , 
t h a t the c r i t i c a l concept of thought i s p o s s i b l e only on 
c o n d i t i o n of being ' s e m a n t i c a l l y ' l i n k e d with s i t u a t i o n s i n 
which thought and r e a l i t y are a l r e a d y r e l a t e d . I t was argued, 
secondly, t h a t the concept of thought could emerge from r e f l e c t i o n 
on such s i t u a t i o n s , only i f thought and r e a l i t y d i d not match up. 
I n the p r e s e n t s e c t i o n , I have argued, f i r s t l y , t h a t the concept 
of t h i n k i n g i s p o s s i b l e only on c o n d i t i o n of being 'semantically' 
l i n k e d w i t h a s i t u a t i o n i n which t h i n k i n g i s somehow embodied; 
and secondly, t h a t the concept of t h i n k i n g can emerge from 
r e f l e c t i o n on such s i t u a t i o n s only i f the t h i n k i n g and the means 
of i t s embodiment f a i l to match up. The l a c k of f i t between 
the s a l i e n t p a r t s of the s i t u a t i o n s d i s c u s s e d i s thus an important 
aspect of both the p r e s e n t argument, and the argument of Chapter 
Four. I w i l l argue l a t e r t h a t the primary understanding of 
t h i n k i n g which t h i s account provides f o r , i s an understanding 
of t h i n k i n g as t h a t which can be, and can f a i l to be, adequately 
a r t i c u l a t e d i n speech. I intend to explore the i m p l i c a t i o n s of 
t h i s c l a i m i n the next chapter. I n the present chapter, i n the 
f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n , I wish to see how t h i s account of the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of the concept of t h i n k i n g a t l e a s t l e aves room f o r a p l a u s i b l e theory 
of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h i n k i n g and language. T h i s theory 
should avoid some of the problems encountered by r i v a l t h e o r i e s 
of those r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and go some way towards answering the 
questions l e f t hanging a t the end of the previous s e c t i o n . 
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The E x p r e s s i o n of Thinking 
We have looked a t some of the necessary c o n d i t i o n s of 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of t h i n k i n g ; i n p a r t i c u l a r , 
i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the m a t e r i a l i t y of speech which serves 
to embody i t . L e t us now focus again on the questions of 
what thought c o n s i s t s i n , and of whether there can be thought 
without speech. The argument of t h i s chapter up to now, which 
has d e a l t with the i s s u e of t h i n k i n g as embodied, or expressed, 
i n speech, seems to leave room for the f o l l o w i n g response: 
One i s tempted to use the following 
p i c t u r e : what he r e a l l y 'wanted to 
say', what he 'meant' was already present 
somewhere i n h i s mind even before we gave 
i t e x p r e s s i o n . • 
And f u r t h e r : 
Now i f i t were asked: "Do you have the 
thought before f i n d i n g the e x p r e s s i o n ? " 
what would one have to r e p l y ? And what, 
to the q u e s t i o n : "What d i d the thought 
c o n s i s t i n , as i t e x i s t e d before i t s 
e x p r e s s i o n ? " 4-1. 
I t may seem, then, t h a t i f I want to claim t h a t t h i n k i n g i s 
embodied i n speech, then I am committed to the k i n d of mentalism 
which W i t t g e n s t e i n and others have f o r c e f u l l y c r i t i c i s e d . I 
want to show i n t h i s s e c t i o n t h a t I am not so committed, and a l s o 
to provide a more p l a u s i b l e theory of the r e l a t i o n s h i p of thinking 
to i t s e x p r e s s i o n . 
R e c a l l the argument of the previous chapter. The concept 
of thought i s made p o s s i b l e only i n the context of r e f l e c t i o n on 
a non-conceptually r e g i s t e r e d breakdown i n a concrete, c o g n i t i v e 
harmony. Thought and r e a l i t y come apart. For t h i s non-conceptual 
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r e g i s t r a t i o n to be p o s s i b l e , t h a t thought cannot be a 
mere a b s t r a c t thought-content, but must inform a concrete 
' l i v e d ' consciousness of r e a l i t y . I n r e f l e c t i n g on how 
th i n g s a r e thought to be, and d i s m i s s i n g i t as f a l s e i n the 
l i g h t of a (presumed) awareness of how things r e a l l y are, I 
need not be r e f l e c t i n g on a thought which i s a l r e a d y e x p l i c i t l y 
a r t i c u l a t e d i n my mind. I n the example introduced i n Chapter 
Four, the conscious thought t h a t my b i c y c l e was s t i l l outside 
the l i b r a r y , need never have entered my_mind. Nevertheless, 
the shock, which non-conceptually r e g i s t e r e d the breakdown 
i n c o g n i t i v e harmony, makes p o s s i b l e the r e f l e c t i o n t h a t t h a t 
i s indeed what I thought: my t h i n k i n g gains e x p l i c i t expression 
only on r e f l e c t i o n . I f I had not been i n a s t a t e of a ' l i v e d ' 
c onsciousness of the world - the content of which awareness could 
subsequently be e x p l i c i t l y a r t i c u l a t e d as t h i n k i n g t h a t my b i c y c l e 
was o u t s i d e - then there would be no c o g n i t i v e breakdown. L e t 
me o f f e r another example to i l l u s t r a t e t h i s p o i n t . 
A f r i e n d of mine returned to her house from work, opened the 
door, entered, and was dumbstruck. The house was n e i t h e r untidy, 
nor d i r t y . Nothing had been taken. But as f a r as she could take 
i n , every a r t i c l e i n the house had been rearranged. There were 
a r t i s t i c arrangements of c l o t h i n g , food and books i n the l i v i n g 
room. The bed was upside down, f u l l y made up, and r e s t i n g on 
two c h e s t s of drawers. I t was the u n f a m i l i a r arrangement of 
f a m i l i a r things which shocked her. There was no question here 
of her c o n s c i o u s l y e n t e r t a i n i n g and accepting the thought-content 
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t h a t her house would be i n the same order as when she l e f t 
i t . Or t h a t the c u t l e r y would be i n the cutlery-drawer, 
i n s t e a d of forming a s c u l p t u r e i n the f i r e p l a c e . Such 
thoughts, as we say, had never entered her head. Even so, 
her sense of shock non-conceptually r e g i s t e r e d a breakdown 
i n c o g n i t i v e harmony. R e f l e c t i v e a n a l y s i s of the s i t u a t i o n 
brought out the f a c t t h a t of course she had b e l i e v e d t h a t her 
house would be ordered as u s u a l . But t h i s b e l i e f was not 
merely an a b s t r a c t thought-content, nor the o b j e c t of a 
conscious e n t e r t a i n i n g and a c c e p t i n g . I t was, r a t h e r , the 
i m p l i c i t content of a concrete l i v e d awareness of the world. 
The t h i n k i n g t h a t i s i n v o l v e d i n such a case i s not the conscious 
process of c o n s i d e r i n g and accepting a c e r t a i n a b s t r a c t thought-
content (although we do sometimes engage i n t h i s ) . I t i s not 
a mental e n t i t y immediately t r a n s p a r e n t to the philosopher's 
gaze ( a s Descartes and H u s s e r l understood the c o g i t a t i o ) . 
I t i s a p r e - a r t i c u l a t e consciousness of the world, which informs 
the s u b j e c t ' s concrete p r a c t i c a l involvements with t h a t world. 
L e t us now see how f a r t h i s account of t h i n k i n g helps us to 
avoid the p i t f a l l s of mentalism. 
On the account j u s t presented, l i n g u i s t i c e xpression and 
the t h i n k i n g which i t expresses are not p r i m a r i l y understood 
as independent e n t i t i e s , so t h a t we have a thought and then look 
around f o r l i n g u i s t i c m a t e r i a l to embody or express i t . I n s t e a d , 
we can understand the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h i n k i n g and language 
as one i n which a p r e - a r t i c u l a t e l i v e d awareness gets a r t i c u l a t e d 
i n speech. The answer to Wittgenstein's question, i s t h a t we do 
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not, i n general, have the thought before f i n d i n g the 
ex p r e s s i o n ; but t h a t we are i n a s t a t e of p r e - a r t i c u l a t e 
awareness which may or may not get a r t i c u l a t e d i n language. 
One way of a r r i v i n g a t the mentalism which W i t t g e n s t e i n 
c r i t i c i s e s i s t h i s . Where a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n f a i l s 
to adequately a r t i c u l a t e the p r e - a r t i c u l a t e awareness, or 
t h i n k i n g , we are wont to say, i n r e f l e c t i n g on the s i t u a t i o n , 
t h a t the ex p r e s s i o n was the wrong one f o r the thought. We 
are thus tempted to use the p i c t u r e described above by 
W i t t g e n s t e i n . But we can and should r e s i s t t h i s temptation. 
T h i s p i c t u r e emerges n a t u r a l l y from r e f l e c t i o n on a s i t u a t i o n 
i n which t h i n k i n g and i t s e x p r e s s i o n do not match up. I n 
t h a t r e f l e c t i o n we separate out the thought and i t s expression: 
I might r e f l e c t l i k e t h i s " I s a i d t h a t the cushion was warm, 
but t h i s was the wrong e x p r e s s i o n f o r the thought. I r e a l l y 
meant t h a t the cushion was s o f t " . I n t h i s r e f l e c t i o n we 
a r t i c u l a t e the content of the t h i n k i n g . This e x p l i c i t l y 
a r t i c u l a t e d thought-content i s then a v a i l a b l e f o r our conscious 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . We now tend to p r o j e c t t h i s p i c t u r e , of a 
c o n s c i o u s l y e n t e r t a i n e d thought-content along with a l i n g u i s t i c 
e x p r e s s i o n of i t , back on to the s i t u a t i o n p r i o r to the r e f l e c t i 
and then to g e n e r a l i s e i t . So t h a t we are l e d always to look 
f o r the thought which accompanies l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n . But 
t h i s p r o j e c t i o n i s i l l e g i t i m a t e . 1^ i s not nece s s a r y f o r us 
to say t h a t , p r i o r to my saying t h a t the cushion was warm, I 
had the thought t h a t the c u s i o n was s o f t . A l l we need i s a 
p r e - a r t i c u l a t e awareness which was inadequately a r t i c u l a t e d . 
Indeed, i t may only be i n r e f l e c t i o n on that inadequacy, t h a t 
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the o r i g i n a l p r e - a r t i c u l a t e awareness gets adequately 
a r t i c u l a t e d . I t may only be i n r e f l e c t i o n t h a t t h a t 
awareness i s c o n s t i t u t e d as an e x p l i c i t thought. Let me 
t r y to r e l a t e t h i s account t o the question posed a t the 
beginning of t h i s s e c t i o n . 
What i s thought wi t h o u t speech? The preceding 
discussion suggests an answer. Thought i s not a f u l l y -
formed mental e n t i t y e x i s t i n g alongside i t s l i n g u i s t i c 
expression. Thought i s instead, e s s e n t i a l l y , a state of 
l i v e d p r e - a r t i c u l a t e awareness of the world, which may or may 
not receive l i n g u i s t i c expression. With our l i n g u i s t i c 
a b i l i t i e s we can a r t i c u l a t e many of these states of our concrete 
c o g n i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h r e a l i t y . Dumb animals, however, 
presumably do not. What are we to say of them? We need 
not deny them a l l awareness of r e a l i t y . On the present account 
we can understand t h e i r awareness as the s o r t of p r e - a r t i c u l a t e 
s t a t e which we can a r t i c u l a t e i n our speech. We can thus allow 
ourselves t o say t h a t c e r t a i n dumb animals t h i n k , but cannot 
a r t i c u l a t e t h e i r t h i n k i n g . That dog, f o r example, may be i n 
a s t a t e of p r e - a r t i c u l a t e awareness which we would be able t o 
a r t i c u l a t e as t h i n k i n g t h a t the squirrel i s up the t r e e . The 
dog's i n a b i l i t y t o a r t i c u l a t e i t s t h i n k i n g f o r i t s e l f , might 
r e s t r a i n us from g r a n t i n g t h a t the dog's awareness i s c o n s t i t u t e d 
as an a r t i c u l a t e d thought. Indeed, many people, while accepting 
t h a t the dog thi n k s t h a t the squi r r e l i s i n the t r e e , would f e e l 
much less comfortable w i t h the idea t h a t the dog has the thought 
t h a t the s q u i r r e l i s up the t r e e , because of the i m p l i c a t i o n s 
t h i s n o t i o n c a r r i e s concerning the a b i l i t y to a r t i c u l a t e t h i n k i n g . 
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I do not wish, i n using t h i s idea of t h i n k i n g as 
p r i m a r i l y a state of p r e - a r t i c u l a t e awareness, t o deny 
the phenomenon of s i l e n t a r t i c u l a t e thought - t h a t t r a i n 
of thoughts i n the mind, which o f t e n seems l i k e an i n t e r n a l 
d iscussion. I want t o say instead t h a t t h i s phenomenon 
of 'inner-saying' cannot provide us w i t h an adequate theory 
of t h i n k i n g i n general. 'Of course, how we use the term 
" t h i n k i n g " can be a matter of personal t a s t e : what i s important 
i s t h a t we understand the d i s t i n c t i o n s which are being made. 
I would want t o claim t h a t the concept of a p r e - a r t i c u l a t e 
awareness or consciousness not only plays a s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t 
i n our i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the necessary conditions of the p o s s i b i l i 
of the concept of thought, but also helps us t o a r t i c u l a t e our 
experiences of c o g n i t i v e contact w i t h r e a l i t y , and our experience 
of expressing our t h i n k i n g . I do not, by a l l t h i s , wish to 
imply t h a t speaking subjects can always a r t i c u l a t e such st a t e s : 
we may be unable to a r t i c u l a t e our s t a t e , and have someone wi t h 
more experience do i t f o r us, a p a t t e r n established t o a lesser 
or greater extent when we are c h i l d r e n . We can thus make sense 
of the f e e l i n g t h a t we sometimes cannot f i n d the words to express 
our thoughts: i t i s not t h a t we have an a r t i c u l a t e thought which 
j u s t requires the appropriate l i n g u i s t i c c l o t h i n g , but t h a t we 
are i n a c e r t a i n state which we cannot a r t i c u l a t e s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
at a l l . (We know the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n consequent on t r y i n g a 
f o r m u l a t i o n which does not q u i t e f i t , and the sense of release 
when an adequate a r t i c u l a t i o n i s found.) We have already seen 
the importance of s i t u a t i o n s i n which there i s a lack of f i t 
between t h i n k i n g and i t s expression, and I w i l l look at more of 
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i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s i n the next chapter. I n t h i s s e c t i o n , 
I have t r i e d t o give a b r i e f idea of how the argument 
presented e a r l i e r i n the chapter, concerning the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of the concept of t h i n k i n g , can provide f o r a p l a u s i b l e 
account of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h i n k i n g and language. 
I n the next chapter I t u r n back to the main course of the 
argument, to examine f u r t h e r the necessary conditions of the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of the c r i t i c a l concept of thought, and t o show 
how these l a y the foundation f o r n o n - r e l a t i v i s t i c e t h i c s . 
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CHAPTER SIX 
COMMUNICATION 
I n t h i s chapter, I w i l l argue t h a t one of the necessary 
co n d i t i o n s of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the c r i t i c a l concept of thought, 
i s t h a t there are speaking subjects engaged i n a process of 
communication. Furthermore, the maintenance of such communication 
i s an ac t i o n - g u i d i n g value, not r e l a t i v e to p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l aims, 
needs, preferences and so on. Before presenting the argument, 
I need t o r e c a p i t u l a t e b r i e f l y some of the argument of the 
previous two chapters, since i t i s from t h a t argument t h a t the 
argument of the present chapter develops. 
I n those chapters, i t was argued t h a t the c r i t i c a l concept 
of thought i s made possible only i n a context of r e f l e c t i v e 
a n a l y s i s of a breakdown i n c o g n i t i v e harmony. This r e f l e c t i o n 
i nvolves the r e j e c t i o n of how things are thought to be, on the 
basis of a (presumed) awareness of how things r e a l l y are. The 
awareness of how things are thought to be, which t h i s r e f l e c t i v e 
process i n v o l v e s , i t s e l f n e cessarily presupposes a grasp of a 
t h i n k i n g subject t o which the thought i s r e f l e c t i v e l y ascribed. 
This grasp of the subject as t h i n k i n g , i t s e l f presupposes, as 
t h a t from which i t i s abstracted, a grasp of the subject as 
speaking. The concept of the t h i n k i n g , which i s embodied i n 
speech, i s possible only i n conjunction w i t h the concept of the 
means of i t s embodiment i n speech: the l i n g u i s t i c expression. 
These concepts are possible only i n v i r t u e of being •semantically* 
l i n k e d , as a p a i r , w i t h speech s i t u a t i o n s i n which t h i n k i n g and 
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expression are already r e l a t e d . Further, these s i t u a t i o n s 
must be such t h a t there i s a d i s t i n c t i o n between the t h i n k i n g 
and the expression a t the l e v e l of t h e i r respective contents; 
t h a t i s , such t h a t the content of the t h i n k i n g i s not matched by 
the content of the expression. 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t there are s t r u c t u r a l p a r a l l e l s between 
the discussion about the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of t h i n k i n g 
( t h a t which i s r e l a t e d t o , but may d i f f e r from, i t s l i n g u i s t i c 
expression), and the discussion about the p o s s i b i l i t y of the 
c r i t i c a l concept of thought ( t h a t which i s r e l a t e d t o , but may 
d i f f e r from, r e a l i t y ) - though these p a r a l l e l s are not as close 
as the p a r a l l e l s t h a t were seen t o hol d between the l a t t e r 
d i s c ussion, and the discussion about the p o s s i b i l i t y of the 
c r i t i c a l concept of experience. Where possible, I w i l l use 
these p a r a l l e l s t o i l l u m i n a t e the argument t h a t f o l l o w s . 
Thinking and i t s Expression 
Let me now place the concerns of the present chapter i n 
the context of the argument I have summarised above. I w i l l 
do t h i s by e l a b o r a t i n g one of the l a t e r stages of t h a t argument. 
I argued there^'that the concepts of the t h i n k i n g embodied i n 
speech, and of the m a t e r i a l i t y of speech which served t o embody 
t h a t t h i n k i n g , are interdependent. They can have t h e i r 
'meaning' only i n v i r t u e of a 'semantic' l i n k w i t h s i t u a t i o n s 
i n an extra-conceptual realm, i n which t h i n k i n g and i t s means 
of embodiment are already r e l a t e d . Furthermore, t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p 
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between t h i n k i n g and i t s means of embodiment must be such 
as t o permit a d i s t i n c t i o n t o be drawn between the two. 
Let us now look more c l o s e l y a t t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , i n terms 
of i t s p o s i t i o n i n the general p h i l o s o p h i c a l s t r a t e g y I have 
so f a r pursued. 
I n discussing the necessary conditions of the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of the concept ( c r i t i c a l or p r e c r i t i c a l ) of t h i n k i n g , i t was 
argued t h a t t h i s concept presupposes an understanding of a 
subject as speaking. Only i n t h i s way could we compensate 
f o r the o n t o l o g i c a l inadequacy, the 'nothingness' t h a t was 
shown i n Chapter Five t o characterise t h i n k i n g . The question 
then arose as t o how, given an understanding of a subject as 
speaking, the concept of t h i n k i n g could be derived. How can 
the concept of t h i n k i n g be acquired on the basis of an understanding 
of the subject as speaking? From w i t h i n speech, we must be able, 
as i t were, to d i s t i n g u i s h the t h i n k i n g which i s embodied from 
the l i n g u i s t i c m a t e r i a l by means of which i t i s embodied. But 
the d i s t i n c t i o n t o be drawn here cannot be an o n t o l o g i c a l one, 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the 'nothingness' t h a t characterises t h i n k i n g , 
from the m a t e r i a l 'substance* of i t s embodiment: f o r i f we could 
focus on the 'nothingness' of t h i n k i n g i n t h i s way, the problem 
would not have ari s e n i n the f i r s t place. The d i s t i n c t i o n 
t o be drawn must be one of content, i n the sense t h a t the content 
of the t h i n k i n g i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the content of what i s said 
i n u t t e r i n g the l i n g u i s t i c expression. There now seems to be a 
t e n s i o n between two demands. The f i r s t demand i s t h a t the 
l i n g u i s t i c expression serve w i t h i n speech as the m a t e r i a l f o r 
the embodiment of the t h i n k i n g : the t h i n k i n g and i t s means of 
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embodiment are thus r e l a t e d w i t h i n the speech s i t u a t i o n . 
The second demand i s t h a t the content of the l i n g u i s t i c 
expression d i f f e r from the content of the t h i n k i n g . But 
i f t h i s second demand i s f u l f i l l e d - and i f i t i s not, we 
w i l l not be able t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h i n k i n g from speaking, and 
so not have the concept of t h i n k i n g a t a l l - then i t must 
seem as i f the l i n g u i s t i c expression does not embody the 
t h i n k i n g . For i t seems as i f , to embody the subject's 
t h i n k i n g , the l i n g u i s t i c expression should have the same 
content as t h a t t h i n k i n g . How can we accommodate t h i s tension, 
which a r i s e s from the apparent requirement t h a t the l i n g u i s t i c 
m a t e r i a l i n speech both embody and not embody the subject's 
t h i n k i n g ? One approach towards the question of such accommodation 
would be t o avoid the tension by removing one or other of the 
demands which generate i t . To see why t h i s approach cannot 
work, l e t us examine both p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 
Let us consider f i r s t the e f f e c t s of removing the demand 
t h a t the l i n g u i s t i c expression and the subject's t h i n k i n g be 
r e l a t e d w i t h i n the speech s i t u a t i o n . I f we were, f o r example, 
to t r y t o account f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of the p a i r of concepts -
t h i n k i n g / i t s l i n g u i s t i c expression - by p o s t u l a t i n g a 'semantic' 
l i n k w i t h a s i t u a t i o n i n which the t h i n k i n g and the l i n g u i s t i c 
expression were not r e l a t e d , then what would be the r e s u l t ? 
Take as an example a s i t u a t i o n i n which I am t h i n k i n g about going 
on h o l i d a y tomorrovr, but am i n f a c t u t t e r i n g the words of a L a t i n 
prayer, the meaning of which I have never known. Now the 
l i n g u i s t i c expression which I u t t e r does not match up w i t h my 
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t h i n k i n g about the h o l i d a y . But we can grasp the d i f f e r e n c e 
i n content between the unr e l a t e d t h i n k i n g and l i n g u i s t i c 
expression i n t h i s case, only i f we already possess the concepts 
of t h i n k i n g and i t s means of embodiment. I f we already have 
those concepts, then we can s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y compare what I 
was t h i n k i n g , w i t h what I was saying, i n u t t e r i n g the l i n g u i s t i c 
expression: but wi t h o u t these concepts, we cannot make such a 
comparison, and so cannot grasp the d i f f e r e n c e . The mere f a c t 
t h a t there i s a d i f f e r e n c e , between a l i n g u i s t i c expression and 
the content of a subject's t h i n k i n g , cannot of i t s e l f make possible 
the concepts of t h i n k i n g and i t s expression. I n the absence of 
the two being r e l a t e d w i t h i n the s i t u a t i o n of speech, a grasp of 
t h a t d i f f e r e n c e presupposes those concepts which i t was t o help 
make po s s i b l e . 
Let us then reverse the p o s i t i o n , and consider the e f f e c t s of 
removing the demand t h a t the t h i n k i n g and the l i n g u i s t i c expression 
d i f f e r i n content. Suppose we have a s i t u a t i o n i n which the 
subject's t h i n k i n g and the l i n g u i s t i c expression are r e l a t e d , 
i n t h a t the l i n g u i s t i c expression i s the means by which the t h i n k i n g 
i s embodied i n speech, but i n which no d i s t i n c t i o n i n content i s 
to be made: the subject says what i t t h i n k s . As I have already 
argued,f^where the means of embodiment matches the t h i n k i n g , there 
i s no way of a b s t r a c t i n g the concept of t h i n k i n g from the grasp 
of the s i t u a t i o n . Without a d i f f e r e n c e at the l e v e l of content, 
no d i s t i n c t i o n between t h i n k i n g and i t s means of embodiment i n 
speech i s possible: there i s only the grasp of the subject speaking. 
Where the subject's t h i n k i n g and the l i n g u i s t i c expression are 
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r e l a t e d i n speech, but are without d i f f e r e n c e i n content, 
the concept of t h i n k i n g i s not possible. Both ways of 
t r y i n g t o put i n t o e f f e c t t h i s approach to the tension 
described above have f a i l e d . What a l t e r n a t i v e approach 
i s there? 
I suggest t h a t the tension between the two demands 
described above - t h a t t h i n k i n g and i t s means of embodiment 
be r e l a t e d w i t h i n speech and y e t d i f f e r i n content - be 
accommodated by considering the f o l l o w i n g . I t i s clear t h a t 
we cannot construct the understanding of the type of s i t u a t i o n 
we want, by s t a r t i n g w i t h an understanding of the subject's 
t h i n k i n g on one s i d e , an understanding of i t s l i n g u i s t i c means 
of embodiment ( w i t h a d i f f e r e n t content) on the other, and then 
jamming them together. This would presuppose the concepts of 
t h i n k i n g and i t s means of embodiment, and so cannot form p a r t 
of an account of the p o s s i b i l i t y of those concepts. The only 
a l t e r n a t i v e i s to begin w i t h an understanding of the subject 
as speaking, and then t o d i s t i n g u i s h the t h i n k i n g from the expression 
by r e f l e c t i n g on s i t u a t i o n s i n which those components come apart 
from one another. On the basis of an understanding of the subject 
as speaking (where we, possessing the concepts i n question, would 
say t h a t the expression matches and embodies the t h i n k i n g ) , we can 
get t o the concept of t h i n k i n g , by r e f l e c t i n g on s i t u a t i o n s where 
the normal coincidence of t h i n k i n g and expression does not obtain. 
The contents of the t h i n k i n g and the expression d i f f e r . But 
t h i s divergence of t h i n k i n g and expression from one another cannot be 
an absolute separation, so t h a t the t h i n k i n g and the expression have 
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t o be grasped independently of one another: f o r t h a t would 
presuppose the very concepts which i t i s to help make possible. 
The divergence of t h i n k i n g and i t s means of embodiment from 
one another must be. a divergence w i t h i n the context of the speech 
s i t u a t i o n i n which t h i n k i n g i s embodied. What sense can we 
make of t h i s ? We can formulate the r e l a t i o n s h i p , which obtains 
between t h i n k i n g and l i n g u i s t i c expression i n the s i t u a t i o n s we 
are d i s c u s s i n g , i n t h i s way. We can say t h a t the t h i n k i n g i s 
t h a t which i s to be embodied by means of the expression; and 
t h a t , c o r r e l a t i v e l y , the expression i s t h a t by means of which 
the t h i n k i n g i s t o be embodied i n speech. I f the t h i n k i n g were 
not t h a t which was t o be expressed, then the grasp of the s i t u a t i o n 
where the content of t h i n k i n g d i f f e r e d from t h a t of the l i n g u i s t i c 
expression could be achieved only by p u t t i n g together the independent 
grasp of the t h i n k i n g , w i t h the independent grasp of the expression. 
Such an understanding would presuppose the concepts whose p o s s i b i l i t y 
i s a t issue; and cannot t h e r e f o r e form p a r t of an account of the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of those concepts. The fo r m u l a t i o n i n d i c a t e s the 
normal speech s i t u a t i o n w i t h i n which t h i n k i n g and i t s means of 
embodiment are r e l a t e d , and yet provides room f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y 
t h a t , w i t h i n the speech s i t u a t i o n , the l i n g u i s t i c expression may 
f a i l to match up w i t h the t h i n k i n g which i t i s t o embody. The 
concept of t h i n k i n g , then, i s possible only i n v i r t u e of a 
'semantic' l i n k w i t h speech s i t u a t i o n s , which are such t h a t the 
expression u t t e r e d f a i l s to adequately express the t h i n k i n g . 
Thus although the understanding of the subject as t h i n k i n g 
presupposes an understanding of the subject as speaking (so t h a t 
t h i n k i n g possesses, as i t were, some o n t o l o g i c a l substance), the 
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understanding of the subject as t h i n k i n g i s nevertheless 
possible only i n v i r t u e of a 'semantic' l i n k between the 
concept of t h i n k i n g , and s i t u a t i o n s i n which the embodiment 
of t h i n k i n g has f a i l e d . 
There i s a p a r a l l e l here w i t h the discussion of the c r i t i c a l 
concept of thought. That concept was shown to be possible only 
i n v i r t u e of a 'semantic' l i n k w i t h s i t u a t i o n s i n which the lack 
of f i t between thought and r e a l i t y c o n s t i t u t e s a f a i l u r e . I t 
i s a f a i l u r e of how t h i n g s are thought to be, t o match up w i t h 
t h a t w i t h which i t was to match up; namely, w i t h how things 
r e a l l y are. That f a i l u r e was a c o g n i t i v e f a i l u r e : what we more 
u s u a l l y c a l l e r r o r . To maintain the p a r a l l e l w i t h the discussion 
of the concept of t h i n k i n g , I w i l l c a l l those s i t u a t i o n s i n which 
the l i n g u i s t i c expression f a i l s t o match up w i t h the t h i n k i n g which 
i t i s t o express, "expressive f a i l u r e s " . They are, i n b r i e f , 
s i t u a t i o n s i n which the expression i s the wrong one f o r the t h i n k i n g 
which i s to be expressed i n speech. Unless there were s i t u a t i o n s 
of t h i s k i n d , i t would not be possible t o d i s t i n g u i s h w i t h i n speech 
the t h i n k i n g from the means of i t s embodiment: the l i n g u i s t i c 
expression. We can d i s t i n g u i s h w i t h i n speech the t h i n k i n g which 
i s to be expressed, and the l i n g u i s t i c expression which i s t o 
express i t , only i f there e x i s t s i t u a t i o n s i n which these two 
aspects f a i l to match up. I w i l l take up t h i s argument and i t s 
i m p l i c a t i o n s again, towards the end of t h i s chapter. I t s 
importance f o r the foundation of e t h i c s w i l l there be i n d i c a t e d . 
For the present, i f t h i s argument works, I need t o make a p o i n t 
of c l a r i f i c a t i o n . 
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The p o i n t i s t h i s : i n claiming t h a t the subject's 
t h i n k i n g must be r e l a t e d to the l i n g u i s t i c expression, as 
t h a t by means of which i t i s t o be a r t i c u l a t e d or expressed, 
I must be c l e a r t h a t t h i s does not e n t i t l e us t o ascribe t o 
the s u b j e c t the i n t e n t i o n to get the r i g h t expression f o r the 
t h i n k i n g . For such an i n t e n t i o n , whether i m p l i c i t or e x p l i c i t , 
would presuppose the concepts a t issue here: and i f those 
concepts are possible only i n v i r t u e of a 'semantic' l i n k w i t h 
cases of expressive f a i l u r e , then we cannot, i n our account of 
expressive f a i l u r e , l e g i t i m a t e l y ascribe the possession of the 
concepts t o the subject p r i o r t o t h a t f a i l u r e . Nevertheless, 
i t i s only i f the subject's t h i n k i n g i s t h a t which i s t o be 
a r t i c u l a t e d , t h a t the concept of t h i n k i n g i s po s s i b l e . How are 
we t o make sense of t h i s s i t u a t i o n , i n which we seem t o be 
d e s c r i b i n g the subject's behaviour ( i t s utterance of a l i n g u i s t i c 
expression) as d i r e c t e d towards a c e r t a i n goal, and yet i n which 
the subject cannot a t t h a t p o i n t possess the concepts necessary 
f o r the a r t i c u l a t i o n of t h a t goal? What s o r t of account i s 
a v a i l a b l e t o us here? 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t these s i t u a t i o n s , i n which the subject's 
t h i n k i n g i s t h a t which i s t o be expressed i n speech, are not the 
k i n d of s i t u a t i o n s where we consciously t r y f o r the r i g h t 
expression f o r our t h i n k i n g , and f a i l . (As when, f o r example, 
we t r y t o say something i n a f o r e i g n language, or t r y to a r t i c u l a t e 
our f e e l i n g s ) . But i t i s wrong to see t h a t k i n d of case as a 
general model f o r g o a l - d i r e c t e d behaviour. To give a complete 
argument about the necessary conditions of the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
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t e l e o l o g i c a l concepts i s w e l l beyond the scope of the present 
i n q u i r y . I s h a l l make instead some remarks to i n d i c a t e the 
k i n d of account of g o a l - d i r e c t e d behaviour and t e l e o l o g i c a l 
concepts t h a t would emerge. This account has a s t r u c t u r e which 
p a r a l l e l s i n important respects the account of the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between thought and language presented i n Chapter Five. 
The f i r s t remark i s t h i s : there are cases of behaviour 
which we spontaneously describe as g o a l - d i r e c t e d , i n the absence 
of possession by the agent of the concepts which would be required 
to a r t i c u l a t e t h a t goal. Thus animals and babies behave i n ways 
which we describe as g o a l - d i r e c t e d ("The baby i s t r y i n g t o f i n d 
the breast", "The dog wants to go o u t " ) , without being able' to 
a r t i c u l a t e e x p l i c i t l y t h e i r goals. Second: I would argue t h a t 
t e l e o l o g i c a l concepts, such as "goal", "want" and " i n t e n t i o n " are 
po s s i b l e , only on c o n d i t i o n of r e f l e c t i o n on s i t u a t i o n s i n which 
(as we can say, having gone through the process of ac q u i r i n g those 
concepts) the subject has f a i l e d t o achieve i t s goals. I n the 
absence of r e f l e c t i o n on such s i t u a t i o n s (which we might c a l l 
instances of p r a c t i c a l f a i l u r e ) , there i s no way of making possible 
the concepts i n question. (As a h e u r i s t i c exercise, we might t r y 
to e x p l a i n the meaning of any of these terms wit h o u t r e f e r r i n g t o 
such s i t u a t i o n s . ) T h i r d : the temptation t o use the m e n t a l i s t i c 
p i c t u r e of a conscious act of i n t e n t i o n which accompanies a l l 
g o a l - d i r e c t e d behaviour, can be understood along the same l i n e s 
as the temptation t o use the m e n t a l i s t i c p i c t u r e of the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between thought and i t s expression, which was described by Wittgenstein. 
Let us look a t an example. Having bought a new p a i r of shoes e a r l i e r 
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i n the day, I am walking home i n the r a i n , t h i n k i n g about 
what t o cook f o r dinner. Suddenly I s l i p , and t r e a d i n a 
deep, muddy puddle. My f o o t and shoe are drenched i n mud. 
I exclaim, and walk on, m u t t e r i n g t o myself, " I was t r y i n g 
t o keep those shoes smart". What we have here i s a case of 
g o a l - d i r e c t e d behaviour. I was avoiding puddles, keeping 
my shoes clean. And y e t a t no time had I consciously set 
myself t h a t goal: r e f l e c t i o n on my f a i l u r e t o achieve i t , 
leads me t o a r t i c u l a t e the goal f o r the f i r s t time. The 
temptation here, i s to then p r o j e c t the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
the goal and the behaviour backwards, and then t o locate the 
existence of the goal i n the mind. The p i c t u r e i s then of a 
subject w i t h a consciously held goal, who then consciously sets 
out t o act i n such a way t h a t t h a t goal be f u l f i l l e d . Of course, 
t h i s s o r t of t h i n g does o f t e n happen: but i t i s a mistake to see 
i t as an adequate model f o r goa l - d i r e c t e d behaviour i n general. 
What i s p r i m a r i l y the case, i s t h a t the subject has p r e - a r t i c u l a t e 
p r a c t i c a l involvements w i t h the world, which can be subsequently 
a r t i c u l a t e d using t e l e o l o g i c a l language. We cannot understand the 
nature of g o a l - d i r e c t e d behaviour p r i m a r i l y by means of p u t t i n g 
together the concept of an i n t e n t i o n w i t h the concept of the means 
of i t s embodiment i n behaviour. These concepts are themselves made 
possible only i n the context of r e f l e c t i o n on s i t u a t i o n s i n which 
g o a l - d i r e c t e d behaviour has broken down. 
I am p a i n f u l l y aware t h a t these three remarks do not c o n s t i t u t e 
a comprehensive account of the issues to which they are addressed. 
Their purpose i s r a t h e r to i n d i c a t e t h a t there i s a p l a u s i b l e 
( n o n - m e n t a l i s t i c ) p i c t u r e of how we can say t h a t , w i t h i n a speech 
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s i t u a t i o n , the t h i n k i n g i s t h a t which i s to be expressed 
by means of the l i n g u i s t i c expression; and yet are not 
committed t o a s c r i b i n g appropriate i n t e n t i o n s t o the subject. 
I n the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n I w i l l look more c l o s e l y a t cases of 
f a i l u r e , of the l i n g u i s t i c expression t o f i t the t h i n k i n g 
which i s t o be thus expressed. 
Expressive F a i l u r e 
To r e c a p i t u l a t e : the concept of t h i n k i n g i s possible only 
i n v i r t u e of a 'semantic' l i n k w i t h s i t u a t i o n s of expressive 
f a i l u r e - of g e t t i n g the wrong expression f o r the t h i n k i n g t o 
be expressed. Such a l i n k i t s e l f n e cessarily presupposes a 
grasp of t h a t s i t u a t i o n ( o f expressive f a i l u r e ) w i t h which the 
concept i s t o be l i n k e d . Without some such already given 
grasp of expressive f a i l u r e , there could be no way of a 
'semantic' l i n k o b t a i n i n g between the concepts.of t h i n k i n g and 
of i t s means of embodiment, and the relev a n t aspects of the 
extra-conceptual realm. Without t h i s l i n k , the concepts 
cannot possess t h e i r r e q u i r e d 'meaning': they cannot e x i s t as 
those concepts at a l l . I want i n t h i s s ection t o examine what 
s o r t of grasp, or understanding of s i t u a t i o n s of expressive 
f a i l u r e there can be, such t h a t i t makes possible the i n t e r -
dependent p a i r of concepts i n question. The issue here i s 
p a r a l l e l t o the issue of how s i t u a t i o n s of c o g n i t i v e f a i l u r e 
are t o be grasped, so as t o make possible the c r i t i c a l concepts 
of thought and r e a l i t y . ^ 1 
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The problem we are faced w i t h i n g i v i n g an account 
of the primary grasp of s i t u a t i o n s of expressive f a i l u r e , 
e x a c t l y p a r a l l e l s the problem encountered i n accounting 
f o r the primary grasp of s i t u a t i o n s of c o g n i t i v e f a i l u r e 
( e r r o r ) . I t i s t h i s . From our conceptual vantage-point, 
as o r d i n a r y adults who have acquired the concepts of t h i n k i n g , 
and of t h a t by means of which i t i s expressed i n speech, we 
can grasp s i t u a t i o n s of expressive f a i l u r e along these l i n e s . 
We can grasp them as s i t u a t i o n s i n which the t h i n k i n g which 
i s t o be expressed, i s not adequately expressed by the ma t e r i a l 
aspect of speech; by the l i n g u i s t i c expression. Indeed, our 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l s t r a t e g y has shown t h a t we require a 'semantic' 
l i n k w i t h s i t u a t i o n s i n which t h i n k i n g and i t s m a t e r i a l expression 
are a t odds w i t h one another. But t h i s understanding of s i t u a t i o n s 
of expressive f a i l u r e c l e a r l y presupposes the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the 
concepts of t h i n k i n g and i t s means of expression: i t cannot, 
then, form p a r t of an account of the p o s s i b i l i t y of those concepts. 
The primary grasp of s i t u a t i o n s of expressive f a i l u r e must take 
another form. Again, we have a s i t u a t i o n i n which the l i n e of 
development of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l s t r a t e g y reverses the l i n e of 
primary conceptual development. I f the primary grasp of 
expressive f a i l u r e cannot employ the concepts which i t i s to 
he l p make po s s i b l e , then how i s such a grasp possible a t a l l ? 
Let us look a t some suggestions. 
The f i r s t suggestion w i l l not take us very f a r . I t i s the 
suggestion t h a t the primary grasp of expressive f a i l u r e can be 
s y n t h e t i c a l l y constructed from a grasp of i t s components, t h i n k i n g 
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and i t s means of expression. The idea behind t h i s suggestion 
i s t h a t the primary grasp of the s i t u a t i o n can be a grasp from 
' i n s i d e ' . This suggestion f a i l s , f o r a f a m i l i a r reason. To 
synthesise an understanding of a case of expressive f a i l u r e from 
the understanding of i t s components, already presupposes the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of the concepts which t h a t understanding of expressive 
f a i l u r e i s to help make possible. I t may now seem, i n the l i g h t 
of the f a i l u r e of t h i s suggestion, t h a t our next move must d i r e c t l y 
p a r a l l e l the move made i n the discussion of the c r i t i c a l concept of 
thought: That i s , i t may seem as i f we must now say t h a t the 
primary grasp of an instance of expressive f a i l u r e must be of i t 
as a t o t a l i t y , from 'outside'. I w i l l indeed argue a l i t t l e 
f u r t h e r on t h a t t h i s i s the case. Before doing so, however, 
I want t o consider some other suggestions, which a r i s e from a 
discus s i o n of how i t i s possible to get the wrong expression f o r 
the t h i n k i n g t o be expressed. I w i l l now t u r n t o t h a t discussion. 
How can an expression b# the wrong one f o r the t h i n k i n g which 
i t i s t o express? I f we consider the p a r a l l e l question, how can 
thought f a i l t o match up w i t h r e a l i t y , there seems to be l i t t l e 
problem. How th i n g s r e a l l y are i s independent of how things are 
thought t o be by the subj e c t , and there seems no good reason t o suspect 
a prearranged harmony between the two. But the case of the 
expression of the subject's t h i n k i n g i s d i f f e r e n t . For i t i s 
the subject which both t h i n k s , and u t t e r s the l i n g u i s t i c expression. 
I f the subject i s the source of both t h i n k i n g and expression, how 
can i t f a i l t o adequately express i t s thinking? How can i t f a i l 
t o achieve a f i t between the content of the t h i n k i n g , and the content 
- 246 -
of the expression uttered? Such a f a i l u r e can be possible 
only i f the content of the expression ( l i k e the content of 
r e a l i t y ) i s independent of the subject. That i s , the 
l i n g u i s t i c expression does not (pace Humpty Dumpty) mean j u s t 
what the speaker chooses i t t o mean. I f i t d i d , then whatever 
expression the subject u t t e r e d would be r i g h t ; and as Wittgenstein 
t e l l s us i n a r e l a t e d context " t h a t only means t h a t here we can't 
t a l k about ' r i g h t ' " . ' 5 ' More important f o r our present purposes, 
i t means t h a t here we can't t a l k about 'wrong'; about g e t t i n g 
the wrong expression f o r the t h i n k i n g , and so about expressive 
f a i l u r e . Expressive f a i l u r e i s possible only on c o n d i t i o n t h a t 
there e x i s t standards of r i g h t and wrong expression, of co r r e c t 
and i n c o r r e c t speech, which are independent of the i n d i v i d u a l 
s u b j e c t . I n expressing our t h i n k i n g we cannot, as the phrase 
goes, " t a l k any way our mouth goes". But t h i s discussion 
n a t u r a l l y leads us t o the question of what form these independent 
standards of r i g h t and wrong expression take; and thence to 
f u r t h e r suggestions about the nature of the primary grasp of 
instances of expressive f a i l u r e . Let us look more c l o s e l y at 
t h i s question. 
What form do the standards, by which the Tightness or wrongness 
of expressions i s measured, take? Let us look a t some ideas. 
Could these standards take the form of an e x p l i c i t set of rules 
r e l a t i n g l i n g u i s t i c expressions t o the contents of the subject's 
t h i n k i n g : f o r example; " I n order to express the thought t h a t X, 
the expression 'X' should be uttered"? C l e a r l y , t h i s w i l l not 
do. Not only are such r u l e s e n t i r e l y uninformative, but they also 
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presuppose the very concepts which comparison w i t h the 
standard i s t o help make pos s i b l e . Associated w i t h t h i s 
idea of e x p l i c i t r u l e s f o r expressing the subject's t h i n k i n g , 
i s a suggestion (our second) as t o the nature of the primary 
grasp of expressive f a i l u r e . This second suggestion i s t h a t 
t h i s grasp takes the form of a comparison of the subject's ( i n c o r r e c t ) 
speech, \n t h the standards of c o r r e c t speech, where these standards 
c o n s i s t of a set of e x p l i c i t r u l e s . Since t h i s n o t i o n of e x p l i c i t 
r u l e s f o r expressing t h i n k i n g i s , as we have seen, useless (the 
r u l e s are t r i v i a l , and presuppose the concepts a t i s s u e ) , t h i s 
second suggestion f a l l s w i t h i t . We need t o look f u r t h e r f o r a 
s a t i s f a c t o r y n o t i o n of Avhat the standards of r i g h t and wrong 
expression c o n s i s t i n . 
These standards of r i g h t and wrong expression, which make i t 
possible f o r a subject t o get the wrong expression f o r i t s t h i n k i n g , 
must be independent of the i n d i v i d u a l subject. I t must not be 
possible f o r the subject t o pi c k on j u s t any l i n g u i s t i c expression 
f o r the t h i n k i n g t o be expressed, since t h i s would make expressive 
f a i l u r e impossible. But i f these standards cannot consist i n a 
set of e x p l i c i t r u l e s , then they must be already i m p l i c i t i n speech 
(o t h e r than t h a t of the subject i n the s i t u a t i o n of experience 
f a i l u r e ) . The r u l e s of c o r r e c t expression must be impl i c i t i n 
such speech as e x i s t s p r i o r t o the instance of expressive f a i l u r e . 
I n c o r r e c t speech, we might say, the r u l e s are obeyed. There are 
cl e a r connections here w i t h Wittgenstein's arguments ( i n the 
Ph i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s and elsewhere) about the nature of 
obedience t o r u l e s . These connections are important, and I w i l l 
look a t them l a t e r on i n t h i s chapter. For the present, I want 
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t o examine a suggestion ( t h e t h i r d ) about the nature of 
the primary grasp of expressive f a i l u r e , which might n a t u r a l l y 
seem t o be associated w i t h the n o t i o n , j u s t introduced, of the 
form taken by the r u l e s of r i g h t and wrong expression. This 
t h i r d suggestion, i s t h a t we can get a primary grasp of instances 
of expressive f a i l u r e , by comparing the subject's speech i n 
question, w i t h c o r r e c t speech: speech i n which the r u l e s are 
fol l o w e d . I n order t o assess the value of t h i s t h i r d suggestion, 
l e t us look at what s o r t of comparison between d i f f e r e n t speech i s 
possible here. Can an understanding of expressive f a i l u r e be 
achieved i n terms of a comparison between the subject's speech 
and other (presumably c o r r e c t ) speech? An i n i t i a l p o i n t i s t h a t 
the subject's speech w i l l , of course, normally d i f f e r from other 
speech, i n t h a t we do not expect people to produce the same 
utterances as one another. That i s not required f o r c o r r e c t 
expression. Suppose, though, t h a t there were empir i c a l c o r r e l a t i o n s 
between the utterances produced i n the other, c o r r e c t , speech, and 
the contextual s t a t e of the world. Suppose f u r t h e r t h a t the 
subject's speech i n question was not e m p i r i c a l l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h 
the s t a t e of the world i n the same way. Would a comparison between 
the c o r r e l a t i o n s provide us w i t h a grasp of the subject's expressive 
f a i l u r e ? The answer must be t h a t i t would not. Subjects i n 
i d e n t i c a l e xternal s i t u a t i o n s may t h i n k or f e e l about those 
s i t u a t i o n s very d i f f e r e n t l y from one another, and so produce 
d i f f e r e n t utterances, w i t h o u t t h e i r being any question of t h e i r 
f a i l i n g t o adequately express t h e i r t h i n k i n g . I f t h i s proposed 
comparison of the subject's speech w i t h other speech i s to do the 
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job r e q u i r e d of i t , i t must take instead the f o l l o w i n g form. 
The comparison must be between the content of the t h i n k i n g 
which i s t o be expressed by means of the subject's utterance 
of a l i n g u i s t i c expression ("X"), and the content of the t h i n k i n g 
which i s expressed by the utterance of "X" i n the other, c o r r e c t 
speech. But such a comparison c l e a r l y cannot give us the primary 
understanding of expressive f a i l u r e we need, since i t presupposes 
the concepts of t h i n k i n g and i t s means of embodiment which i t i s 
to help provide f o r . This t h i r d suggestion as t o the nature of 
the primary grasp of cases of expressive f a i l u r e cannot, then, be 
adequate. I t f a i l s f o r e s s e n t i a l l y the same reason as the two 
preceding suggestions f a i l e d : namely, because i t aims to use the 
concepts of t h i n k i n g and i t s means of embodiment, i n constructing 
an understanding of the s i t u a t i o n of expressive f a i l u r e which i s 
to h e l p make possible those very concepts. Such an understanding 
cannot then form p a r t of an account of the p o s s i b i l i t y of those 
concepts. Let us now consider what has become i n these pages a 
f a m i l i a r approach t o t h i s s o r t of issue. 
I n the discussion i n Chapter Four of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the 
c r i t i c a l concept of thought, i t was argued t h a t the primary grasp 
of s i t u a t i o n s of e r r o r cannot co n s i s t i n some k i n d of synthesis of 
the understanding of i t s components (thought and r e a l i t y ) , since 
t h a t would presuppose the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the very concepts which 
t h a t grasp was to help make possible. We have now reached a 
p a r a l l e l stage i n the present argument. I n Chapter Four i t was 
argued t h a t i f the primary grasp of s i t u a t i o n s of c o g n i t i v e f a i l u r e 
cannot be s y n t h e t i c a l l y constructed from the understanding of i t s 
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components, then t h a t grasp must be of the s i t u a t i o n of 
c o g n i t i v e f a i l u r e as a t o t a l i t y . ^ ' The p a r a l l e l p o i n t 
holds good here. The primary grasp of s i t u a t i o n s of expressive 
f a i l u r e cannot be s y n t h e t i c a l l y constructed from the understanding 
of i t s components (the t h i n k i n g , and the means of i t s embodiment), 
since t h a t would presuppose the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the very concepts 
which t h a t grasp i s t o help make possible. The primary grasp of 
an instance of expressive f a i l u r e must then be of t h a t instance 
as a t o t a l i t y ; as a whole. The grasp of t h i s t o t a l i t y must 
i t s e l f be such as to leave open the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e f l e c t i v e 
a n alysis of the s i t u a t i o n i n terms of the expression u t t e r e d being 
the wrong one f o r the t h i n k i n g which was to be expressed or a r t i c u l a t e d . 
The f o r ce of t h i s t a l k about grasping a t o t a l i t y , i s brought out by 
considering t h a t t h i s t o t a l i t y cannot be primarily grasped from the 
• i n s i d e ' - i n terms of an understanding of i t s components - since 
t h i s would of course presuppose the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the concepts 
which are a t issue. The s i t u a t i o n of expressive f a i l u r e can be 
p r i m a r i l y grasped as a t o t a l i t y only from the 'outside', leaving 
analysis of the ' i n s i d e ' f o r subsequent r e f l e c t i o n . 
We can take the p a r a l l e l w i t h Chapter Four's argument f u r t h e r . 7 -
The t o t a l i t y we are considering i s t o b£ s p e c i f i c : one i n which 
t h i n k i n g and i t s means of embodiment are, as subsequent r e f l e c t i o n 
can show, r e l a t e d , but a t odds w i t h one another. That t o t a l i t y 
must then be marked o f f , or d e l i m i t e d , from t h a t which i s 'outside' 
i t ; from i t s surrounding context. Without such d e l i m i t a t i o n , 
there would be no p o s s i b i l i t y of grasping a s p e c i f i c t o t a l i t y from 
the outside a t a l l . Although the s p e c i f i c i t y of the t o t a l i t y can 
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be subsequently grasped i n terms of the understanding of 
i t s components (as a s i t u a t i o n i n which the t h i n k i n g t o be 
expressed i s not matched by the l i n g u i s t i c expression which 
i s t o express i t ) , i t i s p r i m a r i l y grasped only i n v i r t u e of 
i t s d e l i m i t a t i o n from i t s s p e c i f i c ' o u t s i d e 1 . I f i t were 
not so d e l i m i t e d then, since i t cannot be grasped from the 
i n s i d e , there would be no way at a l l of grasping the s i t u a t i o n 
as a t o t a l i t y a t a l l . The primary grasp of expressive f a i l u r e 
must then be of i t i n r e l a t i o n t o an 'outside* from which i t 
i s marked o f f . We have to draw the boundary of the t o t a l i t y 
(the t o t a l s i t u a t i o n i n which t h i n k i n g and i t s means of 
embodiment are r e l a t e d , but at odds) from wi t h o u t . I t cannot 
be drawn from the i n s i d e without presupposing the very concepts 
whose p o s s i b i l i t y we are t r y i n g t o account f o r . 
Pressing the p a r a l l e l f u r t h e r , we must ask how t h i s grasp 
of the t o t a l i t y of expressive f a i l u r e from w i t h o u t , i s i t s e l f 
p o s s i b l e . I f i t i s a s i t u a t i o n of expressive f a i l u r e , and i f 
t h i s f a i l u r e cannot be grasped p r i m a r i l y i n terms of a lack of 
f i t between i t s components, then i t must be p r i m a r i l y grasped i n 
r e l a t i o n t o t h a t which i t f a i l s t o achieve. What i s i t , then, 
which expressive f a i l u r e f a i l s to achieve? I t f a i l s t o achieve 
a harmony between the t h i n k i n g which i s to be a r t i c u l a t e d and 
the expression which i s t o provide the means of t h a t a r t i c u l a t i o n 
The s i t u a t i o n of expressive f a i l u r e must be p r i m a r i l y grasped as 
a t o t a l i t y i n r e l a t i o n t o what we might c a l l , h i g h l i g h t i n g the 
p a r a l l e l w i t h the argument of Chapter Four, an expressive harmony 
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This n o t i o n of expressive harmony o f f e r e d as a way of t a l k i n g 
about the context from which the s i t u a t i o n of expressive f a i l u r e 
must be d e l i m i t e d , c l e a r l y holds an important place i n the s t r u c t u r e 
of t h i s argument. Let us look a t i t more c l o s e l y . 
To begin w i t h , we must be c l e a r t h a t the n o t i o n of expressive 
harmony amounts to the n o t i o n of a coincidence between the t h i n k i n g 
t o be a r t i c u l a t e d i n speech, and the l i n g u i s t i c expression which i s 
to e f f e c t t h a t a r t i c u l a t i o n . This n o t i o n , then, c l e a r l y presupposes 
the concepts of t h i n k i n g , and i t s means of embodiment i n speech. 
The n o t i o n of expressive harmony i s therefore unavailable to a 
subject p r i o r t o r e f l e c t i o n on s i t u a t i o n s of expressive f a i l u r e , i n 
connection w i t h which those concepts are t o be made possible. P r i o r 
to such expressive f a i l u r e , the expressive harmony from which i t i s 
marked o f f i s unquestioned and unquestionable: f o r t o question i t 
would r e q u i r e those concepts which are a t t h a t stage unavailable. 
This p o i n t now leads us to the question of how the d e l i m i t a t i o n of 
the s i t u a t i o n of expressive f a i l u r e , from the context of expressive 
harmony, i s i t s e l f p o s s i b l e . 
I n Chapter Four, the p a r a l l e l problem was h i g h l i g h t e d by 
i n v e s t i g a t i n g the suggestion t h a t e r r o r i s d e l i m i t e d from c o g n i t i v e 
harmony by v i r t u e of a comparison of the two s i t u a t i o n s . The 
p a r a l l e l suggestion here, would be t h a t expressive f a i l u r e i s 
marked o f f from expressive harmony by v i r t u e of a comparison of 
the two s i t u a t i o n s . On the one side, the content of the subject's 
t h i n k i n g i s matched by the content of the l i n g u i s t i c expression: 
on the other side, i t i s not so matched. But t h i s suggestion 
cannot work. For such a comparison would presuppose the concepts 
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of t h i n k i n g and i t s means of expression, which t h a t comparison 
i s t o help make po s s i b l e . But i f we cannot use those concepts 
i n the primary d e l i m i t a t i o n of expressive f a i l u r e from the context 
of expressive harmony, then what a l t e r n a t i v e i s there? Any 
conceptual grasp of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between expressive f a i l u r e 
and expressive harmony, presupposes the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the very 
concepts a t issue. What we have here can, then, be no abstract 
conceptual marking o f f of expressive f a i l u r e from expressive harmony. 
The primary grasp of expressive f a i l u r e i n i t s d e l i m i t a t i o n from 
expressive harmony must be non-conceptual. The question now 
a r i s e s : how i s such a non-conceptual grasp of the t o t a l i t y of 
expressive f a i l u r e i t s e l f possible? 
I n order to be able t o answer t h i s new question, we need f i r s t 
t o recognise t h a t the s i t u a t i o n of expressive f a i l u r e cannot be 
d e l i m i t e d from the context of expressive harmony i n a merely 
a b s t r a c t manner, since a grasp of the t o t a l i t y of expressive f a i l u r e 
d e l i m i t e d i n such a way would r e q u i r e the concepts which i t i s to 
make p o s s i b l e . The grasp of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between expressive 
f a i l u r e and expressive harmony could not take the form of understanding 
the case of expressive f a i l u r e as a f a i l u r e to l i v e up t o an abstract 
i d e a l of expressive harmony, which we already had i n mind. The 
d e l i m i t a t i o n of expressive f a i l u r e from expressive harmony can 
only take the form of a concrete r u p t u r e , or breakdown, i n t h a t 
harmony. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between expressive f a i l u r e and expressive 
harmony, i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p of expressive f a i l u r e t o t h a t i n which 
i t c o n s t i t u t e s a r u p t u r e , or breakdown. I t i s t h i s d e l i m i t a t i o n of 
expressive f a i l u r e as a concrete breakdown i n expressive harmony -
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r a t h e r than as an a b s t r a c t comparison between the two, or 
as a f a i l u r e of one to l i v e up t o an abstract i d e a l of the 
other - which makes possible the primary non-conceptual grasp 
of the t o t a l i t y of expressive f a i l u r e . 
I n arguing towards the necessity of a non-conceptual grasp 
of expressive f a i l u r e , we have p a r a l l e l e d an important p a r t of 
the argument about the p o s s i b i l i t y of the c r i t i c a l concept of 
thought. At the p a r a l l e l stage i n t h a t argument, I o f f e r e d an 
i l l u s t r a t i o n . I am sure t h a t i t would be, or a t l e a s t seem to 
be, h e l p f u l t o do so here. Nonetheless, I must postpone 
i l l u s t r a t i o n of the argument f o r the time being. The reason 
f o r t h i s i s t h a t , although the s t r u c t u r e of the argument i n t h i s 
chapter runs p a r a l l e l i n important respects t o t h a t of Chapter 
Four, the issue of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h i n k i n g and i t s means 
of embodiment i n speech i s more complicated than the issue of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between thought and r e a l i t y . These complications 
need e l u c i d a t i n g before i n t e l l i g i b l e i l l u s t r a t i o n of the present 
argument i s possible. I w i l l do t h i s i n the next s e c t i o n , by 
l o o k i n g i n more d e t a i l a t the nature of t h a t expressive harmony 
which has been so important to the argument of t h i s s e c t ion. 
(An i l l u s t r a t i o n of a breakdown i n expressive harmony, which 
f o l l o w s the e l a b o r a t i o n of the n o t i o n of expressive harmony as 
a p a t t e r n of communication, i s provided i n the f o u r t h section of 
t h i s chapter: seepp.275-6). 
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Expressive Harmony 
I n the previous s e c t i o n I argued t h a t the primary grasp of 
the s i t u a t i o n of expressive f a i l u r e i s possible only i n v i r t u e 
of i t s d e l i m i t a t i o n from a context of expressive harmony. This 
d e l i m i t a t i o n , i t was argued, must necessarily take the form of 
a concrete breakdown i n t h a t harmony. I want to now look closer 
a t the nature of t h i s expressive harmony. 
The basic n o t i o n here i s t h a t of g e t t i n g the r i g h t expression 
f o r the t h i n k i n g which i s t o be a r t i c u l a t e d or expressed. But 
what i s i t t o get the r i g h t expression f o r one's thinking? We 
noted, i n the previous s e c t i o n , t h a t i n order f o r i t to be possible 
t o get the wrong expression f o r the t h i n k i n g , there must be standards 
concerning the r i g h t and wrong expression of the subject's t h i n k i n g . 
These standards must be independent of the i n d i v i d u a l subject. 
I t cannot be the case t h a t the subject can l e g i t i m a t e l y p i c k on 
any l i n g u i s t i c expression f o r the t h i n k i n g t o be expressed; f o r then 
i t would be impossible to get the wrong expression, and s i t u a t i o n s 
of expressive f a i l u r e could not occur. Expressive f a i l u r e , then, 
occurs when these standards are not complied w i t h ; expressive 
harmony obtains when speech does comply w i t h these standards. 
But what s o r t of form do these standards take? I t was also 
argued i n the previous s e c t i o n , t h a t these standards cannot consist 
p r i m a r i l y i n a set of e x p l i c i t r u l e s , r e l a t i n g l i n g u i s t i c expressions 
to the contents of the speaker's t h i n k i n g . Not only would these 
r u l e s be e n t i r e l y t r i v i a l and u n h e l p f u l , but they would also presuppose 
the concepts of t h i n k i n g and i t s l i n g u i s t i c expression. Now i f these 
concepts are made possible only i n the context of r e f l e c t i o n on a 
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breakdown i n expressive harmony, then these concepts are not 
a v a i l a b l e t o the subject p r i o r t o t h a t breakdown. Expressive 
harmony, then, cannot be a matter of f o l l o w i n g a set of e x p l i c i t 
r u l e s , whose understanding would already require the possession 
of those concepts. I f the r u l e s governing the Tightness and 
wrongness of the expression of t h i n k i n g cannot be p r i m a r i l y 
e x p l i c i t , then they must be somehow i m p l i c i t , or embedded, i n 
something e l s e . This 'something else' can only be speech 
i t s e l f . The ru l e s of c o r r e c t expression must be i m p l i c i t i n 
speech, other than t h a t speech i n which the speaker s u f f e r s 
expressive f a i l u r e . I n such speech, the r u l e s are followed. 
Let us now look a t the connections between t h i s argument, and 
Wittgenstein's discussions on f o l l o w i n g a r u l e . 
I n order to make the connection e x p l i c i t , r e c a l l one of the 
comparatively rare d i r e c t p h i l o s o p h i c a l assertions i n the 
P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s : 
I t i s not possible t h a t there should have 
been only one occasion on which someone 
obeyed a r u l e . ^ * 
I am committed to agreeing w i t h Wittgenstein on t h i s , having j u s t 
argued t h a t the primary grasp of expressive f a i l u r e i s possible 
only i f expressive f a i l u r e i s d e l i m i t e d from a context of expressive 
harmony, i n which standards of the r i g h t expression of t h i n k i n g are 
already i m p l i c i t i n other speech. But l e t us elaborate on t h i s a 
l i t t l e f u r t h e r . Why i s an i s o l a t e d case of r u l e - f o l l o w i n g not 
possible? Let us imagine a s i n g l e , s o l i t a r y speech-act. I s i t 
possible f o r such a speech-act t o be, i n the absence of any other 
speech, an instance of obeying the r u l e s of c o r r e c t speech? To 
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answer t h i s question, l e t us consider the a v a i l a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s . 
I f t h a t speech-act i s the only instance of speech t h a t e x i s t s , 
then, ex hypothesis, i t cannot be obeying rules which are i m p l i c i t 
i n other speech. Perhaps i t i s instead the case t h a t t h i s 
speech-act could be s e t t i n g standards f o r f u t u r e speech-acts: 
but i n t h a t case i t i s a s i t u a t i o n i n which rules are being 
produced, r a t h e r than obeyed. The only a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h i s , i s 
t h a t the s o l i t a r y speech-act i s obeying an e x p l i c i t r u l e , such 
as " I n order to express t h i s t h i n k i n g , you should u t t e r the 
expression 'X'." The argument I have already o f f e r e d above, 
i s t h a t t o be able to understand and f o l l o w such an e x p l i c i t r u l e , 
would r e q u i r e the possession of concepts which are not a v a i l a b l e 
to the subject p r i o r t o r e f l e c t i o n on breakdown i n expressive 
harmony. The expressive harmony cannot then i t s e l f consist i n 
the subject's f o l l o w i n g such e x p l i c i t r u l e s . Wittgenstein's 
argument on t h i s issue i s d i f f e r e n t . Instead of dealing w i t h 
the necessary presuppositions of the concepts r e q u i r e d t o f o l l o w 
such r u l e s , he argues t h a t such a r u l e cannot determine how an 
expression i s to be used: "no course of action could be determined 
by a r u l e , because every course of a c t i o n can be made out to accord 
w i t h the r u l e " . * 0 . The r u l e by i t s e l f cannot e s t a b l i s h the r i g h t 
or wrong use of an expression, i t requires an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a 
r u l e f o r applying the r u l e . But t h i s i n t u r n cannot e s t a b l i s h 
the r i g h t or wrong use of an expression, since any course of act i o n 
could be made out t o accord w i t h the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . We would 
need an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and so on. I n 
Wittgenstein's words: 
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any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t i l l hangs i n the 
a i r along w i t h what i t i n t e r p r e t s , and 
cannot give i t any support. I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
by themselves do not determine meaning.H» 
For W i t t g e n s t e i n : 
What t h i s shows i s t h a t there i s a way 
of grasping a r u l e which i s not an 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , but which i s e x h i b i t e d 
i n what we c a l l "obeying the r u l e " and 
"going against i t " i n actual cases.I 2-' 
And hence also 'obeying a r u l e ' i s a p r a c t i c e . * 3 -
Wittgenstein's i n s i g h t s i n t o the business of f o l l o w i n g 
r u l e s , are considerable. I t i s on the nature of t h e i r status 
t h a t we p a r t company. I n the present chapter I have used these 
i n s i g h t s i n the service of a more systematic p h i l o s o p h i c a l strategy 
than W i t t g e n s t e i n would have admitted. Following r u l e s i n speech 
has been shown to be a necessary c o n d i t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
expressive f a i l u r e , hence of the concept of t h i n k i n g , hence of the 
c r i t i c a l concept of thought, and hence of a l l c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
i n q u i r y . For W i t t g e n s t e i n , these i n s i g h t s are notes "on the grammar 
of the expression 'to obey a r u l e ' " . ^ Both Wittgenstein's argument 
and the argument of the present chapter came to the conclusion t h a t 
f o l l o w i n g r u l e s i n speech cannot be p r i m a r i l y a matter of obeying 
e x p l i c i t r u l e s . I t i s r a t h e r t h a t i n actual speech the r u l e s are 
already embedded. Let us look a t the i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s conclusion 
f o r the discussion of expressive harmony. 
I f the argument so f a r i s r i g h t , then expressive harmony -
g e t t i n g the r i g h t expression f o r the t h i n k i n g t o be expressed -
i s a matter of i m p l i c i t l y f o l l o w i n g r u l e s which are already embedded 
i n other speech. Wittgenstein's term f o r t h i s i s "agreement" i n 
language. 1 5 - I n expressing i t s t h i n k i n g a r i g h t , the subject i s agreeing 
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i n i t s use of language w i t h the subjects of other speech-acts. 
Now l e t us look closer a t t h i s n o t i o n of agreement. I n what 
e x a c t l y does i t consist? Consider some suggestions. Their 
inadequacies should p o i n t us towards a more s a t i s f a c t o r y account 
of the matter. F i r s t : could t h i s agreement i n the use of 
language be a matter of a subject t a k i n g a c e r t a i n sample of 
other speech as a model: and, on the basis of t h a t model, 
i n t e n t i o n a l l y producing s i m i l a r speech? This suggestion w i l l 
not work, f o r t h i s reason. The n o t i o n of s i m i l a r speech 
employed here, i f i t i s t o play the p a r t required of i t , must 
amount t o the n o t i o n of a r t i c u l a t i n g the same thought-content 
by means of the same l i n g u i s t i c expression. I n order t o be 
able t o i n t e n d t o speak l i k e the model speech, the subject would 
thus need t o possess concepts ( o f t h i n k i n g and i t s means of 
a r t i c u l a t i o n ) which are not a t t h a t p o i n t a v a i l a b l e t o i t . Let 
us t u r n t o a second suggestion. This i s the suggestion t h a t 
agreement i n use of language could c o n s i s t merely i n the happy 
coincidence t h a t independent subjects happen to express t h e i r 
t h i n k i n g by means of the same l i n g u i s t i c m a t e r i a l . (Something 
l i k e t h i s suggestion i s a t work i n the w r i t i n g s of the c l a s s i c a l 
B r i t i s h E m p i r i c i s t s . ) This second suggestion w i l l . n o t work 
e i t h e r . For i f agreement i n the use of language consisted 
merely i n t h i s coincidence between the speech of independent 
s u b j e c t s , then now could a grasp of a breakdown i n expressive 
harmony be possible? I t would have t o take the form of a 
r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the subject i n question no longer expressed 
i t s t h i n k i n g by means of the same l i n g u i s t i c expressions as 
other speakers. But such a r e c o g n i t i o n would already r e q u i r e 
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the concepts of t h i n k i n g and i t s means of expression, i n order 
to be able t o compare the way i n which subjects a r t i c u l a t e t h e i r 
t h i n k i n g . ^ - This suggestion i s , i n e f f e c t , the t h i r d suggestion 
o f f e r e d i n the previous s e c t i o n as t o the nature of the primary 
grasp of expressive f a i l u r e : but approached from a d i f f e r e n t 
angle. However, i f r e p e t i t i o u s , i t can s t i l l p o i n t us i n the 
r i g h t d i r e c t i o n . As we w i l l see, i t points us i n the d i r e c t i o n 
of an account of the concrete nature of expressive harmony. 
Both of these suggestions as t o the nature of the agreement 
i n language, i n which expressive harmony co n s i s t s , f a i l . They 
f a i l because they presuppose the possession, on the p a r t of speaking 
s u b j e c t s , of the concepts of t h i n k i n g and i t s l i n g u i s t i c expression, 
which are made possible only i n the context of r e f l e c t i o n on a 
breakdown i n t h a t expressive harmony. Those concepts are not 
a v a i l a b l e t o subjects i n agreement i n language p r i o r to such 
breakdown. I n order t h a t we might see what a l t e r n a t i v e suggestion 
t o these two i s a v a i l a b l e , l e t us connect up the argument of the 
present s e c t i o n , w i t h t h a t of the sect i o n preceding. 
I n the argument of the previous s e c t i o n , the p o i n t was made 
t h a t the primary grasp of the s i t u a t i o n of expressive f a i l u r e must 
take the form of a non-conceptual grasp of a concrete breakdown i n 
expressive harmony. We have now seen t h a t t h i s expressive harmony -
g e t t i n g the r i g h t expression f o r the t h i n k i n g which i s to be a r t i c u l a t e d 
i s a matter of agreement i n language: of i m p l i c i t l y f o l l o w i n g rules 
which are already embedded i n other speech. But suppose t h a t t h i s 
agreement i n the use of language were j u s t a matter of an abstract 
coincidence, between the r e l a t i o n between the contents of the t h i n k i n g 
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and the l i n g u i s t i c expression i n one speech, and the r e l a t i o n 
between those contents i n another subject's speech. I f t h i s 
were the case, then the grasp of a breakdown i n expressive harmony, 
and so the primary grasp of expressive f a i l u r e , would have t o be 
a matter of comparing the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the subject's 
t h i n k i n g and i t s expression i n one case, w i t h t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p 
i n another case. But t h i s s o r t of comparison, as we have seen, 
already presupposes the very concepts which r e f l e c t i o n on t h i s 
breakdown i s t o help make p o s s i b l e . Such.a comparison cannot, 
then, form p a r t of an account of the p o s s i b i l i t y of those concepts. 
I n the l i g h t of these remarks, what i s needed to make possible t h a t 
non-conceptual grasp of breakdown i n expressive harmony, which i s 
i t s e l f r e q u i r e d as a necessary c o n d i t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
the concepts of t h i n k i n g and i t s means of embodiment? The 
requirement i s t h i s : i n order f o r t h a t non-conceptual grasp of 
breakdown i n expresive harmony to be possible, the agreement i n 
language-use i n which t h a t expressive harmony c o n s i s t s , must have 
a concrete nature. I f i t were merely a matter of an abstract 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the t h i n k i n g and the expressions u t t e r e d by 
d i f f e r e n t s u bjects, then i t s breakdown could only be r e g i s t e r e d 
u sing the concepts whose p o s s i b i l i t y i s at issue. Only i f t h a t 
agreement i s of a concrete nature, can there be a non-conceptual 
grasp of i t s concrete breakdown.^- Expressive harmony, then, must 
be a matter of a concrete agreement between speakers i n the language 
they use. This has an a t t r a c t i v e W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n f l a v o u r , but i t 
b r i n g s w i t h i t c e r t a i n questions. This n o t i o n of 'concrete 
agreement' may have played a u s e f u l p a r t i n the present philosophical 
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s t r a t e g y , h e l p i n g us to account f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of a 
non-conceptual grasp of s i t u a t i o n s of expressive f a i l u r e , 
but what e x a c t l y does i t involve? We know t h a t agreement 
i n the use of language cannot be j u s t the k i n d of abstract 
coincidence described e a r l i e r , but what i s i t f o r such agreement 
to be 'concrete'? Consideration of these questions w i l l lead 
us towards an understanding of the necessary s t r u c t u r e of 
communication. We w i l l take them up i n the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n . 
Communication 
Let us summarise the argument of the present chapter so 
f a r , i n the f o l l o w i n g two sentences. The concept of t h i n k i n g 
i s made possible only i n the context of r e f l e c t i o n on a non-conceptually 
r e g i s t e r e d breakdown of expresive harmony i n t o a s i t u a t i o n of expressive 
f a i l u r e . This expressive harmony - g e t t i n g the r i g h t expression 
f o r the t h i n k i n g t o be a r t i c u l a t e d i n speech - i s a matter of a 
concrete agreement between speaking subjects i n t h e i r use of language. 
The question I wish t o consider i n t h i s s e c t i o n , i s i n what does 
t h i s 'concrete* agreement consist? We can move towards an account 
of t h i s concrete agreement, and so t o an account of the necessary 
s t r u c t u r e of communication, by considering a succession of po i n t s . 
These p o i n t s w i l l lead us i n the d i r e c t i o n of a conception of 
agreement i n language as e s s e n t i a l l y i n v o l v i n g subjects which 
understand each other's speech, and thence t o a f u r t h e r development 
of the argument. 
The f i r s t of these p o i n t s i s t h i s . I f there i s t o be concrete 
agreement i n the use of l i n g u i s t i c expressions, then the speaking 
subjects involved cannot be e n t i r e l y independent, and unrelated t o 
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one another. I f they were so u n r e l a t e d , then any agreement 
i n language could be a matter only of an a b s t r a c t coincidence 
of the k i n d described i n the previous s e c t i o n , making a non-
conceptual grasp of the breakdown i n t h a t agreement, and so 
the concept of t h i n k i n g i t s e l f , impossible. The second p o i n t 
i s the f a i r l y obvious one t h a t the s o r t of r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t 
e x i s t s between these speaking subjects, must i n v o l v e t h e i r 
speech. I f they merely r e l a t e d to each other i n ways which 
do not i n v o l v e speech (perhaps they knock against each other, 
or share the food they f i n d ) , then t h i s has nothing t o do w i t h 
agreement i n speech. This leads on t o the t h i r d p o i n t , which 
concerns the way i n which the r e l a t i o n s h i p between subjects 
involves speech. For there seems to be more than one p o s s i b i l i t y 
here. For example, could t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p be merely a matter 
of causal e f f e c t s on behaviour, such t h a t an utterance of an 
expression "X", causes a subject t o behave i n a c e r t a i n manner? 
The answer i s t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p cannot be of t h i s k i n d . Such 
a behavioural r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of 1 communication 1-has nothing t o do 
w i t h the n o t i o n of a subject a r t i c u l a t i n g i t s t h i n k i n g . I f t h i s 
'agreement' were to break down (so t h a t the utterance of "X" d i d 
not evince the normally r e s u l t a n t behaviour), the subject could 
perhaps r e f l e c t t h a t the utterance had f a i l e d to produce the usual 
r e s u l t : but there i s no room f o r the d i s t i n c t i o n between", the 
l i n g u i s t i c expression and the t h i n k i n g which was to be a r t i c u l a t e d 
by means of t h a t expression. A merely causal r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
speech and behaviour cannot provide f o r the r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h i n 
speech between the t h i n k i n g and t h a t by means of which i t i s t o be 
a r t i c u l a t e d . ^ ' R e f l e c t i n g on these three p o i n t s , l e t me o f f e r a 
general remark about the nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p of agreement 
\irhich i s t o o b t a i n between speakers i n respect of t h e i r use of language 
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This remark, the f o u r t h p o i n t , i s as f o l l o w s . Concrete 
agreement i n language n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e s , at the l e a s t , 
speakers who understand the speech-acts of others, who understand 
what other subjects say. Let us look a t the reason why t h i s must 
be so. Concrete agreement i n the use of language must take the 
form of a r e l a t i o n s h i p between subjects, which involves t h e i r 
speech. Now, i f , i n t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p , subjects do not grasp 
the content of the t h i n k i n g which i s a r t i c u l a t e d i n other speech, 
then t h i s r e s t r i c t s the s o r t of breakdown which i s possible i n 
t h a t concrete agreement i n language. For unless t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p 
does i n v o l v e one subject grasping the content of the t h i n k i n g t h a t 
i s expressed i n another's speech, then there i s no way i n which a 
breakdown i n t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p can be a matter of g e t t i n g the wrong 
expression f o r the t h i n k i n g t o be expressed. Breakdown might, perhaps, 
be a matter of f a i l u r e t o produce the behavioural e f f e c t s u s u a l l y 
associated w i t h the utterance of a c e r t a i n expression, but r e f l e c t i o n 
on such a 'breakdown' could not analyse i t i n terms of the speaker's 
expressive f a i l u r e . Unless the r e l a t i o n s h i p between subjects 
i n v o l v e s , i n p a r t , subjects which grasp the content of the t h i n k i n g 
expressed i n the speech of others, then the question of a f a i l u r e t o 
get the r i g h t expression f o r such t h i n k i n g simply cannot a r i s e . 
Expressive harmony, then, consists i n agreement between speaking 
subjects i n language-use. This agreement must i t s e l f take the form 
of a concrete r e l a t i o n s h i p between subjects, which consists a t l e a s t 
i n p a r t of subjects grasping the content of the t h i n k i n g expressed i n 
another's speech: i n other words, of subjects who understand the speech 
of o t h e rs. I t i s then possible f o r a breakdown i n t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p of 
understanding t o be r e f l e c t i v e l y analysed i n terms of the subject's 
expressive f a i l u r e . 
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Having introduced the n o t i o n of understanding i n t h i s 
way, we must now be c a r e f u l about i t s use i n t h i s argument. 
I have t a l k e d of understanding as t h a t grasp of the content 
of the t h i n k i n g which i s expressed i n another subject's speech. 
This grasp i n t u r n makes possible a r e f l e c t i v e analysis of a 
breakdown i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between subjects, i n terms of a 
subject g e t t i n g the wrong expression f o r the t h i n k i n g t o be 
expressed. This i s the s o r t of account which i s a v a i l a b l e t o 
us ( w r i t e r and r e a d e r ) , as subjects who have gone through the 
process of a c q u i r i n g the concepts of t h i n k i n g and i t s means of 
expression i n speech. But these concepts presuppose r e f l e c t i o n 
on a breakdown i n the context of expressive harmony: they are not 
t h e r e f o r e a v a i l a b l e t o subjects which are i n t h a t s t ate of agreement 
i n language p r i o r t o i t s breakdown. What t h i s means, i s t h a t those 
subjects' understanding of one another's speech cannot i t s e l f be 
a matter of e x p l i c i t l y a s s o c i a t i n g a p a r t i c u l a r thought-content 
w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r expression: f o r t o do t h i s would r e q u i r e those 
concepts which are a t t h a t p o i n t unavailable. That understanding, 
then, cannot consist i n the a b s t r a c t a s s o c i a t i o n of the content of 
a subject's t h i n k i n g w i t h the p a r t i c u l a r l i n g u i s t i c expression by 
means of which t h a t t h i n k i n g i s a r t i c u l a t e d . The grasp of the 
content of the t h i n k i n g expressed i n another's speech cannot be 
e x p l i c i t , but must be embedded i n a more concrete form. What are 
we t o make of t h i s ? 
I have argued t h a t expressive harmony must be a matter of agreement 
between subjects i n t h e i r use of language. This agreement cannot be 
a mere a b s t r a c t coincidence between the way t h e i r thoughts are expressed, 
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but must take the form of a concrete r e l a t i o n s h i p i n which 
one another's speech i s understood. This understanding, 
i n t u r n , cannot be a matter of e x p l i c i t a ssociation of a 
thought-content w i t h a l i n g u i s t i c expression, but must be 
embedded i n the more concrete aspects of the subject's 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . I now want to ask what, e x a c t l y , t h i s 
understanding of another's speech 'concretely' consists i n . 
Let me begin by c a l l i n g the way i n which a subject r e l a t e s to 
the speech of another i t s response. I must be c l e a r here 
t h a t t h i s response cannot be j u s t a behavioural e f f e c t caused 
by the production of a speech-act: the response i s t h a t i n which 
understanding - grasping the content of the t h i n k i n g expressed i n 
the speech - c o n s i s t s . Agreement i n language, then, necessarily 
involves subjects responding t o the speech-acts of others i n a 
way which c o n s t i t u t e s t h e i r understanding of t h a t speech. 
Understanding one another's speech, which i s i t s e l f a necessary 
c o n d i t i o n of agreement i n language being more than a mere abstract 
coincidence, must take the form of concrete responses, on the p a r t 
of s u b j e c t s , t o the speech-acts of others. What s o r t of responses 
must these be? W i l l any s o r t of response do? Let me take up 
these questions. 
To answer the second question: c l e a r l y not j u s t any s o r t of 
response to speech w i l l c o n s t i t u t e understanding t h a t speech. I f 
agreement i n language was j u s t a matter of responding i n any way 
whatever to.a subject's speech-act, then there could be no way of 
r e g i s t e r i n g a breakdown i n t h a t agreement. For i f any response 
c o n s t i t u t e d understanding, then a breakdown i n understanding could 
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not be r e g i s t e r e d on the basis of the response which t h a t 
understanding consists i n : i t could only be grasped i n terms 
of an e x p l i c i t comparison between the content of the t h i n k i n g 
expressed by means of the speaker's utterance of a c e r t a i n 
expression, and the thought-content associated w i t h t h a t 
expression by the audience of the speech-act. But of course 
such a comparison employs concepts which are not a t t h a t stage 
a v a i l a b l e : they presuppose r e f l e c t i o n on a breakdown i n 
expressive harmony, and cannot be the terms i n which such a 
breakdown i s p r i m a r i l y grasped. Not j u s t any k i n d of response 
w i l l do here, then. But does t h i s mean t h a t each p a r t i c u l a r 
expression c a l l s f o r one s p e c i f i c response? Let us consider 
t h i s suggestion. 
I f agreement i n language cannot be a matter of subjects 
responding t o speech-acts i n j u s t any way whatsoever, then the 
suggestion t h a t the utterance of each p a r t i c u l a r expression c a l l s 
f o r a p a r t i c u l a r response might seem a n a t u r a l one. I n discussing 
why t h i s suggestion w i l l not work, we should be able to see our way 
forward t o a more adequate account of the responses t o speech-acts 
which c o n s t i t u t e the audience's understanding of the speech of others 
The problem w i t h t h i s suggestion of a one-to-one r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between l i n g u i s t i c expressions and responses to t h e i r utterance, 
i s t h a t i t c a l l s f o r f a r too t i g h t a connection between speech and 
response. For surely I may respond to the utterance "The ice-cream 
van i s here" i n a number of d i f f e r e n t ways: by covering up the ears 
of my c h i l d r e n ; by h i d i n g i n the cupboard under the s t a i r s ; by 
searching my pockets f o r money; and so on. Each of these responses 
i n d i f f e r e n t contexts, might count as understanding the utterance; 
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as grasping the content of the t h i n k i n g t h e r e i n expressed. 
To see what i s meant by " d i f f e r e n t contexts" here, look at 
the responses i n the example. Covering my ch i l d r e n ' s ears 
would count as an understanding response, i f I believe t h a t 
they w i l l want an ice-cream; i f I do not \irish t o have t o cope 
w i t h t h e i r requests; and i f I believe t h a t covering t h e i r ears 
w i l l prevent the request occurring t o them. H i d i n g i n the 
cupboard would count as an understanding response, i f I believe 
t h a t the c h i l d r e n w i l l want an ice-cream; i f I do not want to 
cope w i t h t h e i r requests; and i f I believe t h a t I w i l l evade 
those requests by h i d i n g . Searching f o r money i s an understanding 
response i f I believe t h a t the c h i l d r e n w i l l want ice-creams; i f 
I want t o give them a t r e a t ; and i f I believe t h a t money i s a 
p r e - r e q u i s i t e f o r o b t a i n i n g the ice-creams. What t h i s example makes 
c l e a r , i s t h a t a number of d i f f e r e n t responses to a speech-act may 
count as understanding t h a t speech-act, given a c e r t a i n context of 
b e l i e f s and desires ( o r w a n t s ) . ^ Recognition of t h i s p o i n t (which 
has become a truism i n discussions of ' r a d i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ' ) ^ " 
allows us t o r e j e c t the suggestion of a one-to-one r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between l i n g u i s t i c expressions and responses t o t h e i r utterance. 
Nevertheless, i t b r i n g s w i t h i t a d i f f i c u l t y which we need to look 
a t now. 
The d i f f i c u l t y i s t h i s . I f what counts as an understanding 
response t o a speech-act i s determined by the context of the hearer's 
b e l i e f s and desires, or wants, then i t seems t h a t there i s no l i m i t 
t o what can count as understanding the speech. When my neighbour 
takes out a sub-machine gun and r i d d l e s the ice-cream van w i t h 
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b u l l e t s , t h i s may count as understanding the speech - i n the 
l i g h t of h i s b e l i e f t h a t a l l ice-cream vans conceal platoons 
of enemy s o l d i e r s , and of h i s desire to p r o t e c t our estate from 
t h e i r i n v a s i o n . Any response whatsoever, given an appropriate 
context of b e l i e f s and de s i r e s , can count as understanding another's 
speech-act: and t h i s takes us back t o the problem discussed two 
paragraphs ago, of how a breakdown i n such an agreement i n language 
could be grasped. Let us reconsider t h a t problem, i n the l i g h t of 
the p o i n t s j u s t made. 
Our f i r s t way of de a l i n g w i t h t h i s problem, was to argue t h a t 
i f agreement i n language was j u s t a matter of responding i n any 
way whatsoever t o the utterance of a l i n g u i s t i c expression, then 
there would be no way of grasping a breakdown i n t h a t agreement, 
without already presupposing the concepts of t h i n k i n g and i t s means 
of expression which r e f l e c t i o n on such breakdown i s to help make 
pos s i b l e . We have now apparently returned to t h i s problem, only 
w i t h an added q u a l i f i c a t i o n : i t seems now t h a t any response w i l l 
do, w i l l count as agreement i n language, given an appropriate 
context of b e l i e f s and desires on the p a r t of the responding 
sub j e c t . How w i l l a grasp of breakdown i n agreement i n language, 
understood on these l i n e s , be possible? C l e a r l y , i f i t i s the 
context of b e l i e f s and desires which determines whether a response 
counts or does not count as understanding the speech, then a grasp 
of a response as not understanding the utterance of the l i n g u i s t i c 
expression, presupposes some k i n d of awareness of the b e l i e f s and 
desires of the responding subject. Now as everyday a d u l t s , who 
have gone through the process of acqu i r i n g the concepts of b e l i e f , 
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desire and l i n g u i s t i c expression, we are i n a p o s i t i o n to 
e x p l i c i t l y judge our audiences response i n the l i g h t of what 
.2.1 
we know about t h e i r b e l i e f s and desires. Thus I might say 
t h a t , given what I know of my neighbour's b e l i e f s and desires, 
h i s response t o the utterance "The ice-cream van i s here" 
cannot count as understanding the utterance. Perhaps he thought 
I s a i d "The hot-dog van i s here". (Or, of course, perhaps h i s 
b e l i e f s and desires have a l t e r e d . ) Indeed, i n t e r p r e t i n g the 
behaviour of other people i s now fashionably seen as solving a 
set of simultaneous equations concerning the b e l i e f s , desires 
and meanings of the subjects whose behaviour i s t o be rendered 
i n t e l l i g i b l e . But does t h i s o f f e r us a workable account of 
expressive harmony and the primary grasp of i t s breakdown? 
The answer must be t h a t i t does not. Let us consider why. 
This account of expressive harmony and the primary grasp 
of i t s breakdown, i n terms of responses t o speech-acts w i t h i n 
an e x p l i c i t context of b e l i e f s and desires cannot work. For 
t h a t s o r t of e x p l i c i t awareness of the context of b e l i e f s and 
desires i n the l i g h t of which a response to a speech-act c o n s t i t u t e s 
understanding, c l e a r l y presupposes the concepts of b e l i e f and desire. 
Now I have already argued t h a t the concept of t h i n k i n g necessarily 
presupposes r e f l e c t i o n on breakdown i n expressive harmony, so t h a t 
i t cannot be employed i n the primary grasp of t h a t breakdown. 
Exa c t l y the same argument w i l l be r e a d i l y seen t o apply t o the 
concept of b e l i e f - indeed, i n t h a t argument, no d i s t i n c t i o n was 
maintained between these two concepts. Expressive harmony-prior 
t o breakdown, and the primary grasp of t h a t breakdown, cannot then 
i n v o l v e the concept of b e l i e f : f o r t h a t concept i s a t t h a t stage 
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u n a v a i l a b l e . This i s enought t o show t h a t the account 
suggested above, of agreement i n language and the grasp of 
i t s breakdown, i s inadequate. But what of the concept of 
desire? I t i s not c l e a r to me t h a t t h i s concept necessarily 
presupposes a breakdown i n agreement i n language. Nevertheless, 
the f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s can be made. F i r s t : were the concept of 
desire t o be accounted f o r i n m e n t a l i s t i c terms, i t would not only 
come up against W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n arguments, but would also be faced 
w i t h the problem of the o n t o l o g i c a l inadequacy t h a t characterises 
consciousness, and which was discussed i n connection w i t h the 
concept of t h i n k i n g i n Chapter Five. Second: t o overcome t h i s 
o n t o l o g i c a l inadequacy would take us along a path p a r a l l e l i n some 
s i g n i f i c a n t respects to the argument of Chapter Five: The concept 
of desire would presuppose an understanding of a d e s i r i n g subject, 
where t h i s desire was embodied i n a mode of t h a t subject's existence 
This aspect of the subject's existence would be i t s v o l u n t a r y 
a c t i v i t y . I n order then t o be able t o ab s t r a c t the concept of 
desire from the understanding of the subject as a c t i n g , there 
would have to be a r e f l e c t i o n on s i t u a t i o n s i n which the desire 
and the behaviour were at odds. These would be s i t u a t i o n s i n which 
the behaviour d i d not r e s u l t i n the f u l f i l l m e n t of the desire; 
s i t u a t i o n s of p r a c t i c a l f a i l u r e . Whatever the d e t a i l s of such 
an argument, we can be c l e a r on t h i s p o i n t . The concept of desire 
n e c e s s a r i l y presupposes r e f l e c t i o n on the subject's a c t i v i t y . 
Furthermore, t h i s r e f l e c t i o n w i l l i t s e l f presuppose agreement i n 
the language by means of which i t i s expressed. The concept of 
d e s i r e , t h a t i s t o say, already presupposes a r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
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speaking subjects of responses which c o n s t i t u t e t h e i r 
understanding of one author's speech-acts. Without the 
existence of t h i s agreement i n language, the concept of 
desire would not be pos s i b l e . Let me now add one f u r t h e r 
piece of t h i s p i c t u r e of agreement i n language. 
I n considering the nature of responses to speech-acts, 
i t has been argued t h a t such response must, i n order t o 
c o n s t i t u t e understanding the speech-act, be appropriate i n 
the l i g h t of an unquestioned, assumed context of an awareness 
of , and p r a c t i c a l involvement i n , the world. There i s a 
c o r o l l a r y here. This i s t h a t the speech-act must i t s e l f be 
appropriate i n the l i g h t of t h a t unquestioned context. For i f 
a speech-act i s not a t a l l appropriate to t h a t context of b e l i e f s 
and d e s i r e s , then there i s nothing i n r e l a t i o n to which the audience 
can make an apt response; the p a t t e r n of speech-act and appropriate 
response cannot e x i s t . I f , f o r example, a speaker says something 
of no possible i n t e r e s t t o the audience, or t e l l s the audience 
something which i t i s c l e a r t h a t the audience i t s e l f knows very 
w e l l , then there i s no appropriate response. The p a t t e r n of 
speech-act and response can only e x i s t i f a t l e a s t some speech-acts 
are not l i k e t h i s , but are appropriate to the awareness of the 
world and the p r a c t i c a l involvements i n i t , which, together provide 
the context of speech and response. Agreement i n language, we can 
now conclude, must be a matter of a p a t t e r n of appropriate speech-acts 
and responses to them. Let us now put together the pieces of t h i s 
p i c t u r e of agreement i n language. 
- 273 -
Expressive harmony consists i n an agreement between 
speaking subjects i n the language they use. This agreement 
i n language must i t s e l f c o n s i s t of a r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
subjects of understanding one another's speech-acts. This 
understanding must i t s e l f take the form of appropriate responses 
to speech-acts. These responses are appropriate - they 
c o n s t i t u t e understanding of the s a l i e n t speech-act - only i n 
the l i g h t of a context of b e l i e f s and desires on the p a r t of 
the responding subject. O r i g i n a l l y , t h i s context of b e l i e f s 
and desires can not be e x p l i c i t , since the concepts of b e l i e f and 
desire already presuppose a p r e - e x i s t i n g expressive harmony (and, 
a t l e a s t i n the case of the concept of b e l i e f , a breakdown i n 
t h a t harmony). The context of b e l i e f s and d e s i r e s , i n the l i g h t 
of which responses to speech-acts c o n s t i t u t e the understanding of 
those speech acts, must then be taken f o r granted. That t h a t 
context obtains must be unquestioned and unquestionable, since t o 
question i t would presuppose concepts which are not at t h a t stage 
a v a i l a b l e . These b e l i e f s and desires must have a r e s t r i c t e d range, 
so as t o r u l e out the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t any response t o a speechract 
could count as appropriate. For i f any response could be appropriat 
and hence form p a r t of the agreement i n language which c o n s t i t u t e s 
expressive harmony, then the primary grasp of breakdown i n t h a t 
harmony would have t o employ concepts which are not a t t h a t stage 
a v a i l a b l e . These would be e i t h e r the concepts of t h i n k i n g and i t s 
expression, i n a comparison of the content of t h i n k i n g expressed i n 
the speech, w i t h the thought-content associated by the audience w i t h 
the l i n g u i s t i c expression; or the concepts of b e l i e f and desire i n 
an e x p l i c i t awareness of the context i n the l i g h t of which a p a r t i c u l 
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response i s grasped as i n a p p r o p r i a t e . We can o f f e r a 
f o r m u l a t i o n of t h i s general p i c t u r e by adapting and extending 
a remark of Wittgenstein's: I f language i s t o be a means of 
communication there must be agreement not only i n the meaning 
of l i n g u i s t i c expressions, but also i n b e l i e f s , and i n desires. 
Agreement i n language i s possible only on the unquestioned 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of a c e r t a i n shared awareness of the world, and 
c e r t a i n shared p r a c t i c a l involvements w i t h the world. This 
p i c t u r e of communication as a p a t t e r n of appropriate speech and 
response, i n v o l v i n g an unquestioned sharing of awareness and 
p r a c t i c a l involvements, comes close t o Wittgenstein's n o t i o n of 
a language-game embedded i n a form of l i f e . Without such a 
form of l i f e , expressive harmony - g e t t i n g the r i g h t expression 
f o r the t h i n k i n g t o be expressed - i s impossible. Hence also 
expressive f a i l u r e ; and i n t u r n , the concept of t h i n k i n g , the 
c r i t i c a l concept of thought; and c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n q u i r y 
i n general, would be impossible. 
We have a r r i v e d a t a n o t i o n of communication as a p a t t e r n 
of speech and response i n the context of a shared awareness of, 
and p r a c t i c a l involvement i n , the world. I t i s i n the context 
of a r e f l e c t i o n on breakdown i n t h i s communication - i n which 
expressive harmony consists - t h a t the concepts of t h i n k i n g and 
i t s means of expression i n speech are to be made possible. Let 
us then i l l u s t r a t e the n o t i o n of breakdown here. Suppose I 
u t t e r the l i n g u i s t i c expression "Snake". Normally when I do 
t h i s , my audience looks around a t the ground, and then begins 
to climb the nearest t r e e . On t h i s occasion, however, having 
y e l l e d "Snake", I n o t i c e t o my h o r r o r t h a t my audience merely 
- 275 -
smiles and s i t s on the ground. I n the l i g h t of the context 
of b e l i e f s and desires which I unquestioningly take f o r granted, 
t h i s i s an i n a p t response. My f e e l i n g of h o r r o r and bewilderment 
i s the non-conceptual breakdown of an agreement between subjects 
i n language. Subsequent r e f l e c t i o n on t h i s breakdown may b r i n g 
t o l i g h t a number of causes. I t may be t h a t my audience i s 
o f f e r i n g h e r s e l f as a r e l i g i o u s s a c r i f i c e , or desires t o d i e . 
I t may be t h a t the snake I see coming i s her pet. I t may be 
t h a t she has not heard p r o p e r l y , and t h i n k s t h a t I said "Snack?" 
i n v i t i n g her t o a l i g h t meal. There are a number of d i f f e r e n t 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s here. A p a r t i c u l a r l y important p o s s i b i l i t y i n the 
present context, i s t h a t I may have i n a d v e r t e n t l y s a i d the wrong 
t h i n g . Although I meant t o say "Snake" I i n f a c t s a i d "Cake". 
Or perhaps I have got the wrong expression a l t o g e t h e r : the word 
f o r t h i s e v i l l ooking animal i s " l i z a r d " , while "snake" i s a term 
of endearment. C l e a r l y , not a l l of these p o s s i b i l i t i e s of breakdown 
i n the t o t a l communication context involve expressive f a i l u r e -
g e t t i n g the wrong expression f o r the t h i n k i n g t o be expressed. 
Some of them, r a t h e r than due t o a f a i l u r e i n understanding, of 
grasping the content of the t h i n k i n g expressed i n the speech, are 
a matter of the b e l i e f s and desires which also go towards determining 
a response t o speech. What then, determines when a breakdown i n 
t h i s p a t t e r n of speech and response i s analysed as a case of 
expressive f a i l u r e ? I do not t h i n k t h a t a set of j o i n t l y s u f f i c i e n t 
c o n d i t i o n s can be provided here. Nevertheless, I s h a l l o f f e r a 
suggestion as to how t h i n g s might go. 
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I am i n c l i n e d t o t h i n k t h a t a r e f l e c t i v e analysis of a 
breakdown i n the p a t t e r n of speech and response - t h a t i s , 
i n communication - can be of t h a t breakdown as a matter of 
expressive f a i l u r e , only under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s . I t h i n k 
i t i s possible t o r e f l e c t on t h a t breakdown as due to a case 
of expressive f a i l u r e , only when the audience not only apparently 
responds i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y , but subsequently refuses t o accept the 
speech-act. Thus my audience i n the example above might suddenly 
see the snake h e r s e l f , jump up and exclaim "That's not a cake, 
i t ' s a snake". This w i l l lead me t o r e f l e c t on my own utterance, 
r a t h e r than on her curious i n i t i a l response, and t o the r e f l e c t i o n 
t h a t I have said the wrong t h i n g . My saying the wrong t h i n g , may 
then be analysed as a f a i l u r e t o express my t h i n k i n g adequately, 
( i t may be due, f o r example, to my having a f a l s e b e l i e f . ) I 
am sure t h a t a reasonable s t o r y of how a breakdown i n communication 
can r e s u l t i n a r e f l e c t i o n on expressive f a i l u r e , can be t o l d 
along these l i n e s . I t has not here been my purpose to provide 
such a s t o r y , but r a t h e r t o have provided a p i c t u r e of what i s 
involved i n expressive harmony - i n g e t t i n g the r i g h t expression 
f o r the t h i n k i n g t o be expressed. Let me now summarise t h i s 
p i c t u r e , t o provide the context f o r the next stage of the argument. 
I t has been argued i n t h i s chapter, continuing the argument 
from Chapter Five, t h a t the concept of t h i n k i n g i s possible only 
i n v i r t u e of being 'semantically' l i n k e d w i t h s i t u a t i o n s of 
expressive f a i l u r e . The primary grasp of expressive f a i l u r e 
cannot be from the ' i n s i d e ' , i n terms of the t h i n k i n g t o be 
a r t i c u l a t e d not being matched by the l i n g u i s t i c expression employed; 
but must be a grasp of the s i t u a t i o n as a t o t a l i t y from the 'outside' 
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i n i t s d e l i m i t a t i o n from t h a t which i t f a i l s t o achieve, 
namely, expressive harmony. I n the l a s t two sections, 
I have argued t h a t expressive harmony must cons i s t i n a 
concrete agreement between speaking subjects i n the language 
they use. This agreement i n language must i t s e l f be a matter 
of subjects r e l a t i n g t o one another's speech i n a way which 
c o n s t i t u t e s understanding t h a t speech. This way of r e l a t i n g 
c o nsists of responding t o speech-act: responses which are 
appropriate t o the speech-act, given a context of b e l i e f s , a n d 
d e s i r e s , or wants, on the p a r t of the responding subject. This 
context of b e l i e f s and desires cannot p r i m a r i l y be e x p l i c i t , 
but must be an unquestioned assumption of a shared awareness o f , 
and p r a c t i c a l involvement i n , the world. I t i s i n the l i g h t of 
t h i s unquestioned (and, p r i o r t o r e f l e c t i o n on i t s breakdown, 
unquestionable) assumption, t h a t responses to speech-acts c o n s t i t u t e 
understanding t h a t speech. This p a t t e r n of appropriate speech-acts 
and responses which c o n s t i t u t e s agreement i n language, which i t s e l f 
c o n s t i t u t e s expressive harmony, we can c a l l communication. While 
a break i n t h i s p a t t e r n i s not always due t o expressive f a i l u r e , 
the primary grasp of expressive f a i l u r e n ecessarily involves a 
non-conceptual grasp of a breakdown i n t h a t p a t t e r n - of a breakdown 
i n t h a t communication which c o n s t i t u t e s expressive harmony. I n 
the l i g h t of t h i s account, we can now consider how the argument so 
f a r lays the foundation f o r the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the n o t i o n of value. 
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Conmmnication as a Value 
The summary of the argument a t the end of the previous 
s e c t i o n sets the scene f o r the next step i n the argument. 
This w i l l be the argument t h a t r e f l e c t i v e analysis on a breakdown 
i n communication as a case of expressive f a i l u r e , i s possible only 
i f communication i s a value f o r the subject concerned. Having 
elaborated the n o t i o n of expressive harmony over the preceding 
two s e c t i o n s , we are i n a p o s i t i o n t o take up a p o i n t made e a r l i e r 
i n t h i s chapter, and t o trace i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s . 
I n the f i r s t s e c t i o n of t h i s chapter, i t was argued t h a t the 
concept of t h i n k i n g i s possible only i n v i r t u e of a 'semantic' 
l i n k w i t h s i t u a t i o n s i n which the l i n g u i s t i c expression employed 
f a i l e d t o f i t the t h i n k i n g which i s to be expressed. Only i n 
such s i t u a t i o n s , i t was argued, can two demands be met. These 
are the demands t h a t , on the one hand, the l i n g u i s t i c expression 
serve w i t h i n speech as the m a t e r i a l f o r the embodiment of the 
t h i n k i n g ; and on the other hand, t h a t the content of the l i n g u i s t i c 
expression d i f f e r from the content of the t h i n k i n g . These two 
demands could only be met, i t was claimed, where there were 
s i t u a t i o n s i n which the divergence i n content between t h i n k i n g and 
i t s means of expression, was a divergence w i t h i n a speech s i t u a t i o n 
i n which t h i n k i n g i s embodied. The understanding of the kin d of 
s i t u a t i o n we need cannot be constructed from a grasp of i t s components. 
The a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o begin w i t h the required understanding of the 
subject as speaking, and then t o r e f l e c t on s i t u a t i o n s i n which the 
components come apart from one another. I n such s i t u a t i o n s , i t was 
claimed, the t h i n k i n g i s t h a t which i s t o be a r t i c u l a t e d by means of 
the l i n g u i s t i c expression, but where the expression f a i l s t o match up 
w i t h the content of the t h i n k i n g t o be expressed. I c a l l e d these s i t u a t i o n s 
cases of expressive f a i l u r e , t o h i g h l i g h t the p a r a l l e l w i t h the argument 
of Chapter Four. 
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Moving on from t h a t p o i n t , i t was then argued t h a t 
the primary grasp of expressive f a i l u r e could not be i n 
terms of the l i n g u i s t i c expression f a i l i n g to match up w i t h 
the content of the t h i n k i n g to be expressed, even though the 
n o t i o n of expressive f a i l u r e was f i r s t introduced i n these 
terms as p a r t of the present p h i l o s o p h i c a l s t r a t e g y . This 
i s because such a grasp employs the concepts, of t h i n k i n g and 
i t s means of expression, whose p o s s i b i l i t y i t s e l f presuppose 
the primary grasp of expressive f a i l u r e . The primary grasp 
of expressive f a i l u r e must be of i t as a t o t a l i t y d e l i m i t e d from 
t h a t which i t f a i l s t o achieve: expressive harmony. I have 
since f i l l e d out the n o t i o n of expressive harmony, but the p o i n t 
t h a t I wish to make here i s t h i s . I f expressive f a i l u r e i s 
p r i m a r i l y grasped i n i t s d e l i m i t a t i o n from t h a t which i t f a i l s 
t o achieve, then t h i s presupposes t h a t t h a t which i t f a i l s to 
achieve i s a value f o r the subject. Expressive harmony i s a 
value f o r the s u b j e c t , i n the l i g h t of which the subject's speech 
can be understood as a f a i l u r e t o achieve i t . There can be no 
t a l k of f a i l u r e , w i t h o u t presupposing a value i n the context of 
which something can come t o l i g h t as a f a i l u r e . I w i l l need to 
discuss t h i s n o t i o n of value f u r t h e r , but before doing so, l e t 
me make a p o i n t which brings i n the argument of the preceding 
two sections. 
So f a r , I have argued t h a t expressive harmony must be a 
value f o r the subj e c t , i f there i s to be the re q u i r e d grasp of 
a s i t u a t i o n of expressive f a i l u r e . But i n the preceding two 
sections i t was argued t h a t expressive harmony cannot consist 
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i n any a b s t r a c t coincidence between the subjects associate 
l i n g u i s t i c expressions w i t h the content of t h e i r t h i n k i n g . 
Expressive harmony must c o n s i s t i n a p a t t e r n of speech-acts 
and responses, i n a context of a shared awareness o f , and 
p r a c t i c a l involvement i n the world. I c a l l e d t h i s p a t t e r n , 
communication. I n those two sections, then, the n o t i o n of 
expressive harmony, which was i n i t i a l l y introduced as a l a b e l 
f o r t h a t which expressive f a i l u r e f a i l e d to achieve, has been 
enfolded. We now have a f u l l e r p i c t u r e of t h a t which expressive 
f a i l u r e i s a f a i l u r e t o achieve. I t i s a f a i l u r e to achieve 
t h a t p a t t e r n of appropriate speech and responses which I have 
c a l l e d "communication". This u n f o l d i n g of the n o t i o n of 
expressive harmony t h e r e f o r e reveals t h a t communication i s the 
value i n the l i g h t of which the subject's speech i s revealed 
as expressive f a i l u r e . I t i s the p a t t e r n of speech-acts and 
appropriate responses, i n the context of shared b e l i e f s and 
d e s i r e s , which i s a value f o r the subject. Having thus 
developed t h i s p o i n t , l e t me look a t what i s meant by "a value" 
here, by considering a possible response to t h i s argument. 
One response t o t h i s argument might run as f o l l o w s . The 
n o t i o n of value introduced above simply does not amount to very 
much - c e r t a i n l y i t does not approach our idea of what a moral 
value i s . For on the view presented i n t h i s chapter, the response 
continues, anything can count as a value, as long as i t i s 
something i n the l i g h t of which there can be a f a i l u r e to achieve 
i t . The f a i l u r e of the c a r b u r r e t o r introduced i n Chapter Three 
may b r i n g t o l i g h t the f a c t t h a t a properly running car i s a value 
- 281 -
( f o r the subject f o r whom the carburretor*s behaviour i s 
a f a i l u r e ) , Scratching a spot; g e t t i n g to the top of a 
pr o f e s s i o n ; having a peaceful h o l i d a y - each of these could 
be a value i n the context of which c e r t a i n events would count 
as f a i l u r e s . But these 'values', the response goes on, are 
ha r d l y the s o r t of t h i n g t h a t can get us very f a r i n a theory 
of moral value: these 'values' a l l seem t o be e n t i r e l y contingent 
on, and r e l a t i v e t o , the desires or preferences of a p a r t i c u l a r 
s u b j e c t . How can t h i s n o t i o n of value help us i n an argument 
t o e s t a b l i s h a transcendental foundation f o r a n o n - r e l a t i v i s t i c 
ethics? Many po i n t s are ra i s e d by t h i s response t o the argument 
of t h i s s e c t i o n : t o most of them, I devote the f o l l o w i n g chapter. 
For the present, I s h a l l j u s t take issue w i t h the suggestion t h a t 
the value of communication i s a contingent one. 
The argument I present here i s b r i e f . I t i s t h a t i t i s 
n e c e s s a r i l y the case t h a t communication i s a value. I t i s 
ne c e s s a r i l y the case f o r the f o l l o w i n g reason. Anyone who 
questions the claim t h a t communication i s a value presupposes -
as does a l l c r i t i c a l i n q u i r y - the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the c r i t i c a l 
concept of thought. The argument of the preceding three chapters 
has been towards the conclusion t h a t the c r i t i c a l concept of thought 
i s p o s s i b l e , only i f communication i s a value ( i n the l i g h t of 
which expressive f a i l u r e i s p r i m a r i l y grasped, thus making possible 
the concept of t h i n k i n g , and thence the c r i t i c a l concept of thought). 
This means t h a t anyone who questions the claim t h a t communication i s 
a value, n e c e s s a r i l y presupposes i t s t r u t h , as a necessary c o n d i t i o n 
of the very p o s s i b i l i t y of the c r i t i c a l questioning. That 
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communication i s a value, cannot coherently be questioned, 
or put i n doubt: i t s t r u t h i s nece s s a r i l y presupposed 
as a necessary c o n d i t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of any scepticism. 
I t i s i n t h i s sense then t h a t we can say t h a t i t i s necessarily 
the case t h a t communication i s a value. I t i s , we might say, 
a matter of transcendental necessity r a t h e r than l o g i c a l 
n ecessity ( i t i s not a question of l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e , or the 
meanings of the terms): a necessary c o n d i t i o n of a l l c r i t i c a l 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n q u i r y . I have made t h i s p o i n t mainly because 
I f e e l t h a t the n o t i o n of a "necessary value", i s s u f f i c i e n t l y 
i n t e r e s t i n g t o make the argument of the present section worth 
c o n t e s t i n g . I s h a l l have much more t o say i n the next chapter, 
about how communication as a value provides us w i t h a transcendental 
foundation of e t h i c s . For the present, I want t o consider an 
o b j e c t i o n t o the argument of t h i s s e c t i o n , which while accepting 
the general l i n e of argument presented i n these chapters, makes 
i t s departure from t h a t argument a t the p o i n t where 'evaluative', 
:or 'normative', notions are introduced. 
The o b j e c t i o n t o the argument of the present chapter takes 
t h i s approach. I t accepts what was argued i n the f i r s t section 
of the chapter; namely, t h a t the primary understanding of 
s i t u a t i o n s i n which the t h i n k i n g and i t s means of embodiment i n 
speech do not f i t , cannot be synthesised from an understanding 
of the components - the t h i n k i n g and the l i n g u i s t i c expression -
since t h i s would presuppose the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the concepts whose 
p o s s i b i l i t y i s a t issue. 
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Rather, the o b j e c t i o n agrees, we begin w i t h an 
understanding of the subject as speaking. This speaking i s 
normally such t h a t we, possessing the concepts i n question, 
would say t h a t the expression matches the t h i n k i n g . I f the 
expression never matched the content of the subject's t h i n k i n g , 
then there could be no question of the t h i n k i n g being embodied 
by means of the l i n g u i s t i c expression. Given t h i s understanding 
of the subject as speaking, the concepts of t h i n k i n g and i t s 
means of embodiment become possible i n a context of r e f l e c t i o n 
on s i t u a t i o n s i n which the normal coincidence of t h i n k i n g and 
i t s expression f a i l s to hold: the t h i n k i n g and the expression 
come apart. I t was then argued t h a t we could formulate the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h i n k i n g and l i n g u i s t i c expression, i n the 
s i t u a t i o n s we are discussing, i n t h i s way. We can say t h a t , i n 
those s i t u a t i o n s , the t h i n k i n g i s t h a t which i s t o be embodied 
by means of the expression; and t h a t the l i n g u i s t i c expression 
i s t h a t by means of which the t h i n k i n g i s t o be embodied i n speech. 
Up t o t h i s p o i n t the o b j e c t i o n agrees w i t h the argument of the 
f i r s t s e c t i o n of the present chapter. I t s p o i n t of departure 
from t h a t argument i s at the next step. I t was argued i n the 
second se c t i o n of the chapter, t h a t the lack of f i t between the 
t h i n k i n g t o be a r t i c u l a t e d i n speech, and the l i n g u i s t i c expression, 
i s a matter of g e t t i n g the wrong expression f o r the t h i n k i n g which 
i s t o be a r t i c u l a t e d . At t h i s p o i n t , the o b j e c t i o n makes i t s e l f 
f e l t . 
The o b j e c t i o n i s t h a t , i n the formu l a t i o n o f f e r e d above, 
of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the t h i n k i n g and the l i n g u i s t i c 
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expression i n a speech, we i l l e g i t i m a t e l y introduce a 
normative element: the phrase "wrong expression f o r the 
t h i n k i n g " i n d i c a t e s i t s presence. The o b j e c t i o n claims 
t h a t i n s t e a d of i n t r o d u c i n g t h i s normative element, we can 
give an a l t e r n a t i v e , and less contentious, account of a 
'coming apart' of the normal s i t u a t i o n of speech. According 
t o t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e account, we can take the normal speech 
s i t u a t i o n as i n v o l v i n g only an e m p i r i c a l , not a normative, 
norm. That i s , we can take the normal s i t u a t i o n as one i n 
which a c e r t a i n thought-content i s e m p i r i c a l l y r e g u l a r l y 
associated w i t h a c e r t a i n l i n g u i s t i c expression. This normal 
s i t u a t i o n 'comes apart' when the subject uses a l i n g u i s t i c 
expression which d i f f e r s from t h a t normally associated w i t h 
the content of the subject's t h i n k i n g . There need, the 
o b j e c t i o n runs on, be no question of g e t t i n g the wrong expression 
f o r the t h i n k i n g t o be expressed, and so no question of expressive 
f a i l u r e : there i s only the use of an expression which d i f f e r s 
from the normal one. Consequently, there need be no t a l k of 
standards of r i g h t and wrong expression embedded i n the speech 
of subjects; but only of e m p i r i c a l r e g u l a r i t i e s t h a t obtain 
between the content of speaking subjects' t h i n k i n g , and the 
l i n g u i s t i c expressions which they u t t e r . Consequently also, 
the t o t a l i t y of the s i t u a t i o n , i n which t h i n k i n g and l i n g u i s t i c 
expression are at odds, can be grasped i n i t s d e l i m i t a t i o n -
not from t h a t which i t f a i l s t o achieve, but from t h a t w i t h which 
i t d i f f e r s . There would then, continues the o b j e c t i o n , be no 
need t o t a l k of a subject f a i l i n g t o achieve a p a t t e r n of 
communication w i t h other subjects, but only of a subject who 
- 285 -
begins t o speak d i f f e r e n t l y from others. The p a t t e r n 
of speech-acts and responses, which i s termed communication, 
need not then be a value f o r the subject: i t need only be 
the p a t t e r n which, e m p i r i c a l l y , normally obtains. I n t h i s 
way, t h i s o b j e c t i o n t r i e s t o give the same account of the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of t h i n k i n g presented i n t h i s 
chapter, but removing from t h a t account a l l the normative 
t a l k , and hence the basis f o r claiming t h a t communication i s 
a value. I f t h i s o b j e c t i o n i s sound, i t i s c l e a r l y a serious 
blow t o my hopes of founding a theory of e t h i c s on the arguments 
of the l a s t three chapters. Let us the r e f o r e address the 
o b j e c t i o n . 
I w i l l argue here t h a t t h i s o b j e c t i o n f a i l s , and t h a t the 
normative element of the argument of t h i s chapter i s indeed 
necessary t o an account of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of 
t h i n k i n g (and hence of c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n q u i r y ) . According 
to the o b j e c t i o n , cases of lack of f i t between the content of the 
subject's t h i n k i n g and the l i n g u i s t i c expression need not be cases 
i n which the wrong expression of the t h i n k i n g has been used, but 
only cases where an expression d i f f e r e n t from the normal one has 
been used. The o b j e c t i o n hopes by t h i s manoeuvre t o avoid 
having t o t a l k about a f a i l u r e t o get the r i g h t expression f o r 
the t h i n k i n g t o be expressed. The idea seems t o be t h a t r e f l e c t i o n 
on a breakdown i n communication can analyse the cause of t h i s 
breakdown as the subject's using an expression f o r i t s t h i n k i n g 
which d i f f e r s from t h a t normally used (by the subject i t s e l f , or 
by other speaking s u b j e c t s ) . The reason why t h i s cannot be an 
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adequate account of the condi t i o n s under which the concept 
of t h i n k i n g i s pos s i b l e , i s t h i s . I f the concept of t h i n k i n g 
i s t o be made pos s i b l e , there must be r e f l e c t i o n on a s i t u a t i o n 
i n which the t h i n k i n g and i t s l i n g u i s t i c expression do not match 
up. The account o f f e r e d of t h i s a f f a i r by the o b j e c t i o n under 
co n s i d e r a t i o n , i s t h a t the l i n g u i s t i c expression i s j u s t a 
d i f f e r e n t one from t h a t normally used. This i s a l l t h a t the 
la c k of f i t i s supposed t o consist i n . But the idea of an 
expression d i f f e r e n t from t h a t which i s normally used, presupposes 
an awareness of the expression which i s normally used: t h a t i s , 
of the expression which i s normally used as the means of expressing 
t h a t p a r t i c u l a r thought-content. The s i t u a t i o n under r e f l e c t i o n , 
has t o be compared w i t h other s i t u a t i o n s , i n order t o see whether 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between thought-content and l i n g u i s t i c expression 
i n the various s i t u a t i o n s i s the same or d i f f e r e n t . Such a 
comparison c l e a r l y already presupposes the concepts of t h i n k i n g 
and i t s means of expression. I t cannot then form p a r t of an 
account of the p o s s i b i l i t y of those concepts. This o b j e c t i o n 
has n o t , then, succeeded i n producing a workable a l t e r n a t i v e 
account of what the lack of f i t , between the t h i n k i n g and the 
l i n g u i s t i c expression i n the s i t u a t i o n s we r e q u i r e , consists. • 
We are l e f t , then, w i t h an account of the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
the concept of t h i n k i n g i n which the normative element plays 
an e s s e n t i a l p a r t . The matching up of expression and t h i n k i n g 
i n speech, has t o be a matter of g e t t i n g the r i g h t expression 
f o r the t h i n k i n g , which i n t u r n i s a matter of maintaining a 
p a t t e r n of communication w i t h other subjects. A lack of f i t 
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between the subject's t h i n k i n g and i t s l i n g u i s t i c 
expression must be a matter of not g e t t i n g the r i g h t 
expression f o r the t h i n k i n g t o be expressed (and so 
f a i l i n g t o express i t ) , which i s i n t u r n a matter of not 
main t a i n i n g the p a t t e r n of appropriate speech and response 
which I have termed "communication". I n order t h a t the 
subject may r e f l e c t on s i t u a t i o n s i n which the t h i n k i n g and 
the means of i t s expression i n speech do not match up, 
communication must be a value f o r the subject i n the l i g h t 
of which c e r t a i n instances of i t s speech can be grasped as 
f a i l u r e s t o get the r i g h t expression f o r the t h i n k i n g to be 
expressed. I n the f o l l o w i n g chapter, I wish to examine i n 
some d e t a i l how t h i s n o t i o n of communication as a value lays 
the foundation f o r a n o n - r e l a t i v i s t i c e t h i c s . 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS 
I n the preceding three chapters I have presented an 
account of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the c r i t i c a l concept of thought, 
according t o which t h a t concept i s made possible only i n the 
context of r e f l e c t i o n on c e r t a i n ruptures i n aspects of the 
subject's existence. S i g n i f i c a n t conceptual progress, 
c o r r e l a t i v e l y , i s made only by r e f l e c t i o n on such breakdowns. 
Furthermore, these breakdowns b r i n g t o l i g h t c e r t a i n values, 
as necessary con d i t i o n s of the primary grasp of s i t u a t i o n s 
as f a i l u r e s , i n 'semantic' r e l a t i o n w i t h which c e r t a i n important 
concepts are alone p o s s i b l e . I n t h i s chapter I wish to examine 
how the value of communication, argued f o r i n the previous chapter, 
can serve as the basis f o r a n o n - r e l a t i v i s t i c e t h i c s . This w i l l 
i n v o l v e a deepening of the account of communication and i t s 
necessary p r e - c o n d i t i o n s , and a development of the account of 
communication as a value. There are many issues to be discussed: 
I begin by o f f e r i n g a p a r t i a l e l a b o r a t i o n of what i t i s which i s 
valued, when I claim t h a t communication i s a value. 
M a i n t a i n i n g Communication 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n I o f f e r a p r e l i m i n a r y e l a b o r a t i o n of what 
i t i s f o r communication t o be a value. The account I present 
w i l l be pr o g r e s s i v e l y deepened through the arguments of l a t e r 
s e c t i o n s , but f o r the present, I wish t o make two p o i n t s . 
These p o i n t s concern f i r s t the idea of communication as t h a t 
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which the subject, i n cases of expressive f a i l u r e , f a i l s 
t o achieve; and second, an idea t h a t might seem t o be 
suggested by the argument so f a r , namely, the idea t h a t 
the value I am presenting here i s the value of t a l k i n g as 
much as p o s s i b l e , t o as many people as possible. Let me 
take up the f i r s t p o i n t . 
I n the f i n a l s e c t i o n of Chapter Six, i t was argued t h a t 
the primary grasp of s i t u a t i o n s of expressive f a i l u r e must be 
of expressive f a i l u r e as a t o t a l i t y d e l i m i t e d from t h a t which 
i t f a i l s t o achieve, namely, communication. But I must be c a r e f u l 
w i t h t h i s t a l k about what expressive f a i l u r e f a i l s to achieve, 
because i t seems t o present a c e r t a i n p i c t u r e which, although 
congenial t o some philosophers, i s not one which I can accept. 
The p i c t u r e t h a t might occur to us here, i s of a subject who gets 
i n t o i t s head the idea of communicating i t s thoughts t o another 
s u b j e c t , and then sets about t r y i n g t o do t h i s (by embodying i t s 
thoughts i n l i n g u i s t i c expressions). This i s the goal which, i n 
cases of expressive f a i l u r e , the subject f a i l s t o achieve. This 
p i c t u r e of independent subjects, w i t h thoughts which they decide 
t o t r y and communicate t o one another, cannot be a workable p i c t u r e 
of communication: though I leave the argument f o r t h i s claim t o 
the next s e c t i o n . I n the present section I want to lessen the 
temptation t o use t h a t p i c t u r e , by showing t h a t communication i s 
not so much an ab s t r a c t i d e a l t o be achieved, as a p r e - e x i s t i n g 
p a t t e r n t o be maintained. Let me el u c i d a t e . Suppose, by way 
of a c o n t r a s t , t h a t i t i s my i n t e n t i o n to become head of the department, 
i n the college a t which I work, by the age of f o r t y . I f , on the due 
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date, I am not i n s t a l l e d i n the appropriate o f f i c e , then I 
can count my past attempts as f a i l u r e s to achieve my goal. 
Becoming head of department by the age of f o r t y was a value, 
i n the l i g h t of which I recognise previous attempts as 
f a i l u r e s . The s i t u a t i o n w i t h regard t o what I have t a l k e d 
of as " f a i l u r e to achieve communication", i s d i f f e r e n t . I n 
t h i s case, i t i s r a t h e r t h a t , having already su c c e s s f u l l y 
p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the p a t t e r n of appropriate speech and response 
which i s communication, I f i n d t h a t I have f a i l e d t o maintain 
t h i s p a t t e r n : communication has broken down, because of my 
f a i l u r e to use the r i g h t l i n g u i s t i c expression f o r the t h i n k i n g 
which was to be expressed. I t i s thus not t h a t I have f a i l e d 
t o achieve communication i n the f i r s t place which i s the problem, 
but r a t h e r t h a t I have f a i l e d t o maintain an already e x i s t i n g 
p a t t e r n of speech and response. I t i s the maintenance of 
communication, r a t h e r than i t s achievement i n the f i r s t place, 
which i s the value i n the l i g h t of which a c e r t a i n speech-act 
i s a f a i l u r e . Indeed, p r i o r t o r e f l e c t i o n on i t s breakdown, 
the p a t t e r n of communication i s taken f o r granted as an unquestioned 
and unquestionable assumption; i t cannot be taken as something which 
was the ob j e c t of an i n i t i a l achievement. I f t h i s argument works, 
so t h a t we see t h a t i n v a l u i n g communication, i t i s i t s maintenance, 
r a t h e r than i t s i n i t i a l achievement, which i s a t issue; then we 
are l e d t o the second p o i n t w i t h which I wish t o deal i n t h i s s e c tion. 
This concerns the! question of what i s required, i n order t h a t 
communication be maintained. 
- 291 -
Before t u r n i n g t o t h i s p o i n t , I wish t o introduce a 
term t h a t w i l l be f r e q u e n t l y used throughout the r e s t of 
t h i s chapter. I argued i n the preceding chapters t h a t 
concepts such as t h a t of experience, t h i n k i n g , b e l i e f and 
d e s i r e , are possible only on r e f l e c t i o n on c e r t a i n ruptures 
i n aspects of the subject's existence. Furthermore, and 
e s p e c i a l l y where the breakdown i n question i s a communication-
breakdown, t h i s r e f l e c t i o n w i l l always presuppose a p r e - e x i s t i n g state 
of agreement i n language: f o r only i n language can e x p l i c i t r e f l e c t i o n 
take place. I t i s t h e r e f o r e a necessary c o n d i t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of the concepts mentioned above, t h a t there e x i s t s a state of 
agreement i n language - which we have seen t o c o n s i s t i n a p a t t e r n 
of speech and response t h a t I have c a l l e d communication - i n which 
those concepts are not a v a i l a b l e . I s h a l l c a l l t h i s s t a t e , the 
"primary stage of communication", or simply "primary communication". 
I t i s t h a t stage of communication presupposed by those breakdowns 
which make possible the concepts mentioned e a r l i e r . I n the r e s t 
of t h i s chapter I s h a l l have occasion t o t r y to characterise t h i s 
primary stage of communication, as i t i s f o r the subjects involved. 
Such c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n w i l l c l e a r l y have t o dispense w i t h concepts 
such as t h a t of t h i n k i n g , b e l i e f and desire. I hope t h a t the 
reasons f o r undertaking such c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n w i l l emerge i n the 
course of the f o l l o w i n g discussion. Let us now t u r n t o the 
second main p o i n t of t h i s s e c t i o n . 
The question of what i s req u i r e d , i n order t h a t communication 
be maintained, may a r i s e i n the f o l l o w i n g manner. I t may seem 
t h a t , i n arguing f o r the maintenance of communication as a value, 
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I am suggesting t h a t we go about t a l k i n g a l l the time, t o 
anyone who happens t o be i n earshot. I want t o show t h a t 
I am not suggesting t h i s , but r a t h e r t h a t maintaining 
communication i s a matter of keeping the channels of 
communication open f o r use when appropriate. To show t h i s , 
l e t me r e c a l l p a r t of the argument of the f o u r t h section of 
Chapter S i x . ^ I t was argued there t h a t expressive harmony 
must c o n s i s t i n a concrete agreement between subjects i n the 
language they use, which i t s e l f consisted i n a p a t t e r n of 
speech-acts and responses which were both appropriate i n the 
l i g h t of an assumed context of b e l i e f s and desires. I t was 
argued not only t h a t the audience's responses must be appropriate 
to the speech-act, but also t h a t the speech-acts must themselves 
be ap p r o p r i a t e , i n order f o r the p a t t e r n of speech and response 
which c o n s t i t u t e expressive harmony t o be possible. I now need 
t o elaborate t h i s l a s t p o i n t . 
I have argued t h a t speech-acts must themselves be appropriate 
i n the l i g h t of an unquestioned context of an awareness o f , and 
p r a c t i c a l involvement i n , the world. What i s i t f o r speech-acts 
t o be appropriate here? I n order t h a t we may move towards an 
adequate c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of the primary stage of communication, 1< 
us consider a c e r t a i n temptation. We might be tempted a t t h i s 
p o i n t t o use an account, d i r e c t l y suggested by the way i n which 
the issues of the appropriateness of speech-acts has been 
introduced i n the course of the present p h i l o s o p h i c a l strategy. 
We might be tempted to claim t h a t speech-acts are appropriate, 
i f produced w i t h the i n t e n t i o n of f u r t h e r i n g the f u l f i l m e n t of 
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an i n d i v i d u a l ' s d e s i r e s , by pr o v i d i n g t h a t i n d i v i d u a l w i t h 
f r e s h , r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n . Thus I might know t h a t my 
f r i e n d wants t o buy a car, and t h a t she does not know where 
to f i n d one. Accordingly, I say t o her, "Here are some 
second-hand car advertisements"; and hand over the newspaper. 
I f I knew t h a t she had no i n t e r e s t whatsoever i n second-hand 
cars, or t h a t she already knew of the existence of the 
advertisements, having j u s t read through them h e r s e l f , then 
my speech-act would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e . We could continue to 
say, on t h i s account, t h a t w i t h speech-acts of t h i s nature, 
there i s no c l e a r appropriate response. My f r i e n d would not 
know what to make of my speech-acts. This i s because the 
con d i t i o n s ( o f relevance t o audience i n t e r e s t s , and of 
i n f o r m a t i o n a l content) under \*rhich c e r t a i n responses would 
be appropriate, do not o b t a i n . I t i s only when, f o r example, 
my f r i e n d does not know of the adverts, and yet wants a car, 
t h a t both my speech-act, and her response of t a k i n g the paper 
and reading i t , are c l e a r l y appropriate. Now i t may not always 
be c l e a r when a speech-act i s appropriate (suppose f o r example, 
t h a t I thought t h a t the advertisements might s t i m u l a t e my f r i e n d ' s 
i n t e r e s t i n buying a car?): the important p o i n t being made here 
i s t h a t there are occasions on which a speech-act i s c l e a r l y 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e , making the normally appropriate response out of 
order. Some speech-acts, at l e a s t , we would say, must not be 
in a p p r o p r i a t e i n t h i s f a s h i o n , since i f a l l speech-acts were so 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e , there could not then e x i s t t h a t p a t t e r n of speech 
and response which I have c a l l e d "communication". Now t h i s s o r t 
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of account of what i t i s f o r speech-acts t o be ina p p r o p r i a t e , 
takes appropriateness, roughly, t o be connected w i t h the 
f u l f i l m e n t of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s desires by increasing the 
r e l e v a n t b e l i e f s of t h a t i n d i v i d u a l . We might then t h i n k 
t h a t t h i s account i s e x a c t l y what i s required. A f t e r a l l , i t 
e x p l i c a t e s the n o t i o n of appropriateness, which was introduced 
i n the course of the present s t r a t e g y , p r e c i s e l y along the 
l i n e s suggested by t h a t i n t r o d u c t i o n . Furthermore, we can 
agree w i t h the content of the account ( w i t h , perhaps, c e r t a i n 
minor caveats). But we need to be c a r e f u l . For t h i s account 
cannot do the task we r e q u i r e of i t here. For although we, 
w r i t e r and reader, as ordinary adults who have gone through the 
process of a c q u i r i n g the rele v a n t concepts, can thus characterise 
the context i n r e l a t i o n to which speech-acts and response are 
ap p r o p r i a t e , t h i s account cannot provide us w i t h a c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n 
of the primary stage of communication as i t i s grasped by the 
subjects themselves a t t h a t stage. For the account p r o j e c t s 
onto subjects at the primary stage of communication the r e c o g n i t i o n 
of b e l i e f s and d e s i r e s ; where t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n requires concepts 
which are not a t t h a t stage a v a i l a b l e . Let me now elucidate 
t h i s remark about the a v a i l a b i l i t y of concepts, so as to help 
determine how the context i n r e l a t i o n w i t h which speech-acts and 
response are appropriate, i s grasped by subjects at the primary 
stage of communication. 
I t has been argued i n Chapter Six t h a t the context, i n terms 
of which speech-acts and t h e i r responses are appropriate, i s not 
a context of b e l i e f s and desires which are recognised as such by 
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the subjects i n v o l v e d , but i s r a t h e r a context of an 
unquestioned assumption of a c e r t a i n awareness o f , and 
p r a c t i c a l involvement i n , the world. This i s how communication, 
i n what we might c a l l i t s primary stage, p r i o r t o the s o r t of 
breakdowns whose r e f l e c t i v e analysis makes possible new concepts, 
must be charact e r i s e d . I n t h i s stage, communication cannot 
occur i n a context i n which the subjects recognise b e l i e f s and 
desires as such, since t o do so would r e q u i r e the concepts of 
b e l i e f and des i r e ; and i t has already been argued t h a t each 
of these concepts n e c e s s a r i l y presupposes a p r e - e x i s t i n g p a t t e r n 
of communication. I t i s because these concepts are not av a i l a b l e 
a t the primary stage of communication, t h a t the context of 
p r a c t i c a l involvements i n the world cannot be at t h a t stage 
grasped as r e l a t i v e t o the desires or i n t e r e s t s of i n d i v i d u a l s . 
That context i s instead grasped, t h e r e f o r e , as a set of impersonal 
p r a c t i c a l involvements, i n the sense t h a t a t t h a t stage, those 
involvements cannot be r e l a t i v i s e d to the desires or i n t e r e s t s 
of any i n d i v i d u a l , or c o l l e c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s . At the stage 
where the concepts of b e l i e f and desire are not a v a i l a b l e , a t 
the primary stage of communication, those p r a c t i c a l involvements 
are unquestioningly and u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y assumed, w i t h no c r i t i c a l 
r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s may have d i f f e r e n t p r a c t i c a l 
involvements. This i s a d i f f i c u l t p o i n t t o make, so I s h a l l o f f e r 
an i l l u s t r a t i o n . The primary stage of communication i s presupposed 
as already e x i s t i n g by the k i n d of r e f l e c t i o n on breakdown which 
makes possible the concepts of b e l i e f and de s i r e . At t h i s stage, 
the awareness of and p r a c t i c a l involvement i n the world, \irhich 
provides the context f o r the p a t t e r n of appropriate speech and 
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response, must be characterised i n a p a r t i c u l a r way. 
Rather than saying t h a t t h i s context i s a matter of 
recognising the i n t e r e s t s or desires of the surrounding 
i n d i v i d u a l s , so t h a t a speech-act can be produced which i s 
r e l e v a n t t o those i n t e r e s t s , we should say t h a t the context 
i s one of an awareness of what i s to be done. Thus r a t h e r 
than say, f o r example, t h a t t h i s context consists of a subject 
r e c o g n i s i n g t h a t sowing corn i s i n the i n t e r e s t s of h e r s e l f 
and her neighbour, so t h a t the utterance " I have some seed: 
w i l l you b r i n g your s e e d - d r i l l ? " i s appropriate, we should 
characterise the s i t u a t i o n i n the f o l l o w i n g manner. We should 
say t h a t t h i s context i s one i n which the subject i s aware t h a t 
the corn i s t o be sown. This context consists of a grasp 
of what i s t o be done, which i s not r e l a t i v i s e d to the desires 
or i n t e r e s t s of p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s , but which i s held as 
an o b j e c t i v e p r a c t i c a l d i r e c t i v e . I n the l i g h t of t h i s grasp, 
the speech-act i s appropriate. I t i s t h i s k i n d of p r a c t i c a l 
awareness of the world which provides the context i n which 
speech-acts and t h e i r responses can be appropriate, and so i n 
which the p a t t e r n of communication can e x i s t . Without such a 
n o n - r e l a t i v i s e d grasp of what i s t o be done, there could be no 
appropriate speech-acts, and so no p a t t e r n of appropriate response 
and so no communication. Communication i s t h e r e f o r e possible, 
only i n v i r t u e of n e c e s s a r i l y presupposing the p r i o r existence 
of an unquestioning acceptance of what i s t o be done i n the world. 
This i m p e r s o n a l i t y cannot be taken as merely an entrenched 
pe r p e t u a t i o n of agreement between subjects i n respect of what 
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are already recognised as t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r aims and desires. 
This impersonal grasp of p r a c t i c a l involvements must precede 
such r e c o g n i t i o n , and i s the basis on which the subsequent 
r e c o g n i t i o n of the aims and desires of i n d i v i d u a l s can occur. 
Now I w i l l claim i n the f i n a l section of t h i s chapter, 
t h a t the p r a c t i c a l involvements which are, a t the primary 
stage of communication, grasped as holding impersonally, are 
i n f a c t r e l a t i v e to p a r t i c u l a r communities or i n d i v i d u a l s . 
The p r a c t i c a l involvements of other communities or i n d i v i d u a l s 
may diverge from, or c o n f l i c t w i t h , those which hold f o r a 
p a r t i c u l a r s ubject. For the present, l e t me make some f u r t h e r 
remarks by way of e l a b o r a t i n g the idea t h a t communication i s 
possible only on c o n d i t i o n t h a t there i s , at the primary stage 
of communication, an unquestioning acceptance of what i s to be 
done as hol d i n g impersonally. 
I n t a l k i n g of the impers o n a l i t y of the p r a c t i c a l involvements 
which form p a r t of the necessary context of the p a t t e r n of 
communication, I do not wish t o create confusion. I n t a l k i n g 
of t h a t impersonality I mean only t h a t the context of primary 
communication i s one i n which p r a c t i c a l involvements are grasped 
as given, and not as r e l a t i v e t o the i n t e r e s t s or desires of 
p a r t i c u l a r persons. This does not mean t h a t those p r a c t i c a l 
involvements concern no one i n p a r t i c u l a r , f o r they do. To 
take the i l l u s t r a t i o n introduced e a r l i e r , i t may be t h a t i n t h a t 
p a r t i c u l a r community i t i s the women who farm, w h i l s t the men are 
concerned w i t h c h i l d and house-care. I n such a society, the 
awareness t h a t the corn i s t o be sown w i l l determine not only 
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the appropriateness of the speech-act produced, but also 
the audience t o which i t i s addressed: " W i l l you come with 
your s e e d - d r i l l ? " w i l l be a p p r o p r i a t e l y asked only of dther 
women. Let us consider another i l l u s t r a t i o n : observing a 
road accident, I see t h a t a t t e n t i o n to the v i c t i m s needs t o 
be given. This a t t e n t i o n i s t o be given, not by j u s t anyone, 
but by someone equipped t o help. This awareness determines 
not only a range of appropriate speech-acts, but also the 
audience to which they are a p p r o p r i a t e l y addressed: I c a l l the 
ambulance-service, say, r a t h e r than the r e f u s e - c o l l e c t i o n 
department. Or again, from a beach I see a shark's f i n near 
some swimmers. This c a l l s f o r evasive a c t i o n , not by j u s t 
anyone, but by the swimmers. They are the people to whom the 
impersonally grasped p r a c t i c a l involvement i s d i r e c t e d . 
Accordingly, I c a l l out "Shark" - addressing myself to the people 
who are t o evade the animal. F i n a l l y , t o take an example from 
S a r t r e , I^am l a t e f o r an appointment. I see the s t r e e t - c a r 
ahead of me. I am aware t h a t the s t r e e t - c a r i s t o be overtaken. 
There i s , however, no-one t o whom I can say anything appropriate 
i n t h i s context. The d r i v e r cannot hear me, and no one else 
can do anything t o h e l p . Accordingly, I say nothing. I n each 
of these examples, i t i s a context of awareness of c e r t a i n 
impersonally grasped p r a c t i c a l involvements which determines 
the appropriateness both of the content of the speech-act, and 
the audience t o which i t i s addressed. With t h i s i n mind, I can 
now r e t u r n t o the second main p o i n t t o be discussed i n t h i s 
s e c t i o n . 
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From the discussion above, i t i s cle a r t h a t i n t a l k i n g 
of m a intaining communication as a value, I am not suggesting 
t h a t we a l l go about t a l k i n g t o one another as much as possible. 
For communication i s n o t , on the account I have given, j u s t a 
matter of endless c h i t - c h a t . Communication i s p r i m a r i l y a 
matter of a p a t t e r n of appropriate speech and response. What 
i s a p p r o p r i a t e , i s i n t u r n determined by a context of an awareness 
of, and p r a c t i c a l involvements i n , the world. I t i s the awareness 
of what i s to be done, which determines the range of appropriate 
speech-acts, and the audience to which they are a p p r o p r i a t e l y 
addressed. I f t h i s i s so, then i n what does maintaining 
communication consist? I s h a l l discuss t h i s question at more 
depth i n l a t e r sections. For the present, as a f i r s t approximation, 
I w i l l say t h a t maintaining communication i s a matter of maintaining 
the c o n d i t i o n s under which a p a t t e r n of appropriate speech and 
response i s possible. 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n , I have argued t h a t i t i s the maintenance, 
r a t h e r than i n i t i a l achievement, of communication t h a t i s a value. 
I have also argued t h a t t h i s maintenance i n v o l v e s , not increasing 
amounts of c h a t t e r , but maintaining the conditions i n which appropriate 
speech and response can continue. I n the course of t h i s second p a r t 
of the discussion, I have characterised the context i n which 
communication at the primary stage takes place. I characterised 
t h i s context as one of an awareness of p r a c t i c a l involvements 
grasped, unquestioningly, as impersonally given; r a t h e r than 
as a context of r e c o g n i t i o n of the desires and i n t e r e s t s of 
p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l persons. I n doing t h i s , i t emerged t h a t 
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i t i s the grasp of what i s t o be done, which determines 
the range of appropriate speech-acts; the audience t o 
which they are a p p r o p r i a t e l y addressed; as w e l l as the 
range of appropriate responses. I f e e l t h a t t h i s 
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of the context of primary communication 
i s important, and I w i l l r e t u r n t o i t i n l a t e r sections. 
I n the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n , however, I wish t o r e s t r i c t myself 
to a discussion of the supposed n o n - r e l a t i v i t y of communication 
as a value. 
The N o n - r e l a t i v i t y of Communication as a value 
One of the claims I have made f o r the argument i n these 
pages, has been t h a t i t w i l l provide the foundation f o r a 
n o n - r e l a t i v i s t i c e t h i c s . While we may now have some f e e l f o r 
the claim t h a t a l l scepticism necessarily presupposes communication 
as a value, I f e e l sure t h a t f o r many people i t w i l l be d i f f i c u l t 
t o swallow the claim t h a t t h i s value i s not r e l a t i v e t o the 
i n t e r e s t s , wants or de s i r e s , of i n d i v i d u a l subjects. I t i s t o 
making t h i s claim easier to swallow t h a t the present section i s 
devoted. Let me begin by asking a simple question. For whom 
(or what) i s communication a value? 
The answer I w i l l give t o t h i s question, i s t h a t communication 
i s a value f o r every being who raises s c e p t i c a l doubts about whether 
communication i s a value; and, more ge n e r a l l y , communication i s a 
value f o r every being which understands i t s e l f as a t h i n k i n g being. 
The reasoning here begins as f o l l o w s . I argued i n the l a s t section 
of Chapter Six t h a t , since a l l scepticism presupposes the a v a i l a b i l i 
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of the c r i t i c a l concept of thought; and t h a t since i t i s 
a necessary c o n d i t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h a t concept 
t h a t cotmminication i s a value, then i t f o l l o w s t h a t scepticism 
about the claim t h a t communication i s a value i s incoherent: 
such scepticism i s possible only i f f a l s e . But t h i s may seem 
r a t h e r vague. Does communication have to be a value f o r 
everyone? Or j u s t f o r a few sceptics? How can I make good 
the claim t h a t i t i s not j u s t s c e p t i c s , but a l l those who 
conceive of themselves as t h i n k i n g beings, f o r whom communication 
i s a value? I s h a l l t r y to answer these questions. 
We can sp e c i f y f o r whom communication must be a value, by 
considering the f o l l o w i n g . The understanding of a subject as 
t h i n k i n g , which i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
the c r i t i c a l concept of thought, i s i t s e l f possible only i n 
the context of a r e f l e c t i o n on breakdown i n expressive harmony: 
on a rupture i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n i n which thought and l i n g u i s t i c 
expression match up. Such a breakdown can be grasped as a case 
of expressive f a i l u r e , and so make possible the concepts of 
t h i n k i n g and i t s expression, only i f communication i s a value 
f o r the subject concerned. The question t o which we must now 
address ourselves, i s t h i s : f o r which subject i s communication 
n e c e s s a r i l y a value? Can anyone - a f r i e n d , neighbour, or 
passer-by - f u l f i l the r o l e of the subject f o r whom communication 
i s a value, and r e f l e c t i o n on whose expressive f a i l u r e makes 
possible the concept of t h i n k i n g and thence the c r i t i c a l concept 
of thought? I f j u s t any subject can indeed f u l f i l t h i s r o l e , 
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then i t leaves open t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y : although there must 
be a t l e a s t one subject f o r whom communication i s a value, 
i n order t h a t the c r i t i c a l concept of thought be possible, 
there i s no reason why communication need be a value f o r 
other subjects. Consequently, there i s no reason why a 
moral sceptic should not accept t h a t communication must be 
a value f o r some subje c t , and yet deny t h a t communication must be 
a value f o r others, i n c l u d i n g h e r s e l f . I w i l l now argue t h a t 
t h i s o p t i o n i s not i n f a c t open: t h a t i s , i t i s not the case 
t h a t j u s t any subject can f u l f i l the r o l e of the subject whose 
expressive f a i l u r e provides f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of the concept of 
t h i n k i n g , and thence of the c r i t i c a l concept of thought. I s h a l l 
argue i n s t e a d , t h a t the subjects f o r whom communication i s 
ne c e s s a r i l y a value must include those subjects which employ e i t h e r 
the c r i t i c a l concept of thought, or the concept of t h i n k i n g . ( I 
s h a l l not argue e i t h e r t h a t communication can be a value only f o r 
subjects which employ these concepts, or t h a t communication must 
be a value f o r a l l t h i n k i n g subjects.^* N e i t h e r of these subjects, 
I w i l l suggest, i s the case.) 
Let us consider our p o s i t i o n here. I w i l l discuss, f i r s t a 
n a t u r a l approach t o the question of which subjects are those f o r 
whom communication i s a value, and then discuss an a l t e r n a t i v e 
approach, i n the l i g h t of whose inadequacy we can a r r i v e a t an 
adequate answer to the question. The n a t u r a l way to approach the 
issue of which subjects are those f o r whom communication i s a value, 
might seem t o be t h i s . R e f l e c t i o n on the f a i l u r e of a speaking 
subject t o get the r i g h t expression f o r the t h i n k i n g t o be 
a r t i c u l a t e d i n speech, i s most n a t u r a l l y seen as r e f l e c t i o n by 
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a subject on i t s e l f . That i s , we would have a subject 
which s u f f e r e d a breakdown i n communication due t o i t s own 
expressive f a i l u r e , and which then r e f l e c t i v e l y analysed 
t h a t f a i l u r e . I n a r t i c u l a t i n g i t s non-conceptual grasp 
o f the breakdown i n expressive harmony, the subject would 
move towards the concept of t h i n k i n g . The subject might, 
f o r example, begin t o say something l i k e " I said t h a t there 
was a b u l l i n the f i e l d , but I d i d n ' t want t o say t h a t . I 
meant ( o r , perhaps, meant t o say) t h a t there was a cow i n 
the f i e l d " . I n t h i s way the subject would be working towards 
a concept of t h i n k i n g as t h a t which i s normally expressed, but 
which can f a i l to be expressed, i n s p e e c h T h e f a c t t h a t t h i s 
process would, on t h i s account, be a process of s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n , 
would mean t h a t the subjects f o r whom communication i s a value 
must include the r e f l e c t i n g s u b j e c t i n g i t s e l f . That i s , i t 
i s the subject which possesses the concept of t h i n k i n g , and 
the c r i t i c a l concept of thought, which i s the subject f o r whom 
communication must be a value. Consequently, since the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of those concepts presupposes such r e f l e c t i o n , 
then communication must be a value f o r any subject which employs 
them. Accordingly, any subject who raises questions about the 
v a l i d i t y of moral claims, i s necessarily a subject f o r whom 
communication i s a value. General scepticism about moral 
claims w i l l be s e l f - d e f e a t i n g : f o r such scepticism presupposes, 
as a necessary c o n d i t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the c r i t i c a l concept 
of thought, t h a t communication i s a value f o r the subject r a i s i n g 
the s c e p t i c a l questions. Now although t h i s way of approaching 
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the question of the i d e n t i t y of the subjects f o r whom 
communication must be a value might seem to be a n a t u r a l 
one, and one which renders general moral scepticism s e l f -
d e f e a t i n g , we cannot adopt i t j u s t as i t stands. We need 
t o consider what a l t e r n a t i v e accounts there might be as to 
how the concept of t h i n k i n g , and the c r i t i c a l concept of thought, 
are p o s s i b l e . I n discussing what a l t e r n a t i v e accounts are 
a v a i l a b l e , we s h a l l see t h a t although the argument i s a l i t t l e 
more complicated than t h a t j u s t o u t l i n e d , i t i s indeed the case 
t h a t any subject which uses the concept of t h i n k i n g , or the 
c r i t i c a l concept of thought, i s a subject f o r whom communication 
must be a value. General moral scepticism w i l l indeed have been 
shown t o be s e l f - d e f e a t i n g . Let us, then, now t u r n t o t h a t 
d i s c u s s i o n . 
The only a l t e r n a t i v e to the n a t u r a l suggestion described i n 
the previous paragraph i s a simple one. I t i s t h a t r e f l e c t i o n 
on the expressive f a i l u r e of a subject f o r whom communication i s 
a value might not be a s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n , but might instead be a 
r e f l e c t i o n on a subject other than the r e f l e c t i n g subject i t s e l f . 
This a l t e r n a t i v e would then leave open the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a 
subject might acquire the c r i t i c a l concept of thought, and the 
concept of t h i n k i n g , w i t h o u t h e r s e l f being a subject f o r whom 
communication i s a value. The concepts would be possible instead 
i n the context of r e f l e c t i o n on the expressive f a i l u r e of another 
s u b j e c t f o r whom communication was a value. I w i l l argue, however, 
t h a t whether or not the primary grasp of expressive f a i l u r e w i l l be 
a grasp of the f a i l u r e of a subject other than the r e f l e c t i n g subject, 
such a grasp i s i n any case possible only i f communication i s a 
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value f o r both the speaking and the r e f l e c t i n g subject. 
The reasoning i s as f o l l o w s . I t was argued i n Chapter 
Six t h a t the primary grasp of expressive f a i l u r e must be 
of t h a t f a i l u r e as a t o t a l i t y d e l i m i t e d from t h a t which 
i t f a i l s t o achieve, namely, expressive harmony. This 
expressive harmony was seen to consist i n a p a t t e r n of 
appropriate speech and response which I termed "communication". 
Expressive f a i l u r e , furthermore, can be possible only on the 
presupposition t h a t m a i n t a i n i n g communication i s a value i n 
the l i g h t of which the subject's speech act can be seen as a 
f a i l u r e . So much holds, whether or not the subject which 
grasps expressive f a i l u r e i s the same subject as t h a t which 
commits the f a i l u r e . The suggestion we are now considering, 
i s t h a t the r e f l e c t i n g subject could grasp the expressive f a i l u r e 
of another sub j e c t , i n the l i g h t of i t s r e c o g n i t i o n of communication 
being a value f o r t h a t speaking subject, but without i t necessarily 
being the case t h a t communication i s a value f o r the r e f l e c t i n g 
subject i t s e l f . This suggestion cannot be r i g h t . For i n order 
f o r the r e f l e c t i n g subject t o be able to r e l a t i v i s e the value of 
communication to an i n d i v i d u a l subject i n t h i s way, i t would need 
to already possess the concept of communication. But t h i s concept 
i s not a v a i l a b l e p r i o r t o r e f l e c t i o n on breakdown i n communication. 
The primary grasp of expressive f a i l u r e cannot then r e l y on a 
r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t communication i s a value f o r the speaking subject: 
f o r such a r e c o g n i t i o n would r e q u i r e the possession of concepts 
which are not at t h a t stage a v a i l a b l e . The primary grasp of 
exprssive f a i l u r e , even i f t h a t f a i l u r e i s on the p a r t of a subject 
other than the r e f l e c t i n g subject i t s e l f , i s possible only on the 
unquestioned.presupposition t h a t communication i s a value f o r 
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both s u b j e c t s . This presupposition must be unquestioned, 
since a t t h a t stage the concepts w i t h which t o question i t , 
are not a v a i l a b l e . That i s , communication must be a value 
f o r the r e f l e c t i n g subject i t s e l f , i n the context of which 
another subject's utterance can be grasped as a case of 
expressive f a i l u r e . Perhaps an i l l u s t r a t i o n w i l l help t o 
make t h i s p o i n t c l e a r e r . Someone c a l l s to me "Shut the 
window, please". I go towards the window and reach up my 
hand before r e a l i s i n g t h a t i t i s already closed. My f e e l i n g 
of s u r p r i s e i s the non-conceptual r e g i s t r a t i o n t h a t the p a t t e r n 
of appropriate speech and response has broken down. Now, looking 
a t t h i s from a detached viewpoint i t i s possible to see t h a t a 
number of d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s may have gone wrong here. I may 
have misheard, the speaker may be performing a play, I or she 
may have got the meaning of "window" or of "shut" wrong. She 
may b e l i e v e t h a t the window i s i n f a c t shut, and so on. Suppose, 
though, t h a t she continues t o ask me to shut the window, and 
responds t o my f a i l u r e t o do anything about i t , i n a way which 
makes i t p l a i n t h a t t h i s i s a serious request. I f I have no 
reason t o m i s t r u s t my hearing, or my grasp of the words u t t e r e d , 
I may r e j e c t the request as in a p p r o p r i a t e : the speaker, I w i l l 
decide, has said the wrong t h i n g . Now i t i s not a t a l l clear 
t o me whether the hearer can go f a r t h e r than t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n 
t h a t something wrong has been s a i d , to analyse i t as a case of 
expressive f a i l u r e ( r a t h e r than, say, f a l s e b e l i e f about the 
window). 1-fc may be t h a t only the speaker can i n f a c t r e f l e c t i v e l y 
analyse the wrongness, or inappropriateness, of what she has said 
i n terms of e i t h e r g e t t i n g the wrong expression f o r the t h i n k i n g 
- 307 -
t o be expressed, or of g e t t i n g her f a c t s wrong. I am 
s t r o n g l y i n c l i n e d t o suspect t h a t what must occur i s a 
process of n e g o t i a t i o n between speaker and hearer, i n which 
the p o s s i b i l i t i e s are r e f l e c t e d on together, and which i s 
s e t t l e d i n accordance w i t h the power r e l a t i o n s between the 
two. But I must leave t h i s issue aside here. The p o i n t 
I need to make i n connection w i t h t h i s i l l u s t r a t i o n i s t h i s . 
The primary grasp of the speaking subject as having said the 
wrong t h i n g , and thence of having f a i l e d t o express t h e i r 
t h i n k i n g , i s possible only on the unquestioned and unquestionable 
presupposition t h a t communication i s a value. Without t h i s 
p r e supposition, there can be no question of the speaking subject 
having f a i l e d t o f i n d the r i g h t l i n g u i s t i c expression f o r the 
t h i n k i n g which i s to be a r t i c u l a t e d . Now at t h i s primary stage 
of communication, p r i o r to r e f l e c t i o n on breakdown, the concept 
of communication i t s e l f (as a p a t t e r n of speech-acts which are 
appropriate i n the l i g h t of a context of awareness o f , and 
p r a c t i c a l involvement i n , the world; and of responseswhich are 
appr o p r i a t e , and which c o n s t i t u t e understanding what i s expressed 
i n the speech) i s not a v a i l a b l e . This means t h a t a t t h i s primary 
stage there can be no r e c o g n i t i o n on the p a r t of subjects, t h a t 
communication i s a value. I n the absence of the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of r ecognising, a t the primary stage of communication, t h a t 
communication i s a value, there i s no way i n which the subject 
which grasps and subsequently r e f l e c t s on expressive f a i l u r e can 
have r e l a t i v i s e d t h a t value t o a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l speaking 
s u b j e c t . The concepts required t o do t h a t , are not a t t h a t 
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stage a v a i l a b l e . The r e f l e c t i n g subject must i t s e l f be 
one f o r whom communication i s an unquestioned value, i n 
the l i g h t of which the speech-act of another subject can 
be grasped as an expressive f a i l u r e . This means t h a t the 
primary grasp of expressive f a i l u r e , which i s t o make possible 
the concept of t h i n k i n g and, subsequently, the c r i t i c a l concept 
of thought, i s possible only i f communication i s a value f o r both 
the speaking subject and the r e f l e c t i n g subject. Communication 
i s n e c e s s a r i l y a value f o r the r e f l e c t i n g subject, which through 
i t s r e f l e c t i o n r equires the concepts a t issue. This enables us 
to say t h a t general moral 5scepticism i s indeed s e l f - d e f e a t i n g , 
since anyone who questions the v a l i d i t y of moral claims (or of 
any other k i n d of claim) requires the c r i t i c a l concept of thought, 
and hence i s a subject f o r whom communication i s a value. We 
now have a general ad hominera argument against a l l general 
scepticism about the v a l i d i t y of moral claims, since the very 
p o s s i b i l i t y of such scepticism presupposes i t s f a l s i t y , i t 
presupposes t h a t m a i n t a i n i n g communication i s a value f o r the 
subject which r a i s e s such questions. This conclusion i s c l e a r l y 
important, and ye t i t r a i s e s c e r t a i n questions which could lead us 
to doubt whether i t i s s t r i c t l y warranted. These include the 
question of whether, despite the f a c t t h a t we have argued t h a t 
communication must be a value f o r anyone who uses the concept of 
t h i n k i n g , or the c r i t i c a l concept of thought, we do i n f a c t have 
a moral value here. I w i l l discuss t h i s , and other issues 
presently.^- For now, I wish t o make a c l a r i f i c a t o r y p o i n t about 
the argument j u s t presented, concerning how communication as a 
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value can be grasped by subjects a t the primary stage of 
communication. 
The p o i n t i s t h i s . I have argued t h a t i n order f o r 
the primary grasp of expressive f a i l u r e to be possible (and 
so the concept of t h i n k i n g ) , communication must be a value 
not only f o r the subject whose f a i l u r e t h i s i s , but also f o r 
the subject which grasps t h i s f a i l u r e i n i t s d e l i m i t a t i o n from 
what i t f a i l s t o achieve, i f t h i s r e f l e c t i n g subject i s d i f f e r e n t 
from the speaking s u b j e c t . I n one sense t h i s i s t r u e , but i n 
another i t i s misleading. For although we, possessing a l l the 
r e l e v a n t concepts, can say t h a t communication must be a value f o r 
the r e f l e c t i n g s u b j e c t , i n the l i g h t of which t h a t subject can 
grasp the speech of another as a case of expressive f a i l u r e , t h i s 
does not give us an adequate c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of how things are 
f o r the subjects themselves i n the primary stage of communication. 
For those subjects, who cannot a t t h a t stage possess the concept 
of communication i t s e l f , i t i s not the case t h a t communication 
i s recognised as a value both f o r the speaking subject, and f o r 
the s u b j e c t which p r i m a r i l y grasps the s i t u a t i o n of expressive 
f a i l u r e . Furthermore, f o r these subjects, communication as a 
value cannot be r e l a t i v i s e d t o any i n d i v i d u a l , or set of i n d i v i d u a l s 
Communication i s , t o use the term introduced i n the previous section 
an impersonal value. At the primary stage of communication, p r i o r 
t o the grasp of breakdown i n communication, communication must be a 
value which i s unquestioningly presupposed. The r e f l e c t i n g subject 
cannot p r i m a r i l y grasp the speaking subject as having said something 
wrong " i f she wished t o communicate", since the concepts ( o f wish, 
or aim) required f o r t h i s grasp are not at t h a t stage a v a i l a b l e . 
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I n s t e a d , the r e f l e c t i n g subject must grasp the speaking 
subject as having s a i d something wrong, s i m p l i c i t e r : 
where the value of saying the r i g h t t h i n g i s unquestioningly 
presupposed. The argument of t h i s s ection has brought out 
the way i n which communication must be a value which holds 
impersonally, and which i s not therefore r e l a t i v i s e d to 
i n d i v i d u a l s , i n order f o r a grasp of expressive f a i l u r e (and 
so, subsequently, f o r the c r i t i c a l concept of thought) to be 
po s s i b l e . But t h i s w i l l perhaps seem, nevertheless, t o have 
accomplished only p a r t of what I set out t o do i n t h i s section. 
For could i t not j u s t be the case t h a t communication i s a value 
contingent on the preferences of i n d i v i d u a l subjects, even though 
t h i s preferences must i n i t i a l l y be presupposed as common to 
speaking and hearing subjects? Although I f e e l t h a t t h i s i s 
c e r t a i n l y not the case, I f e e l also t h a t I should say a l i t t l e 
more about the non-contingency of the value of communication on 
the wants or preferences of i n d i v i d u a l s . I w i l l do t h i s by 
considering two stages of a possible response to the argument j u s t 
presented. 
Let us consider d i r e c t l y the question of whether communication, 
although a value f o r a l l subjects which employ the c r i t i c a l concept 
of thought ( o r the concept of t h i n k i n g ) , might be nevertheless 
co n t i n g e n t , as a value, on the desires or preferences of a l l those 
s u b j e c t s . The answer t o t h i s question i s t h a t communication as a 
value i s not contingent i n t h i s way. I t i s a value f o r those 
subjects whatever p a r t i c u l a r wants or preferences they might have. 
The reason f o r t h i s , i s t h a t communication must be a value f o r those 
subjects which come t o acquire the concepts of t h i n k i n g or thought, 
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p r i o r t o the possession by those subjects of the concept 
of communication. Communication i s , a t the primary stage 
of communication, an unquestionable and unthinkable value. 
I t can be revealed as a value, only through r e f l e c t i o n on i t s 
breakdown. P r i o r t o t h a t r e f l e c t i o n , the concept of 
communication (as developed i n Chapter Six) i s not a v a i l a b l e . 
Consequently, i t i s i l l e g i t i m a t e to ascribe to subjects i n 
the primary stage of communication any desires, preferences, aims etcetera, 
which concern communication. Whatever p a r t i c u l a r desires or 
i n t e n t i o n s such subjects have, communication must nonetheless be a 
value f o r any subject which employs e i t h e r the c r i t i c a l concept of 
thought, or the concept of t h i n k i n g . 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n I have argued t h a t communication i s necessarily 
a value f o r any subject which possesses e i t h e r the c r i t i c a l concept 
of thought, or the concept of t h i n k i n g . I t i s a value which holds 
impersonally, and i s not r e l a t i v e t o p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s among 
those s u b j e c t s . Furthermore, i t i s a value which i s not contingent 
on the desires or i n t e n t i o n s of such subjects, but holds whatever 
desires or i n t e n t i o n s those subjects may have. No-one, th e r e f o r e , 
can coherently question the claim t h a t communication i s a value: 
f o r such questioning presupposes possession of the c r i t i c a l concept 
of thought, and hence t h a t communication i s indeed a n o n - r e l a t i v e , 
non-contingent value. Such scepticism i s possible only i f f a l s e . 
I want t o use t h i s argument as a basis f o r f u r t h e r discussion of 
how f a r t h i s account of communication as a value f i t s i n w i t h our 
notions of moral values. I n the section t h a t f o l l o w s , I w i l l 
argue t h a t communication as a value i s characterised by the 
p r e s c r i p t i v i t y which i s at the heart of our n o t i o n of m o r a l i t y . 
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P r e s c r i p t i v i t y 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n I want to b r i e f l y p o s i t i o n the argument 
of t h i s chapter so f a r , i n the context of some recent philosophical 
work on the nature of m o r a l i t y . I hope t h a t t h i s w i l l enable us 
to get a c l e a r e r perspective on the nature of communication as a 
moral value, and t h a t i t w i l l pave the way f o r a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t 
i t i s a necessary moral p r i n c i p l e t h a t communication be maintained. 
Let us begin by considering the nature of our everyday moral 
discourse. 
Ordinary moral discourse, argues John Mackie, lays claim to 
a c e r t a i n o b j e c t i v e c a t e g o r i c a l , p r e s c r i p t i v i t y . M o r a l p r i n c i p l e s 
are u s u a l l y taken t o be o b j e c t i v e , i n t h a t t h e i r grasp i s a matter 
of knowledge r a t h e r than d e c i s i o n . They are also taken to be 
c a t e g o r i c a l , i n t h a t they are independent of the p a r t i c u l a r aims, 
desires or i n t e n t i o n s of any i n d i v i d u a l , or group of i n d i v i d u a l s . 
This claim t o o b j e c t i v e c a t e g o r i c a l p r e s c r i p t i v i t y does not, 
however, f i n d much favour i n recent B r i t i s h philosophy. To 
s i m p l i f y matters, we can say t h a t philosophers who r e j e c t t h i s 
c l a i m f a l l i n t o two broad camps, each associated w i t h a view of 
the nature of moral discourse. On the one hand, there are the 
n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t s , such as Hare, who accepts the c a t e g o r i c a l q u a l i t y 
of moral r u l e s , but deny t h e i r o b j e c t i v i t y : such rules are founded 
on s u b j e c t i v e decisions, and have no o b j e c t i v e v a l i d i t y . ^ ' On the 
other hand, there are n a t u r a l i s t s , such as Foot, who r e j e c t the 
c a t e g o r i c a l aspect; arguing instead t h a t m o r a l i t y i s a system 
of h y p o t h e t i c a l imperatives which depend on the ends of the agents 
i n question, and t h a t nothing more c a t e g o r i c a l i s needed.^- (Foot 
makes c l e a r t h a t the ends she discusses can be other-regarding, as 
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w e l l as s e l f - r e g a r d i n g . ) Moral b e l i e f s can ther e f o r e be 
tru e or f a l s e on t h i s view, but t h e i r t r u t h or f a l s i t y 
depends on the ends and desires of the agents i n question. 
N e i t h e r of these camps accepts, then, the o b j e c t i v e , 
c a t e g o r i c a l , 'binding f o r c e ' which i s o r d i n a r i l y ascribed t o 
moral r u l e s . Each camp o f f e r s instead an account of why we 
o r d i n a r i l y c l i n g t o t h i s i l l u s i o n of o b j e c t i v e c a t e g o r i c a l i t y , 
i n s t e a d of recognising m o r a l i t y f o r the non-absolute a f f a i r they 
take i t t o be. I n o f f e r i n g such accounts, they are f o l l o w i n g 
a procedure associated e s p e c i a l l y w i t h Hume: i n many areas of 
philosophy Hume undermines naive o b j e c t i v i s m , and replaces i t 
w i t h a c r i t i c a l s u b j e c t i v i s m accompanied by a theory of why we 
c l i n g t o t h a t o b j e c t i v i s m . This procedure leaves us w i t h no 
hope of a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d reinstatement of the o b j e c t i v e categorical 
nature of m o r a l i t y , and w i t h a sense of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h what 
we are o f f e r e d i n exchange. How does the account of communication 
as a value f i t i n t o t h i s context? 
The account given above of communication as a value f i t s 
i n t o the context j u s t o u t l i n e d l i k e t h i s . That communication 
i s a value i s , f i r s t , something t h a t we can come to know, by 
going through the argument presented so f a r i n these chapters. 
Our grasp of t h i s f a c t i s a matter of knowledge, r a t h e r than 
s u b j e c t i v e decision. Secondly, the value of communication i s 
not dependent on any p a r t i c u l a r aims or desires of agents: the 
imperatives which i t gives r i s e to are i n t h i s sense c a t e g o r i c a l 
ones. We can sum t h i s up by saying t h a t we can know t h a t 
communication i s a p a t t e r n of appropriate speech and response 
which i s , c a t e g o r i c a l l y , t o be maintained - whatever the aims 
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of p a r t i c u l a r agents. The account of communication as a 
value, and of the p r i n c i p l e of maintaining communication, 
shows t h a t t h i s value and t h i s p r i n c i p l e possess p r e c i s e l y 
those c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which are o r d i n a r i l y taken t o characterise 
everyday moral discourse. We need not then quibble about saying 
t h a t i t i s a moral p r i n c i p l e t h a t communication i s t o be maintained 
(though nothing very much hangs on t h i s ) . What else could be 
meant by c a l l i n g something a moral p r i n c i p l e ? We have reached 
a p o i n t a t which we can say t h a t communication i s a value which 
possesses an o b j e c t i v e , c a t e g o r i c a l p r e s c r i p t i v i t y . I t s obtaining 
i s a matter of knowledge r a t h e r than d e c i s i o n ; and the p r e s c r i p t i o n s 
which i t licenses are independent of the p a r t i c u l a r aims or desires 
of i n d i v i d u a l agents, or groups of such agents. We have established 
a transcendental foundation of e t h i c s . But we should not expect 
t h a t t h i s argument w i l l remain unchallenged. Before we can f e e l 
secure as t o i t s conclusion we need to look a t some awkward 
questions, which concern the extent t o which we can base e t h i c a l 
p r i n c i p l e s on the account of communication as a value. 
One question i s t h i s . Surely there are some people who 
both possess the c r i t i c a l concept of thought, and yet who c l e a r l y 
do not value communication? Do we not know of people who e i t h e r 
shun communication, or even take a pleasure i n i t s d i s r u p t i o n . 
Do not such people provide an empirical r e f u t a t i o n of the theory 
presented i n t h i s chapter? What we have here are cases i n which 
the p a r t i c u l a r aims of an agent c o n f l i c t , i n the most d i r e c t way 
po s s i b l e , w i t h what I have claimed to be a value binding on a l l 
s ubjects who possess e i t h e r the c r i t i c a l concept of thought, or 
the concept of t h i n k i n g . What can we make of t h i s c o n f l i c t ? 
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We have to recognise here the p o s s i b i l i t y of a d i s p a r i t y 
between the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l y established value of communcation, 
and the 'values', or aims, which an i n d i v i d u a l subject may 
recognise f o r i t s e l f . For i t has been shown t h a t communication 
must be a moral value f o r any subject which possesses the c r i t i c a l 
concept of thought, whatever the p a r t i c u l a r aims or desires of 
such a s u b j e c t . I f people act against the p r i n c i p l e t h a t 
communication i s t o be maintained, then they are a c t i n g 
immorally: they are not doing t h a t which i s c a t e g o r i c a l l y t o 
be done, by any subject which possesses the c r i t i c a l concept of 
thought. I n t h i s way we can preserve the o b j e c t i v e , categorical 
p r e s c r i p t i v i t y of the p r i n c i p l e of maintaining communication: t h a t 
p r i n c i p l e holds, despite the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n f l i c t w i t h the 
p a r t i c u l a r aims of i n d i v i d u a l subjects. Now t h i s argument f o r 
the p r i n c i p l e of m a i n t a i n i n g communication, and the n o t i o n of a 
d i s p a r i t y between the transcendentally established value of 
communication, and the aims or desires of a p a r t i c u l a r subject, 
are bound t o give the impression t h a t I am p u l l i n g r a b b i t s out 
of an empty hat: there must be a t r i c k , somewhere. Let me 
then t r y t o show t h a t there i s nothing up my sleeves, by deepening 
the question asked at the beginning of t h i s paragraph, concerning 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between communication as a value, and the aims and 
desires of p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s . 
The question can now take t h i s developed., form: "We may be 
able t o accept t h a t the existence of communication i s a necessary 
c o n d i t i o n of our possessing the c r i t i c a l concept of thought, and 
indeed t h a t the existence of communication i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n 
of our being able t o do t h i n g s such as l y i n g , i n s u l t i n g , deceiving. 
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and so on, which are i n c o n f l i c t w i t h what you have c a l l e d 
the p r i n c i p l e of ma i n t a i n i n g communication. Even so, 
given t h a t i t may be a necessary c o n d i t i o n of such endeavours 
t h a t communication e x i s t s , i t i s not clear t h a t any p r e s c r i p t i v e 
weight can be c a r r i e d by t h i s n o t i o n , or t h a t we can found 
o b l i g a t i o n s on the necessary existence of communication. 
For," the question continues, "why should I not, having 
accepted t h a t communication must e x i s t f o r me t o possess the 
c r i t i c a l concept of thought, then use or abuse communication 
when and how I please, i n the p r u d e n t i a l p u r s u i t of my own 
s e l f - i n t e r e s t ? Where i s the o b l i g a t i o n to maintain communication 
(even given t h a t m a i n t a i n i n g communication involves the actual 
production of speech-acts only when appropriate)?" The 
answer I must give t o t h i s question i s t h i s . The existence 
of communication i s indeed a necessary c o n d i t i o n of many of the 
acts t h a t are o r d i n a r i l y deemed to be wrong, and which v i o l a t e 
the p r i n c i p l e of maintaining communication. But we must go 
f u r t h e r than t h i s t o show t h a t communication i s not something t o 
be maintained only when i t f i t s i n w i t h p r u d e n t i a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t . 
I t i s t o be maintained whether i t serves p r u d e n t i a l aims or not. 
The argument goes l i k e t h i s . Our questioner e v i d e n t l y possesses 
the c r i t i c a l concept of thought. Now t h i s concept i s possible, 
and can be acquired, only on c o n d i t i o n t h a t the questioner r e f l e c t 
on a f a i l u r e of a subject t o get the r i g h t expression f o r the 
t h i n k i n g to be expressed i n a p a r t i c u l a r u tterance. ( I omit, 
f o r b r e v i t y , some of the stages of the by now f a m i l i a r argument 
of Chapters Five and Six.) Now a grasp of such expressive 
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f a i l u r e i s possible only i f the subject which grasps i t 
i s one f o r whom communication i s a p a t t e r n of speech and 
response which i s to be maintained. I f communication were 
not something t o be maintained, then there could be no grasp 
of expressive f a i l u r e , and so no c r i t i c a l concept of thought. 
The questioner, who possesses t h i s concept, i s thus necessarily 
a subject f o r whom the p r i n c i p l e of maintaining communication 
already holds, (although, a t the primary stage of communication, 
t h i s f a c t cannot be recognised as such). Furthermore, as we 
have seen, t h i s p r i n c i p l e i s not dependent on any p a r t i c u l a r 
aims or desires of the subj e c t , but holds c a t e g o r i c a l l y . This 
means t h a t issues of p r u d e n t i a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t are not relevant 
t o the p r i n c i p l e t h a t communication i s t o be maintained. Where 
ideas of s e l f - i n t e r e s t begin t o emerge, and thenceforth a 
questioning of the o b l i g a t i o n s concerning the maintenance of 
communication a r i s e s , we must show the questioner how t o retrace 
the steps by which t h a t questioning was made possible. The 
questioner must be shown, by means of the argument presented 
i n t h i s t h e s i s , t h a t she i s already a subject f o r whom communication 
i s a value, f o r whom communication i s something t o be maintained. 
I n drawing the questioner back t o a r e c o g n i t i o n of the values and 
p r i n c i p l e s t h a t she ne c e s s a r i l y already holds, reasoning has an 
end. The questioner i s confronted w i t h the r e c o g n i t i o n of the 
s o r t of being she ne c e s s a r i l y i s . This i s the k i n d of s e l f -
r e c o g n i t i o n which i t i s so d i f f i c u l t to a t t a i n i n a society which 
works i n many ways t o prevent, obscure or d i s t o r t people's 
understanding of themselves. I t i s i n the l i g h t of such 
- 318 -
s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n , t h a t we may give s e l f - i n t e r e s t i t s proper 
place: as something which may be l e g i t i m a t e l y pursued w i t h i n 
a c e r t a i n framework of moral p r i n c i p l e s , but which cannot 
j u s t i f y transgressions of those p r i n c i p l e s . I hope by now 
to have d i s p e l l e d the impression of having performed some 
k i n d of c o n j u r i n g t r i c k ; and t o have shown t h a t i n t r a c i n g 
the necessary c o n d i t i o n s of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the c r i t i c a l 
concept of thought, we a r r i v e a t an understanding of ourselves 
as subjects f o r whom a basic p r i n c i p l e , t h a t of maintaining 
communication, n e c e s s a r i l y and c a t e g o r i c a l l y obtains. Nevertheless, 
I s h a l l allow the questioner another t r y , so as to b r i n g out what 
h i s question must, i n e f f e c t , be a request f o r . Let us look at 
the questioner's l a s t chance. 
" I am s t i l l not c l e a r " , the questioner may say "on what 
communication i s a value f o r . I t may very w e l l not serve t o 
promote the aims I set f o r myself. Why, then, should I act i n 
accordance w i t h t h i s p r i n c i p l e , which from the i n d i v i d u a l subject's 
viewpoint may seem t o be an im p o s i t i o n from w i t h o u t , and one which 
c o n f l i c t s w i t h the subject's own aims?" (This i s reminiscent of 
the o l d question, "Why should I be moral?") What s o r t of answer 
can we give t o t h i s question? We cannot r e l y , i n answering t h i s 
question, on the claim t h a t a c t i o n i n accordance w i t h t h i s p r i n c i p l e 
w i l l c o n t r i b u t e to the i n d i v i d u a l ' s happiness; f o r t h i s would i n 
e f f e c t make the v a l i d i t y of the p r i n c i p l e dependent on the aims 
of the subject, and so would remove i t s c a t e g o r i c a l q u a l i t y . 
Communication i s not a value f o r something else: f o r , say, the 
promotion of p r u d e n t i a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t . I t i s r a t h e r a value 
which we can come t o recognise as c o n s t i t u t i n g i n pa r t what^sort 
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of beings we n e c e s s a r i l y are. The way to answering our 
question, then, i s t o recognise t h a t the question cannot 
be a request f o r a j u s t i f y i n g reason to act i n accordance 
w i t h the p r i n c i p l e of maintaining communication, but only 
f o r a motive. For as f a r as reasons are concerned, they 
have already been given. The reason why someone should 
maintain communication i s simply t h a t , as a subject which 
employs e i t h e r the c r i t i c a l concept of thought or the concept 
of t h i n k i n g , communication i s f o r them something which i s , 
c a t e g o r i c a l l y , t o be maintained. I f things were not so, 
the subject would not possess e i t h e r of the concepts mentioned, 
and would not be able t o ask such questions i n the f i r s t place 
(since such questions nec e s s a r i l y presuppose an awareness of 
the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the statement of the p r i n c i p l e of maintaining 
communication might be f a l s e ) . There i s no more t h a t e i t h e r 
can, or need, be done as f a r as pro v i d i n g reasons f o r a c t i n g 
i n accordance w i t h the p r i n c i p l e t h a t communication i s to be 
maintained. Reasoning has come to i t s r i g h t end. The question 
a t the beginning of t h i s paragraph can, i n the l i g h t of the p o i n t 
j u s t made, only be p r o p e r l y taken as a c a l l f o r a m o t i v a t i o n to 
t o act i n accordance w i t h what i s (or at any r a t e can be) known 
to be r i g h t . Given t h a t maintaining communication i s o f t e n 
d i f f i c u l t , and o f t e n c o n f l i c t s w i t h a subject's own avowed aims 
and d e s i r e s 4 what m o t i v a t i o n can be o f f e r e d as an inducement t o 
the subject t o abide by the moral p r i n c i p l e ? I s h a l l address 
t h i s question d i r e c t l y i n the next s e c t i o n . At present I wish 
only t o show how we must understand the question w i t h which t h i s 
paragraph begins. Let me now t u r n t o a c o r o l l a r y of the argument 
j u s t presented. 
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I f the question "Why should I maintain communication?" 
i s r a i s e d a f t e r the argument i n these chapters has been 
fo l l o w e d , then i t can only be pro p e r l y understood as a request 
f o r a motive. C o r r e l a t i v e l y , there are s i m i l a r r e s t r i c t i o n s 
on how we can p r o p e r l y understand the reasons which an agent 
produces f o r i t s a c t i o n s . Let me i l l u s t r a t e t h i s . I f 
someone says "Well, I know t h a t communication i s t o be maintained, 
but I s h a l l nevertheless not t e l l X about her promotion for 
"but I nevertheless d i d not t e l l X about her promotion"lbecause 
i t pleases me to see people kept i n the dark", how are we t o 
take t h i s ? We cannot take t h i s as a reason j u s t i f y i n g the 
a c t i o n , because the p r i n c i p l e of maintaining communication has 
been o b j e c t i v e l y established as l i c e n s i n g c a t e g o r i c a l imperatives. 
We can take the subject's statement only as an account of the 
subject's motive i n a c t i n g i n t h a t way. 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n I have argued t h a t the p r i n c i p l e t h a t 
communication i s t o be maintained has a c e r t a i n binding f o r c e . 
I t i s a p r i n c i p l e which i s not dependent on the p a r t i c u l a r aims 
or desires of agents, and y e t one which can be known to obtain. 
I t s v a l i d i t y i s not> t h e r e f o r e , a f f e c t e d e i t h e r by changes i n 
agents' aims or d e s i r e s , or by coming i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h them. 
I t s v a l i d i t y i s n e c e s s a r i l y presupposed by any subject which 
possesses the c r i t i c a l concept of thought. I t cannot then 
be coherently put i n question, since the v a l i d i t y of the p r i n c i p l e 
i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n of the very p o s s i b i l i t y of such doubt. 
The p r i n c i p l e of maintaining communication i s , I have argued, 
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an o b j e c t i v e l y necessary and c a t e g o r i c a l moral p r i n c i p l e . 
I n a sense, t h i s i s the culmination of the argument of 
t h i s t h e s i s : a transcendental foundation of e t h i c s has 
been esta b l i s h e d . I n the f o l l o w i n g sections, however, I 
wish t o f i l l i n some of the d e t a i l of what has been established. 
I n the next s e c t i o n I w i l l t u r n t o the question of what motive 
there can be f o r a c t i n g m o r a l l y ; f o r a c t i n g , t h a t i s , i n 
accordance w i t h the p r i n c i p l e of maintaining communication. 
Moral motives 
So f a r i n t h i s chapter, I have been concerned to provide 
a transcendental foundation of an o b j e c t i v e l y necessary and 
c a t e g o r i c a l moral p r i n c i p l e . I n the l a s t s e c t i o n , i t became 
c l e a r t h a t my main aim was t o show t h a t t h i s p r e s c r i p t i v e 
p r i n c i p l e - t h a t communication i s to be maintained - necessarily 
holds f o r any subject which possesses the c r i t i c a l concept of 
thought. This l e f t t o one side the question of what mo t i v a t i o n a l 
c o n s i d e r a t ions, as against j u s t i f y i n g reasons, there could be f o r 
a c t i n g i n accordance w i t h t h i s p r i n c i p l e ; 1 Now i t may seem, i n 
any case, u n l i k e l y t h a t I can produce m o t i v a t i o n a l considerations 
which w i l l s a t i s f y everyone who demands them. Nevertheless, i t 
seems t o me t h a t , i n sharply separating the j u s t i f i c a t i o n from 
the m o t i v a t i o n of the subject's a c t i o n , an important issue i n 
moral philosophy i s being ignored. I n t h i s s e c t i o n , I w i l l 
b r e i f l y present t h i s issue, s i t u a t e the account of communcation 
as a value i n the context of r i v a l views on t h a t issue, and then 
argue t h a t communication as a value not only j u s t i f i e s , but also 
motivates, the a c t i o n of the agents we are discussing. 
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The issue I want t o present, i s formulated i n terms 
of a dispute between ' i n t e r n a l i s m ' and 'externalism' w i t h 
regard t o the m o t i v a t i o n a l aspect of m o r a l i t y / * 0 ' I n t e r n a l i s m 
i s the view t h a t the presence of a motive f o r a c t i n g morally 
i s guaranteed by the t r u t h of e t h i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s themselves. 
On t h i s view, the m o t i v a t i o n must be so t i e d t o the t r u t h , 
or perhaps the meaning, or moral statements, t h a t when someone 
i s ( o r perhaps merely believes she i s ) morally required t o do 
something, then i t f o l l o w s t h a t she has a motive f o r doing i t . 
Externalism, on the other hand, i s the view t h a t the necessary 
m o t i v a t i o n i s not supplied by e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s or judgements 
themselves, and t h a t an a d d i t i o n a l psychological sanction i s 
accordingly r e q u i r e d t o motivate our compliance w i t h the 'moral 
l a w 1 . I n the previous s e c t i o n , I may have given the impression 
t h a t , since I separated j u s t i f y i n g from m o t i v a t i n g considerations, 
I was advocating an e x t e r n a l i s t view. Consequently, i t may 
seem t h a t I am committed to leaving the question of mo t i v a t i o n 
t o the psychologists. I wish to counteract such an impression, 
and t o do t h i s w i l l provide the o u t l i n e of an i n t e r n a l i s t account 
of the m o t i v a t i o n t o act i n accordance w i t h moral p r i n c i p l e s . 
The basis f o r t h i s account, i s a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the necessary 
pre s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t communication i s a value f o r a l l subjects 
capable of asking c r i t i c a l questions, allows of two d i r e c t i o n s 
of i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The account presented i n the preceding sections 
has been concerned w i t h how, i n t r a c i n g the necessary conditions of 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of the c r i t i c a l concept of thought, we can es t a b l i s h 
an o b j e c t i v e , c a t e g o r i c a l p r e s c r i p t i v i t y l i n k e d t o communication as 
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a value. But another l i n e of i n v e s t i g a t i o n remains open. 
For i f a grasp of expressive f a i l u r e i s to be pos s i b l e , 
then communication must be presupposed as an end which 
governed the subject's ( l i n g u i s t i c ) behaviour. For i f the 
behaviour of the subje c t we are considering i s not i n any 
sense d i r e c t e d towards communication, towards maintaining a 
p a t t e r n of appropriate speech and response, then there i s no 
p o s s i b i l i t y of a grasp of i t s utterance as a case of expressive 
f a i l u r e . A grasp of the t o t a l i t y of expressive f a i l u r e i s 
possible only of t h a t t o t a l i t y i n d e l i m i t a t i o n from t h a t which 
i t f a i l s t o achieve. There can, i n t u r n , be no t a l k of f a i l u r e , 
i n the absence of the n o t i o n of an end to which the behaviour i n 
question was i n some sense d i r e c t e d . A necessary con d i t i o n of 
the primary grasp of expressive f a i l u r e (and thence of the concept 
of t h i n k i n g , and so on), i s the r e f o r e t h a t expressive harmony 
i s i n some sense an end towards which the subject's. behaviour has 
already been d i r e c t e d . I argued i n Chapter Six t h a t t h i s 
expressive harmony consists of a p a t t e r n of speech and response 
which I c a l l e d "communication". Consequently, communication 
must be recognised as an end towards which the subject's behaviour 
i s already d i r e c t e d . Communication i s t h e r e f o r e revealed as a 
value i n a t w o - f o l d sense. I t i s revealed as a p r e s c r i p t i o n : 
communication i s a p a t t e r n of speech and response which i s to be 
maintained. I f i s revealed also as an end: communication i s a 
p a t t e r n of speech and response to which behaviour i s already 
d i r e c t e d . Communication thereby serves as both p r e s c r i p t i o n and 
m o t i v a t i o n . While t h i s conclusion seems a t i d y one to me, i t 
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also r a i s e s c e r t a i n questions which need t o be answered, 
concerning the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h i s m o t i v a t i o n . 
The f i r s t i s a question which has already been discussed 
i n Chapter Six,^* I t i s t h i s . How can a subject be motivated 
by an end which the subject cannot i t s e l f conceive o f , since 
i t lacks the concepts r e q u i r e d f o r such a conception? The 
answer t o t h i s i s e s s e n t i a l l y the same as t h a t provided i n the 
e a r l i e r discussion. There are cases where the end towards 
which our behaviour i s d i r e c t e d , i s recognisable only through 
r e f l e c t i o n on a f a i l u r e to achieve t h a t end. I n the case of 
communcation, I have argued t h a t the primary grasp of expressive 
f a i l u r e - the f a i l u r e t o get the r i g h t l i n g u i s t i c expression 
f o r the t h i n k i n g t o be expressed - i s possible only i f expressive 
harmony i s an end towards which the subject's behaviour i s 
d i r e c t e d . Since the concepts of expressive harmony, and of 
communication, are unavailable p r i o r t o r e f l e c t i o n on a breakdown 
i n communication; i t f o l l o w s t h a t we have such a case here. 
That i s , the subject's behaviour must be d i r e c t e d towards an 
end, communcation, which i s recognisable only through r e f l e c t i o n 
on a f a i l u r e to achieve t h a t end. We might say t h a t communication 
i s an end which 'moves' the subject to act i n ways which are f u l l y 
comprehensible t o the subject only when t h a t end i s not achieved. 
A second question p a r a l l e l s t h a t asked i n the preceding section 
about c o n f l i c t s between the aims of an i n d i v i d u a l , and the cat e g o r i c a l 
p r e s c r i p t i o n associated w i t h communication as a value. The question 
here i s t h i s . Surely there are some beings who possess the c r i t i c a l 
concept of thought, and y e t who are not motivated t o abide by the 
p r i n c i p l e of ma i n t a i n i n g communication? Sometimes they w i l l be 
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motivated t o communicate i f i t f u r t h e r s t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s , 
hut the maintenance of communication does not w i t h them carry 
any, as i t were, c a t e g o r i c a l m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e . Their mo t i v a t i o n 
to m aintain communication i s dependent on t h e i r personal aims 
or d e s i r e s . There are indeed, apparently, cases where the 
subject seems incapable of such m o t i v a t i o n , even where i t would 
serve t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s . Surely such p a t h o l o g i c a l cases, and 
the ones described before them, c o n s t i t u t e an empiri c a l r e f u t a t i o n 
of the claim t h a t communication i s an end which motivates a l l 
subjects capable of c r i t i c a l thought? I t may seem t h a t i n 
the case of m o t i v a t i o n , as against the case of e s t a b l i s h i n g the 
p r e s c r i p t i v i t y of the p r i n c i p l e of maintaining communication, 
such cases must provide an em p i r i c a l r e f u t a t i o n of t h a t claim. 
To see t h a t they do not, we need t o recognise t h a t there i s a 
possible d i s p a r i t y between what we might c a l l deep and surface 
m o t i v a t i o n . Let me e x p l a i n t h i s . Communication as an end 
towards which a subject's behaviour i s d i r e c t e d , i s at the 
primary stage of communication unthinkable by the subject i t s e l f . 
The subject can not a t t h a t stage possess the necessary concepts. 
Whatever p a r t i c u l a r goals the i n d i v i d u a l subject may acquire f o r 
i t s e l f , i t i s n e c e s s a r i l y the case t h a t communication i s an end 
towards which i t s behaviour i s d i r e c t e d . I f t h i s were not the 
case, the grasp of cases of expressive f a i l u r e would be impossible 
(and so, t h e r e f o r e , would the c r i t i c a l concept of thought be 
im p o s s i b l e ) . What sense then, can we make of cases where t h i s 
c a t e g o r i c a l m o t i v a t i o n i s i n c o n f l i c t w i t h the p a r t i c u l a r goals 
t h a t a subject sets i t s e l f ? I n order to be able to understand 
such cases, l e t us r e c a l l p a r t of the argument from the f i r s t 
s e c t i o n of the present chapter. 
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I n t h a t s e c t i o n , i t was argued t h a t the context i n 
which speech-acts and t h e i r responses can be appropriate, 
needs t o be characterised i n a c e r t a i n way. I t i s a 
context which consists i n p a r t of an unquestioning acceptance 
of c e r t a i n p r a c t i c a l involvements w i t h the world - the corn 
i s t o be sown, the t i g e r avoided, and so on. Now none of 
these p r a c t i c a l involvements i s i t s e l f necessary} f o r example, 
i n Greenland the people would l i v e , speak, t h i n k and c r i t i c i s e 
w i t h o u t even being aware of the existence of corn and t i g e r s . 
Nevertheless, i t i s an awareness of what i s t o be done i n the 
world, which determines what speech-act i s appropriate, and t o 
whom i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e l y addressed. At the primary stage of 
communication, there are no l i m i t s on the range of possible 
audiences: anyone might be an audience, i f the unquestioningly 
accepted p r a c t i c a l involvements make i t appropriate. At t h i s 
stage, the production of appropriate speech-acts and responses 
i s an end towards which the subject's behaviour i s d i r e c t e d : i f 
i t were not so, then there would be no grasp of expressive f a i l u r e , 
and so no concept of t h i n k i n g , and so on. We can, then, e s t a b l i s h 
t h a t a t the primary stage communication i s an end f o r a l l those who 
become c r i t i c a l subjects (and, indeed, f o r some who do not become 
so). How i s i t , then, t h a t there seem to be subjects who move 
from t h i s stage, and come to a l t e r t h e i r motivation? We must 
understand the p o s i t i o n i n the f o l l o w i n g way. Since communication 
as an end i s not dependent on the p a r t i c u l a r desires and aims of 
i n d i v i d u a l s , then i t cannot be a f f e c t e d by any changes i n such 
desires and aims. What must happen i s t h a t communication as an 
end which 'moves' subjects t o act i n c e r t a i n ways, becomes obscured 
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or d i s t o r t e d by c e r t a i n experiences t h a t the subject 
undergoes. Uncovering communication as a primary end 
f o r a subj e c t , i s the task f o r p s y c h i a t r y r a t h e r than 
philosophy. Even so, the argument j u s t o u t l i n e d lays down 
l i m i t s t o p s y c h i a t r i c theory: f o r i f i t were the case t h a t 
at no stage was communication an end towards which the subject's 
behaviour was d i r e c t e d , then the subject could not acquire e i t h e r 
the concept of t h i n k i n g or the c r i t i c a l concept of thought. Let 
me give a p i e c e of speculative p s y c h i a t r y as an i l l u s t r a t i o n of 
the p o i n t being made here. There are cases i n which men are 
apparently motivated i n t h e i r behaviour towards women, by a 
desire t o destroy them. Such a desire c l e a r l y c o n f l i c t s w i t h 
the suggestion t h a t a l l c r i t i c a l subjects are motivated by the 
p r i n c i p l e of mai n t a i n i n g communication. We can understand t h i s 
c o n f l i c t by recognising t h a t such men undergo experiences which 
e f f e c t i v e l y remove women from the range of subjects w i t h which 
i t i s appropriate t o communicate. The openness towards communicating 
w i t h anyone, where shared p r a c t i c a l involvements make i t appropriate, 
i s closed o f f . A psychological block against maintaining 
communication w i t h a c e r t a i n group of subjects has developed, 
which i t i s the psychotherapists task t o undo. I f successful, 
the s u b j e c t i n question i s thereby freed t o d i r e c t h i s behaviour 
towards communication as an end. I t i s not t h a t communication 
has ceased t o be an end f o r the subject, but t h a t i t has been 
d i s t o r t e d or obscured i n c e r t a i n ways. 
I f e e l a c e r t a i n embarrassment about the argument of t h i s 
s e c t i o n , which was not present i n the preceding s e c t i o n . This 
i s because although i t i s the philosopher's task t o trace the 
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p r e s c r i p t i v i t y of communication as a value, uncovering 
the maintenance of communication as an o b j e c t i v e l y necessary 
and c a t e g o r i c a l p r i n c i p l e , i t i s not the philosopher's task 
t o take a subject through the process of recognising t h a t 
communication i s indeed a c a t e g o r i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g end. 
(Again, t h i s aim of achieving s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n i s not easy 
to f u l f i l i n a s o c i e t y such as ours.) A l l I have aimed t o 
show here, i s t h a t communication i s necessarily both a p r e s c r i p t i v e 
value - t h a t which i s t o be maintained - and a m o t i v a t i n g end -
t h a t towards which behaviour i s d i r e c t e d . Having o f f e r e d t h i s 
o u t l i n e of an i n t e r n a l i s t account of moral m o t i v a t i o n , I should 
l i k e t o t u r n i n the next s e c t i o n t o a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of some 
substantive e t h i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of the argument presented i n 
t h i s chapter. 
Substantive e t h i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s 
I n t h i s chapter I have so f a r argued t h a t the p r i n c i p l e t h a t 
communication i s t o be maintained, i s an o b j e c t i v e l y necessary and 
c a t e g o r i c a l one. I t holds f o r a t l e a s t a l l beings which possess 
e i t h e r the concept of t h i n k i n g , or the c r i t i c a l concept of thought. 
I t i s not dependent on the p a r t i c u l a r aims or desires of agents. 
I t i s i n t e r n a l l y m o t i v a t i n g . I f the argument of t h i s t h e s i s 
has been v a l i d , then I have reached the end which I se't myself. 
Nevertheless, although I do not have the space i n which to develop 
a comprehensive e t h i c a l theory here, I f e e l t h a t I should o f f e r a t 
l e a s t one substantive e t h i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e of 
m a i n t a i n i n g communication. I s h a l l argue t h a t t h i s p r i n c i p l e 
- 329 -
i m p l i e s t h a t people should not be k i l l e d . This i s hardly 
a novel conclusion. The p o i n t of the argument w i l l be to 
show t h a t a l l t h i s t a l k of communication as a value does 
indeed have moral consequences; and t o give some idea of 
the d i r e c t i o n by which a more f u l l y developed e t h i c a l theory 
could be obtained. I w i l l proceed i n two stages. F i r s t , 
I w i l l consider the i m p l i c a t i o n s of maintaining communication 
i n a s i t u a t i o n where p r a c t i c a l involvements are accepted by 
the subjects as impersonal and given. Second, I s h a l l develop 
the argument t o account f o r what happens when the p r a c t i c a l 
involvements of d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s or communities diverge, 
or even c o n f l i c t . 
F i r s t , then, l e t us r e c a l l p a r t of the argument of the f i r s t 
s e c t i o n of t h i s chapter. I n t h a t s e c t i o n , i t was argued t h a t 
the primary stage of communication, preceding any breakdown i n 
communication, had t o be characterised i n a c e r t a i n way. At 
t h a t primary stage, communication i s a p a t t e r n of speech-acts and 
responses, which are appropriate given a context of awareness of, 
and p r a c t i c a l involvement i n , the world around. These p r a c t i c a l 
involvements, p r i o r t o any r e f l e c t i o n on breakdown which could 
make possible the concepts of personal aims, desires, i n t e r e s t s 
and so on, would have t o be unquestioningly accepted as given, and 
as impersonal: t h a t i s , not a r e l a t i v e to the aims or desires 
of i n d i v i d u a l agents or groups of i n d i v i d u a l agents. I n such a 
s i t u a t i o n , a c e r t a i n p r a c t i c a l involvement - expressed, perhaps 
as "pain i s t o be r e l i e v e d " - would necessarily be accepted as 
h o l d i n g f o r a l l subjects. Each subject i s equal i n s o f a r as t h i s 
p r a c t i c a l involvement i s grasped as impersonal, and so as obtaining 
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f o r each subject: That pain i s to be r e l i e v e d , f o r example, 
i s taken as given; and since i t cannot be r e l a t i v i s e d , a t 
the primary stage, t o the aims or desires of i n d i v i d u a l s , i t 
i s l i t e r a l l y u n t h i n k a b l e . t h a t there could be a subject which i s 
not bound by i t , 1^. i s t h i s s o r t of p r a c t i c a l involvement 
which forms p a r t of the context w i t h i n which speech-acts and 
responses to them can be appropriate. I t also determines which 
subject i s the appropriate audience f o r a speech-act. At t h i s 
primary stage of communication, or wherever p r a c t i c a l involvements 
are shared, what can the maintenance of communication imply f o r 
the treatment of other subjects? 
We can begin by saying t h a t since, at the primary stage 
of communication, i t i s the context of awareness and p r a c t i c a l 
involvement which determines the appropriate audience f o r a 
speech-act, then the range of subjects w i t h whom communication 
might be undertaken i s u n l i m i t e d . Any subject f o r whom the 
p r a c t i c a l involvements h o l d , or t o whom they r e l a t e , w i l l be a 
subject w i t h whom communication might take place. There i s an 
u n l i m i t e d range of p o t e n t i a l communicants. What does maintaining 
communication w i t h such subjects c o n s i s t in? I have already argued 
t h a t maintaining communication i s not a matter of endless cha t t e r 
w i t h whoever comes i n t o view. What else , then, does our hard-won 
moral p r i n c i p l e involve? I f communication, t h a t i s , a p a t t e r n of 
appropriate speech-acts and responses, i s t o be maintained, then i t 
i m p l i e s the f o l l o w i n g w i t h regard t o the treatment of other subjects. 
I f a subject i s a p o t e n t i a l communicant, then f o r communication t o 
take place t h a t subject must be i n such a c o n d i t i o n t h a t i t i s 
able t o produce appropriate speech-acts, and appropriate responses 
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t o speech-acts. Now there are many ways i n which subjects 
can f a i l to be i n such a c o n d i t i o n . There are o f t e n 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l , s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l b a r r i e r s to speaking and 
responding a p p r o p r i a t e l y i n a c e r t a i n context of p r a c t i c a l 
involvements. The p r i n c i p l e of maintaining communication 
requires t h a t other people be t r e a t e d i n such a way as t o 
maintain t h e i r status as p o t e n t i a l communicants. While I 
f e e l t h a t t h i s requirement may carry consequences f o r p o l i t i c a l 
a c t i o n , I want here t o focus on a very d i r e c t instance of t h i s 
requirement. I f other people are to be t r e a t e d so as t o 
maintain them as p o t e n t i a l communicants, then i t i s clear t h a t , 
under normal c o n d i t i o n s , they are not t o be k i l l e d . K i l l i n g 
someone i s very d i r e c t l y going against the p r i n c i p l e of maintaining 
communication, which requires t h a t others are t r e a t e d as p o t e n t i a l 
communicants. I n t h i s way, then, we can see t h a t the p r i n c i p l e 
t h a t communication i s t o be maintained has substantive, i f 
u n o r i g i n a l , e t h i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . But so f a r I have been 
discussing the s i t u a t i o n a t the primary stage of communication, 
i n which p r a c t i c a l involvements are unquestioningly grasped by 
the subjects as given, and as impersonal: t h a t i s , they are not 
grasped as r e l a t i v e t o the aims and desires of i n d i v i d u a l s . What 
happens when t h i s unquestioned assumption of p r a c t i c a l involvements 
as h o l d i n g impersonally, and so as holding equally f o r each subject, 
i s brought i n t o question? Does t h i s a f f e c t how we are to t r e a t 
others? Let us consider these questions i n the context of a 
discussion of cases where subjects d i f f e r from each other w i t h 
respect t o t h e i r p r a c t i c a l involvements. 
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We can begin the discussion l i k e t h i s . Although a t 
the primary stage of communication p r a c t i c a l involvements 
may be taken as h o l d i n g impersonally, we know, as ordinary 
a d u l t s having undergone the" processes which make such knowledge 
p o s s i b l e , t h a t p r a c t i c a l involvements are i n f a c t r e l a t i v e 
t o p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s or communities. I n one community, 
f o r example, dolphins may be seen as animals t o be befriended 
and played w i t h , i n another as animals t o be k i l l e d f o r meat. 
I n the context of such d i f f e r e n t p r a c t i c a l involvements, d i f f e r e n t 
speech-acts and responses w i l l be appropriate. To a c a l l of 
"There are some dolphins", people of one group may wade out 
to play w i t h them, while people of another group may search 
f o r t h e i r harpoons. Given t h a t the contexts, i n r e l a t i o n to 
which speech-acts and responses are appropriate, may d i f f e r , 
then i t i s c l e a r t h a t there are p o s s i b i l i t i e s here f o r ruptures 
i n communication between subjects w i t h d i f f e r e n t p r a c t i c a l 
involvements. Imagine the shock of someone from the f i r s t 
group described above, when i n response to her c a l l a member of 
the second group fetches a harpoon and k i l l s the animal. 
Communication, the p a t t e r n of appropriate speech and response, 
w i l l have broken down i n such a way as t o r e v e a l , on r e f l e c t i o n , 
t h a t p r a c t i c a l involvements do not hold impersonally: some hold 
f o r some people, others hold f o r other people. Before discussing 
what consequences t h i s has f o r our drawing of substantive e t h i c a l 
i m p l i c a t i o n s , I should l i k e to make two poi n t s concerning t h i s 
r e a l i s a t i o n of the r e l a t i v i t y of p r a c t i c a l involvements. 
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The f i r s t p o i n t concerns what we are t o make of 
t h i s d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t , t h i s loss of innocence, w i t h regard 
to p r a c t i c a l involvements taken as holding impersonally. 
C l e a r l y i t i s not a necessary c o n d i t i o n of subjects possessing 
the c r i t i c a l concept of thought, t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r p r a c t i c a l 
involvement holds f o r them. Members of e i t h e r group described 
above could possess t h a t concept, w h i l s t also possessing d i f f e r e n t 
p r a c t i c a l involvements. P r a c t i c a l involvements are not absolute, 
but r e l a t i v e . I n t h i s respect they d i f f e r from the value of 
communication, which i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n of any subject 
possessing the c r i t i c a l concept of thought. But even i f 
p r a c t i c a l involvements are r e l a t i v e to the aims and desires 
of i n d i v i d u a l s , or communities, we must be c a r e f u l how we 
understand the r e l a t i o n s h i p between such i n d i v i d u a l s or communities. 
Frequently, ( i am t h i n k i n g of people such as Hobbes), society i s 
seen as a c o l l e c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s , each w i t h t h e i r own aims and 
des i r e s , some of which happen, f o r t u n a t e l y , t o coincide w i t h each 
other. The account o f f e r e d i n t h i s chapter, however, provides a 
d i f f e r e n t p i c t u r e . For i t argues t h a t the primary n o t i o n i n terms 
of which to understand r e l a t i o n s h i p s between people i s not the 
concept of the i n d i v i d u a l , f u l l y armed w i t h aims and desires. 
Ins t e a d , i t i s the n o t i o n of a community of subjects who communicate 
i n the l i g h t of a context of p r a c t i c a l involvements which are taken 
to o b t a i n impersonally and so, a f o r t i o r i , are shared by the 
community. We have seen t h a t there may be a breakdown i n t h i s 
unquestioned acceptance of p r a c t i c a l involvements as holding f o r 
a l l ; but t h i s should not prevent us from seeing t h a t i t i s the 
n o t i o n of community which i s the primary one here, not t h a t of the 
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i n d i v i d u a l . For the n o t i o n of an i n d i v i d u a l w i t h i t s 
own aims and des i r e s , i s possible only through r e f l e c t i o n 
on a breakdown i n communication, which reveals a break up of 
the p r a c t i c a l involvements of the community. 
The second p o i n t , which, while important i n i t s own r i g h t , 
also serves t o r e i n f o r c e the f i r s t p o i n t , i s t h i s . A breakdown 
i n communication can be r e f l e c t e d on as due to a divergence of 
p r a c t i c a l involvements on the p a r t of the various subjects, 
only w i t h i n c e r t a i n l i m i t s . The breakdown cannot be r e f l e c t e d 
on as due t o a t o t a l divergence of p r a c t i c a l involvements, so 
t h a t the subjects d i f f e r e d e n t i r e l y i n t h e i r conception of what 
i s to be done (so t h a t , f o r example, one subject held t h a t pain 
and hunger were to be r e l i e v e d , while another held t h a t they were 
to be promoted). This i s not possible, because i n the absence of 
a common ground of p r a c t i c a l involvements, the behaviour of another 
subject would be e n t i r e l y incomprehensible: we could understand 
nothing of t h a t subject's behaviour i n terms of i t s language, 
b e l i e f s , and aims. ''ithout a common ground of p r a c t i c a l involvements, 
the r e c o g n i t i o n of communication breakdown as due to a c e r t a i n 
divergence i n p r a c t i c a l involvements would not be possible. This 
i s e s s e n t i a l l y the same p o i n t made by Davidson, but i n connection 
w i t h p r a c t i c a l involvements r a t h e r than b e l i e f s . Having thus 
elaborated a l i t t l e on the idea of subjects d i v e r g i n g from each 
other i n respect of t h e i r p r a c t i c a l involvements i n the world, 
what can be said of the substantive e t h i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of the 
p r i n c i p l e of maint a i n i n g communication i n such s i t u a t i o n s ? Let us 
look a t a suggestion, which seems to f i n d some empirical backing i n 
the behaviour of c e r t a i n s o c i a l groups. 
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The suggestion i s t h i s . When people move, through 
r e f l e c t i o n on ruptures i n communication, from the primary, 
p r e - c r i t i c a l stage of communication, they can come to a 
r e a l i s a t i o n about the context of p r a c t i c a l involvements w i t h 
reference t o which speech-acts and responses are appropriate. 
This i s the r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t t h i s context of p r a c t i c a l 
involvements i s no t , as i t was pr e v i o u s l y taken to be, given 
as h o l d i n g impersonally, f o r a l l subjects. This context i s 
i n f a c t r e l a t i v e t o a p a r t i c u l a r community (perhaps a community 
w i t h only one member).' What t h i s i m p l i e s , the suggestion 
continues, i s t h a t the moral o b l i g a t i o n to maintain communication 
i s not u n l i m i t e d w i t h respect to the range of other people to 
be t r e a t e d accordingly ( t h a t i s , as p o t e n t i a l communicants). 
That moral o b l i g a t i o n i s t o maintain communication only amongst 
the community f o r which those p r a c t i c a l involvements hold; and 
not n e c e s s a r i l y t o maintain communication w i t h subjects f o r whom 
those p r a c t i c a l involvements do not hold. Thus we have popular 
examples of f a m i l y , or t r i b e m o r a l i t i e s , where members of the 
f a m i l y or t r i b e are t r e a t e d as p o t e n t i a l communicants; but members 
of other groups, or f a m i l y members who no longer share those 
involvements, are t r e a t e d only as means to the ends, the p r a c t i c a l 
involvements of the f a m i l y . (The popular example here i s the 
Mafia.) We now have t o consider whether the p r i n c i p l e of 
mainta i n i n g communication i s indeed l i m i t e d i n range to the group 
of subjects w i t h which p r a c t i c a l involvements are held i n common, 
or whether i t extends beyond such a group. What argument can 
he i p us here? For a moral p r i n c i p l e l i m i t e d i n such a way w i l l 
not seem t o most people a very s a t i s f a c t o r y foundation of e t h i c s . 
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The argument we need i s t h i s . Where communication 
has broken down, r e f l e c t i o n on t h i s f a i l u r e s t i l l requires 
t h a t communication be a value f o r the r e f l e c t i n g subject. 
Where r e f l e c t i v e analysis reveals t h a t the breakdown i s due 
to a divergence i n p r a c t i c a l involvements between subjects 
( r a t h e r than a divergence of b e l i e f s , or meanings), then 
the unquestioned acceptance of p r a c t i c a l involvements as given, 
and as hol d i n g impersonally f o r a l l , i s broken. The problem 
now i s t h i s . Where the pr e v i o u s l y unquestioned sharing of 
p r a c t i c a l involvements no longer e x i s t s , how can communication 
take place? For communication requires a common context of 
p r a c t i c a l involvements as the reference-point f o r the appropriateness 
of speech-acts and responses to them. How can the p r i n c i p l e of 
main t a i n i n g communication, whose obta i n i n g i s a necessary con d i t i o n 
of r e f l e c t i o n on communication-breakdown, be acted on i n t h i s k i n d 
of s i t u a t i o n ? The answer i s t h a t i n order to act i n accordance 
w i t h the p r i n c i p l e t h a t communication i s to be maintained, there 
must be a n e g o t i a t i o n of a new shared context of p r a c t i c a l 
involvements. This context w i l l now be recognised as r e l a t i v e 
to the groups i n v o l v e d , so t h a t the previous p r e - c r i t i c a l innocence 
cannot be regained: but a new consensus i n required i f appropriate 
speech and response i s t o be again possible. We can see t h a t there 
i s a s o l i d basis f o r such n e g o t i a t i o n , by r e c a l l i n g the second po i n t 
made e a r l i e r : namely t h a t r e f l e c t i o n on communication as due t o a 
divergence i n p r a c t i c a l involvements i s possible only on a c e r t a i n 
common ground of p r a c t i c a l involvements which s t i l l hold f o r both 
p a r t i e s . Where t h i s n e g o t i a t i o n i s successful, communication i s 
re s t o r e d . Where i t i s not, then communication continues t o be 
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broken. I n e i t h e r case, the moral o b l i g a t i o n i s t o 
t r e a t others so as to maintain t h e i r status as p o t e n t i a l 
communicants. This r u l e s out k i l l i n g people, since t h i s 
i s t o act d i r e c t l y against t h a t p r i n c i p l e . I should make 
i t c l e a r , here, t h a t I do not regard t h i s argument as 
e s t a b l i s h i n g an absolute moral p r o h i b i t i o n on k i l l i n g people. 
There may be occasions ( i n war, i n sel f - d e f e n c e ) , i n which 
people are r i g h t l y k i l l e d . What I would argue i s t h a t t h i s 
i s not allowable on the ground of some other moral p r i n c i p l e , 
which i s allowed t o override the p r i n c i p l e of maintaining 
communication. I t i s r a t h e r t h a t such k i l l i n g i s allowable 
on the basis of a broader understanding of the extent of 
communication. I n war, where negoti a t i o n s of common p r a c t i c a l 
involvements have broken down, the only way to r e - e s t a b l i s h 
communication, and to maintain subjects as p o t e n t i a l communicants 
and communicators, may be to k i l l those who are t r y i n g to k i l l 
you. C l e a r l y the substantive moral decisions t o be made i n such 
s i t u a t i o n s go beyond the scope of the present work. We can, i n 
any event, see t h a t the p r i n c i p l e of maintaining communication 
not only holds f o r a l l subjects which possess the c r i t i c a l concept 
of thought, but i s u n l i m i t e d ( o r u n i v e r s a l ) w i t h regard t o the 
range of subjects who are t o be considered and t r e a t e d as p o t e n t i a l 
communicants. 
I f the argument of t h i s s e c t i o n i s v a l i d , then we now have a 
moral p r i n c i p l e which i s o b j e c t i v e l y necessary and c a t e g o r i c a l , 
which i s u n i v e r s a l i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n , and which has substantive 
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e t h i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . I have n e i t h e r the time nor space 
to develop these i m p l i c a t i o n s i n t o a comprehensive e t h i c a l 
theory. Nor have I time or space to i n v e s t i g a t e the 
i m p l i c a t i o n s which the argument of t h i s t h e s i s has f o r 
t h e o r i e s of meaning, freedom of a c t i o n , and other minds, or 
f o r p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l theory. These must be f o r another 
time. For the present I have had to content myself w i t h 
p r o v i d i n g an argument f o r the claim t h a t , i n showing t h a t 
communication i s n e c e s s a r i l y a value f o r each subject which 
possesses the c r i t i c a l concept of thought, t h i s t h e s i s has 
l a i d out a transcendental foundation of e t h i c s . 
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Chapter One 
1 . Strawson, 1966. A l l page numbers i n t h i s s e c t i o n r e f e r t o 
t h i s work. 
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The views a t t r i b u t e d t o him i n t h i s s e c t i o n are abstracted 
mainly from the work of h i s 'middle' period. See Husserl, 
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i s Husserl, 1970(b). 
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1. See Appendix to Chapter Two for the use of "intentionally". 
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I have i n mind a d i r e c t l y r e f e r e n t i a l theory of meaning, 
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24. See, for example, Russell, 1905* 
25. Drawn from Whewell, 1981. pp. 590-1. 
26. The argument which hegins on p.70, above. 
27. I n saying t h i s , I mean that the statements could have no 
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am not discussing here the idea that the empiricists' 
statements are about an objective r e a l i t y , i n which there 
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28. Taylor, 1978-9. 
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32. i b i d . , p.160. 
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l i n g u i s t i c terms, and e n t i t i e s i n the extra-conceptual realm. 
But I would argue that, even i n cases such as that of the 
term " i s " , there must be a certain relationship between that 
term and an extra-conceptual realm, i f the term i s to have 
meaning. I n such cases this l i n k would presumably be a 
matter of how the term functions i n a range of sentences, 
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extra-conceptual realm. 
34. As i n Phenomenalism; or the notion that ordinary t a l k has 
the status of a f i c t i o n , or theoretical posit, by means of 
which we t r y to make sense of experience i t s e l f . 
35. See above, pp.SO-l, for this characterisation of the situation. 
36. The position i s i n fact more complex than as I have described 
i t here. See below,pp.H5ff. for further elaboration. 
37. See the discussion of the F i r s t Objection, above. 
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38. I n talki n g of "nothing" here, I should l i k e to keep 
clear of the Heideggerian connotations which, largely 
through ignorance, have come to be associated with such 
t a l k . I am concerned here only with what i s being said 
i n utterances i n which t h i s term is used. 
39. The concepts envisaged here include, for example, concepts 
of ordinary material objects such as cats and tables. 
40. See above, p .60ff, f o r the argument fo r t h i s claim. 
41. See the Second Objection, above, p.66. 
42. Above, p.90. 
43. See the argument of Chapter Two, above. 
44. Gellner, 1963. 
45. See Cooper, 1973, p.66. 
46. See below, pp,125ff, for further elaboration of the temporal 
nature of t h i s relationship. 
47. See below, p . l25f f . for the relationship between logical 
and temporal p r i o r i t i e s i n t h i s context. 
48. I do not intend to push this analogy too f a r , only to use 
i t insofar as i t can be he l p f u l . 
49. A note on terminology: I use the term " r e g i s t r a t i o n " or 
"grasp" rather than "understanding" or "conception" here, 
i n order to avoid the implication carried by the two l a t t e r 
terms that concepts are therein employed. To talk of a 
non-conceptual understanding, would seem to be a contradiction 
i n terms. "Registration" i s used here primarily as a term 
f o r a non-conceptual awareness, or grasp, of something. 
50. I n f a c t , i t i s a picture of language far closer to that presented 
i n Heidegger, 1962. 
51. See Heidegger, 1962. 
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Chapter Four 
1. See Chapter Two above. 
2. See, for example, Husserl, 1973, pp.18-21 
3. cf Kant, 1933, A737/B765; and Taylor, 1979-80, p.160 
4. The objection i s included i n Descartes, 1969, Vo. I I , p.62. 
Pears considers the issue i n Pears, 1979. 
5. See, for example, Husserl, 1931, Second Section, Third Chapter. 
6. Though see above, p.125-8, for an account of the way experience 
i s primarily grasped as temporally displaced from the present. 
7. See, for example, Ayer, 1979, p.285-9, where he offers a careful 
reply to Pears. 
8. See Taylor, 1978-9, p.160. 
9. See Russell, 1961, p.550. 
10. See Frege, 1977, p.17. 
11. ibid.,p.16. 
12. i b i d ? , p 4*5. 
13. ibid.,p.17. 
14. Furthermore, i f t r u t h i s timeless, then i t may seem that the meaning-
e n t i t i e s to which i t i s ascribed must also be timeless. Thus i f i t 
i s timelessly true that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, then i t may seem 
that the e n t i t y to which t r u t h i s ascribed (the thought that Caesar 
crossed the Rubicon) must also be timeless. 
15. Frege makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between the two which i s not important for 
our purposes. See Frege, 1977, p.7. 
16. t See for example, Stroud, 1968, p.255. 
17. I t may be that instead of the term "content" the term "'meaning'" would 
be less misleading here, as long as i t i s taken to be the equivalent 
for a thought/doubt of a sentence having meaning, 
18. For t h i s argument see Chapter Three above, pp.70-1. For the use of 
the term "'semantic'" to p a r a l l e l for concepts the notion of a semantic 
l i n k between words and the world which makes meaning possible, see 
above pp.71-2. 
19. . See Chapter Three, pp.70-1. 
20. For t h i s argument see "The Recursive Paradigm Case Argument," above, 
pp.102-5. 
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21. Chapter Three, passim. 
22. See above, pp.134-8. 
23. Hegel, 1977, p.47. ( F i r s t pages of the Introduction.) 
24. See Chapter Two, above,pp.4-0-6. 
25. Taylor, 1978-9, p.159. 
26. Compare the argument concerning the required concept of experience, 
which occupied Chapter Two. 
27. See Chapter Two, above.pp.4-2-4-. 
28. Or, i n terms of thought, an alternative account of that i n relatio n 
with which thought has content, or 'meaning1. 
29. Although the connection between empricism and moral scepticism i s 
close i n writers i n the Humean t r a d i t i o n . 
30. Hegel, 1977, pp.46-7. 
31. For the notion of self-formation i n Hegel, see, for example, Taylor, 
1975, Part Two. 
32. Above, p.145. 
33. Husserl's notion of hyle seems more or less equivalent to Ayer's 
notion of sense-contents, here. 
34. For page references to the p a r a l l e l stages i n Chapter Three, see 
table of contents. 
35. c f . Blanshard, 1939, Vol.11, Ch.25-7. 
36. For example, Neurath, 1932/3. " 
37. I t i s not my claim to have dealt i n this section adequately with 
the coherence theory of t r u t h , but only to see why one variant of 
i t cannot work. For a f u l l e r account, see Rescher, 1973. 
38. For t h i s use of the phrase "(presumed) awareness," see Chapter Three, 
above, p.86. 
39. cf. the discussion of Strawson i n Chapter Two above, pp.4-0_6. 
40. As i n Chapter Three, I wish to avoid any unwelcome Heideggerian 
overtones concerning the use of the term "nothing", here. 
cf. Chapter Three, note 38. 
41. We might argue here that both features being discussed here could be 
brought together under one complex concept; that of nothing, over and 
above thought, i n the objective world. In any event, the concept of 
thought must clearl y be presupposed by the use of such a concept. 
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42. Above, p.162. 
43. i b i d . 
44. i b i d . , pp.160-1. 
45. For the relationship between logical and temporal p r i o r i t i e s 
i n t h i s kind of s i t u a t i o n , see Chapter Three, above, pp.125-8. 
46. See above, pp.134-8. 
47. For the background to th i s argument, see the last section of 
Chapter Three, above, pp.107-128 
Chapter Five 
1. For t h i s process, see Chapter Four, above, pp.134-8. 
2. Descartes, 1969, v o l , I , p.101 
3. For evidence of i t s p l a u s i b i l i t y , see Kenny, 1968(a),Ch.3. 
4. i b i d . , p.62. 
5. Kant, 1933, A363-4. 
6. Hume, 1888, p.252. 
7. i b i d . , p.634. 
8. Husserl, 1970 ( a ) , p.549. 
9. i b i d . , p.562. 
10. i b i d . , p.549. 
11. Husserl, 1973, p.21. 
12. Husserl, 1970(b}p.22. 
13. Husserl, 1931, p.136. 
14. i b i d . , p.172. 
15. For Sartre's position, see Sartre, 1957(b), p.97. 
16. For example, Husserl, 1931, pp.231-2. 
17. For attempts to unravel Husserl's theory of the subject, see Fink, 
1970; Ricoewr, 1967; and Berger, 1972. 
18. Although th i s move i n chronologically inappropriate, i t i s j u s t i f i e d 
i n view of the fact that Husserl's views of the subject remain, i n an 
important sense, pre-Kantian. I shall not develop th i s remark here. 
19. Kant, 1933, B75. 
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20. . Strawson, 1966. I use Strawson rather than Kant himself here, 
as a way of avoiding some problems of textual interpretation 
and retaining the cutting edge of Kant's argument. I recognise 
that many Kantian scholars regard Strawson's view of Kant as a 
li m i t e d one. 
21. i b i d . , pp.100-1. 
22. i b i d . , p.100. For problems with the notion of a component of 
recognition, see Rorty, 1970. 
23. i b i d . , p.101. 
24. i b i d . , pp.110-1. 
25. i b i d . , p.107. 
26. i b i d . , p.111. 
27. Zemach, 1975. 
28. cf. the discussion i n Mehta, 1971, p.22. 
29. see Sartre, 1957(a), Ch.l. 
30. McGinn, 1982, p.13. 
31. For the notions of noema and noesis, see Husserl, 1931, Third 
Section, Third Chapter. 
32. I t might seem that we have not paid s u f f i c i e n t attention to the 
notion of the mental i n t h i s discussion. Without offering an 
argument here, I w i l l say that t h i s i s because this notion would 
need to be explained with reference to the concept of thinking. 
I t cannot be i t s e l f used to explain the concept of thinking. 
33. Davidson, 1975, p.9. 
34. For the notion of i m p l i c i t concepts, or understanding, see Chapter Two, 
above, pp.34--6, 
35. For arguments to t h i s e f f e c t , see McGinn, 1982,pp.60 f f . 
36. From t h i s conceptual vantage-point, we may feel happier with the 
term "expression". This term expresses our understanding of the 
r e l a t i o n between language and thought; the term "embodiment" 
expresses the strategic requirements of the present philosophical 
approach. 
37. I n Chapters Three and Four. 
38. See Saussure, 1974. 
39. Above, pp.212-s3. 
40. Wittgenstein, 1953, ^ 334. 
41. i b i d . , ^7=335. 
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42. Further developments of t h i s notion can be found i n Heidegger, 
1962; and Merleao-Ponty, 1962. 
43. cf. McGinn, 1982, pp.60 f f . 
Chapter Six 
.1. I n Chapter Five. 
2. Chapter Five, above, p.218. 
3. See the discussion i n Chapter Five, pp.226-232. 
4. . See the discussion i n Chapter Four, above, pp.152-180. 
5. Wittgenstein, 1 9 5 3 , ^ 258. 
6. Chapter Four, above, p.171. 
7. For t h i s argument, see above pp.171-180. 
8. i b i d . , pp.171-5. 
9. Wittgenstein, 1953,^#=199. 
10. i b i d . , ^ = 2 0 1 . 
11. i b i d . , ##198. 
12. i b i d . 201. 
13. i b i d . , # 2 0 2 . 
14. i b i d . , 4^199. 
15. i b i d . , =££241. 
16. I would agree that some degree of coincidence between the different 
subjects i n the way i n which they express their thoughts is necessary 
here. My point i s that agreement i n the use of language cannot 
consist i n t h i s alone. 
17. c f . the argument i n Chapter Three, pp.122-8. 
18. Again, I would agree that there i s some kind of causal relationship 
describable here. The point i s that the agreement i n the use of 
language cannot be understood i n terms of causal relationships alone. 
19. I do not here need to make any distinctions between these concepts 
(though there are, of course, distinctions to be made which are 
important i n other contexts). 
20. See, for example, Lewis 1974; and Davidson 1973. 
21. See note 20. 
22. See above, p254. 
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23. cf. Wittgenstein, 1953, =M=2U2. 
24. Again, I would agree that such empirical regularities are indeed 
a necessary condition of expressive harmony. The point i s that 
communication cannot consist i n such regularities alone. 
Chapter Seven 
1. See above, pp.263-278. 
2. . Sartre, 1957(b), p.49. 
3. I do not agree here that communication must be a value for a l l 
thinking subjects, since the argument of Chapter Five allowed 
for the p o s s i b i l i t y of beings which think but do not communicate. 
4. c f . Chapter Five, above, pp.226-232. 
5. I should say here that I do not regard the introduction of the 
term "moral" in t o the argument as a matter of great import. 
This w i l l become clear i n the following discussion - cf.below, 
pp.313-322. 
6. See below, pp.313-322. 
7. Mackie, 1977, pp.30-36. 
8. See Hare, 1964. 
9. See Foot, 1978, especially Ch.XI. 
10. I n t h i s discussion,as i n others i n th i s chapter, I have benefited 
from Nagel, 1970. 
11. Seetabove, pp.241-244. 
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